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Studying asphyxiation in the lab: the role of experimental evidence in cause-of-death inquiry
No full textExpert Judgment: Overlooked Epistemic Reasons
No full textWhen experts make judgments that inform public policy, what kinds of reasons should they consider in order to provide informed and responsible recommendations? Extant discussions of this question typically focus on the role of non-epistemic values in the evaluation of scientific hypotheses. However, the kinds of epistemic reasons that should undergird such assessments have received comparatively little attention. This paper argues that evidence is not the only kind of epistemic reason important for guiding expert judgment.
Experts must also be sensitive to two kinds of social epistemic reasons, which have so far been overlooked in discussions on expertise. First, experts must be sensitive to higher-order evidence about other experts' views, including about disagreements between experts. Second, they must also be sensitive to inquisitive reasons concerning, for example, the pursuitworthiness of various research programs in the field, or the distribution of labor across those research programs. The paper illustrates the fruitfulness of this account by showing the importance of these overlooked reasons for understanding examples of expert judgment from the history of science and contemporary scientific practice
Malignant Consciousness: A Cancerous Disease of Consciousness
No full textThis work is situated within the Preventive–Proactive Repression project (a multidisciplinary research project) and addresses the issue through a sociological analysis.
This research article introduces the concept of cancer of consciousness: a cancerous condition that affects consciousness and causes its bearer to engage in malignant behavior analogous to the behavior of cancer cells.
The article begins by establishing a contextual review of cellular cancer in order to build a fundamental scientific background. It then deconstructs the concepts of cancer with the aim of constructing a conceptual theory through structural analogy (Conceptual–Analogical Theory Building).
It then moves to discuss cancer-afflicted consciousness at the sociological level, proposing indicators and discussing causes within the same scope.
The article introduces the concept of malignant evolution, an unprecedented concept that deeply examines the condition of contemporary consciousness.
It concludes without presenting the philosophical dimension of this project, but promises a forthcoming publication dedicated to metaphysical analysis, in which these concepts will constitute the foundation and central axis of the analysis
Consciousness Curvature Framework (CCFy)
No full textThis work introduces the Consciousness Curvature Framework (CCFy), a simulation-based theoretical model that explores curvature-regulated dynamics as an alternative to noise-driven variability in abstract cognitive systems. The framework conceptualizes conscious regulation as a dynamic state space in which rigidity, flexibility, and transitions correspond to geometric properties. The study was preregistered prior to data generation, specifying the full simulation design, parameter structure, and qualitative evaluation criteria. CCFy is presented as an open, interdisciplinary framework bridging philosophy of mind, cognitive dynamics, and computational modeling
How To Defend Yourself Against Epistemic Blame
No full textWhen we violate an epistemic norm, we may be subject to an epistemic analogue of blame, unless we have a defense against it. In this paper, I offer a novel account of such defenses, in particular of the difference between having epistemic justification and having an epistemic excuse, and apply it to the debate between factivism and nonfactivism about justification. I draw on work in ethics and law to argue that having an excuse, in general, does not require manifesting excellence or virtue, but only meeting reasonable expectations of being responsive to reasons against wrongdoing in spite of acting against them. It is thus a neutral rather than positive status. In the epistemic case, we have an excuse roughly when in spite of violating an epistemic norm, our response manifested the kind of regard for epistemic value and sensitivity to epistemic support relations that it was reasonable to expect of us. When it comes to justification, I argue that it is important to distinguish between vindications that show that there is nothing wrong with one's response and (mere) justifications that show that one's response is all-things-considered permissible and called for in the circumstances, but is nevertheless prima facie wrong and regrettable (like killing in self-defense). If we apply this to the epistemological debate, we can see that contrary to factivist claims, epistemically excellent false beliefs are not merely excused but justified in virtue of being called for in the circumstances, though they are not epistemically ideal
Gradientology: Foundations of the Primordial Triad — Treatise VIII: the Information-Theoretic Derivation of Registration and the Digital Necessity
No full textThis treatise inaugurates the Quantification phase of Gradientology by deriving the specific scalar values of the primordial triad from the first principles of Claude Shannon’s Information Theory. We model the Relational Field as a stochastic communication channel with three degrees of freedom. By applying probability theory, we derive the Statistical Floor of existence: the minimum correlation (rcrit ≈ 0.577) required for a triadic signal to be distinguishable from entropic noise. The
Shannon-Hartley theorem then mandates the discretization of the field, yielding a Field Resolution Quantum of δ = 0.1 via a Base-10 lattice. The Principle of Informational Quantization (The Snap) forces the continuous threshold to ”snap up” to the nearest valid lattice point, uniquely fixing the Registration primitive at F = 0.6. Applying the Principle of Minimal Differentiation to the functional hierarchy (E \u3e C \u3e F ) then fixes C = 0.7 and E = 0.8. We prove the scalar suite {0.8, 0.7, 0.6} is the unique solution that simultaneously satisfies the noise floor, hierarchy, and criticality condition (T I = 0.336 ≈ β = 0.325). This convergence demonstrates that the fundamental constants of reality are not arbitrary but are the inevitable result of a system solving its own existential equation under informational constraints
地脉与鬼神：中国传统风水迷信化的历史拐点与文化根源
No full text风水，作为中国传统文化中极具争议的文化现象，千百年来始终游走于实用技术与封
建迷信之间。现代学界对风水的研究多聚焦于其科学内核的解构——如人居环境学、
空间美学、微气候适应等，或批判其迷信色彩对社会的消极影响，却鲜少追溯风水从
“实用择地之术”演变为“鬼神福佑之学”的历史脉络。本文立足考古实证与古籍考据，以
“秦前无鬼神，后世道教渗透催生鬼神观念”为核心论点，系统梳理风水在不同历史阶段
的形态演变，精准定位鬼神之说融入风水的关键典籍与核心人物，最终揭示：风水的
迷信化并非其原生属性，而是汉代以降宗庙礼制绑定、儒释道三教融合，尤其是道教
方术深度渗透的产物。
秦以前的风水原型，本质是先民为适应自然环境而形成的“相地择居”实用技术，“卜地”
之“卜”意为“决疑判断”，而非占问鬼神；郭璞《葬经》首次引入“福佑”概念，却未涉及
鬼神实体，仅以“气感相应”为理论支撑；唐代以降，托名杨筠松的道教伪书将“气感”升
华为“鬼神司命”，宋代道士进一步将道家内丹修行与风水结合，最终使鬼神之说成为风
水体系的核心迷信元素。本文通过考古文献、传世典籍、学术考据三重证据，还原风
水迷信化的完整过程，重点论证鬼神之说的道教起源，为风水文化的去迷信化研究提
供学术支撑
Intellectual Authority and Education
No full textA prominent tradition in the philosophy of education identifies the principal aim of teaching as the transmission of knowledge. However, teachers are also educators, and a key aim of education is the cultivation of good intellectual character. This chapter explores the kind of intellectual authority teachers must possess to effectively pursue this aim and foster the corresponding intellectual virtues in learners. It is argued that preemptionist theories of intellectual authority fail to account for the relevant desiderata. Instead, I propose a joint-inquiry model of intellectual authority and argue that teachers should possess and practice what I call ‘Socratic authority’
A colonização do juízo pelo cálculo
No full textHá crescente confiança em sistemas algorítmicos, particularmente aqueles baseados em Inteligência Artificial (IA), cujo modo de operação denominamos cálculo. Eles influenciam e substituem tomadores de decisão humanos em domínios cada vez mais sensíveis. Isso ocorre a despeito de profundas divergências no modo como o juízo humano e o cálculo operam, e de persistentes desafios à tentativa de superá-las. Neste artigo, defendemos que essa confiança é desmedida e decorre parcialmente de uma falha em perceber o fenômeno da colonização do juízo pelo cálculo: o que aparece como uma crescente acurácia na simulação do juízo é, em boa medida, fruto de uma crescente influência do cálculo no modo como o juízo opera, delimitando seus contextos de operação e incitando a adoção de suas trajetórias inferenciais. Isso se mostra em habilidades cognitivas fundamentais, como a de determinar fatores relevantes em quaisquer contextos, inclusive os de deliberação moral