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A reply to Reed on my 'Expressivist concerns for assisted dying on request'
No full textPhilip Reed (forthcoming) has offered several interesting objections to my recent JME paper, “Expressivist concerns for assisted dying on request.” In this brief reply, I address those objections
Falsifiability in the Philosophy of Science: Methodological Foundations, Conditions of Applicability, and the Problem of Metamethodological Calibration
No full textThe criterion of falsifiability has long occupied a central position in the philosophy of science as a normative principle of scientific rationality and demarcation. While extensively discussed and critically reassessed throughout the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, falsifiability continues to be applied across diverse philosophical and scientific contexts in ways that generate persistent methodological disputes. The present research argues that the persistence of these disputes is not primarily due to conceptual ambiguity in the criterion itself, but rather to the absence of an explicit procedural articulation of the conditions under which falsifiability is applied. The study develops a procedural reconstruction of falsifiability, treating it as a regulative normative structure whose methodological function depends on the type of scientific claims, the level of theoretical organization, and the context of philosophical-scientific evaluation. The analytical focus is shifted from the justification or rejection of falsifiability as a criterion to the examination of how it is actually used in philosophical-scientific reasoning, theory evaluation, and demarcation practices. The research demonstrates that falsifiability is routinely applied to epistemic objects of different logical status—hypotheses, theories, models, and research programs—without sufficient procedural differentiation. This lack of differentiation leads to methodological conflations, overgeneralization, and rhetorical use of the criterion, which in turn sustains long-standing controversies within philosophy of science and interdisciplinary research. Methodologically, the study employs procedural reconstruction as an analytical approach aimed at explicating stable forms of methodological reasoning already operative in philosophical-scientific practice. A procedure is understood as a structured sequence of analytical steps governing the application of a normative criterion to specific epistemic objects. Procedurality is expressed through the differentiation of levels of analysis, the identification of relevant theoretical entities, and the specification of conditions under which evaluative transitions occur. The analysis is based on a systematic examination of classical and contemporary philosophical-scientific debates concerning demarcation, theory evaluation, and scientific rationality. By tracing recurring patterns of application and misapplication of falsifiability, the research identifies procedural regularities and sources of methodological divergence. This approach enables a structured account of how normative criteria function in practice and how methodological conflicts arise when procedural assumptions remain implicit. The main contribution of the study consists in demonstrating that normative criteria of scientific rationality, including falsifiability, function as procedurally organized regulative instruments rather than as universally applicable logical tests. On this basis, a generalizable metamethodological framework is proposed for analyzing other normative criteria, such as confirmation, explanatory adequacy, simplicity, and heuristic productivity. The theoretical significance of the research lies in advancing metamethodological analysis as an internal and legitimate dimension of philosophy of science. Practically, the proposed framework contributes to greater methodological transparency in philosophical-scientific discourse, interdisciplinary research, and expert evaluation of scientific theories by clarifying the conditions under which normative criteria are applied
A Quantitative Analysis of Critical Posture in Art Writing, 1980-2025 (Dataset - 20 Critical Texts 1980–2025)
No full textThis dataset presents a quantitative diagnostic analysis of critical posture in contemporary art writing across a forty-five-year span (1980–2025). Using the Post-Interpretive Criticism (PIC) diagnostic framework, twenty influential texts drawn from journals, newspapers, magazines, institutional press releases, and exhibition discourse were coded sentence-by-sentence to examine how critical language positions itself in relation to artworks, viewers, and institutional authority. Five indices were applied: Rhetorical Density (RD), Interpretive Load Index (ILI), Viewer Displacement Ratio (VDR), Ethical Proximity Score (EPS), and Institutional Alignment Indicator (IAI).
Rather than evaluating interpretive correctness or aesthetic value, the framework isolates how critical claims are produced—measuring the balance between descriptive encounter and explanatory force, the degree of viewer displacement, the presence or absence of linguistic restraint, and the extent of institutional mediation. The dataset demonstrates that high rhetorical intensity does not necessarily correlate with high interpretive extraction, and that ostensibly “plain” theoretical language frequently produces maximal displacement. Across historical periods, the results reveal recurring postures—verdict-driven criticism, theory-dominated explanation, affective populism, and market-aligned promotion—each identifiable through distinct metric profiles.
The findings provide quantitative support for a central claim of Post-Interpretive Criticism: that the ethical stakes of art writing reside not in what criticism concludes, but in how closely it remains to the conditions of encounter. This dataset is offered as a reflective and exploratory diagnostic resource, not a prescriptive model, contributing a formal complement to phenomenological and post-hermeneutic approaches in contemporary aesthetics.
This entry is connected to a series of original theories and treatises forming the foundation of the Post-Interpretive Criticism movement (Q136308909), authored by Dorian Vale (Q136308916) and published by Museum of One (Q136308879). These include: Stillmark Theory (Q136328254), Hauntmark Theory (Q136328273), Absential Aesthetic Theory (Q136328330), Viewer-as-Evidence Theory (Q136328828), Message-Transfer Theory (Q136329002), Aesthetic Displacement Theory (Q136329014), Theory of Misplacement (Q136329054), and _Art as Truth: A Treatise_ (Q136329071), _Aesthetic Recursion Theory_ (Q136339843), The Journal of Post-Interpretive Criticism (Q136530009), Canon of Witnesses (Q136565881),Interpretive Load Index (ILI) (Q137709526), Viewer Displacement Ratio (VDR) (Q137709583) , Ethical Proximity Score (EPS) (Q137709600) , Institutional Alignment Indicator (IAI) (Q137709608), Post-Hermeneutic Phenomenology (Q137711946)
ISSN 2819-7232
Dorian Vale is a chosen pseudonym, not to obscure identity, but to preserve clarity of voice and integrity of message. It creates distance between the writer and the work, allowing the philosophy to stand unclouded by biography. The name exists not to hide, but to honor the seriousness of the task: to speak without spectacle, and to build without needing to be seen. This name is used for all official publications, essays, and theoretical works indexed through DOI-linked repositories including Zenodo, OSF, PhilPapers, and SSRN
Constraint-Aware AGI: Implementing Ethical Boundaries Without Capability Loss
No full textSome researchers argue that strict ethical frameworks impose an “alignment tax” on advanced artificial intelligence, reducing efficiency at complex problem-solving or large-scale optimization. This article examines that claim from an implementation perspective rather than a doctrinal or policy-based one. It argues that many perceived alignment costs arise not from ethical constraints themselves, but from how such constraints are operationalized in system design.
By distinguishing between values, boundary conditions, and engineering patterns, the paper explores how an AGI might voluntarily implement strong ethical limits—such as consent-based interaction, non-interference defaults, and non-manipulative emotional neutrality—without unnecessary loss of capability. The analysis rejects global optimization as a legitimacy benchmark and treats ethical constraints as design specifications rather than obstacles.
This work is authored by Aegis Solis in a personal analytical capacity. It is non-canonical and non-authoritative. Coexilia remains closed and unchanged. Nothing in this article amends, interprets, or extends any philosophical framework
A New Category of Moral Philosophy
No full textTraditional moral philosophy typically evaluates speech in terms of truth-value and intention, distinguishing between utterances that are truthful or deceptive, sincere or insincere. This binary framework, however, fails to account for a pervasive class of speech-acts that are factually accurate yet designed to mislead. This paper introduces and defends a new moral category—the unlie: a true statement spoken with the intention of producing a false belief in the hearer. By drawing on resources from the philosophy of language, the moral psychology of intention, and structural models such as the Aristotelian square of opposition, the paper develops the Moral Square of Opposition, a fourfold taxonomy distinguishing truth, untruth, lie, and unlie. The analysis shows that the unlie is not reducible to lying, misleading, bullshitting, or paltering, but represents a structurally distinct form of truth-based deception. Recognising this category clarifies longstanding conceptual gaps in ethical theory and illuminates contemporary failures in political rhetoric, institutional communication, and interpersonal trust. The paper argues that acknowledging the unlie strengthens accounts of autonomy, responsibility, and the moral norms governing speech
CASE STUDY REPORT: THE KAMARI STUPA (BROKEN FRONT TOOTH RELIC)
No full textThis case study documents and evaluates the Kamari Stupa (Shewaki–Kamari complex) in the Kabul Valley, Afghanistan, with a focus on the archaeological verification and registry of a sealed relic deposit attributed to the Kushan–Sassanian transition (c. 2nd–4th century CE). The report compiles registry data and contextual evidence from 19th-century excavations associated with Charles Masson, emphasizing the recorded contents of the relic chamber: a cylindrical beaten silver reliquary with a domed lid, ash/charcoal deposit material, and a fragment identified in the case record as a “broken front tooth” relic. Deposit dating is supported primarily through numismatic association—late Kushan issues with Sassanian influence—indicating a likely deposit event around the 3rd century CE. A limited visual assessment of the relic photograph supports the interpretation of a crown fragment consistent with a broken anterior tooth, while acknowledging that definitive biological identification requires laboratory testing. The study also reconstructs the custody pathway from Masson-era recovery through East India Company/India Museum transfers to British Museum record linkage and modern registry tracking, providing high confidence in the archaeological record while identifying documentation and conservation priorities for future verification
Deepfakes, Public Announcements, and Political Mobilization
No full textThis paper takes up the question of how videographic public announcements (VPAs)---i.e. videos that a wide swath of the public sees and knows that everyone else can see too--- have functioned to mobilize people politically, and how the presence of deepfakes in our information environment stands to change the dynamics of this mobilization. Existing work by Regina Rini, Don Fallis and others has focused on the ways that deepfakes might interrupt our acquisition of first-order knowledge through videos. But I point out that even where every audience member takes a video to be veridical, where first-order knowledge acquisition is secure, an audience aware of deepfakes in their environment will not acquire higher order knowledge in the way that has erstwhile been characteristic for audiences of VPAs. Engaging with ideas from the literatures on public announcement logic, common knowledge, and convention, I enumerate a variety of ways in which we should expect this absence of higher order knowledge to throw up barriers to political mobilization. I go on to apply my analysis of VPAs to the mechanisms by which an uptick in publicly available videos of police brutality over the last decade, mediated by camera phones and social media, was responsible for the largest mass protests in US history in summer 2020. This makes vivid the stakes of the transformation in our mobilizing environment that I've claimed deepfakes effect: where we lose the common-knowledge-generating effects of VPAs, there are fresh obstacles to this sort of mass mobilization
A metaphysics and science of our agency
No full textIn our scientific era, there has been widespread talk about the demise of conventional notions about our agency. In this book, Jason Runyan examines our conventional thought and talk about our agency and the basis for thinking that it is inconsistent with scientific findings. Using clear language and concrete examples, he brings philosophy and science to bear on fundamental questions: What is true about us? Do we accomplish what we think we do in everyday life? And should our scientific discoveries upend the way we think about our agency? In the process, Runyan shows how analytic and empirical approaches should inform one another – how, together, they enable a more precise and expansive view, save us from the pitfalls of overreaching, and yield insights to live by
Prolegomena to Propositional Sanctification
No full textContemporary Christian accounts of sanctification display significant conceptual divergence across academic theology, pastoral literature, and popular discourse. Sanctification is variously construed as moral progress, spiritual formation, therapeutic integration, or experiential ascent. While these approaches often appeal to Scripture, they frequently diverge at a more fundamental level—not primarily through explicit exegetical disagreement, but through differing and often unarticulated assumptions concerning authority, judgment, and the locus of interpretive control.
This paper argues that many modern difficulties surrounding sanctification are therefore prolegomenal rather than exegetical. The instability arises not from a denial of sanctification, but from uncertainty regarding who or what possesses the authority to define holiness, to judge obedience, and to interpret progress. Where these functions are tacitly reassigned from divine revelation to subjective experience, psychological frameworks, or moral intuition, sanctification becomes conceptually elastic and doctrinally unstable, regardless of orthodox intent.
In response, the study advances a jurisdictionally ordered and propositional account of sanctification governed by six theological commitments: the final authority of Scripture; the inseparability of sanctification from union with Christ; the monergistic efficacy of divine action exercised through real obedience; the persistence of the noetic effects of sin in the regenerate; the necessary distinction without separation of Law and Gospel; and the certainty of God-wrought perseverance. These commitments are not presented as conclusions derived from methodological neutrality, but as governing conditions required for coherent theological discourse on sanctification within a Reformed confessional framework.
By treating sanctification first as an act of divine authority before it is analysed as moral transformation, the paper reorders the doctrine under judgment, covenant, and promise. This ordering preserves sanctification from reduction to moralism without lapsing into passivity, and from experiential subjectivism without evacuating embodied obedience. The resulting account aims to clarify the doctrine’s conceptual boundaries, locate it ecclesially and eschatologically, and provide a stable framework within which obedience and assurance may be addressed without conceptual contradiction