Social Psychological Bulletin
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Does the Sense of Power Influence Reputational Concern? Tests With Episodic and Semantic Power Priming
No full textReputational concern shapes various social behaviours, since having a negative reputation often results in receiving negative social consequences such as ostracism and punishment. As such, individuals are motivated to avoid displaying socially disapproved behaviour. Previous studies have found that individuals with power (i.e., those who can asymmetrically influence others) tend to show various behaviours that would damage their reputation (e.g., aggression and exploitation). Taken together, we hypothesised that power would be associated with the extent to which individuals are concerned about their reputation. More specifically, we hypothesised that those who have a high and low sense of power would experience reduced and increased reputational concern, respectively. To test the relationship, we conducted three preregistered studies with commonly used power priming methods: episodic priming (Studies 1 and 3) and semantic power priming (Study 2). In Studies 1 and 2, the power priming methods failed to significantly influence the sense of power or reputational concern. In Study 3, we sought to overcome potential methodological issues with online episodic priming, and a modified high power episodic priming was successful. Yet, we did not find evidence for the hypothesised relationship between the experimentally induced sense of power and reputational concern. Our three studies offer valuable implications not only for further research on the relationship between reputational concern and power but also for the effectiveness of power priming methods
Investigating Lay Perceptions of Psychological Measures: A Registered Report
No full textIn recent years, the reliability and validity of psychology measurement practices has been called into question, as part of an ongoing reappraisal of the robustness, reproducibility, and transparency of psychological research. While useful progress has been made, to date, the majority of discussions surrounding psychology’s measurement crisis have involved technical, quantitative investigations into the validity, reliability, and statistical robustness of psychological measures. This registered report offers a seldom-heard qualitative perspective on these ongoing debates, critically exploring members of the general public’s (i.e., non-experts) lay perceptions of widely used measures in psychology. Using a combination of cognitive interviews and a think aloud study protocol, participants (n = 23) completed one of three popular psychology measures. Participants reflected on each of the measures, discussed the contents, and provided perceptions of what the measures are designed to test. Coding of the think aloud protocols showed that participants across the measures had issues in interpreting and responding to items. Thematic analysis of the cognitive interviews identified three dominant themes that each relate to lay perceptions of psychology measurements. These were: (1) participants’ grappling with attempting to ‘capture their multiple selves’ in the questionnaires, (2) participants perceiving the questionnaire method as generally ‘missing nuance and richness’ and (3) exposing the ‘hidden labour of questionnaires’. These findings are discussed in the context of psychology’s measurement reform
Natural Hazard Versus Natural Disaster: Does Framing the Event Affect Preparedness Intentions, Attitudes, and Behaviour?
No full textEven when perception of risks such as earthquakes is high, preparation is generally low. Previous research shows relatively minor changes in the framing of target issues can impact decisions. In the area of risk, the terms “natural hazards” and “natural disasters” are used inconsistently. Using the Theory of Planned Behaviour as a framework, we conducted an online experiment with a large community sample from Wellington, Aotearoa New Zealand (N = 604) to examine possible framing effects. Half of the participants were asked about their attitudes and intentions regarding preparing for natural hazards and half about natural disasters. We found few significant differences in mean factor scores between the two groups, suggesting that people have attitudes and perceptions of similar strength for both natural hazards and natural disasters. However, half of the factors in structural equation modelling differed in significance or valence between the two conditions and intentions to prepare were positively associated with information-seeking behaviour only for the natural hazards frame, not the natural disaster frame. These findings suggest that the way in which these issues are framed meaningfully impacts how intentions form and translate to actual behaviour. It is possible that participants understood disaster as manifested, devastating impacts of a natural event rather than the potential for impact implied by the term hazard. Such interpretations could influence perceptions of preventability, and therefore preparation. These findings have critical implications for public information campaigns and interventions aimed at increasing preparedness for the risk posed by natural hazards
I “Knew” They Wouldn’t Last: Hindsight Bias in Judgments of a Dating Couple
No full textWhen a romantic relationship ends, individuals often look back and wish they had done things differently. What may seem clear in hindsight, however, is often unclear in foresight. We investigated the effects of outcome knowledge on individuals’ judgments of a dating couple. In Study 1 (181 U.S. college students, 334 U.S. community adults), participants read about a couple with an uncertain relationship trajectory; then, experimental group participants received knowledge about the couple’s status six months down the road as broken up or still together, while control group participants received no outcome knowledge. Individuals who were told the dating couple broke up perceived that outcome as more likely and obvious compared to those who were not given outcome knowledge or who were told the couple stayed together. In Study 2 (262 U.S. college students, 333 U.S. community adults), participants in the experimental conditions received knowledge about the couple’s status six months later as broken up or engaged, while control group participants received no outcome knowledge. In both samples, outcome knowledge of a breakup had a negative effect on individuals’ judgments about the couple. Among community adults, but not among college students, outcome knowledge of an engagement positively affected judgments of the couple. We offer directions for future research and discuss the mechanisms by which hindsight bias might affect evaluations of our own and others’ relationships
Beyond Reliability in First Impressions Research: Considering Validity and the Need to “Mix It Up With Folks”
No full text‘First impressions’ are a popular topic in social psychology. They are researched because the initial judgments of others are consequential in everyday life (such as job interviews, first dates, justice outcomes). In the context of broader concerns about the credibility of psychological science, first impressions research has developed commendable initiatives for improving reliability (open stimulus databases, international collaborations, replication studies and reanalyses). However, these initiatives can impact the validity of studying how people form first impressions. There is a long history of critiquing the usefulness of passive-observer judgments of controlled, reduced, presentations of people—and these concerns are still relevant today. Here, we highlight the praiseworthy practices improving reliability in first impressions research, before moving on to identify persistent methodological concerns in the field. This includes inadequate stimulus sampling and diversity, constrained participant response options, limited consideration of study context, and limitations of atomised presentations of target people. We identify how these methodological limitations impact theory development, how we might be over/underestimating everyday experience, and even misunderstanding social differences in autism and mental health. Finally, we identify opportunities for methodological reform, focusing on codifying instead of controlling interactions, promoting inductive, participant-led, methodologies, and asking for stronger theory development and clarity on ‘can’ vs. ‘do’ research questions. Overall, we praise reforms for improving the reliability of first impressions research, but improvements to making scientific predictions about first impressions require renewed consideration of validity
Cognitive Reflection and Endorsement of the “Great Replacement” Conspiracy Theory
No full textAccording to the “great replacement” conspiracy theory, mass immigration to Europe and the U.S. is part of a secret plot to replace the autochthonous White and Christian population with non-White and Muslim immigrants. With the aim of exploring psychological factors that play a role in believing in the “great replacement” theory, the present research focused on individual differences in reflective thinking. Using data from a cross-sectional study (N = 906), we found that cognitive reflection was negatively associated with belief in the “great replacement” conspiracy theory, even when political ideology and sociodemographic characteristics were controlled in the analysis. The findings highlight the key role of reflective thinking in countering conspiracy theories
Strategic Ambiguity in the Social Sciences
No full textIn the wake of the replication crisis, there have been calls to increase the clarity and precision of theory in the social sciences. Here, we argue that the effects of these calls may be limited due to incentives favoring ambiguous theory. Intentionally or not, scientists can exploit theoretical ambiguities to make support for a claim appear stronger than it is. Practices include theory stretching, interpreting an ambiguous claim more expansively to absorb data outside of the scope of the original claim, and post-hoc precision, interpreting an ambiguous claim more narrowly so it appears more precisely aligned with the data. These practices lead to the overestimation of evidence for the original claim and create the appearance of consistent support and progressive research programs, which may in turn be rewarded by journals, funding agencies, and hiring committees. Selection for ambiguous research can occur even when scientists act in good faith. Although ambiguity might be inevitable or even useful in the early stages of theory construction, scientists should aim for increased clarity as knowledge advances. Science benefits from transparently communicating about known ambiguities. To attain transparency about ambiguity, we provide a set of recommendations for authors, reviewers, and journals. We conclude with suggestions for research on how scientists use strategic ambiguity to advance their careers and the ways in which norms, incentives, and practices favor strategic ambiguity. Our paper ends with a simple mathematical model exploring the conditions in which high-ambiguity theories are favored over low-ambiguity theories, providing a basis for future analyses
Among Us: Fear of Exploitation, Suspiciousness, and Social Identity Predict Knowledge Hiding Among Researchers
No full textKnowledge hiding in academia—the reluctance to share one’s ideas, materials or knowledge with other researchers—is detrimental to scientific collaboration and harms scientific progress. In three studies, we tested whether (a) knowledge hiding can be predicted by researchers’ latent fear of being exploited (i.e., victim sensitivity), whether (b) this effect is mediated by researchers’ suspiciousness about their peers, and whether (c) activating researchers’ social identity alleviates or rather amplifies this effect. Study 1 (N = 93) shows that victim-sensitive researchers whose social identity as a “researcher” has been made salient are particularly prone to knowledge hiding. Study 2 (N = 97) helps explaining this effect: activating a social identity increases obstructive self-stereotyping among researchers. Study 3 (N = 272) replicates the effect of victim sensitivity on knowledge hiding via suspiciousness. Here, however, the effects of the same social identity activation were less straightforward. Together, these findings suggest that knowledge hiding in science can be explained by victim sensitivity and suspiciousness, and that making researchers’ social identity salient might even increase it in certain contexts
Psychology’s Reform Movement Needs a Reconceptualization of Scientific Expertise
No full textScience is supposed to be a self-correcting endeavor, but who is “the scientific expert” that corrects faulty science? We grouped traditional conceptualizations of expertise in psychology under three classes (substantialist, implicitist, and social conventionalist), and then examined how these approaches affect scientific self-correction in reference to various components of the credibility crisis such as fraud/QRPs, the inadequate number of replication studies, challenges facing big team science, and perverse incentives. Our investigation pointed out several problems with the traditional views. First, traditional views conceptualize expertise as something possessed, not performed, ignoring the epistemic responsibility of experts. Second, expertise is conceived as an exclusively individual quality, which contradicts the socially distributed nature of scientific inquiry. Third, some aspects of expertise are taken to be implicit or relative to the established research practices in a field, which leads to disputes over replicability and makes it difficult to criticize mindless scientific rituals. Lastly, a conflation of expertise with eminence in practice creates an incentive structure that undermines the goal of self-correction in science. We suggest, instead, that we conceive an expert as a reliable informant. Following the extended virtue account of expertise, we propose a non-individualist and a performance-based model, and discuss why it does not suffer from the same problems as traditional approaches, and why it is more compatible with the reform movement's goal of creating a credible psychological science through self-correction
Assessing the Reliability of an Infrared Thermography Protocol to Assess Cold-Induced Brown Adipose Tissue Activation in French Psychology Students
No full textThe authors use infrared thermography measurements of skin temperature to non-invasively assess the heat production of Brown Adipose Tissue (BAT). In species other than humans, BAT has been linked to maternal care, and may thus be crucial for understanding differences in attachment security. Whereas early BAT research measured its relative presence in the human body through radioactive tracers, researchers have recently used infrared thermography measurement of skin temperature in cold conditions to study BAT thermogenesis outside of medical facilities. Infrared thermography relies on comparing skin temperature in the supraclavicular region (where a BAT depot is located) with skin temperature in the sternal region (which contains no BAT depots) in cold conditions, when the supraclavicular BAT depot produces heat. We replicated an infrared thermography protocol, which previously reported an increase of 0.2 °C in supraclavicular (vs. sternal) skin temperature in cold (vs. control) conditions in only 7 adults, which probably led to overestimation of the effect. With a much larger sample size (N = 94 young adults) and a similar protocol, we did not find any significant variation in relative, Cohen’s d = 0.10, 95% CI [-0.31, 0.50], or absolute supraclavicular skin temperature, Cohen’s d = 0.11, 95% CI [-0.30, 0.52]. Using conditional random forests, we also excluded a variety of alternative explanations for why the method failed to achieve an effect. This protocol of infrared thermography cannot measure BAT thermogenesis and is thus not recommended for future studies to study individual differences in attachment