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Section 1983: A Strict Liability Statutory Tort
No full textScholars have traditionally framed Section 1983 as a “constitutional tort,” and they have recently devoted much attention to critiquing one side effect of that constitutional rhetoric: the doctrine of qualified immunity. That approach misses a more fundamental issue: the transformation of Section 1983 into a fault-based tort. Through textual and historical analysis as well as reliance on tort theory, this Article demonstrates how the judicial rewriting of Section 1983 has undermined its effectiveness and diverged from the Reconstruction Congress’s intent. The Article argues that Section 1983 should be interpreted as a strict liability statutory tort. Part I examines the history and text of Section 1983, revealing Congress’s intent to create a broad, strict liability cause of action. Part II traces the evolution from no-fault to fault liability, highlighting how courts gradually injected fault into Section 1983, both through state-of-mind requirements and qualified immunity. Part III leverages tort theory to argue that Section 1983 makes sense as a strict liability tort and serves both private and public functions traditionally associated with common-law torts, thereby highlighting tort law’s dualism. Part IV critiques the scholarly consensus around Section 1983’s fault principle, addressing potential objections to strict liability and demonstrating the flaws in the transformation of a harm-based statute (one prohibiting right deprivations) into a conduct-based provision (one prohibiting duty violations). The Article concludes by calling for a fundamental reassessment of the existing Section 1983 jurisprudence. It also sets an agenda for future scholarship to develop a comprehensive theory of statutory torts beyond Section 1983, exploring their unique role in pursuing specific public goals through private enforcement mechanisms. </p
“There Were No Founding Mothers”: Reimagining Constitutional Equality
No full textEfforts to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) have resurged due to fourth-wave feminism and the #MeToo movement’s exposure of widespread sexual harassment and abuse; Women’s Marches protesting Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential election; and the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent gutting of reproductive rights and affirmative action. For the first time in nearly forty years, three new states have ratified the ERA. But there are several reasons to pause and reconsider focusing efforts on ratifying the ERA. Ongoing litigation surrounding states’ recent ratification of the amendment shows the legal uncertainties in the procedures for ratifying constitutional amendments and the ERA in particular. More importantly for this Note, the ERA’s substance—written and rewritten in the last century—is insufficient to address ongoing inequities, especially for women of color. Advocates should instead concentrate efforts on writing a new amendment constitutionalizing equality aimed at rectifying the constitutional Founding Era’s treatment of people of color, women, and other subordinated groups. Beginning anew is both desirable and necessary. As conservative states inch closer to achieving the requisite number of states to call for the United States’ first constitutional convention, advocates of women’s rights and equality need to be ready with their own vision of a free and equal society. Writing a new constitutional amendment would create a set of twenty-first-century framers whose vision of equality is better informed and equipped to ameliorate ongoing inequities and to remedy severe limits in current constitutional jurisprudence. Instead of being constrained by arcane doctrinal traditions, drafters should write a constitutional amendment that promotes substantive intersectional equality, protects historically subordinated groups, and prohibits intentional and unintentional discrimination by public and private actors alike.</p
Wie wissenschaftlich ist die Rechtswissenschaft? ::Tagung des Jungen Forums Rechtsphilosophie (JFR) im September 2024 in Bayreuth /
No full text"In vier thematisch gegliederten Abschnitten widmen sich Nachwuchswissenschaftler:innen zentralen Aspekten juristischer Wissenschaftlichkeit: der Struktur rechtswissenschaftlicher Theoriebildung, dem Verhältnis von Normativität und Empirie, den Grenzen klassischer Methodik sowie den Herausforderungen durch KI und Sprache im Recht. Die Beiträge greifen auf rechtsphilosophische, wissenschaftstheoretische, linguistische und argumentationstheoretische Zugänge zurück. Dabei zeigt sich: Die Rechtswissenschaft ist kein abgeschlossenes System, sondern ein offenes, sich wandelndes Erkenntnisfeld. Ihre Wissenschaftlichkeit ist keine Selbstverständlichkeit - sie muss stets neu begründet, diskutiert und weiterentwickelt werden. Ein Band für alle, die das juristische Denken hinterfragen, vertiefen und in seinen methodischen Grundlagen verstehen wollen."-
