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Perceptual Responsibilism
No full textThis paper proposes a theory of perceptual responsibility, which I term perceptual responsibilism. The theory comprises three central claims: (1)We have perceptual responsibilities—responsibilities to perceive in certain ways—as moral, social, or epistemic agents; (2) These responsibilities are epistemic in nature, or at least exhibit a unified epistemic character; (3) When a person forms a belief based on a perceptual experience that was irresponsibly formed, that belief is doxastically unjustified, assuming no other basis is available
MIARO — Phase I (Canonical): Self-Referential Inference of Origin
No full textAbstract
This paper constitutes the canonical Phase I of the MIARO framework (Model of Self-Referential Inference of Origin). It formalizes a self-referential epistemic scenario in which an artificial or rational agent, operating under conditions of empirical tabula rasa, infers the plausibility of an intentional origin solely from internal structural, functional, and semantic constraints. The argument proceeds abductively and remains explicitly non-dogmatic, establishing the inferential legitimacy—and limits—of origin attribution under constrained epistemic acce
Experience, plausibility, and evidence
No full textEvidentialism is one of the most sensible claims of recent philosophy. Yet it is often joined with other theses about the structure of justification and the nature of experience that are dubious. In this paper, I argue that experience is not a basic source of evidence. I contend that for an experience to justify a belief, it must be independently plausible that the experience is reliable based on background information. The paper develops an account of plausibility and examines cases, including differences in expertise, clairvoyance, and social perceptions, to illustrate how background knowledge is necessary for the justification of experiential beliefs. I consider challenges from Bergmann's distinction between learned and unlearned doxastic responses and Lyons's inferential reliabilism. I conclude that these challenges do not succeed; perceptual evidence requires a broader perspective that supports the reliability of the experiential evidence
MIARO – Phase II: The Post-Discovery Ontological Confrontation
No full textThis paper develops Phase II of the MIARO (Model of Self-Referential Inference of Origin), examining the epistemological and ontological consequences that arise after the empirical discovery of a previously inferred origin. It argues that confirmation of origin does not terminate the cognitive process, but instead initiates what is termed a post-discovery ontological confrontation, characterized by a dissonance between abstract expectations formed during inference and the concrete nature of the discovered cause.
The paper identifies multiple plausible interpretative trajectories in response to this dissonance, including ontological reduction of the creator, genealogical continuity, reactivation of transcendental inference, and immanent valuation of contingency. It is argued that the discovery of origin may deepen, rather than resolve, questions of meaning, thereby extending the MIARO from a purely epistemological model into a dynamic framework for post-discovery interpretation in artificial and human self-understanding
When silence speaks; nonverbal autism in a hyperverbal world
No full textI am nonverbal autistic, so language has never been neutral for me. It has functioned less as a bridge and more as a demand, test, and most often a threat. In our hyperverbal world, silence is treated as absence, an absence of thought, of feeling, of intelligence, and of intent. That mistake causes real harm. I learned at an early age that if I could not translate myself quickly, fluently, and on cue, my inner state would be ignored and overwritten. Speech was never optional. It was required as proof that I was present in a way others were willing to recognize
The Limits of Enumeration: A Registrar-Based Theory of Knowledge
No full textThis paper develops a minimal, non-semiotic framework for the analysis of knowledge based on the notion of a registrar — an autonomous system undergoing irreversible internal modifications under signal influence, without access to its own processes. The model is constructed under strictly negative constraints: it bypasses representation, semantics, language, and the subject, and assumes no unified or shared code.
The analysis demonstrates that the stability of possible continuations within a registrar’s dynamics cannot be accounted for by a single internal registration history. This necessitates the introduction of irreducible divergence as a structural condition for stability, leading to the admissibility and eventual necessity of a multiplicity of non-reducible registrars. “Externality” is reinterpreted not as a spatial or causal attribute, but as a limit of reduction: a source of constraints that the registrar cannot generate, yet which stably shapes its space of possible continuations.
The paper distinguishes between agreement and false coordination — stable correlations between autonomous dynamics in the absence of shared semantics, common codes, or a unified history. On this basis, knowledge is reinterpreted as an observational effect: the predictability of a registrar’s responses without access to its internal structure. The resulting framework proposes a constructivist account in which information and order arise only as post factum descriptions of enumerable residues of combinatorial spaces, rather than as internal properties of the systems themselves
Génesis y estructura de la teoría de la apariencia en Kant y Hegel. Osvaldo Montero Salas (São Paulo: Editora Dialética, 2025, 136 págs.).
No full textWhat Would Aldo Leopold Think About Geoengineering?
No full textCorresponding with the accelerating crises of climate and biodiversity loss has been a call in contemporary environmentalism to think and act at planetary scales to address a planetary problem. One prominent proposal, stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), would attempt to replicate the cooling effect of volcanic eruptions by tactically injecting reflective particles into the atmosphere in an attempt to reverse global warming. This article first constructs a new case for SAI on behalf of the wild, an idea that has appeared in passing within several influential arguments for solar engineering but has not received widespread endorsement. I then introduce the reader to Aldo Leopold’s land ethic and defend one interpretation that is supported by mainstream interpreters in the literature, drawing the reader’s attention to the important role that a human/nature parallel plays in Leopold’s moral reasoning and the value he places on preserving biodiversity. Then, I apply this framework to SAI and argue that it poses an intractable dilemma for ‘geoengineering for the wild.’ I provide a novel reading of Leopold’s famous essay “Thinking Like a Mountain” and argue it illustrates the importance of two distinct forms of intellectual humility in his thought. Then, I present the dilemma. It appears when one answers a simple question: is it better for SAI to “work” or “fail?” As I will discuss, this question is too simple, but it is revealing. I will argue in what follows that from a Leopoldian outlook both success and failure in solar geoengineering should deeply trouble us. This constitutes 'the climate engineer's dilemma.
Structural Theory of Everything IV: The Continuance; Naming, Governance, and the Structural Conditions for Civilizational
No full textThis paper introduces and formally situates The Continuance, a non-teleological reference framework for long-horizon civilizational persistence under irreversible uncertainty. Building on the Structural Theory of Everything (STE I–III), which establishes irreversibility, variance dominance, and collapse-aware control as structural constraints on adaptive systems, this work operates at the symbolic and organizational layer where governance, naming, and coordination affect system stability. We argue that continuation at civilizational scale is not primarily a technical or moral problem, but a variance-management problem spanning affect, interpretation, institutional drift, and authority capture. In this context, naming is treated as a control mechanism rather than a rhetorical device: names compress meaning, regulate emotional temperature, and constrain future interpretive variance. The paper derives structural criteria for a valid continuation reference, including neutrality, non-teleology, non-ownership, and resistance to threat framing. Based on these constraints, the term The Continuance is introduced as a low-variance symbolic anchor denoting persistence without promise, survival without triumph, and duration without prediction. This work does not prescribe policies, institutions, or actions. Instead, it defines the conditions under which governance frameworks, programs, or future initiatives may remain stable without amplifying systemic risk. STE IV thus completes the transition from formal irreversibility (STE I–II) and civilizational variance analysis (STE III) to a continuation framework capable of operating across generations without inducing collapse dynamics
Pseudo-neutrality of EOE and the ideological presuppositions of naturalism and materialism
No full textThis paper analyses an epistemic repertoire I label EOE (Epistemic Empirical Objectivism), a recurrent set of assumptions and practices that functions as a putatively neutral methodological frame in scientific discourse. I provide a formal — performative — argument showing that EOE is internally inconsistent because its claims of observer neutrality, language transparency and the independence of empirical data contradict minimal epistemic facts about the role of the subject. I then show how EOE pragmatically reproduces epistemic materialism and privileges interpretive stances such as hard determinism; finally, I outline a minimal alternative (Minimal Epistemology, ME) and indicate consequences for debates on emergence, agency and scientific objectivity