16885 research outputs found
Sort by
Infrastructure Finance for the Public Good: How Asset Recycling Can Untangle the New York MTA\u27s $50 Billion Debt Load
Get PDFSystematic infrastructure underinvestment - a 50 billion of debt, COVID-19-related losses exceeding 33 to 1.1 trillion opportunity. The Article concludes with a discussion of normative and policy considerations, as well as areas for future research, including multi-stakeholder governance frameworks for imperfect public goods, ESG-based contractual mechanisms and the interplay between infrastructure policy and climate change, with an emphasis on broad-based social and allocative equity
Balancing Tradition and Inclusion: Framework Principles for an Afghan Accord
Get PDFThis Article examines the turbulent constitutional history of Afghanistan and proposes a pragmatic constitutional framework balancing Islamic principles with rights, protections, and constraints on power. After analyzing the Taliban’s current extraconstitutional rule and ideological objections to an inclusive order, it makes the case for principled compromise. The first step to constitutional reform for Afghanistan is to recognize that Afghans, the Taliban, and the international community pay a high price for disregarding law and accountability in governance. To that end, this Article canvasses the many factors that could motivate the Taliban to accept the rule of law, despite the constraints it would impose on their authority.
This Article then proposes a constitutional framework that affirms Afghanistan’s Islamic foundations while integrating participatory mechanisms and institutional checks drawn from comparative global precedents. Core principles include safeguarding citizens’ basic rights, decentralizing some provincial authorities, upholding judicial independence, and enshrining equality protections for women and minorities. The goal is to balance religious values with accountable, stable governance.
This framework incorporates beneficial aspects of participatory Islamic models in nations like Iran, Malaysia, and Indonesia without outright adopting Western norms. It represents an incremental adaptation rooted in the country’s unique needs and constraints. The flexible provisions allow future enhancement of rights and accountability as conditions permit. While risks remain regarding implementation, this modest vision charts a realistic pathway from instability towards participatory constitutional order. Afghanistan’s diverse voices deserve recognition, and its citizens warrant basic protections, regardless of regime type. This imperfect but flexible and adaptable framework provides initial foundations to escape the vacuum of dictatorship and slowly build participatory consensus suited to local realities
An Interview with W. Taylor Reveley, III (part two)
Get PDFIf you have really able, really hard working people of character and integrity, and commitment and ambition, you can do marvelous things... -- Taylor Reveley
------------------------------------
The second part of Reveley’s oral history, structured around his 2007 Memorandum on the State of the Law School, took place in the Reeder Media Center in the Swem Library at William & Mary on February 15, 2024. The second part focused on the categories of “things physical,” “things human,” “things programmatic,” “things financial,” and “things spiritual.” Topics addressed in “things physical” included Reveley’s work on capital improvements to the McGlothlin Courtroom and the North Wing as well as renovations to the law library as well as improvements to the lobby. “Things human” addressed the growth in class size and the improvement in student quality as well as the growth of tenure track faculty and the expansion of reunion efforts. “Things programmatic” addressed improvements to Courtroom 21 and court technology as well as the development of new centers and groups. “Things financial” addressed the increasing operational budget and the growth of the endowment. Finally, “things spiritual” addressed the rebuttal of Harvard’s claim to being the oldest law school and the growth of institutional pride.https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/oralhist_all/1014/thumbnail.jp
The Case of the Missing Case: How Neglecting \u3cem\u3eChisom v. Roemer\u3c/em\u3e Leaves § 2 of the Voting Rights Act Analytically at Sea
Get PDFThis article critiques the Supreme Court\u27s decision in Allen v. Milligan for relying solely on Thornburg v. Gingles and overlooking Chisom v. Roemer, a key precedent interpreting § 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Chisom established that vote dilution claims must be tied to unequal access to the political process, not just electoral outcomes. By ignoring this linkage, the Court risks turning § 2 into a vehicle for race-based electoral entitlements. The author argues that reaffirming Chisom is essential to preserving the statute’s process-focused intent and analytical clarity.
This abstract was written using generative artificial intelligence
National Center for State Courts, International Programs Division in Arlington, Virginia
No full textBrooks Alderman [1L] will contribute to NCSC’s global programs, which partner with governments, donors and non-governmental organizations around the world to strengthen the Rule of Law and democratic institutions in post-conflict societies and developing democracies
International Bridges to Justice in Geneva, Switzerland
No full textKristen Adolf [1L] will intern at IBJ’s headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, where she will conduct research and provide back-up services to IBJ’s global programming efforts against cruel and unusual punishment and in support of fair trial rights in developing and post-conflict countries
The Independent Agency Myth
Get PDFRepublicans and Democrats are fighting the wrong fight over independent agencies. Republicans are wrong to see independent agencies as anathema to hierarchical presidential control of the administrative state. Democrats are likewise wrong to reflexively defend independent agency expertise and influence. Supreme Court Justices also need to break free from this trap; the ongoing struggle over independent agencies should be about facts, not partisan rhetoric.
This Article seeks to reframe the fight over independent agencies. By surveying executive branch and independent agency department heads and supervisors during the Obama (2014) and Trump (2020) administrations, we have assembled unique and expansive data for evaluating agency performance. This data is also uniquely reliable: Notwithstanding fundamental differences in the rhetoric and strategies of these two administrations, these surveys of 554 political appointees and 4,776 career executives reinforce each other. The hallmarks of independent agency design (including staggered terms, for cause removal, and partisan balancing) neither facilitate nonpartisan expertise nor shield independent agencies from presidential control.
Our findings are striking and disturbing. Contrary to the goals and assumptions of Progressive Era designers, independent agencies are not particularly expert, influential, or independent. Indeed, the very touchstones of today’s politics— party polarization and presidential unilateralism—cannot be squared with Progressive Era assumptions about both independent agency decision-making (including that agency decision-making is expert, apolitical, fact-based, and durable) and the willingness of political actors to support independent agency decision-making. Correspondingly, we recommend that Congress no longer turn to the independent agency design when establishing new federal programs. Our data also calls attention to a critical divide between major and smaller independents. In the maelstrom of party polarization and presidential efforts to gain control of major independent agencies, smaller independents are largely forgotten by a government that has too many agencies to manage and too many Senate-confirmed vacancies to fill. In other words, our government is overburdened and these agencies are its orphans. We recommend that smaller independents be relocated to the executive branch where they would benefit from coordinated executive branch initiatives, Department of Justice representation, and Office of Management and Budget review. For the major independent agencies, we argue that the independent agency design may not work well but ought not to be completely jettisoned. It is not obvious that these agencies will be more successful in the executive branch and there are risks of unintended negative consequences