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[Letter] 2022 November 21, Desmond Bertrand-Pitts, CEO, Buffalo Soldiers National Museum to Hon. Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, and General James McConville, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
No full textThe Buffalo Soldiers National Museum chronicles the entire African American military experience from the Revolution to the current day. they write to urge that clemency be granted to the members of the 24th Infantry, their convictions be overturned, and the characterization of their service be upgraded to honorable
[Letter] 2022 November 22, Congressman Al Green to Hon. Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, and General James McConville, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
No full textCongressman Al Green urges clemency be granted to the members of the 24th Infantry. He recounts the events of August 23, 1917 including the injustice and prejudice faced by the African-American soldiers
[Letter] 2022 June 08, Hon. Charles J. Clarke, President General, the Original General Grand Masonic Congress of Grand Masters Ancient and Accepted Masons of the United States and Canada, to Hon. Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C.
No full text[Letter] 2022 November 17, Hon. Sylvester Turner, Mayor, City of Houston, to Hon. Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, and General James McConville, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
No full textMayor Turner requests, on behalf of all Houstonians, that clemency be granted to the members of the 24th Infantry
[Letter] 2022 February 3, (Ret.) Black Judge Advocate Generals, to Hon. Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, and General James McConville, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
No full text"We are a group of patriotic and loyal retired (Ret.) Black Army Judge Advocates. We
have reviewed both the Clemency Petition and its Addendum, submitted to the Secretary through
the Army General Counsel on 27 October 2020 and 5 December 2021. Our review of the
extensive due process failures in the three courts-martial (United States v. Nesbit et al., United
States v. Washington et al., and United States v. Tillman et al.) lead us to strongly recommend
that the Army grant clemency to the 110 soldiers convicted in these trials."s
February 3, 2022 SUBJECT: Endorsement of Clemency Petition for Members of 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment in the 1917-1918 Houston “Mutiny” Courts-Martial The Honorable Christine Wormuth Secretary of the Army 101 Army Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20310-0101 General James C. McConville Office of the Chief of Staff 200 Army Pentagon Washington, D.C. 20310-0200 Dear Secretary Wormuth and General McConville: We are a group of patriotic and loyal retired (Ret.) Black Army Judge Advocates. We have reviewed both the Clemency Petition and its Addendum, submitted to the Secretary through the Army General Counsel on 27 October 2020 and 5 December 2021. Our review of the extensive due process failures in the three courts-martial (United States v. Nesbit et al., United States v. Washington et al., and United States v. Tillman et al.) lead us to strongly recommend that the Army grant clemency to the 110 soldiers convicted in these trials. We ask the Secretary to forward these three trials to the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records to evaluate whether the substantial failure of due process in these three trials amounts to fundamental unfairness sufficient to overturn the convictions obtained as a result. Based on our experiences with military law, we believe this standard is met and that the convictions should be overturned. As retired Judge Advocates, we remain committed, along with leaders in all branches of the United States Armed Forces, to eliminating racial inequities in both the military and its related justice system. Good order and discipline is fundamentally dependent on the actuality and the perception of fairness in the administration of our justice system. The soldiers tried in the aftermath of the events in Houston on 23 August 1917 were denied the rights due them as soldiers of the United States in their trials and in the review of their clemency petitions. Although 100 years after their deaths we cannot remedy theses Soldiers’ wrongful imprisonments and executions that resulted from violations of military law, we believe that the Army can and should address the injustice by taking the requested action. Only by understanding and acknowledging failures of the past and granting these Soldiers posthumous clemency in the form of overturning their convictions, can the Army belatedly provide some small measure of justice to these soldiers. -2-
These soldiers served their nation in peace and in war, and they did so in the Spanish-American War, in the Philippine Insurrection and pacification, and in the 1916 Punitive Expedition. They willingly deployed and bravely fought for our nation in World War I. Loyalty in the military goes both ways; the Army has an obligation to provide justice to these soldiers, their descendants, and the victims harmed during the underlying events in Houston on August 23, 1917. We urge you to do so on behalf of the Army and the nation that these soldiers served so loyally.
Respectfully and sincerely,
Charmaine E. Betty-Singleton Patricia C. Bradley Kirsten V. C. Brunson
Charmaine E. Betty-Singleton Patricia C. Bradley Kirsten V. C. Brunson
LTC Ret., US Army MAJ Ret., US Army COL Ret., US Army
Sebastian A. Edwards Denise A. Council-Ross David T. Crawford
Sebastian A. Edwards Denise A. Council-Ross David T. Crawford
LTC Ret., US Army LTC Ret., US Army COL Ret., US Army
Bobbi J.W. Davis Toshene Fletcher Dolly R. Gray
Bobbi J. W. Davis Toshene Fletcher Dolly R. Gray
LTC Ret., US Army LTC Ret., US Army COL Ret., US Army
Deon M. Green Benjamin K. Grimes Patricia A. Harris
Deon M. Green Benjamin K. Grimes Patricia A. Harris
LTC Ret., US Army LTC Ret., US Army LTC Ret., US Army
Charles D. Hayes, Jr. Raymond Jackson Brenda Jarden-Holter
Charles D. Hayes, Jr. Raymond Jackson Brenda Jarden-Holter
COL Ret., US Army COL Ret., US Army LTC Ret., US Army
Crystal L. Jennings Kevin D. Jones Cheryl Renea Lewis
Crystal L. Jennings Kevin D. Jones Cheryl Renea Lewis
MAJ Ret., US Army LTC Ret., US Army COL Ret., US Army
James A. Lewis Juan Pyfrom Stephen T. Redmon
James A. Lewis Juan Pyfrom Stephen T. Redmon
COL Ret., US Army LTC Ret., US Army MAJ Ret., US Army
Cheryl Swangin
Cheryl Boone Swangin
LTC Ret., US Arm
[Letter] 2022 November 18, Shellye Arnold, President & CEO, Memorial Park Conservancy, to Hon. Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, and General James McConville, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
No full text[Letter] 2022 November 17, Abbie Kamin, Houston City Council Member, District C, to Hon. Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, and General James McConville, Office of the Chief of Staff, Washington, D.C.
No full text[Letter] 2022 February 3, Dru Brenner-Beck and John A. Haymond to Army Board for the Correction of Military Records.
No full textDru Brenner-Beck and John Haymond ask the board to consider all the materials and supporting historical documentation in the Petition and Addendum as they seek clemency for all the members of 24th.1
February 3, 2022
Army Board for the Correction of Military Records RE: Clemency Petition & Addendum, Houston “Mutiny” Courts-Martial, 1917-1918 United States v. Nesbit, et al., United States v. Washington, et al., United States v. Tillman, et al.
Dear Board Members:
On October 27, 2020, we submitted the Petition seeking clemency for the 110 soldiers convicted in the three courts-martial held in the aftermath of the violence of August 23, 1917 in Houston, Texas, to the Secretary of the Army through the General Counsel. We submitted an Addendum with additional information in support of the Clemency Petition on 5 Dec. 2021. Both are attached. We ask that you carefully consider all the matters and supporting historical documentation in the Petition and Addendum, which was based on the military law that applied in 1917. We have also attached a factual and due process summary to assist in your evaluation of these cases, and have included citations to the original record of trial and official records to assist in your review. We are also available to provide additional historical documentation or evidence upon request.
As we exhaustively detail in the Petition and its Addendum, these three trials failed to provide due process to all 110 convicted soldiers in the three trials. The errors identified are remarkably similar to, but far more egregious than, the errors identified by the ABCMR in its 2007 evaluation of the case of United States v. Alston, et al. These flaws and their similarity to those identified in the Alston case are described in depth in the Addendum. The ABCMR overturned all convictions obtained in that case because of a denial of due process amounting to fundamental unfairness. See ABCMR Case AR20070009496.
In your review, we ask that you consider the following points in addition to those raised by the Judge Advocate General’s Decision Memorandum of 7 Jan. 2022.
First, although representation by Major Grier as a non-attorney was legal under the 1916 Articles of War (A.W.) as we detail in the Petition, the defense representative Major Grier was required by Army regulation to provide the same duty of loyalty and zealous advocacy as an attorney. See Petition, at 24. His presentation of the racist violence experienced by the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry in Houston was limited to the anodyne opening statement which was jointly presented to the panel by the defense and the prosecution at the opening of each of the 2
three cases.1 Id. at 26-28. This evidence was directly relevant not only to guilt, but to the issue of mitigation and determination of the appropriate sentence for each soldier, but it was not presented fully to the courts-martial panels. Secondly, Major Grier made public statements to the press on the second day of first trial stating that the prosecution had proven mutiny had occurred, a statement available to the court-martial panel, and directly adverse to the interests of the soldiers he was charged to defend. Id. at 25. Importantly, Major Grier defended these soldiers under a fundamental conflict of interest, putting the interests of the Army above those of the soldiers he was responsible to defend. Major Grier kept a copy of a memorandum from the prosecutor in the case commending his dedication to the interests of the Army during the defense of the case in not raising race issues. Found in Grier’s scrapbook on the case,2 this commendation highlighted that Grier “never loses sight of his obligations to the Government,” and that “You of course appreciate fully the opportunities he had as counsel to raise race questions and so forth, which, while they might not have helped his clients, certainly would not have helped the interests of the service.” Petition, at 23. These actions do not demonstrate the loyalty and zealous advocacy that these soldiers were entitled to under military law and regulation.
Although the TJAG’s memorandum highlights the base competence of Major Grier’s performance as counsel, it ignores these issues, as well as the fundamental inadequacy, also recognized in the Board’s decision in United States v. Alston, et al., of one officer representing such a large number of soldiers with conflicting roles in the alleged crimes. Grier represented 118 soldiers (63 soldiers in the first trial, 15 in the second and 40 in the third) with the first two trials being completed in 58 calendar days (to include the Christmas holidays). The impossibility of any counsel adequately representing these soldiers under these circumstances is obvious. Grier had less than two weeks to prepare the defense for 63 defendants in the Nesbit case, in contrast to the months of preparation done by the prosecution, immediately followed by two additional capital trials in Washington and Tillman. He had no investigatory support, again in contrast to the prosecution’s use of the regimental Board of Investigation proceedings and transcripts and continued support throughout trial by its investigators.
Despite the TJAG’s analysis of the adequacy of Maj. Grier’s performance the records of trial are also replete with unobjected to hearsay and opinion testimony and the pervasive use of leading questions by the prosecution on core issues such as identification of accused soldiers. The TJAG’s analysis also does not include the diametric changes in the prosecution witnesses’ testimony between the three trials, changes that underscore the fundamental unreliability of the
1 The TJAG’s 7 Jan. 2022 memorandum is similarly underinclusive, noting only the two violent incidents between the Houston Police and the members of the 3d Battalion that occurred on 23 Aug. 1917. It ignores the weeks of physical attacks on members of the unit by the Houston Police as well as the pervasive threats of violence made to members of the unit, threats so serious that Sgt. Nesbit required guards at Camp Logan to perform their duties in pairs to protect against attack, and pervasive threats that a member of the 24th would be lynched before they left Houston
2 The Scrapbook was found in the Papers of Harry S. Grier at the US Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Penn. A digital copy can be provided to the Board upon request. 3
testimony against the soldiers of the 3d Battalion.3 The Petition and Addendum also explain the use of coercive interrogation and the subsequent use of coerced statements by the prosecution, nor that the defense did not have a copy of the Board of Investigation’s transcripts of prior sworn witness testimony to use in cross examination of prosecution witnesses or corroboration of defense testimony. Even small fundamental requirements of 1917 military law were violated; ironically Cpl. Baltimore was not advised of his right to testify or provide an unsworn statement, the President of the court-martial simply skipped him as he advised the remaining soldiers in the Nesbit trial of their fundamental right to provide testimony in their defense.
Secondly, although some soldiers received clemency by the Army in the thirty years following their convictions, the record is clear that the Army, even after recognizing fundamental problems with the proof underlying the convictions, nonetheless provided no relief whatsoever in light of demonstrated failures of proof. The Petition provides the most complete representative example of this failure in the evaluation of the clemency review of Abner Davis, whose conviction was reviewed in 1919 by LTC Edward A. Kreger. Petition, at 46-48. Not only did the Army fail to provide clemency in the form of a reduction in sentence based on the failure of proof for the murder and assault convictions as recommended by two senior reviewing Judge Advocates, it left Davis in prison for decades more, and used the fact of his unproved convictions for murder and assault as the basis for denying clemency as late as 1931. See Petition, at 48. Even the prosecutor, Col. John A. Hull, acknowledged in 1921, “that these men, . . . have as a group had less clemency extended to them than any other group of prisoners that the United States now has in custody.” Petition, at 51-52. More egregiously, in his 1921 review for the Secretary of War, Hull questioned whether Corporals Tillman, Geter, and Mitchell had even left the camp that night (and the records of trial raises significant doubt that they did so), yet despite these questions as to guilt, no clemency was provided, and they remained in prison for many more years. The historical record belies the TJAG’s assertions that these soldiers clemency petitions were considered in good faith by the Army, and the fact that Hull, the prosecutor in the first two trials, conducted the 1921 review for the Secretary of War, a review that terminated ongoing congressional inquiries on behalf of these soldiers, speaks for itself. See Petition, at 46-52.
The failure of the Army to hold the commander of the 3d Battalion, Maj. Kneeland Snow accountable for his abandonment of his unit and complete failure of leadership that night, as recommended by Brig. General Chamberlain, the Army Inspector General, is exacerbated by its decision to promote him on 31 August 1918, a little more than a year after his running away from his unit in panic, and prior to the last of the executions of his soldiers. The Petition and testimony at the City of Houston inquiry demonstrates Maj. Snow’s complete breakdown. See e.g., Petition, at Annex D.
3 These changes only become obvious if one reader reads the entire three records of trial. Given that the third trial had an entirely different panel, the dramatic changes in testimony would not have been presented to the panels that found the soldiers guilty, and the fact that the original 13 death sentences had been executed without review ensured that these changes would not insure to the benefit of those soldiers. Given the limited time for the TJAG review of the records of trial, it is unlikely that one reviewer read all 5878 pages of the records of trial, let alone the clemency and other reviews. 4
As found by the Board in its review of United States v. Alston, et al., a joint trial of 43 accused African-American soldiers, “[i]n joint trials, each accused had the same rights and privileges that he would have been afforded if tried separately.” It is difficult to conclude that each defendant in the three Houston courts-martial received the “individualized attention from counsel that the seriousness of the charges warranted,” particularly in light of the lack of investigatory or trial assistance, the limited time to prepare the defense, and the lack of access to core evidence (the Report of the Board of Investigation and its transcripts of prior testimony), and Grier’s commitment to the interests of the Army. See Alston Opinion, para. 6. The Petition and its Addendum are careful to delineate the procedures, that although technically compliant with the Articles of War, nonetheless failed to provide due process to these soldiers, particularly when all the errors and flaws are taken together to render the trials “fundamentally unfair and improper.” See Alston Opinion, at para. 9.
We ask the Board to carefully and exhaustively review the Petition, Addendum, Records of Trial in all three cases, and subsequent clemency reviews conducted by the Army. Although the dedication of the historical marker by the Veteran’s Administration and National Cemetery Administration on 22 February 2022 is important, far more important is a thorough analysis of the due process failures of these trials and impact on the 110 convicted soldiers. These soldiers have never had their trials evaluated fairly by the Army, as is shown in the historical record. The original thirteen soldiers executed had no opportunity to seek clemency from their commander or the President, which although legal under the 1916 A.W., was an authority never intended to operate away from the battlefield and was implemented in breach of longstanding Army tradition. In fact the Articles of War themselves provided the authority to suspend executions pending review of the President; an authority Maj. Gen. Ruckman disregarded in his rush to punish. The choice of the Army to try the cases using mutiny to impose joint liability, while failing to prove the specific intent required of that charge under military law, deprived not only these soldiers of their right to a fair trial, but also deprived those killed and injured the night of August 23, 1917 of the justice that they also deserve. Although there is some value in the finality of criminal convictions, that value must not supplant the requirements of justice, and the obligation of the Army to provide equal justice under the law to all of its soldiers.
We can be reached at [email protected], cell 303-229-8717; and [email protected], cell 360-960-0885.
Sincerely,
Dru Brenner-Beck & John A. Haymon
[Letter] 2022 April 5, Dru Brenner-Beck and John A. Haymond to Army Board for the Correction of Military Records.
No full textFollow up and final letter regarding the clemency petition for the soldiers of the 24th.1
April 5, 2022
Army Board for the Correction of Military Records RE: Clemency Petition & Addendum, Houston “Mutiny” Courts-Martial, 1917-1918 United States v. Nesbit, et al., United States v. Washington, et al., United States v. Tillman, et al.
Dear Board Members:
On October 27, 2020, we submitted the Petition seeking clemency for the 110 soldiers convicted in the three courts-martial held in the aftermath of the violence of August 23, 1917 in Houston, Texas, to the Secretary of the Army through the General Counsel. We submitted an Addendum with additional information in support of the Clemency Petition on Dec. 5, 2021. Both were attached to our Feb. 3, 2022 letter. Our team has recently gained one day’s access to records contained at the National Archives, College Park, and these records raise at least two additional issues. First, these records substantiate that the prosecution had access to and used the witness statements and report of The Army Inspector General (DAIG) in the prosecution of all three cases, while MAJ Grier, the defense representative, had no access to these records. Second, although the Southern Department Commander/Convening Authority MG John Ruckman informed the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army that both MAJ Snow and LT Silvester were to be court-martialed for their dereliction of duty after the soldiers of the 3d Battalion were tried, neither officer was tried or suffered any other adverse consequences. As we stated in our original materials and letter of Feb. 3, 2022, instead of being held accountable for his actions during the events in Houston, MAJ Snow was promoted on Aug. 31, 1918. The newly available records disclose that additional adverse consequences were recommended against African American soldiers of the 3d Battalion, to include those who testified on behalf of the accused soldiers. The Army’s continued pursuit of negative discharges in addition to three separate courts-martial was in direct contrast to its failure to ensure that the Southern Department Commander’s explicit representations to the Secretary of the Army that MAJ Snow would be tried by court-martial.
The scanned archival records from the National Archives containing Army Inspector General J.L. Chamberlain’s report on the violence in Houston are attached. General Chamberlain’s report describes his personal investigation of the events in Houston conducted in Sep. and Oct. 1917, and includes appendices of statements of the officers and soldiers of the 3d Battalion taken in early September in the immediate aftermath of the events in Houston.1 This
1 The Chamberlain Report is located in Record Group 159 (PC-51), IG General Correspondence 1917-1934, Box 802, File 333.9 Houston. 2
DAIG report was classified as confidential, and COL George Cress, the Southern Department Inspector General, gave it in its entirety to COL John A. Hull, the prosecutor in two of the three courts-martial that followed the violence in Houston. COL Hull acknowledged that the report was used in all three courts-martial,2 yet MAJ Grier, the defense representative, did not have access to this information. This only adds to the deprivation of relevant evidence for the defense that we highlighted in the Addendum to the Petition. The Addendum provided record citations showing that MAJ Grier did not have access to the sworn transcripts or testimony of the 24th Regimental Board of Investigation which were also used extensively by the prosecution.3
In the ABCMR’s evaluation of due process failures in United States v. Alston in 2007, it weighed heavily the lack of access to a confidential IG investigation when it assessed “whether release of the IG report was so materially relevant to the charges and the defense of the Fort Lawton Soldiers that the decision to withhold it deprived defense counsel of the opportunity to fully prepare for trial.” In its decision overturning all convictions obtained in the Alston trial, the ABCMR determined this failure was relevant and adversely affected all accused Soldiers “especially when viewed in light of other factors(two defense counsel for 43 accused and limited time to prepare) involved in this case,” regardless of whether some evidence on the guilt of specific defendants was present in the record. The newly accessed records demonstrate that the defendants in the Nesbit, Washington, and Tillman trials were similarly denied access to a confidential IG investigation to which the prosecution had access and used in its case preparation.
In the Houston cases, the lack of defense access to key evidence contained within the confidential IG investigation materially and adversely affected the ability of the defense counsel to prepare a defense in the three courts-martial. First, both MAJ Snow’s and CPT James’ statements explicitly recognize that the men of the 3d Battalion were terrified of being attacked by a mob, a state of fear which resulted in the panicked firing in camp that night.4 COL Cress,
2 Id. at pdf page 8.
3 Addendum to Petition, Dec. 5, 2022, at 14-16.
4 See e.g., Chamberlain Report, supra note 1, at pdf page 145-46, 152 (Statement of CPT Bartlett James) (While counting the weapons to see if they were all taken in, James then testifies “I heard yells in camp that the civilians were coming into camp and that there was a large mob just outside the camp. About six of my company came to the door of the ammunition tent and seemed very much frightened and said there was a mob right outside the camp and asked for their rifles. I told them to go back and fall in. The noise in the camp was increasing, when a supply sergeant and a mechanic who was in the tent, took their guns and loaded them. . . . [after the first shot was fired in camp] it seemed my whole company then rushed into the ammunition tent. They grabbed their arms, tore open the ammunition boxes, and some of the men began firing out between the boxes in the tent. They seemed to be perfectly panic stricken. The light in the tent was put out and I was helped or carried outside.” In response to the question, “That such a thing as this could have occurred, you would have thought impossible?,” CPT James answered, “I would have thought it absolutely impossible. I didn’t think the men would become panic stricken at anything. I thought that even if a mob had come into camp and the men had been unarmed---as they were---they would not have lost all control of themselves. They were absolutely crazy with fear. You could tell by their faces.”); id. at pdf page 194 (Statement of MAJ Kneeland S. Snow) (In response to a question, “What was the attitude of your men after this trouble occurred—from Friday morning until you came away?,” MAJ Snow answered, “Well sir, I should say that they were very much afraid and scared. I think the morale improved some after the 19th Infantry battalion got there, but I believe that a great many of the men were stampeded by fear. I think they thought a white mob was coming after them.” Gen. Chamberlain asked, “They didn’t think that at 6 o’clock Thursday evening, did they?” To which Snow replied, “No, sir. I mean after the shooting occurred. From that time until the 19th Infantry got there, I think a 3
the Southern Department’s Inspector General, also recognized the sincerity of the fear experienced by the 3d Battalion soldiers that August night. After recommending that the soldiers “who went into town murdering and rioting should be tried for mutiny, murder, and riot; [Cress also recommended] that the men who remained in camp firing their rifles and who got beyond the control of their officers, were not guilty of mutiny, but their conduct was the result of panic that arose from fear of attack, first by mobs from Houston and later fear that those men who had left camp would return and shoot them up.”5 This fear of a white mob was explicitly ridiculed by two prosecutors in their trial of all soldiers, to include those who participated only in the panicked firing in camp. Depriving the defendants of the earlier sworn statements of CPT James, a statement that would have been admissible because CPT James died before trial rendering his prior sworn statement admissible, and the earlier statement of MAJ Snow that the soldiers were “sincerely frightened” materially affected their defense. MAJ Grier could not effectively cross-examine prosecution witnesses using their prior sworn testimony provided to the DAIG. This inability only reinforces MAJ Grier’s inability to highlight the significant inconsistencies in MAJ Snow’s and CPT Shekerjian’s trial testimony outlined in Ms. Cromika’s analysis at Encl. B to the Addendum to the Petition to the courts-martial panels. MAJ Grier lacked both access to the evidence contained in the IG report or the Board of Investigation transcripts and time to investigate the discrepancies in key prosecution witnesses’ testimony.
Further, both the entire Chamberlain report with its sworn statements and the various sworn statements included within the IG General Correspondence files6 provides important direct evidence and potential witnesses to substantiate the significant racial hostility experienced by the soldiers of the 3d Battalion as they served in Houston in August 1917. In a September 2, 1917 telegram, General Chamberlain himself characterized the “ultimate causes of the Houston trouble [as] . . . far reaching, involving race question.”7 MAJ Grier was denied access to these records, both in preparation for trial, as well as for use in his direct and cross examinations. As described in the Petition, based on his incomplete knowledge of the facts MAJ Grier chose only to present an adonized version of these issues , at the beginning of each trial. Such a deprivation of substantial supporting evidence by the Army cannot have failed to affect MAJ Grier’s representation of all 118 defendants. The degree of racist animosity the soldiers of the 3d
great many of them were sincerely frightened.”); id. at pdf page 136-37 (Statement of 2LT Charles Snider) (After stating that all the soldiers in his company turned their weapons in, and in response to a question, “It was not until the firing began that they showed any disposition to disobey or mutiny?” Snider responded, “No, sir.” He was then asked “What do you attribute that to?” Snider responded, “I believe it was done from self-defense, that they thought a mob was coming.”); see id. at pdf page 203 (Statement of COL Millard F. Waltz) (relating CPT Shekerjian’s statement that “when the disorder started the night before he did not believe any power on earth could have stopped the frenzied movements of those men. He said it was started as the officers were speaking to the men and some of the men shouted ‘Here they come, boys, get your rifles; they are coming’, voicing apparently what had been in the minds of those men, that they were going to be attacked by somebody, and they gathered their rifles and began firing indiscriminately and the disorder was on.”).
5 Chamberlain Report, supra note 1, at pdf page 214 (Southern Dep’t Inspector General Memorandum to Commander, Southern Dep’t, Re: Investigation of Trouble at Houston, Texas, Sep. 1, 1917).
6 See Record Group 159 (PC-51), Records of the IG, General Correspondence, 1917-1934, Box 801, File 333.9 Houston, Stack 390/71/25/6.
7 Chamberlain Report, Text of Original Report, Sep. 13, 1917, provided separately by National Archives and attached digitally, at pdf page 10. 4
Battalion experienced in Houston is underscored by the statement of COL Millard F. Waltz, commander of the 19th Infantry, whose unit was sent to Houston the morning after the violence to take the men of 3/24 Infantry into custody. He describes being ordered to retrieve two severely wounded soldiers (most likely Privates Wiley Strong and George Bivens) from the hospital before the disarmed 3d Battalion was loaded on trains to leave Houston. COL Waltz was instructed by General Bell to take the two wounded men with him to San Antonio, and when he “reminded the officer delivering the message what the surgeon of the 24th Infantry had said as to their condition [that they were wounded and their condition was such that they should not attempt to travel] and that I had no medical attendants or litters and no way of taking care of them on the train except in the baggage car, General Bell himself came down and said he desired to send these men out of town,—that they better be taken to Fort Sam Houston even if they died, than to have them lynched.”8 Yet MAJ Grier had no access to this information. Both Strong and Bivens died of their injuries, Strong later than evening in Houston, and Bivens days later at Fort Sam Houston.
Secondly, exacerbating the racial disparities in the Army’s holding those responsible for the violence in Houston accountable, the newly accessed records also disclose that in 1918 the Southern Department Commander accepted prosecutor MAJ Dudley V. Sutphin’s recommendation that ten additional enlisted soldiers of the 3d Battalion be discharged and barred from reenlisting as a result of their actions on 23 August 1917, and the prosecutor’s subjective determination that these soldiers did not provide sufficient assistance to the government and harmed its case by testifying on behalf of the accused solders.9 We are unable to determine if the approved recommendations were implemented, although they were forwarded to the Department of the Army for action. Additional newly accessed records also disclose that MAJ Sutphin similarly recommended that three of the cooperating witnesses used by the prosecution be discharged from the Army in the aftermath of the trials because of his opinion that the men “took advantage of immunity that had previously been granted them and simply refused to give any further information.”10 We do not know if this recommendation was implemented until we can access the National Archives at St. Louis when they reopen. These records further demonstrate that adverse consequences were meted out only to the African American soldiers of the 3d Battalion, while the Army completely failed to try the white officers whose failures in leadership largely contributed to the violence that night in Houston.
8 Chamberlain Report, supra note 1, at pdf page 204.
9 Id. at pdf page1-5 (Memorandum, Apr. 5, 1918, from MAJ DV Sutphin to Commander, Southern Department, and subsequent endorsements. These records were found in the first folder in this box. Our researcher did not have enough time to complete his review of the additional two folders. The memorandum does not indicate if these soldiers were actually so discharged, and we cannot yet gain access to the archival records at St. Louis to determine their fate. Ironically, MAJ Sutphin recommended that Acting Sergeant Major Washington be reduced in rank or discharged because of his cowardly conduct in hiding in his tent during the firing in camp and then running out of camp with CPL Baxter to the warehouse guard at Camp Logan where he spent the rest of the night.
10 Id. at pdf page 6. We do not yet know if these recommendation were approved or implemented. But the prosecutor’s recommendation of these results only reinforces concerns or coercion and possible perjury pressured by the prosecution raised by the significant alterations in testimony of cooperating witnesses between the first and third trials as described in the Addendum to the Petition. 5
We can be reached at [email protected], cell 303-229-8717; and [email protected], cell 360-960-0885.
Sincerely,
Dru Brenner-Beck & John A. Haymon
[Letter] 2021 December 3, Jason Holt, East Orange, NJ, to Hon. Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the Army, Washington, D.C.
No full textMr. Holt writes in support if the petition for clemency on behalf of his family, the descendants of P.F.C. Thomas C. Hawkins, defendant in US v. Nesbit, who was executed