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In an Age of Anti-Intellectualism, What is the Value of Expertise?
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Abstract
The nature of the scientific enterprise is sometimes misunderstood by large sections of the public. Failure to understand how progress occurs within scientific disciplines can lead to nonadherence with expert recommendations, with devastating consequences. Why does the public put enough stock in scientific research and medical science to comply with certain research findings but are skeptical of others? Through careful attention to history, current socio-cultural contexts, scientific data, and knowledge development within professions, we argue in favor of greater public deference to expertise. Though we rely on a variety of examples rooted in medical science, our focus is on general conceptions of expertise and what might be learned from reflection on its proper role. We situate our analysis within the context of current discussions in philosophy, bioethics, and public policy around the idea of ‘wicked problems’.
Introduction
Expertise, broadly speaking, has come under serious attack in recent years. The current presidential administration is engaged in large-scale dismantling of the scientific and public health infrastructure at a variety of federal agencies. This is happening concurrently with ongoing attacks on academic institutions. This should concern not just members of the scientific and academic community but also the public at large. Unfortunately, the nature of the scientific enterprise is sometimes misunderstood by large sections of the public.[1] Although trust in science remains high among Americans, the level of trust contrasts sharply depending on one’s political affiliation.[2] There has been growing hostility toward science itself.[3] This can have devastating consequences when a failure to understand how progress occurs within scientific disciplines leads to ignorance of and even nonadherence to expert recommendations. How ought members of the public be persuaded to put enough stock in scientific research and medical science to listen to and comply with sound research findings but remain appropriately questioning of expert advice? For instance, recent polling data suggests that a majority of US adults are concerned that agencies such as the CDC will make decisions that are influenced by politics.[4]
Through careful attention to history, current socio-cultural contexts, the role of expertise, and knowledge development within the scientific professions, we argue in favor of greater, albeit prudent, deference to expertise. Our hope is that lessons will be learned for better responses to future public health crises and other collective action problems that require public support to properly address them. We are careful to focus our efforts on the value of expertise, which is hard-won and takes years to cultivate. We situate our analysis within the context of current discussions of pandemics as ‘wicked problems,’[5] responding to potential critiques rooted in concerns about epistemic justice,[6] and suggest bioethics as a working model for addressing these concerns and bioethicists as potential leaders in future public policy discussions.
The Authority of Experts
The authority of experts has increasingly attracted the attention of ethicists. For instance, some ethicists have argued that we should be wary of the authority of experts because experts are human beings that may have conflicts of interest, speak outside their area of expertise (“epistemic trespassing”), or offer advice that is not useful.[7]
Managing deference to the authority of experts has long been a challenge in the United States. The authority of experts has waxed and waned throughout the history of the United States. For instance, the authority of experts was under assault during the era of Jacksonian democracy in the early 19th century.[8] Licensure of professionals was repealed. Many irregular physicians practiced medicine. The prevailing ideology held that each individual could and should decide how to manage their own health. This was the state of affairs for much of the 19th century. But, with the rise of laboratory science and the demonstrable efficacy of the germ theory of disease, the authority of physicians grew. As chronicled in the classic book The Social Transformation of American Medicine, physicians enjoyed an unparalleled run of cultural and moral authority throughout much of the 20th century.[9] Today, health care professionals such as physicians and nurses typically hold the top rung in Gallup surveys of public trust (although they suffered a downturn as a result of COVID).[10]
Public health experts have always struggled for the same level of cultural authority. Despite the successes of public health in the 20th century, medicine garnered the lion’s share of resources. Respect for those treating individual patients surpassed respect for public health officials, who offered prevention strategies and focused on infectious disease avoidance, vaccination, and food safety. It also surpassed those engaged in the practice of medicine in clinics and publicly funded venues serving individuals who were stigmatized – the poor, minorities, individuals with disabilities, individuals with mental illness or addiction, or immigrants. Public health journalist Laurie Garrett highlights the difference in a rather stark way by comparing the public health school at Harvard with the medical school building: “The medical school is all marble, with these grand columns….The school of public health is this funky building, the ugliest possible architecture, with the ceilings falling in….That’s America.”[11]
During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, the authority of public health and scientific experts came under withering attacks. President Trump dismissed the authority of scientific experts when the pandemic first started. Trust in expertise was further eroded by right-wing media personalities attacking figures such as Anthony Fauci. Ideally, public health and medicine should acknowledge mistakes and be transparent to the public. Robert F. Kennedy, Jr, the current head of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has continued the administration’s undermining of science and expertise by promoting falsehoods about autism, vaccines, chemtrails and fluoride. Trust as precious social capital is diminished when officials in positions of power promote mistruths.
It is this social capital of trust that is essential in preserving the authority of credible experts. Since no one is an expert in everything, we must have some level of trust in the expertise of certain individuals. But who merits our trust? With the vast amount of information available, it is increasingly difficult to determine who is trustworthy and who is not. We have witnessed a stratification of trust toward individuals and institutions based on income and education. For instance, more highly educated individuals tend to trust academic experts. And this trust goes beyond individual trust to institutional trust. The CDC has enjoyed a good deal of trust throughout its history. Yet even this agency has seen its trustworthiness diminish with its recommendations during COVID of school closings, mandatory vaccination, isolating, and masking. Institutional trustworthiness is historically more precarious than the trustworthiness of individuals, but both have been undermined in recent years.
Historically, professional experts have grossly abused their authority. We have witnessed this with unethical experiments in Nazi Germany and human rights abuses in the US, including Tuskegee, Willowbrook, the Iowa ‘monster’ stuttering studies, Havasupai Tribe gene studies, and the Stanford prison experiments, among many others. Ordinary people rightly question the authority of experts when such a legacy of abuse exists.
The COVID pandemic highlighted a great deal of disagreement among a variety of experts. Dr. Vinay Prasad, now in high office at the FDA, emerged as a staunch critic of mainstream public health measures, such as vaccine and mask mandates.[12] So did those who authored the Great Barrington Declaration.[13] Mark Battersby stated, “Disagreement among experts renders appeals to authority fallacious. But many of the interesting cases one deals with will involve conflict among experts.”[14] The pandemic reflected not only disagreement but the very undermining of the notion of expertise.
Others have highlighted the role of anti-intellectualism in American life. Anti-intellectualism reflects a suspicion of experts and the expert class. The scholar and public intellectual Tom Nichols chronicled this phenomenon in his 2017 book The Death of Expertise.[15] It also harbors a suspicion toward ‘the academy,’ or institutions of higher education. (Nichols provides a stinging critique of the academy and its dereliction of promoting logical discourse and reason.) This kind of suspicion and mistrust has persisted throughout US history and has seen a resurgence in recent years with the election and re-election of Trump. Such attitudes support populist or even conspiratorial explanations for complex phenomena, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, chemtrails, and climate change. As Merkley and Loewen state: “People who are highly distrusting of experts are not simply willing to put aside their distrust of these sources to resolve the crisis and return to normalcy. Relaying information from experts is unlikely to be of use in persuading these individuals, even in times of crisis. Other communication strategies are needed.”[16]
For many individuals who are distrustful of public health advice, their experience with COVID-19 may have only reinforced that distrust. Asymptomatic people or those with very mild symptoms led to the spread of the virus to vulnerable members of society who were more likely to experience severe COVID-19 complications. Thus, the failure to heed public health advice placed a significant burden on the US healthcare system, even if some individual persons had mild or asymptomatic cases. Although awareness of how viruses are transmitted improved during and after the pandemic, misinformation and disinformation often undermined understanding. Viruses that change or mutate, such as COVID-19, make efforts to communicate new information from experts to the public extremely difficult. These challenges are further compounded in the current climate of assault toward experts and the value of expertise. Before turning to the value of expertise itself, it is important to respond to a set of arguments that has received wide attention of late.
Politicization in the Face of Expertise
One argument against trusting experts is that experts’ advice has been compromised by politics. This argument stems from the intertwining of politics and healthcare (broadly understood). Politicians who find themselves offering recommendations that are at odds with experts have trotted out this reasoning, particularly those in leading roles in the Trump administration. Dr. Josh Sharfstein suggests HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., engages in this technique. In his analysis of the role of expertise relative to political power (referring to Kennedy’s guidance), Sharfstein noted that, “Kennedy has been sowing doubt in public health for years. He's basically saying, here's my view; here's some thoughts, and you can't trust what people who – you know, their whole career, their whole goal is to support health, and they have all this expertise – you can't trust them at all.”[17] Understanding what this claim means is important to understanding why it is both mistaken and wrongheaded, and it might mean at least one of four things.
First, consumers of information can sometimes lack the relevant knowledge and critical skills to properly assess who might be an expert. The possibility of mistaken and fraudulent “experts” is a real and too common occurrence. Second, given the diversity of thought and the lack of critical assessment skills and opportunities, it is possible for people to find “experts” to support their own pre-existing views. Third, the view that everyone is or can be an expert is arguably common. This point is of special interest to bioethicists who generally recognize that all people are (or might be) experts with respect to their own sets of values, but not with respect to other bodies of knowledge, such as medical science. The idea that anyone can be an expert can be coupled with an effort-focused qualification (“they could be if they just put their mind to it”; consider, e.g., the meme ‘I did my own research’). Fourth, some argue that those who are dubbed experts are selected based only upon non-relevant factors, such as their political stances, as opposed to their knowledge of medicine or of epidemiology. Experts can then be seen as political tools, as the perception is that they are chosen for reasons that are not relevant. Some may feel that they have all “sold out” to someone or something—big pharma, big law, billionaire philanthropists, big food, celebrity, tenure, etc.
Concerns about conflicts of interest, personal expertise, the ability to become an expert, post hoc expert shopping, and the lack of critical reasoning and knowledge base familiarity should give pause to those who understand the importance of expertise. These considerations, however, are not without response. For instance, one line of response to the politics charge is to simply drive a wedge between politics and science (whether that be medical science, scientific research, or another body of knowledge with practical importance and application that is distinct from politics). For instance, the former director of the National Institutes of Health, Francis Collins, said, “When you mix politics and science, you just get politics.”[18] Others argue that the only way for science to escape the political allegation is to keep politics completely out of science. However, neither view offers a viable response, as the health needs of the public are – in different ways – the purview of both sets of expertise (politics and science). Further, it is unclear how driving such a wedge rebuts the lack of trust in experts, nor is it clear whether such a wedge could be successfully driven into spaces which are intertwined.
Politics is a part of what research gets done, who gets to do it, what messaging is utilized, and whether that messaging is amplified or squashed. The way to manage the dismissal of expertise as “just politics” is neither to deny the reality of politics nor pretend that it can be safely isolated, but rather to insist on methods to tamp down the direst consequences of one on the other. There are, at least, two methods that can be employed for this purpose.
First, it is important to remember that though people are referred to as experts, expertise belongs to groups as well as individuals. Peer consensus among individual experts (even false or would be “experts”) drives the legitimization of expertise—not who is the loudest, most educated, flashiest, best funded, most quoted, or the closest friend of those in power. Checks of claims and assessments offered by experts from other, relevantly situated experts are essential. This notion is the basis for peer review, among other common substantiations of the claims of experts.
Second, expertise must be vindicated by application. Consider, for example, the importance of replicability in scientific experimentation. Consider also the importance of consensus that follows on an understanding of expertise that that which belongs to a group, not merely to a set of individuals. If, for example, the majority of climate experts successfully predict continuing rising temperatures, more humidity, more algae outbreaks, species extinctions, excessive heatwaves, more wildfires, and nastier storms, then climate change deniers lose credible standing. When the predicted instances occur, the usefulness of proper expertise is highlighted. If a scientist or a political official dismisses the values of vaccines but then witnesses outbreaks of measles, mumps, hepatitis or flu, then that scientist or official ought to lose credibility. This is not to say that experts cannot make mistakes; however, in such cases, explanations of the mistake and revisions of expertise-dependent reviews are needed. An official or scientist who rejects the germ theory of disease, for example, shoulders the burden of explaining the reduced morbidity and mortality that occurred in the early 1900s after that theory gained prominence and physicians (and others) began washing their hands more diligently. In other words, the ability to apply expertise successfully falsifies the ‘it’s just or all politics’ argument.[19]
Expertise
(i) Expertise
In popular discussions, the idea that one must do something for “10,000 hours”[20] has permeated considerations of who counts as an expert. It takes time and resources to develop expertise in a specific area, as well as particular skill sets to be able to master a practice or gain command of the tools of a discipline. That said, our aim in this section is not to articulate a full description of what counts as having expertise, but rather to highlight two features of expertise relative to its boundaries, which should inform the role of expertise within public discussions of public health.
In their classic work on the nature of expertise, Chi, Glaser, and Farr describe seven key characteristics of experts, two of which apply to the limits of expertise. The first is that “Experts excel mainly in their own domains” (Chi, Glaser, and Farr, xvii). When reflecting on and evaluating “authority,” it is important that notions of expertise are taken seriously. It is not mere authority which marks out proper expertise. Experts are such only in their particular domain and we make a significant mistake if we defer to the authority of an expert of the wrong domain. For example, we might look to the famed Red Sox baseball player and author of the Science of Hitting Ted Williams for advice on how to hit a baseball. Williams was, by all accounts, an expert at it. However, it does not follow that society should have relied on him for recommendations of legal interpretation of baseball stadium and game regulations, cooking (even of ballpark franks), or public health measures (even about crowding at baseball games). Williams likely had views about these latter matters; he may even have had informed opinions having spent time in many stadiums around the country, but he did not hold any expertise in these latter areas.
The second boundary-relevant criterion that Chi, Glaser, and Farr note is that “Experts have strong self-monitoring skills” (Chi, Glaser, and Farr, xx) (Chi, 2009). The ability to restrict oneself in one’s capacity as an expert is important for at least two reasons. First, as we often appeal to experts in situations that are complex (in ways relevant to their expertise), it is likely that laypersons making the appeal lack the ability or struggle to draw clear lines as to when the expert has overstepped. The domains of expertise, especially where multidisciplinary and interprofessional teams are needed to properly respond to an issue, are a good example of the sometimes vague or murky lines of expertise and need for experts to carefully self-monitor. Second, self-monitoring is important not only when the bounds of expertise are murky, but in situations where the dissemination, use, and influence of the results of that expertise occur through channels that may not involve the expert. If an ordinary manager of a baseball team aims to share the results of Ted Williams’ hitting expertise, he needs to take care in both ensuring (to the best of his ability) that Williams has not overstepped, but also that he is not conflating his standing as a star with the results of the expertise he is sharing.
Public health is an especially important example of this potential confusion and conflation for several reasons. First public health responses are complex – requiring multi-disciplinary and interprofessional teams of experts. Second, those disseminating and then acting upon the information shared by particular experts within the team often have standing to share this information due to other kinds of expertise or a different kind of authority. Thus, a political leader – a president or governor, for example – may be charged with the care of the public and so it is within their purview to disseminate relevant scientific information that they receive. However, it would be an abuse of authority or – in the very least, a conflation – to fail to self-monitor and, say, to share one’s own opinions under the auspices of expertise.
It is especially important in our current socio-cultural and political moment to pay attention to the bounds of expertise. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many individuals frequently stepped outside of the proper bounds of their expertise. Merely because someone is an expert on a particular subject matter does not mean, as noted above, that they are competent to discuss complicated matters which, even if relevant to the subject area, require different training, experiences, or knowledge bases to master, or those especially challenging problems which require an interdisciplinary team to fully address.
Consider another pandemic-relevant example: an expert in supply chain management might possess sufficient expertise to comment on and evaluate the way in which COVID-19 vaccine materials made their way from production and transportation mechanisms to distributions centers. However, they should show restraint and not comment on the merits of particular vaccines, as that would properly fall to biochemists, virologists, vaccinologists or other experts.
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The Ethical Significance of Brain-Computer Interfaces as Enablers of Communication
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Abstract
This article argues that the primary ethical significance of brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) lies not in the specific content they transmit, but in their capacity to restore communicative agency to individuals otherwise excluded from ethical engagement due to conditions such as complete locked-in syndrome. While current ethical frameworks focus largely on risks, privacy, and clinical outcomes, this analysis foregrounds the ontological dimension: BCIs safeguard and re-establish the practical conditions under which autonomy, recognition, and interpersonal accountability can be exercised. Drawing on documented clinical cases, the article applies the concept of communicative reinstatement to describe how BCIs reconfigure relationships between patients, caregivers, and the broader moral community. The argument culminates in a normative claim: societies have an ethical obligation to maintain and protect communicative capacity where feasible, treating BCIs not merely as therapeutic tools but as infrastructures of moral inclusion. This reorientation carries implications for regulation, informed consent, policy, and distributive justice.
Introduction
Brain-computer interface (BCI) technology has emerged as one of the most ethically consequential developments in contemporary medicine and neurotechnology. Much of the public discourse surrounding BCIs has centered on high-profile commercial ventures—such as Elon Musk’s Neuralink—and the controversies these projects generate. These controversies include the ethics of animal testing protocols, speculative claims regarding human enhancement and human-AI symbiosis, and the broader societal implications of merging minds with machines.[1] While these debates are significant, there is a more fundamental ethical dimension inherent to BCIs. They constitute a novel class of moral technology that reconfigures the very possibility of communicative agency for individuals with severe disabilities.
The current ethical literature predominantly analyzes BCIs through two prevailing frameworks. The first treats them as medical devices warranting standard risk-benefit analysis, assessing safety, efficacy, and clinical outcomes.[2] The second framework situates BCIs within the emerging field of neuroethics, emphasizing concerns about privacy, cognitive liberty, data security, and the potential for manipulation.[3] Although previous work has already emphasized the ethical importance of BCIs in restoring communicative capacities, this paper develops the claim further by foregrounding what may be termed the ethical function of BCIs.[4] Their significance lies not just in enhancing particular interactions or reducing barriers, but in re-establishing the very possibility of communication, through which individuals assert their will, can participate in community, and be recognized as interlocutors. In this sense, BCIs are ethically constitutive, since they sustain the conditions under which autonomy and accountability can be expressed. Following this reasoning, this paper argues that the primary ethical significance of BCIs lies not in the specific content they transmit or in the circumstances under which they are implanted, but in the fact that they render transmission possible at all.
To develop this argument, the paper first examines documented clinical cases of BCI-mediated communication in locked-in patients. These cases show how BCIs reconfigure ethical relationships among patients, caregivers, and society by transforming patients from passive recipients of care into more active participants. Subsequently, the paper considers the broader implications of this ethical perspective for clinical practice and policy, especially regarding long-term maintenance obligations.
The central claim is that BCIs should be understood not merely as therapeutic tools but as infrastructures of moral inclusion, generating ethical duties to establish, maintain, and protect communicative capacity where feasible.
BCIs as a Way to Restore Communication
The ethical significance of BCIs becomes most evident in the context of complete locked-in syndrome (CLIS), a condition in which patients retain cognitive awareness but lose all voluntary muscle control. Traditional assistive technologies relying on residual movements, such as eye-tracking systems, become ineffective under these circumstances. Intracortical BCIs, by contrast, can restore communicative capacity by directly decoding neural signals associated with intended speech or movement.[5] One landmark study documented an amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) patient who, after entering CLIS, learned to use an implanted BCI speller to construct sentences at a rate of approximately one character per minute. The patient’s communications ranged from the mundane, such as requesting music, to expressions of existential significance involving care preferences.[6] Importantly, when researchers were asked how they would respond if the patient spelled “unplug my ventilator,” they emphatically stated that BCI output would not determine decisions regarding life support withdrawal. This position reflects appropriate clinical caution but also reveals a critical ethical distinction. While the content of BCI-mediated communication requires verification and contextual interpretation, the very fact that said communication occurs transforms the patient’s moral status from a passive recipient of care to an active participant in ethical dialogue.[7]
A comparable case involved an electrocorticography (ECoG) based BCI, which restored communication for a patient previously reliant on eye movement interpretation with limited accuracy. This patient gained the ability to produce verified short phrases and, among the first communications, corrected care team assumptions about personal preferences. Such moments fundamentally reconfigure the ethical relationship, shifting the patient from an object of interpretation to a subject capable of self-representation and autonomous expression.[8]
These cases share the same ethical pattern: the BCI’s biggest impact is not the specific messages it transmits but its role as the enabler of transmission itself. This transition from silence to speech might be termed “communicative reinstatement,” the re-entry of a person into a moral community through restored capacity for expression.
Different Dimensions of BCI Ethics
Traditional ethical frameworks for medical devices focus predominantly on what we commonly refer to as the “concrete dimension,” addressing concrete outcomes, risks, and clinical applications. For BCIs, this focus materializes in debates over whether to honor euthanasia requests (where legal) communicated through neural implants or concerns about data privacy and cognitive liberty. While these concerns are valid and urgent, they fail to capture the more “fundamental dimension,” which is how BCIs alter the conditions of moral personhood by restoring the capacity to communicate.
From a philosophical standpoint, the concrete pertains to particular instances such as the content of a patient’s message, technical specifications, or safety reports. The fundamental, by contrast, concerns the foundational preconditions that make communication and moral agency possible. This distinction bears significant ethical weight. For example, consider a patient with locked-in syndrome who can communicate “I am in pain” through a BCI. In this scenario, caregivers and clinicians must deliberate on how to interpret and respond to the patient’s expressed experience. In contrast, if the patient lacks any means of communication, no such ethical deliberation can occur because the patient’s perspective remains inaccessible to the moral and caregiving community. In this latter case, the BCI functions ethically by creating the very possibility for ethical engagement where none previously existed.
This fundamental perspective also shows why device failure or abandonment inflicts harm that transcends mere technical malfunction. Clinical reports describe psychological trauma among patients who lost access to BCI functionality due to corporate discontinuation, comparable to the loss of a sensory organ.[9] This harm is not simply empirical or technical but ethical and existential, since it represents the collapse of a reconstructed mode of engagement and involvement with one’s community as a speaking subject. Such cases underscore that BCIs are not simply devices but essential conditions for sustaining moral agency and personhood.
Obligations of Maintenance and Moral Inclusion
From this understanding emerges an ethical imperative. If BCIs can restore communicative agency, and if communicative agency constitutes a foundation of moral personhood, then society holds an obligation to provide and maintain technologies that enable such restoration wherever reasonably possible. This obligation extends beyond traditional medical ethics in three key respects.
First, it recognizes communicative restoration as a distinct ethical good, irreducible to conventional therapeutic aims focused on curing disease or alleviating symptoms. BCIs address a deeper deprivation, namely, the exclusion from the communal domain where moral relations and agency occur.
Second, this obligation entails durable responsibilities extending beyond initial implantation. Communicative capacity depends on sustained technical support, ongoing software updates, and user training, demands that challenge existing models of medical device regulation and healthcare infrastructure. Historical cases of early BCI users abandoned by manufacturers exemplify the grave ethical costs incurred when these responsibilities are neglected.[10]
Third, the imperative to restore communication reshapes informed consent practices. Traditional consent protocols emphasize risk disclosure and benefit assessment, but BCI users face a unique transition from communicative isolation to reinstatement that is difficult to fully apprehend in advance, especially by healthy individuals. Ethical consent must therefore encompass this experiential dimension to genuinely respect autonomy.
This imperative does not demand that BCIs be provided at any cost but prioritizes communicative reinstatement as a fundamental ethical goal in clinical practice, research, and policy. Just as society accepts obligations to provide language education or accommodations for disabilities, it must recognize a corresponding obligation to establish and maintain technologies that restore basic communicative capacity.
Policy, Practices, and Objections
Recognizing BCIs as infrastructures of moral inclusion rather than mere medical devices also requires reconsideration across multiple policy domains. Regulatory frameworks that currently evaluate BCIs mainly for safety and efficacy must be expanded to include assessments of reliability in enabling nuanced expression, guarantees of long-term continuity, and interoperability standards that prevent vendor lock-in. Funding models must evolve beyond traditional reimbursement schemes ill-fitted to support the sustained maintenance and upgrading necessary for BCI functionality. Innovative approaches might include insurance categories recognizing “communicative benefit,” public-private consortia dedicated to maintenance, or endowment funds ensuring long-term support. Ethics oversight bodies, including institutional review boards, require new frameworks tailored to the unique challenges of communicative reinstatement research. These include enhanced consent protocols addressing phenomenological shifts, mandatory plans for post-trial access, and contingency measures against commercial abandonment. Finally, legal recognition must evolve to address the evidentiary status of neural signals as expressions of intent, protections against compelled device use, and rights to device continuity.
These policy reforms formalize an ethical recognition of communicative capacities as constituting a fundamental human good that technologies like BCIs can restore, imposing corresponding social and legal obligations to protect this capacity.
Counterarguments
Several objections to this framework merit consideration. One common argument prioritizes therapeutic intervention aimed at curing disease rather than investing in assistive communication technologies. This objection falsely dichotomizes care, since communicative reinstatement often facilitates more effective therapeutic collaboration and patient-centered outcomes. Another concern involves technological risk, as invasive BCIs entail surgical and medical dangers. Yet as non-invasive alternatives continue to advance, ethical risk-benefit assessments must weigh these risks against the profound psychological and social harms of communicative isolation.
Skeptics could point to interpretive challenges, noting that BCI output represents an imperfect proxy for thought. However, all communication involves interpretative acts; ethical standards should require basic intelligibility sufficient to respect autonomy rather than perfect fidelity. Finally, distributive justice objections might cite the high cost and limited access to BCIs. This is principally an implementation challenge, paralleling the historical trajectory of other assistive technologies, which initially faced similar barriers before becoming more widely accessible.
While these concerns highlight genuine practical difficulties, they do not undermine the core ethical argument that communicative reinstatement via BCIs constitutes a distinct and critical moral good.
Another issue concerns the temporality of access. For many patients, even temporary use of BCIs may provide immeasurable benefit, restoring participation and recognition for a limited period rather than not at all.[11] Yet reliance on devices that may later be discontinued, abandoned, or unsupported raises serious ethical risks of dependency and loss. At the same time, requiring companies to guarantee indefinite support could deter development or delay availability. Ethical evaluation must therefore balance the immediate benefits of temporary communicative access against the structural vulnerabilities introduced by uncertain long-term provision.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Brain-Computer Interfaces demand an ethical paradigm shift that recognizes their capacity to restore persons to the moral community through communicative reinstatement. By redirecting analysis from the concrete, what is communicated, to the fundamental, that communication occurs at all, BCIs are shown not to be mere medical devices but as infrastructures of moral inclusion. This ethical status generates corresponding obligations to develop these technologies responsibly, maintain them reliably, and prioritize communicative restoration as a fundamental human good. As BCI technologies advance, ethical frameworks must evolve accordingly to protect not just the users of these devices but the communicative capacities they enable, the essential threads that connect human beings as moral persons.
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[1] Perez, C. (2025, June 23). The Advancements and Ethical Concerns of Neuralink. The Princeton Medical Review. https://medreview.odus.princeton.edu/2025/06/23/the-advancements-and-ethical-concerns-of-neuralink/
[2] Lavazza, A., Balconi, M., Ienca, M., Minerva, F., Pizzetti, F. G., Reichlin, M., Samorè, F., Sironi, V. A., Navarro, M. S., & Songhorian, S. (2025). Neuralink’s brain-computer interfaces: medical innovations and ethical challenges. Frontiers in Human Dynamics, 7, Article 1553905. https://doi.org/10.3389/fhumd.2025.1553905
[3] Christiansen, T. (2025). The future of medicine or an ethical nightmare? Elon Musk’s Neuralink and the advent of brain-machine interfaces. Fall 2021, Spectrum. https://voices.uchicago.edu/triplehelix/2025/01/02/the-future-of-medicine-or-an-ethical-nightmare-elon-musks-neuralink-and-the-advent-of-brain-machine-interfaces/
[4] Burwell, S., Sample, M., & Racine, E. (2017). Ethical aspects of brain-computer interfaces: A scoping review. BMC Medical Ethics, 18, Article 60. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-017-0220-y
[5] Chandler, J. A., Van der Loos, K. I., Boehnke, S., Beaudry, J. S., Buchman, D. Z., & Illes, J. (2022). Brain computer interfaces and communication disabilities: Ethical, legal, and social aspects of decoding speech from the brain. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 16, 841035. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2022.841035
[6] Chaudhary, U., Birbaumer, N., & Ramos-Murguialday, A. (2016). Brain-computer interfaces for communication and rehabilitation. Nature Reviews Neurology, 12(9), 513–525. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrneurol.2016.113
[7] Holz, T., Kübler, A., & Birbaumer, N. (2023). Brain–Computer Interfaces, Completely Locked-In State in Neuroethics. Neuroethics, 16(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-023-10256-5 ; Sankary, L. R., Ford, P. J., Machado, A. G., Hoeksema, L. J., Samala, R. V., & Harris, D. J. (2020). Deep brain stimulation at end of life: clinical and ethical considerations. Journal of Palliative Medicine, 23(4), 582–585. https://doi.org/10.1089/jpm.2019.0129
[8] Sellers, E. W., & Donchin, E. (2006). A P300-based brain–computer interface: initial tests by ALS patients. Clinical Neurophysiology, 117(3), 538–548. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clinph.2005.06.027
[9] Poppe, C., & Elger, B. S. (2024). Brain-Computer Interfaces, Completely Locked-In State in Neurodegenerative Diseases, and End-of-Life Decisions. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 21(1), 19–27. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-023-10256-5
[10] Bottorff, E. (2025). The Aftermath of Abandoned Neurotech: Ethical and Regulatory Challenges in the Dawn of Brain-Computer Interfaces. Knowing Neurons. https://knowingneurons.com/abandoned_neurotech/
[11] Blain-Moraes, S., Schaff, R., Gruis, K. L., Huggins, J. E., & Wren, P. A. (2012). Barriers to and mediators of brain-computer interface user acceptance: Focus group findings. Ergonomics, 55(5), 516–525. https://doi.org/10.1080/00140139.2012.66108
The Hidden Legacy of U.S. Foreign Policy in Argentine Memory Sites
Full text linkThis paper explores the consequences of the United States’ support for the military dictatorship in Argentina from 1976 to 1983, through the provision of political, military, and economic aid to the repressive regime. Employing the theoretical framework of memory studies, I interrogate how the legacies of U.S. foreign intervention in Argentina impact collective memory of the dictatorship and human rights in both countries today. I turn towards the establishment of Argentine memory sites - through the country’s transitional justice process - as a means of reckoning with the violent legacies of the past. I examine what the United States has done to acknowledge its past human rights record in Argentina and how else it might be held accountable for a more conclusive truth and reconciliation process to occur in both countries. By bringing memory studies and foreign policy into conversation, I argue that the search for truth and justice in post-dictatorship Argentina is incomplete without acknowledgement and accountability from the United States as well
Brooklyn’s Deadly Darling: Environmental Remediation, Gentrification, and Resistance to Change the Gowanus Canal
Full text linkGreen gentrification and ongoing displacement collide in this study of the changing Gowanus Canal and the neighborhood surrounding it. The Gowanus Canal has been the site of anthropogenic manufacturing, development, and pollution for centuries at this point, and is widely known as a carcinogenic cesspool of Brooklyn. However, as clean-up efforts continue, housing costs in the area have skyrocketed, leading locals to resist projects that would make the Canal and its surroundings safer in the name of preserving the working-class spirit and culture of the neighborhood. The Gowanus neighborhood represents a unique case study to examine how the human right to housing conflicts with the human right to a healthy environment, as the green growth cycle wreaks havoc on locals’ financial ability to remain in the area. The issue of canal cleanup is one that will only increase in relevance, as climate change pushes more superstorms into New York City. The Gowanus Canal serves as a runoff site for raw sewage that floods during times of extreme precipitation, and with an increase in such weather events, extremely contaminated and poisonous water will more often breach its banks. Neglected by the city, exploited by developers, and in dire need of environmental intervention, the Gowanus Canal is a growing local challenge, as is navigating its remediation in a socially responsible way
The Socioeconomic Right to Education: Accessibility and its Implications for the Validity of Affirmative Action Measures
Full text linkIn 2012, Black, Brown, and Indigenous students made up over 60 percent of students enrolled in primary and secondary education in Brazil; yet, they made up only 40 percent of the student population in higher education. This underrepresentation of minority students indicates that these students face additional barriers, such as the effects of systemic racism, to accessing higher education in Brazil. The human rights framework has sought to address such inequalities in various ways, including by recognizing the right to education in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Under the ICESCR, state parties are obligated to dismantle structural barriers that hinder full educational participation and establish equitable education policies. As Brazil is a state party to the ICESCR, it is crucial to further investigate persistent barriers to education.
This paper will analyze the international community’s construction of the accessibility feature of the right to education. The Brazilian Supreme Federal Court’s ruling in Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental (ADPF) 186 will be analyzed to explore how domestic legal action can affirm or weaken the enforceability and public legitimacy of a human right. The ruling’s successes, critiques, and impact on future litigation involving the right to education will be discussed. This paper will draw on scholarship from human rights activists and legal scholars to examine how ADPF 186 contributed to the implementation of accessible education in Brazil. It will also explore how the presence of rights-affirming norms in domestic contexts (non-discrimination, universality, and interdependence) impacts the efficacy of introducing human rights principles into domestic legislation, arguing that both international and domestic action is necessary for the realization of human rights
Haunting: The Ghost of Colonialism in Antarctica
Full text linkIt’s a windy spring evening when Elizabeth Rush is offered a place on a research expedition to Antarctica—the opportunity of a lifetime. A continent shrouded in snow and uncertainty, Antarctica and its glaciers are kingpins in the conversation on climate change, and Rush takes seriously this opportunity to better understand its complexities, detailing her experiences before, during, and after the expedition in her narrative essay “Searching for Women’s Voices in the Harshest Landscape on Earth.” The title suggests that this essay will be concerned with a gender-specific approach to the icy continent.
However, as Rush delves into the history of Antarctic exploration in an effort to prepare for her upcoming trip, the words on the page puzzle together like an optical illusion revealing itself to faintly spell out another: colonialism. Yet nowhere in the text does the word or any of its variants appear explicitly. In fact, the only mention of a “colony” refers to a group of emperor penguins, who—despite their name—have nothing to do with human political or economic systems. Why, then, does Rush employ language and imagery associated with colonialism to describe Antarctic exploration without ever naming it? The answer lies in the driving factors behind the initial Antarctic expeditions that she investigates.
Upon initial reading, it appears that Rush characterizes historical Antarctic expeditions and the dated perspectives that frame them in two main ways: through violence and through the urge to conquer. The latter comes through explicitly—shortly before embarking on her own expedition, Rush reads a New York Times article that describes two men, Colin O’Brady and Louis Rudd, as “[hoping] to conquer a continent that has become the new Everest for extreme athletes.” Pushing back against this narrative of conquest, Rush writes that
[t]o pit O’Brady and Rudd against the elements is to continue to drive a wedge between man and nature, to make of this place that we know so very little about, into a hurdle, a hindrance, a problem. . . . a poetic metaphor, a thing that must be overcome in order for the singular human being to rise up. . . . a place to be conquered. . . .
In her critique of the traditional lens of understanding Antarctic exploration, Rush evokes language reminiscent of the rhetoric justifying Manifest Destiny in the nineteenth century through the fantasy of a region unfamiliar to humans and instead run only by nature. Unsubdued and untamed, this land is meant to be subdued, to be tamed. The use of the verbs “overcome” and “conquer” in particular fuels this allusion, as nature becomes a wild thing to subjugate, to domesticate, to assert superiority over. The verb “must” is also vital, evoking the inevitability that defined Manifest Destiny; just as Manifest Destiny was framed as a pressing duty, so too does this perspective on Antarctic exploration push for domination as an act of human triumph.
Consequently, it is also a perspective that is underlined by violence. Rush quotes Sara Wheeler’s Terra Incognita, which makes the declaration that “[m]en have been quarrelling over Antarctica since it emerged from the southern mists, perceiving it as another trophy, a particularly meaty beast to be clubbed to death outside the cave.” Not only is the exploration of Antarctica compared to the killing of an animal, but this killing is described viscerally and brutally through the specificity and vividity of “clubbed to death” as opposed to “killed.” So too is the attitude of these men toward female explorers entering Antarctica shadowed by violence; Rush writes that “[w]hen New York Times journalist Walter Sullivan wrote of the first all-women scientific expedition to the South Pole . . . he described the undertaking as ‘an incursion of females’ into ‘the largest male sanctuary remaining on this planet.’” In this framework, the first all-women expedition is an “incursion” on the existing “sanctuary”—language that echoes aggressive warfare and military campaigns. The men of the time viewed Antarctic expeditions through the lens of violence and accordingly framed an all-women expedition through that same violence, unable to conceive of it as different from another instance of invasive violence. The echoes of invasion, in turn, call to mind colonialism, which haunts readings of early Antarctic explorations.
The ghost of colonialism makes the time that Rush spends with Ursula K. Le Guin’s short story “Sur”—a fictional account of an all-female Antarctic expedition—even more striking; the characters are not only all women but also all Latin-American, an ancestry influenced by Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonization. It is this stark inversion of the identities of traditional and historical Antarctic explorers that renders “Sur” so revolutionary. Men from the Global North, bearing legacies as colonizers, are instead reimagined as women from Latin America, bearing legacies as colonized. The contrast between these fictional characters and their historically accurate counterparts is what allows the piece not only to stray from but fully break and abandon the chains of accuracy that other texts, such as biographies and historical accounts, are necessarily bound to by the nature of their genres. Instead, as a work of fiction, Le Guin’s work is able to reimagine not only the characters’ identities but Antarctic exploration as a whole, informed by these new identities. This kind of reimagination is what fundamentally shifts Rush’s own understanding of Antarctic expeditions, as “boundaries long built between two gendered ways of inhabiting the world blur a little.” However, Rush only speaksexplicitlyon the axis of gender. The juxtaposition of “a relic of exploration” amidst “domestic bobbles” is what she names as striking, while the juxtaposition of “Rosita’s christening dress and Juanito’s silver rattle,” prized mementos belonging to children with names that reflect their ethnic background and culture, against the Norwegian “finneskos” remains unmentioned. Again, Rush shies away from the axis of colonized versus colonizer.
More thorough examination of Rush’s investigation of these expeditions, however, complicates this reading. In her mention of the “Heroic Age of Antarctica Exploration,” Rush remarks that the explorations were “undeniably driven and largely dominated by countries from the global north.” The mention of the Global North here and its domination calls to mind colonization—nations that gained wealth through such conquest again seeking more land to exert control over. The complication arises only a few words later, as Rush explains that this domination occurred because “such folly was affordable” to the Global North. The word “folly” here stands out. It is not a practical endeavor but, rather, an instance of imprudence. The Antarctic explorations are not an effort to gain capital but, instead, are a drain on disposable resources, a waste that wealthier nations can take on without so much as a dent in their infrastructure. Further, the South Pole is notably barren of life—the continent is unfriendly and devoid of “indigenous history,” as “[f]or the majority of human history no one glimpsed, let alone set foot, on Antarctica.” Definitions of colonization naturally vary from source to source. The Oxford English Dictionary, for instance, defines it as “the action or process of establishing a colony or colonies in a place, esp. as part of an effort (typically by a foreign state) to appropriate the area settled and to assert political control over any Indigenous inhabitants” (“Colonization, N.”), while the International Encyclopedia of Human Geography defines it as “the combination of territorial, juridical, cultural, linguistic, political, mental/epistemic, and/or economic domination of one group of people or groups of people by another (external) group of people” (Murrey 315). But the existence of a people to colonize is necessary—notably, a people who cannot be found in the harsh Antarctic landscape. Can the conquest of Antarctica, then, be called colonization if there is no population to colonize? If there is no capital to be gained, as has historically driven colonization? Or is this movement—despite its framework of violence and conquest and triumph over nature—not an instance of colonization but, rather, a symptom of it? Through prior colonization, countries in the Global North acquired capital, enabling them to pursue the “folly” of Antarctic expeditions. Combined with the values of individual triumph that defined colonialism and the violence that framed it, though without that same capital to gain, such expeditions are not a direct continuation of colonization but are still inherently tainted by its legacy. Colonization is driven by greed; early exploration of Antarctica was driven by pride.
To invoke colonization explicitly would be to bring alongside it the desire for economic and/or political gain that drives and is thus associated with colonization, a desire that does not align with the phenomenon that Rush details. Rush’s avoidance may also have roots in her identity. Rather than theorizing on the Latin-American perspective of the women of “Sur,” for example, Rush is able to make more confident assertions from the female lens. By not explicitly addressing colonization, so too does Rush avoid overstepping or extrapolating. She instead grounds her argument in what she knows. Identifying her avoidance allows for greater insight on the impetus behind the dominant narrative of Antarctic exploration. Further, it points to the pervasive nature of colonization. Hints of colonization come through in spite of Rush shying away from it; the themes of conquest, superiority over nature, individuality, and even the patriarchy are inextricably tied to colonial structures. The text is consequently haunted by colonization, just as the expeditions it addresses are. Thus, it is ever the more crucial to grapple with its inescapable ghost.
WORKS CITED
"Colonization, N." Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford UP, December 2022, www.oed.com/view/Entry/36538. Accessed 6 Feb. 2023.
Murrey, Amber. “Colonialism.” International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, edited by Audrey Kobayashi, 2nd ed., Elsevier Science & Technology, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10804-2. Accessed 6 Feb. 2023.
Rush, Elizabeth. “Searching for Women’s Voices in the Harshest Landscape on Earth.” Literary Hub, 16 Sept. 2019, https://lithub.com/tales-of-collective-survival-when-women-write-about-antarctica/. Accessed 24 Jan. 2023
A User-Centered Account of Urban Energy Transitions in Kampala, Uganda
No full textThe rapid and complex effects of urbanization are shifting energy production and consumption patterns on the African continent. Energy poverty is manifesting to an increasing degree and in diverse forms in low-income, vulnerable urban populations like informal settlements and/or “slums.” This photo essay shows the lived realities of the urban energy transitions unfolding across Kampala, Uganda’s many informal communities. Though residents are almost universally connected to the grid, 97% of households and businesses rely on expensive and polluting charcoal. Electricity access is precarious and residents develop personalized fuel-stacking strategies to balance the competing demands of affordability, health, convenience, etcetera. Redundancy, hybridity, and improvisation are key features of the strategies that low-income communities use to meet their daily energy needs in the face of an unreliable, unaffordable, or inaccessible grid. This essay contributes to a growing body of research that aims to center users within discussions of urban energy transitions and sustainable development broadly
Variability and inconsistency in clinical education setting terminology: a call to action
No full textPurpose: Significant variation exists in clinical education placement setting terminology amongst clinical education stakeholders. The lack of agreed-upon terminology impacts clear communication between academic institutions and clinical sites while also impacting researchers’ abilities to successfully conduct large-scale national studies. This study explored the variability of physical therapist (PT) student clinical education placement setting nomenclature across the United States.
Methods: De-identified full-time PT student clinical education placements between January 2014 and September 2023 were extracted from Exxat© Version 3. Using the American Physical Therapy Association membership profile data as guidance, researchers created broad categories that represented the clinical education placement settings. Eight unique settings along with one category for ‘mixed setting’ and one for ‘unclassified’ were identified: acute care, day rehabilitation, home care, inpatient rehabilitation, long-term acute care hospital, outpatient, school and sub-acute rehabilitation (sub-acute rehabilitation, long-term care and skilled nursing facilities). Extracted data were sorted into those categories.
Results: The dataset was composed of 132,320 clinical education placements from 178 PT education programs. There were 1,388 different labels in the dataset used to describe the settings for those clinical education placements.
Conclusions: Task forces have worked diligently to establish standardization in terminology in physical therapy clinical education. Due to the current variability in labelling clinical placement settings, the authors present a call to action for the development of agreed-upon placement setting terminology. A common naming system is proposed which may facilitate clear communication between all parties while also supporting research efforts in clinical education
Recentering Women in Judicial Decisions on Reproductive Practices: U.S. and Israeli Case Studies
Full text linkIn the dynamic landscape of legal academia, narrative analysis emerges as an essential avenue of study. Narratives shape laws, policies, and societal norms, urging parties and observers to recognize the profound influence of stories in legal discourse. Yet, the role of storytelling, particularly within the nuanced sphere of court rulings, has been undertreated by legal scholars. This Article explores how storytelling converges with legal, ethical, and feminist perspectives in court, where narratives wield transformative power, offering a critical reading of the rhetoric and narrative structure in two court cases that address the constitutionality of restricted access to reproductive practices. The first, a ruling from the Supreme Court of Israel, Arad-Pinkas v. Committee for Approval of Embryo Carrying Agreements, establishes the eligibility of same-sex couples and single men for domestic surrogacy services after years of ineligibility. The second, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, holds that the right to abortion is no longer considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This Article contends that the narratives underpinning legal proceedings are not mere rhetorical devices but wield ethical and practical significance, shaping society’s implicit image of women, their societal role, and the opportunities they are afforded. Through this analysis, this Article uncovers the underlying values, assumptions, and narratives that courts rely on and, perhaps more significantly, dismiss. Findings reveal tensions between women’s rights and competing interests—those of single men who rely on a woman’s body to achieve parenthood (in the Israeli case) and those of fetuses (in the Dobbs case). In both contexts, legal narratives centering these other figures are used to systematically downplay women’s interests, restrict their opportunities, and minimize their autonomy. This Article advocates for centering women in the legal narrative when discussing reproductive practices performed on women’s bodies. The failure to do so, it argues, causes far-reaching harm to women’s experiences and life opportunities. Lessons from both cases are relevant to ongoing and future advocacy fights and the women whose well-being depends on their outcomes
The Role of Securities Regulation in the Development of the Thai Stock Market
Full text linkCapital markets have the potential to be powerful engines of economic growth in developing nations. An efficient stock market provides the public with investment opportunities and mobilizes their savings, as well as international capital, for productive corporate financing. Market forces serve to discipline management and public ownership improves the accountability of the business sector. But developing a robust and efficient capital market is a difficult task for many emerging economies. One of the many challenges they encounter is creating an effective securities regulatory regime.
In a mature capital market, securities regulations form the framework within which the market operates. They are designed to protect the investor, prevent systemic crises and promote the market they govern. But in what capacity do securities regulations operate in smaller, developing capital markets? The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of securities regulation in the development of the Thai stock market. The first half of this paper provides some basic background information on the Thai legal system, stock market and economy, and then offers an analysis of the role of securities regulations in the 1997 financial crisis and subsequent process of recovery. The second half addresses the future of securities regulation in Thailand. It begins with an examination of the obstacles that face effective oversight by securities regulators and the regulators' efforts to overcome these obstacles. The paper concludes with an evaluation of the current reform initiative and a proposal for an alternative strategy. In short, this paper seeks to analyze the role that securities regulation has played, will likely play and could play in the development of the Thai stock market