Open Journals at Memorial University
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Straying from The Path: Rethinking Culpability in “Little Red Riding Hood” through a Fairy Tale Video Game
No full textOnce upon a time, in 2009, a video game was released by video game studio Tale of Tales and this game was called The Path.Developed by Auriea Harvey and Michael Samyn, they describe The Path as “an ancient tale retold in a modern medium” (“Games,”2021). As a narrative, The Path is familiar: it follows the traditional tale type ATU 333, commonly known as “Little Red Riding Hood.” As a video game, The Path is unfamiliar. Described by the developers as a “slow game,” The Path does not have the typical objectives ofmost video games: there are no “monsters to defeat” or “hard puzzles” to solve, and “most activities in the game are entirely optional” (“The Path,” 2021). With no challenges for the player, The Path focuses less on gameplay and more on narrative, taking the video game format and transforming it into an interactive storytelling experience. The focus on narrative above video game skill and play results in a game that “does not appeal to everyone” but for those who do enjoy it, the game “produces an intense emotional reaction”: players have described it as “unsettling,” “upsetting,” and “thought-provoking” (Ryan and Costello 2012, 113). These player reactions stem from The Path’s grim narrative of a young girl being attacked by a wolf—the standard plotline of ATU 333— but these emotions are amplified by the gameplay itself. What makes The Path stand out from other retellings of “Little Red Riding Hood” across various cultural mediums is not its narrative, nor its gameplay techniques, but rather how it is able to take a traditional, popular folktale and reinvent it through the interactivity of video games
Increasing Diversity in the Sciences through Critical Service-Learning
No full textThe purpose of this article is to explicate the benefits of engaging youth of color in a way that engenders a rights-based understanding of disparities. We also show how critical service-learning experiences can encourage students of color to pursue careers in applied and social sciences. The aims of this paper are met by briefly exploring the inequities presently facing communities of color; discussing the utility of engaging youth of color through critical service-learning opportunities; and the potential of experiential learning in motivating youth of color to pursue careers in STEM, health, and human service professions with a critical, rights-based lens
Life and Parallelism in Schelling’s Critique of Spinoza
No full textA central claim of Schelling and Spinoza: Realism, Idealism, and the Absolute is that Schelling distinguishes his own philosophical system from that of Spinoza by way of a critique of his undeniable predecessor’s doctrine of attribute parallelism. Though Schelling’s inheritance of Spinoza’s monism has been widely noted in the secondary literature, his explicit critique of Spinoza’s parallelism is rarely discussed in significant detail. Granted, doing so is not a straightforward affair. Throughout his writings, Schelling’s position regarding parallelism contradicts itself. Though he is largely consistent in his criticism of Spinoza’s parallelism, we can find Schelling at times advocating for a parallelism of his own. Schelling writes of a preestablished harmony between transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature as well as a non-intersecting parallelism between the ideal and the real. If it is the case that Schelling’s critique of Spinoza centers around the issue of parallelism, then does Schelling ultimately fail to learn the lesson of this critique? In light of this dilemma, the purpose of this essay is to reconcile Schelling’s vacillating utilization of parallelism within a more unified account of Schelling’s notion of life as the conflict generated by a dynamic identity of identity and opposition and his account of the Idea as something other than just an element of subjective cognition
Schelling’s Later Philosophy of Religion as a Philosophy of Life
No full textOne of the most characteristic themes of Schelling’s later philosophy is, in the famous words of the Essay on Human Freedom, that “God is a life, not merely a Being” (SW VII: 403). Despite the prominence of this idea in Schelling’s later work, it is far from obvious what it means for God to be a living God. What is at stake in this claim? How do we know that God is a living being? What are the form and content of the divine life? And if life, as Schelling insists, implies movement, toward what end does the divine being move? This paper addresses these questions through a reading of Schelling’s treatise titled Monotheism. In conjunction with the Historical-Critical Introduction, to which it is “formally and immediately” connected (SW XII: vi), Monotheism serves as a “foundation” to the Philosophy of Mythology and, by extension, the entire positive philosophy of religion. In the Historical-Critical Introduction, Schelling demonstrated that mythology was “something lived and experienced,” and argued that historical polytheism stems from an original monotheism in human consciousness (SW XI: 89). Picking up the thread of the Historical-CriticalIntroduction, Monotheism aims to demonstrate the universal possibility of polytheism by explaining monotheism as a “living fact” (SW XII: 7–8). If monotheism does not negate the possibility of polytheism, then the one true God affirmed in it must be conceived as “the living God, that is, the uni-total God” (SW XII: 70). Since God is absolutely free, He must be both immanent and transcendent in relation to His creation. Therefore, Schelling interprets the creation of the world and human consciousness as moments in the realization of the divine life
