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The AI Quid Pro Quo Problem: Suggesting a Framework for Patents Involving Artificial Intelligence-Assisted or -Created Inventions
Innovation involving artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly expanding and diffusing into other areas of technology. Additionally, inventors have been using AI to assist in new technology for quite a while and have likely received patents from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or “Office”) for their inventions without disclosing the AI involved in the patentable subject matter. As AI has become increasingly present in the implementation of new technology, the question of whether an AI can be an inventor has arisen. In Thaler v. Iancu and on appeal, the courts have affirmatively said no. However, this decision implicates the reliability, clarity, and incentivization of patents involving this subject matter. Given how fast AI technology has been developing, Congress should act to modernize the Patent Act to account for AI-assisted or -created inventions. In the meantime, this Note suggests the USPTO, through its regulatory power, can help alleviate these concerns by creating an identification system and requiring inventors to disclose the kind of AI involved in the assistance or in the creation of subject matter in patent applications
Let My People Go, Part One: Black Rebellion and the Second Amendment Political Necessity Defense
This Article argues that when an individual or group acts to protect a government-assailed constitutional right by criminal means, the doctrine of political necessity may serve as a constitutionally protected defense. The doctrine of political necessity builds on the common law doctrine of necessity. The necessity doctrine, also referred to as the “choice of evils” defense, exonerates an individual who creates a social harm to allay a greater harm to herself or others. Both state and federal courts have been especially reluctant to allow the use of the necessity defense in cases with political implications, in which the defendant acts to address a government-enabled social wrong.
The leading federal case on political necessity, United States v. Schoon, held that the defense is per se inapplicable in cases of indirect purposeful lawlessness, in which the defendant violates a law unrelated to the law the defendant endeavored to change. Under this rule, acts of purposeful lawlessness critical to this country’s founding—e.g., the Boston Tea Party and the Stamp Act Riots—and crucial to its development—e.g., the illegal marches that made the civil rights movement successful—would have been deemed more harmful to society than beneficial, as a matter of law.
This Article argues that all forms of purposeful lawlessness—direct or indirect, forcible or peaceable—are protected under the Second Amendment. That is, the Second Amendment embraces its own version of the political necessity defense. The history of the Second Amendment as well as the Supreme Court’s two most influential Second Amendment cases, District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, provide the proof. This Article explores this proof in detail. It also highlights tumultuous social upheavals that have occurred throughout the course of American history—including the country’s founding acts of resistance as well as major slave rebellions and modern urban riots growing out of analogous oppressions—and describes how they provide proof of the Second Amendment political necessity defense, thus providing context for the types of social wrongs potentially covered by the defense. Race massacres are also discussed, to provide both examples of when the defense is clearly not applicable and additional evidence as to why certain counter-government acts of forcible resistance may be justified under the Second Amendment. Finally, this Article uses the recent storming of the Capitol as a test case for the application of the Second Amendment political necessity defense
Law School Faculty 2022-2023
Back Row, from left to right: Fredric I. Lederer, Alan J. Meese, Caleb R. Stone, Davison M. Douglas, A. Benjamin Spencer, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, James Dwyer, Eric D. Chason, Jeffrey Bellin, Adam M. Gershowitz
Middle Row, from left to right: Margaret Hu, Elizabeth A. Andrews, Nancy Combs, Erin J. Hendrickson, Laura A. Heymann, Darian M. Ibrahim, Laura R. Killinger, Leslie A. Street, Stacy Kern-Scheerer, Allison Orr Larsen, Rebecca Green, Neal E. Devins
Front Row, from left to right: Catherine Stahl, Iria Giuffrida, Christie S. Warren, Robert E. Kaplan, Eric A. Kades, Vivian Hamilton, Thomas J. McSweeney, Anna Perez Chason
Not pictured: Peter A. Alces, Kami N. Chavis, Evan J. Criddle, Katherine Mims Crocker, Jennifer R. Franklin, Michael S. Green, Kevin S. Haeberle, Myrisha S. Lewis, Mason Ernest Lowe, Steven E. Miskinis, Nathan B. Oman, Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Catherine Stahl, James Y. Stern, Cynthia V. Ward, Timothy Zickhttps://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facultyphotos/1022/thumbnail.jp
Kids, Cognition, and Confinement: Evaluating Claims of Inadequate Access to Mental Health Care in Juvenile Detention Facilities
In the United States, almost 60,000 juveniles are incarcerated in juvenile jails and prisons every day, and, as of March 2021, at least seventy percent of juveniles in the juvenile justice system have a mental health condition. For many young adults, prison and detention centers have “become the avenue of last resort” for treatment of those mental health conditions. However, juvenile detention facilities lack the support and resources to provide adequate care, which has led to high recidivism in the juvenile population. Juveniles, and individuals on their behalf, can challenge inadequate access to mental health resources by bringing claims under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment. In evaluating these claims, federal courts are split on whether to use the Deliberate Indifference Standard or the Professional Judgment Standard, which requires a lower standard of culpability than the Deliberate Indifference Standard. This Note argues that, because juveniles are an extremely vulnerable group, the Professional Judgment Standard should be applied in evaluating claims of inadequate mental health care in juvenile detention facilities. By using this standard, more institutions could be held accountable for inadequate care, which could lead to improved access to mental health care in juvenile detention facilities
Pride Month: A Brief Overview of LGBTQ+ Legal Issues
On display in the Wolf Law Library June-August 2023.https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/libdisplays/1004/thumbnail.jp
Move Over Wright & Miller--Is ChatGPT the Only Secondary Source You Will Ever Need? Spoiler Alert...It\u27s Not!
AI tools like ChatGPT are increasingly widespread, and despite an uncertain future due to a rapidly evolving technology landscape, they are likely here to stay. Many of the digital tools used by law students and lawyers will soon be incorporating sophisticated AI technology into their platforms. Students already use ChatGPT to brainstorm, proofread their papers (or write them entirely), summarize information, and more. Failing to integrate ChatGPT into the legal research curriculum not only risks diminishing our professional authenticity with students but could also lead to the devaluation of traditional legal research skills in favor of convenient, albeit less reliable AI solutions. Consequently, it’s crucial that we find a place for ChatGPT within legal research.
This presentation suggests that we incorporate ChatGPT within the existing research framework as a secondary source. As with any secondary source, it is essential to educate students on ChatGPT’s strengths and weaknesses. This is especially crucial when instructing novice legal researchers.
ChatGPT offers several advantages, such as: Explaining complex legal topics in plain language. Summarizing lengthy documents. Identifying relevant primary sources.
However, we must also discuss ChatGPT’s limitations, including: Imprecise and/or fabricated responses. Limited access to quality training data. Outdated information (pre-2021). Dependence on the quality of user-drafted prompts. Difficulty in recognizing legal exceptions. Ethical concerns.
While incorporating ChatGPT into the existing legal research curriculum poses challenges for legal faculty, its inclusion is essential to stay relevant and provide students with a comprehensive understanding of available research tools. This proposal emphasizes the need for faculty to name it to tame it. By doing so, faculty can empower students to leverage AI and ChatGPT\u27s capabilities while educating them on potential pitfalls and ensuring they retain a strong foundation in traditional legal research methods
American Chemistry Council Global Affairs Division in Washington, D.C.
Sarah Conley will research global environmental, economic and trade issues in support of ACC’s work with over 190 companies engaged in the world of chemistry and innovation. ACC’s target areas include health, sustainability and productivity
The Unfinished Business of Desegregation: Race Conscious College Admissions
This rejection of race conscious admissions practices under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the [Supreme] Court requires a revisit to desegregation jurisprudence and practice to demonstrate why the considerations of race in higher education admissions fulfills the desegregation mandate. Given its rich history and contributions to the formation of equality norms and affirmative action, desegregation jurisprudence and practice provide a foundation for the premise that the use of race in college admissions constitutes a compelling state interest, supported by specific evidence of discrimination, that moves us closer to the democratization of education and racial equality under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
Part I summarizes the jurisprudence of desegregation law in K–12 and higher education. The jurisprudence supports the rationale proffered in Part II for a compelling governmental interest—undergirded by evidence of the present effects of past discrimination in K–12 education traceable to de jure segregation—for considering race as a factor in college admissions.
This abstract has been taken from the author\u27s introduction