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Does One Future Matter More Than the ‘Other(ed)’? A Brief Critical Analysis of the UNESCO Education for Sustainable Development 2030 Framework
Get PDFThe United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s (UNESCO) Education for Sustainable Development roadmap (ESD 2030) is a policy document that reiterates the urgency of the climate crisis and affirms the central role of education in ensuring the survival of the planet. Building on nearly two decades of international policy on education for sustainable development, ESD 2030 highlights priority areas and recommendations for integrating education for sustainable development at all levels of society. Despite its urgent call to action, there is little to no attention paid to systemic issues such as capitalism and racism and their role in accelerating the climate crisis. This essay critically analyzes the ESD 2030 framework and makes a case for reckoning with past and present systemic injustice to combat the climate crisis effectively. It examines how modernity has functioned as a justification for colonial conquests and exploitation, and the role of racism in perpetuating the dehumanization that makes such activities possible. While ESD 2030 implicitly attempts to integrate empathy and relationality in its approach to sustainability education, this essay draws from Black critical theorists to argue why relationality should confront racism and racialized violence for it to have an enduring impact in education. The essay spotlights ways in which environmental education is taking a more critical and race-inclusive approach while honoring the principles that ESD 2030 proposes
“Unprecedented and Unparalleled”: The Last Step in Rabbi Kalonymus Kalman Shapira’s Altered Faith
Get PDFThis essay reexamines the final writings of Rabbi Kalonymus Kalman Shapira after the Grossaktion Warsaw, challenging the claim—most prominently advanced by Shaul Magid—that Shapira’s faith was “broken” at the end of 1942. Through a close analysis of two post-deportation sermon addenda and two letters buried in the Ringelblum Archive, I argue that R. Shapira did not abandon faith, but rather arrived at its final form: a faith marked not by rational theodicy or historical paradigms, but by radical submission to divine will and the continued potency of prayer. This “altered faith,” though stripped of explanatory frameworks, remains robust and deeply devotional—a final, faithful response to incomprehensible suffering
Municipium, Absens Parens: Rectifying Monell and Parens Patriae for Institutional Liability
Get PDFThe impact of the carceral system and policing on youth led to the development of a separate juvenile system recognizing the special needs of young people. However, policing-based harm remains at the forefront of legal scholarship not just for its continued prevalence in the country as a whole, but also because of the disproportionate impact on Black and Brown people. This impact is compounded when the targets of police violence are youth, who are subjected to extreme force by police at higher rates in comparison to adults and their white youth counterparts. Legal protections that purport to protect citizens’ rights inhibit victims from obtaining any meaningful recourse or compensation after experiencing the most heinous forms of police misconduct or violence. Individual police officers are protected by qualified immunity, and institutional liability is an illusory concept due to the flawed and extremely high bars created by the Monell framework. States have obligations to protect children under the parens patriae doctrine but are shielded from liability both because policing falls under municipal control and because the Eleventh Amendment provides states with sovereign immunity. Municipalities responsible for police conduct and discipline lack a similar common law obligation to their vulnerable citizens. This Note explores how the existing Monell and parens patriae doctrines can be reformed and adapted to ensure that institutions not only have a duty to protect youth from policing-based harm, but also that this duty is enforced with mechanisms for finding liability. Only with a meaningful pathway to liability for harm caused to youth at the hands of police can any real police accountability or long-term reform in policing be expected and racial disparities in this harm be addressed
Cardiac Regeneration: A Promising Future For Tissue Engineering and Cardiac Repair
Get PDFCardiovascular diseases are the leading cause of human death worldwide. These diseases have detrimental effects on the heart, damaging the tissue and disrupting healthy heart function. Cardiac functioning begins to dissipate as a result of cardiac cell death and subsequent damage to the structures of the heart. Cardiac regeneration is an evolving field in cardiac therapy that aims to rebuild damaged cardiac tissue that may have previously been beyond repair. Understanding how cardiac cells function within the heart is crucial in studying tissue engineering and cardiac regeneration. With the loss of cardiac cells following cardiovascular disease, the ability to extract healthy cardiac cells for tissue engineering becomes greatly limited. Thus, tissue cultures and cellular reprogramming become crucial methods for in vitro expansion of healthy cells. Understanding regeneration in the heart, cell sources necessary for cardiac regeneration, and the existing models that have been implemented for cardiac regeneration are crucial in advancing its study and improving methods to take cardiac regeneration to clinical trials. Imaging techniques to model patient-specific structures of the heart will ultimately help map damaged tissue, assisting with the entire regeneration process. Investigating the limitations of these techniques is equally important to improving cardiac regeneration, with the possibility to save countless lives
Risk, Discretion, and Bank Supervision: Peter Conti-Brown & Sean Vanatta
Get PDFThis Article argues that an old but overlooked form of governmental oversight—bank supervision—sits at the center of two foundational tensions in the governance of the American economy. The first is the extent to which the financial system is controlled by public actors (i.e., the government) versus private actors (e.g., the banks). The second is the extent to which the contest for that control is regulated by bright-line rules versus by the exercise of regulatory discretion. On the first tension, this Article argues that supervision is the public and private participation in financial risk management, such that public actors cannot relinquish control of residual risk while private actors do not relinquish control of frontline risk management. In this sense, risk management is shared, but not shared equally: bank supervisors represent a government that has essentially guaranteed the resilience of the financial system through formal and informal commitments. Supervision is the part of the government that is created and evolves— however imperfectly—to manage those relationships, guarantees, and commitments. The second tension, between rules and discretion in managing those commitments, represents the defining ethos of bank supervision. The process of supervision is not simply the verification of compliance with laws promulgated by Congress; rather, it is a flexible use of discretion within a system whose boundaries are defined by rules that are intentionally broad and vague. This last point is of profound importance in the post-Chevron era: as regulations receive less deference in courts, supervisory assessments will likely expand in importance even further.
Using the rich history of supervision in the United States from the antebellum period to the present, this Article presents a theoretical conception of supervision as the space where bankers and the government engage each other in sometimes cooperative, sometimes contentious disputes with substantial influence on the direction of financial and economic policy. This conception of bank supervision makes important contributions to our understanding of issues of importance to banking, such as climate change finance and deposit insurance, but also has important implications for administrative law, constitutional law, and the evolution of state capacity in the United States in the long 20th century.
 
The Right to Die: Autonomy at the Limits
Get PDFPhoto by Kateryna Hliznitsova on Unsplash
Abstract
This paper examines whether the autonomous self can give rise to a right to die in the form of a right to physician-assisted death (PAD) with a geographic focus on Europe. The paper questions whether a patient’s request for PAD can be justified as an expression of true autonomy or whether autonomy itself must be understood as inherently relational. The paper further explores case-law concerning human rights and the incompatibility of a right to die with the right to life, which serves as the foundation for human rights protections. The paper argues that neither patient autonomy nor the right to life provides a sufficient basis for establishing a right to die. Rather, autonomy should be viewed within an interdependent ethical framework that recognizes human vulnerability and mutual responsibility. The paper concludes that legitimizing PAD risks altering the meaning of care and eroding societal and medical commitments to preserving life.
Introduction
This paper examines whether autonomy justifies a right to die in the form of physician-assisted death (PAD) and explores the possible implications of this right in the European countries where PAD is legal. The paper begins by analysing autonomy in the context of end-of-life care, through the lens of the patient-doctor relationship and the decision-making process. The issue is whether a patient’s request for PAD can be seen not only as justifiable but also as necessarily grounded in the patient’s autonomous decision-making capacity. The paper then delves into the legal implications of a putative right to die, exploring its incompatibility with the right to life, which is a cornerstone of protecting all human rights. The paper also investigates the conditions under which PAD might nevertheless be legally permissible, e.g., under European Law. Finally, the paper concludes that neither patient autonomy nor the right to life provides a solid foundation for a right to die. It argues that patient autonomy should be understood as inherently relational, emphasizing that individual decisions impact society at large, and that autonomy as a purely individualistic concept is ultimately illusory. Moreover, the theoretical foundation of the self is shown to depend on its relation to others, which implies that the act of killing is not only an act against the other but also against the self.
Background
In Europe, six countries – Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, and Austria – have legalized some form of assisted dying, while others, including England and Wales, are in the process of doing so. In addition, Colombia, Canada, New Zealand, ten states in the US and six states in Australia allow assisted dying. In some countries, patients can access assisted dying only in case of terminal illness, while in others the requirement can be ‘severe suffering’ from a ‘chronic disease,’ which may encompass mental health conditions. Generally speaking, the legislative safeguards which place conditions on access to PAD raise concerns over equal access.[1] Yet the safeguards are meant to protect against uses of PAD that legislatures have not approved and to make sure that citizens requesting PAD are doing so freely and without any form of coercion and external pressure.
The Concept of the Autonomous Self in End-of-Life Care and Its Implications
Autonomy is a central concept in Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles of biomedical ethics, often seen as the cornerstone of medical ethics. To these authors, respecting autonomy means recognising a person’s right to make choices based on their values and beliefs, not just by avoiding interference but by actively supporting their ability to decide freely.[2] Beauchamp and Childress’s conceptualization of autonomy explains the paradigm shift of the past half century from the ‘doctor knows best’ tendency towards a more balanced doctor-patient approach where patients are seen as active protagonists with their own opinions, desires, and, above all, a right to know about and consent to medical treatment. Patients’ autonomous choices may not always align with what doctors consider to be in their best interests, as seen in refusals of life-saving treatments that their medical practitioners deem essential. And, patients cannot force doctors to administer medical treatments that they do not consider optimal. These two assumptions create tension when it comes to life-and-death decisions and whether the patient’s autonomous choice can stretch to the point of choosing when and how to die. The questions, therefore, are whether a legitimate request for PAD can stem from autonomy. According to Beauchamp and Childress, public policies on PAD should prevent abuse but should not undermine its moral justification: “A favourable response by a physician to a request for assistance in facilitating death by hastening it through prescribing lethal medication is not relevantly different from a favourable response to requests for assistance in facilitating death by easing it through removal of life-prolonging technology or use of coma-inducing medication.”[3] On this view, the principle of autonomy (the ‘patient’s perspective’) and the principle of beneficence (the ‘clinicians’ perspective’, i.e., a positive obligation to contribute to the welfare of others) do not necessarily conflict ethically, although competing principles should be balanced on a case-by-case basis. Countries where some forms of PAD are legal offer an example of how these principles need some kind of ‘support’ to avoid exploitation.
An Autonomy-Based Argument for PAD
The expressivist objection to assisted dying claims that allowing PAD for a specific group of persons expresses a negative judgment on whether their life is worth living. Some argue that an autonomy-based approach is the only way to address this objection. For example, Esther Braun claims that policies permitting assisted dying to all autonomously choosing it avoid the expressivist objection.[4] To Braun, the autonomy-based approach is the way forward since “assisted suicide should not be understood as a medical procedure that can be ‘indicated’ but rather as an autonomous action that can be carried out for all sort of reasons that should not be judged by others.”[5] Consequently, PAD should not be considered a medical practice because, as such, it would fall under the umbrella of indicated treatments under certain circumstances (such as irremediable suffering) where the patient would benefit.[6] Second, intentionally terminating the life of a patient can lead to a harmful division within the clinician’s medical and social role. Instead, “the judgment of whether her [the patient]’s life is worth living is strictly the patient’s.”[7] According to Braun, assisted suicide should be removed from the realm of beneficence relevant to all medical procedures and confined to the autonomous self who has full power over his or her fate. Braun’s autonomy-based position is that it would be legal to provide PAD to anyone who makes an autonomous request regardless of their medical condition, thus circumventing the principle of beneficence. To her, restrictions would be needed only to ensure that the patients’ decision to end their own life is taken autonomously (so the patient has decision-making capacity, the decision is informed and voluntary). This avoids depicting any group as less worthy of living. However, Braun refrains from delving into the practical implications of this kind of autonomy-based approach to PAD.
Given the fact that people are situated in social contexts, the question is whether this decisional power stemming from the autonomous self, in particular in circumstances of vulnerability, can be seen as entirely beginning and ending in the individual – as Braun maintains – or can be the subject of external influences.
“Desperation and a feeling of being superfluous”[8] form the context in which individuals exercise self-determination.[9] This creates a fragile foundation for both autonomy and decision making. Therefore, Ole Hartling defines autonomy when it comes to deciding about one’s own death as a “prison of freedom.”[10] The idea of deciding autonomously – understood as acting independently not only of other people’s influence but also of any duress (physical or psychological) may seem like an illusion. End-of-life decisions are undoubtedly grounded in the concept of autonomy, but not in the individualistic sense that views human beings as isolated entities. Rather, these decisions reflect that people are deeply embedded in the fabric of society, which shapes their identities in both positive and negative ways.
Autonomy needs to be considered in the context of the wider ethical framework of medicine and society.[11] It is not just a matter of individual will, but it is relational: when patients express their desire to die due to suffering, clinicians should look beyond autonomy and focus on relieving the suffering, not ending the life of the sufferer. Patient choices are not an isolated exercise of will and can also affect others both directly and indirectly – to such an extent, for instance, that in countries where PAD is legal, it has increased at a steady pace in the years immediately following its legalization, likely due to rising public acceptance.[12] Unassisted suicide has also increased in jurisdictions where PAD is legal.[13]
PAD and A Duty of Care
PAD is not a "neutral" act but has profound implications not only for the patient but for the clinicians’ duty of care embedded in their professional ethos, since this becomes the umbrella under which PAD falls. In this regard, the American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics is clear: “Physician-assisted suicide is fundamentally incompatible with the physician’s role as healer, would be difficult or impossible to control, and would pose serious societal risks.”[14] Some assert that doctors’ role in PAD undermines the moral integrity of their profession in a way that is similar to doctors’ refusal to help their patients during their end-of-life stage.[15]
As mentioned above, doctors are not obligated to do everything in their power to prolong a patient’s life. Patients can refuse treatment and doctors can prescribe palliative drugs whose side effects may include some shortening of life. “But while patient autonomy gives us a right to refuse procedures, it does not give us a right to demand them; it is a shield, not a sword.”[16] In fact, “[p]atient autonomy yields to the inviolability of life.”[17]
Does the Right to Life Encompass the Right to Die? A Legal Overview
Human rights laws protect individuals from undue interference with the rights and liberties considered pillars of human dignity and its preservation. The right to life is the first and foremost right protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) since its deprivation prevents the protection of any subsequent rights. The right to life is an absolute right that may be derogated only “(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.”[18] The state has both a positive duty to ensure that “[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law”[19] and a negative duty not to deprive citizens of their life unless the exceptional cases stated above apply. This right must also be protected without discrimination on any ground.[20] When it comes to healthcare provisions, Article 2 is often read in conjunction with Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life):[21] “Article 2 cannot, without a distortion of language, be interpreted as conferring the diametrically opposite right, namely a right to die; nor can it create a right to self-determination in the sense of conferring on an individual the entitlement to choose death rather than life.”[22]
Pretty v. The United Kingdom (2002) clearly established that Article 2 cannot be stretched to include the opposite right, namely, the right to die.[23] This statement has been reiterated in cases concerning euthanasia and/or assisted suicide that underwent scrutiny by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), also referred to as the Court of Strasbourg. This does not imply that contracting States cannot allow PAD because when there is no general agreement on such sensitive matters, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) affords States a margin of appreciation. In fact, States must guarantee safeguards (they have positive obligations) to protect their citizens from coercion and make sure their decision is made autonomously. As the Court recently stressed in Daniel Karsai v. Hungary (2024), “Article 2 does not prevent the national authorities from allowing or providing PAD, subject to the condition that the latter is accompanied by appropriate and sufficient safeguards to prevent abuse and thus secure respect for the right to life.”[24] This would mean that the right to life is not seen as a priori contrary to provisions of euthanasia or PAD.
In Mortier v. Belgium (2022),[25] the Court addressed the State’s positive obligations relating to euthanasia and PAD. The issues were “whether the Euthanasia Act, as in force at the relevant time, offered an effective safeguard for protecting vulnerable individuals’ right to life and whether the euthanasia of the applicant’s mother was performed under the conditions compliant with Article 2 of the Convention.”[26] The Court of Strasbourg found the Belgian law on euthanasia compliant with Article 2 ECHR with the requirement to provide material safeguards while in breach of the right to life in relation to procedural safeguards applicable once the patient has died.
As the Court of Strasbourg highlighted in Mortier, “the legislative framework governing pre-euthanasia procedures must ensure that an individual’s decision to end his or her life has been taken freely and with full understanding of what is involved.”[27] As stated in Haas v. Switzerland (2011),[28] the national authorities have the duty “to prevent an individual from taking his or her own life if the decision has not been taken freely and with full understanding of what is involved.”[29] The Court is particularly mindful that the risk of abuse in the provision of assisted dying is directly proportional to the ease and speed of access to such provision. Since the Mortier case concerns mental and not physical suffering, the Court expects “enhanced safeguards in the euthanasia decision-making process.”[30] The Court found that the legislative framework in place in Belgium did sufficiently protect patients seeking euthanasia for mental illness. Article 2 ECHR requires independence among medical practitioners consulted by patients to obtain the green light for euthanasia: independence both in terms of institutional connections (formal independence) and de facto independence. While the former can be considered in terms of hierarchical connections (such as a junior-senior work relationship) the latter is vaguer. It is not clear what degree of acquaintance would negate independence. In the Mortier case, the majority of judges did not view the doctors’ shared affiliation with the Life End Information Forum (LEIF), which advocates for dignified death for all, as sufficient evidence of a lack of independence.[31] Medical practitioners’ independence also concerns the post-euthanasia procedural safeguards where an independent judicial system needs to establish that no suspicious circumstances led to the patient’s death. The Belgian Euthanasia Act established an independent board of 16 members nominated by a legislative assembly of qualified doctors, lawyers, and professionals expert in end-of-life issues to review each case. However, the law did not prevent doctors who actively participate in the case under review from voting on whether their own acts complied with the law.[32] In Mortier, a doctor was involved in both the case and its review. This is one of the reasons (alongside the undue length of the criminal investigation) that the Court found the a posteriori safeguarding process in breach of Article 2 ECHR.
There is a significant grey area surrounding the compatibility of PAD provisions and the Article 2 ECHR. In fact, the State’s positive obligations may extend to National Health Service (NHS) medical practitioners since the NHS is government-owned and directed and publicly funded (primarily through taxation)[33]: “[T]he negative obligation prohibits the State from conducting euthanasia and assisted suicide itself, even as part of a well-regulated scheme with appropriate safeguards. This means, under the Convention, States may allow/tolerate private parties from conducting euthanasia/assisted suicide with appropriate safeguards but the State itself cannot conduct them.”[34] NHS medical practitioners can be considered State employees. If assisted dying were implemented in England and Wales, medical practitioners in charge of assisting patients through the process would likely be NHS-funded; therefore, a plausible case can be made that a law of this kind is incompatible with the ECHR.[35] However, the ECtHR has not yet addressed cases specifically concerning the role of state-funded doctors in PAD.
Hence, the fact that other European countries already permit physicians employed by the state or state-run healthcare system to perform PAD does not, per se, resolve the issue. The Court of Strasbourg addresses only those cases brought by individuals who are directly affected and only after all national remedies have been exhausted. Yet, in Mortier dissenting opinion Judge Serghides argued that euthanasia has no legal basis within the Convention and that if the drafters had wanted to insert PAD provisions they would have included a separate protocol (as it happened when, first, protocol no. 6 and then protocol 13 entered into force to abolish the death penalty in both wartime and peacetime). Moreover, if the State’s positive obligations to protect human life are not read together with the State’s negative obligations not to act against human life (obligations in place “regardless of whether the threat comes from State agents using lethal force or from State organs applying euthanasia procedures and practices”[36]) there would be no room for the negative obligations to protect the right to life effectively.
The right to life is considered an absolute right. The right to life does not inherently include a right to die, as such an interpretation contradicts the fundamental principles of the right to life. However, it remains possible in law to enact legislation permitting the active hastening of death, provided there is a robust framework in place to protect citizens from potential abuses of their right to life (positive obligations).[37] Hence, “the devil is in the detail”[38] in terms of whether PAD, assessed case-by-case and in terms of procedure, violates Article 2. Yet, when it comes to State negative obligations in relation to Article 2, they can become blurred in particular since they fall under the ‘margin of appreciation’ umbrella. In Karsai the ECtHR reiterated that criteria for PAD such as terminal illness should not be perceived as attaching less value to the lives of people meeting them, instead “these criteria can be viewed as reflecting the delicate balance to be struck between respect for human dignity and the right to self-determination on the part of patients with full mental capacity who wish to die, and the risks involved in allowing PAD beyond a narrowly defined scope.”[39] However, this position – likely rooted in the principle that competent patients can refuse life-sustaining treatments even if this hastens death – risks conflating cases that are apparently similar but are instead fundamentally different. This surely further muddies the waters.
Relational Autonomy and the Impossibility of a Right to Die
In recent weeks, the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill,[40] proposed by Labour MP Kim Leadbeater, which seeks to legalise PAD for terminally ill, competent adults in England and Wales, has been the subject of extensive discussion.[41] While proponents of the Bill stressed the value of the patient’s autonomy, which they argue should encompass when and how the patient would die, opponents emphasised the need to invest in the palliative care system and the risk that the law could pose to vulnerable people and society at large if medical boundaries are stretched and the doctor-patient relationship is indelibly compromised.
The path to accessing PAD begins with a preliminary discussion with a registered medical practitioner. Eligible individuals must be terminally ill, mentally competent adults with a life expectancy of no more than six months, registered with a GP in England and Wales, and ordinarily residing in England and Wales for at least the past year. Doctors have no obligation to initiate a conversation about PAD. However, a doctor is permitted to raise the subject proactively with an adult patient. If a doctor declines to discuss PAD and a patient expresses interest, the doctor must offer the patient the relevant information to allow the patient to seek PAD elsewhere. The preliminary discussion must be followed by a first declaration signed by both a ‘coordinating doctor’ and another person. Following the initial assessment, a seven-day reflection period begins. Then, a second doctor independently evaluates the patient to confirm the findings of the initial assessment. It may also be necessary to obtain a further assessment if the previous doctor is not satisfied that the patient meets t
How physical therapy residents and fellows influence doctor of physical therapy students’ experiences: a single program mixed methods study
No full textPurpose: Physical therapy residency and fellowship programs help healthcare providers develop stronger clinical skills and professional confidence. While research shows that these programs benefit the residents and fellows, we know little about how these advanced practitioners impact entry-level Doctor of Physical Therapy (DPT) students they work with during their education. This study investigates the influence of physical therapy residents and fellows on the educational experience and professional development of DPT students through focused surveys and semi-structured interviews.
Methods: Students eligible (229) for this study were students enrolled in the DPT program from January 2018 to March 2022. Cohorts were selected based on their exposure to residents and fellows during their time in the DPT program. Students from the identified cohorts were invited to complete a web-based survey and participate in virtual interviews. An inductive content analysis approach was employed to identify and refine codes and establish themes.
Results: Twenty-three percent of students completed the survey (52), and 42 completed the interview. Seventy-three percent of students acknowledged that a residency and fellowship program associated with the DPT program positively enriched their educational experience. Additionally, 50% of students indicated that access to residents and fellows influenced their decision to pursue a residency or fellowship.
Conclusion: The findings suggest that integrating residents and fellows within a DPT program positively influences students’ educational experiences and professional development within a single university setting. While these results are encouraging, additional research is warranted to deepen our understanding of this relationship
Resolving Misunderstanding through an Extended Sequence
No full textThis study investigates the resolution of misunderstandings through complex repair practices in Korean conversation. Utilizing data from a 45-minute phone call between two native Korean speakers, Sophia and Chan, the paper examines how an extended sequence of repair practices is employed to address a misunderstanding regarding a third person, Kihoon. Through a conversational analytic framework, the analysis reveals how the participants navigate and resolve the trouble source over multiple turns, demonstrating the use of various repair initiators. The findings highlight three key points: (1) the progression from weaker to stronger repair initiators as the repair sequence unfolds, (2) the elastic and robust nature of repair mechanisms that allow for extended trouble resolution, and (3) the implications for language teaching, emphasizing the importance of repair practices in second language acquisition. While the study offers insights into complex repair sequences in a non-English language, it acknowledges limitations in generalizability and suggests further research into diverse repair practices across different languages. This paper contributes to expanding the theoretical understanding of repair practices and provides practical insights for language educators
Across Sea and Ocean: Transmitting and Receiving Caliphal Sovereignty Claims between the Late Medieval Cairo Sultanate and the Sultanates of India
No full textAlthough universal recognition of the caliphate diminished substantially in the post-Mongol territories of the Islamic East it remained a symbol of culture and tradition capable of bridging Muslim societies across the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean. The eighth-/fourteenth- and ninth-/fifteenth-century Muslim rulers of India considered themselves in need of symbolic ties with the Abbasid line in Egypt to better strengthen their claims to ruling authority. This article examines diplomatic exchanges linking Syro-Egyptian elites with those in Delhi, Gujarat, Bengal, Malwa, and the Deccan, placing emphasis on the role of late medieval Indian sultanates in shaping the discourse associated with the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo. Analysis also considers the relationships connecting premodern societies that spanned the Red Sea, Indian Ocean, and Eastern Mediterranean, framed through the prism of religious diplomacy involving transoceanic ideas of caliphate