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Introducción. 'De philosophia in vulgare' (siglos XIII-XVII). Origen y desarrollo del pensamiento filosófico, científico y político en vulgar
No full textIntroduction. Medievalia. 28/1. Special number: 'De philosophia in vulgare'. This special issue of ‘Medievalia’ (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) collects examples of how, in the span of the 13th and 17th centuries, philosophical, scientific and political thought (‘philosophia’ in the broad sense) was born and evolved in the vernacular
Différence entre le quantificateur existentiel et le prédicat d’existence selon Mario Bunge
No full textLa plupart des philosophes analytiques croient que le quantificateur existentiel, ∃, a une portée ontologique. Mario Bunge a été l’un des premiers penseurs à contester ce point de vue. Il fait une distinction entre le quantificateur ∃ et un prédicat d’existence de premier ordre. De plus, il reconnaît deux types d’existence : réelle et conceptuelle. L’une des raisons d’accepter la position de Bunge est qu’elle peut rendre justice aux énoncés portant sur des entités fictives, ce que les positions rivales ne semblent pas capables de faire. Je discuterai également de la question de l’argument ontologique et du problème de la constitution matérielle
What Is the Feeling of Effort About?
No full textFor agents like us, the feeling of effort is a very useful thing. It helps us sense how hard an action is, control its level of intensity, and decide whether to continue or stop performing it. While there has been progress in understanding the feeling of mental effort and the feeling of bodily effort, this has not translated into a unified account of the general feeling of effort. To advance in this direction, I defend the single-feeling view, which states that the feeling of effort is one and the same for both mental and bodily actions. This feeling represents the subjective costs, both mental and physical, of performing a given action. Cost-based approaches have recently become influential for the feeling of mental effort. Here I focus on arguing that our sense of bodily effort does not simply represent physiological processes, but rather represents the subjective costs of a bodily action. Through this paper I discuss the role of the feeling of effort (and affective states more broadly) in action guidance and the sense of agency. I also define efforts themselves in terms of the feeling of effort
Large physics models: towards a collaborative approach with large language models and foundation models
No full textThis paper explores the development and evaluation of physics-specific large-scale AI models, which we refer to as large physics models (LPMs). These models, based on foundation models such as large language models (LLMs) are tailored to address the unique demands of physics research. LPMs can function independently or as part of an integrated framework. This framework can incorporate specialized tools, including symbolic reasoning modules for mathematical manipulations, frameworks to analyse specific experimental and simulated data, and mechanisms for synthesizing insights from physical theories and scientific literature. We begin by examining whether the physics community should actively develop and refine dedicated models, rather than relying solely on commercial LLMs. We then outline how LPMs can be realized through interdisciplinary collaboration among experts in physics, computer science, and philosophy of science. To integrate these models effectively, we identify three key pillars: Development, Evaluation, and Philosophical Reflection. Development focuses on constructing models capable of processing physics texts, mathematical formulations, and diverse physical data. Evaluation assesses accuracy and reliability through testing and benchmarking. Finally, Philosophical Reflection encompasses the analysis of broader implications of LLMs in physics, including their potential to generate new scientific understanding and what novel collaboration dynamics might arise in research. Inspired by the organizational structure of experimental collaborations in particle physics, we propose a similarly interdisciplinary and collaborative approach to building and refining large physics models. This roadmap provides specific objectives, defines pathways to achieve them, and identifies challenges that must be addressed to realise physics-specific large scale AI models
Trust Reductions, Epistemic Blame, and Preventative Measures
No full textWhen we learn that someone holds irrational beliefs, we often respond by reducing our epistemic trust in them. In this paper, I will propose a novel account of such trust reductions. The recently popular relationship-modification account (RMA) of epistemic blame will serve as a foil for this project. RMA says that epistemically blaming others for their epistemic failings involves modifying our epistemic relationships with them, paradigmatically via a reduction of epistemic trust. RMA has recently faced two challenges of extensional inadequacy, which I will show result from a mistaken view about what type of response trust reductions are. I will draw on resources from legal theory to show that trust reductions bear all the hallmarks of so-called non-punitive measures, which serve preventative collective purposes. I will argue for an account of trust reductions as non-punitive epistemic measures that serve the purpose of preventing unreliable informants from negatively affecting the epistemic commons. My account explains when and why it is appropriate to reduce epistemic trust and shows where RMA goes wrong
Ditching Decision-Making Capacity
No full textDecision-making capacity (DMC) plays an important role in clinical practice—determining, on the basis of a patient’s decisional abilities, whether they are entitled to make their own medical decisions or whether a surrogate must be secured to participate in decisions on their behalf. As a result, it’s critical that we get things right—that our conceptual framework be well-suited to the task of helping practitioners systematically sort through the relevant ethical considerations in a way that reliably and transparently delivers correct verdicts about who should and should not have the authority to make their own medical decisions. Unfortunately, however, the standard approach to DMC does not get things right. It is of virtually no help in identifying and clarifying the relevant ethical considerations. And, embedded in the prevailing anti-paternalist paradigm, DMC assessments obfuscate and distort the underlying ethical justification for granting or withholding decisional authority. Here, we describe the core commitments of the standard approach to DMC and then highlight three problems with it. We then argue that these problems are significant enough that they call for more than merely tinkering and fine tuning—variations of the standard approach cannot adequately address them. Instead, we should ditch DMC
First-Person Propositions
No full textA central dispute in discussions of self-locating attitudes is whether attitude relations like believing and knowing are relations between agents and properties (things that vary in truth value across individuals) or between agents and propositions (things that do not so vary). Proponents of the proposition view have argued that the property view is unable to give an adequate account of relations like communication and agreement. We agree with this critique of the property view, and in this essay we show that the problems facing the property view are much more serious than has been appreciated. We then develop and explore two versions of the proposition view. In each case, we show how facts about the self-ascription of properties may be determined by facts about propositional attitudes in conjunction with certain other facts
The role of stakes in lying: an empirical investigation of the robustness of the folk concept of lying
No full textSeveral studies suggest that stakes matter for knowledge attributions. Based on these findings, one might wonder whether stakes – broadly construed – also matter for lying ascriptions. While several studies have addressed certain aspects of the role of stakes in lying, none have tested whether lying ascriptions are affected by stake manipulations. Given that lying is deeply embedded in our social life, empirical studies seem to be a natural approach to this question. To maximize the chances of finding a stake effect, we employed cases of deceptive implicatures, which are not clear-cut cases of lying. The findings of three experiments suggest stakes do not have a significant impact on people’s lying ascriptions. We discuss the implications of these findings and conclude that they are good news for the folk concept of lying
