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Contagion. FTX, A Sector\u27s Crisis & Crypto\u27s Silent Victims
Late 2022 was crypto’s Minsky moment, characterized by wholesale sector collapse and over a dozen major bankruptcies, including FTX’s implosion. For millions of investors, it was the worst of all worlds, combining the frenetic contagion of 2008 with consumer protections most reminiscent of the Panic of 1907.
While the industry’s challenges are often attributed to the nature of crypto itself, the true root cause reflects a fundamental category error. This Article’s comprehensive market taxonomy identifies as the sector’s nexus of risk entities it terms “Crypto Platforms,” like FTX. Crypto Platforms are essentially financial institutions – a cauldron of externalities subject to comprehensive oversight and tailored insolvency frameworks. Yet, despite presenting similar risk profiles, Crypto Platforms have not been treated as such, evolving in an unsupervised parallel universe-turned systemic risk tinderbox. Compounding the challenges, Crypto Platforms appear generally ill-suited for the Chapter 11 reorganization processes to which they have inaptly defaulted.
Crypto’s 2022 crisis and exceptionally problematic bankruptcies underscore the need for a paradigm shift with respect to sector oversight and insolvency resolution. First, to prevent future crises, regulation must emphasize substance irrespective of form – uniform treatment for uniform risks – while evolving beyond an instrument-level approach toward broader sector oversight including Crypto Platforms as well as emerging risks. Second, distressed Crypto Platforms should follow the financial institution bankruptcy template: orderly liquidation to facilitate prompt return of customer assets. Both recommendations are actionable using existing legal tools, without the need for bespoke crypto-specific legislation or regulatory action
International Bridges to Justice in Geneva, Switzerland
Laura Langford [1L] will intern at IBJ’s headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, where she will conduct research and provide back-up services to IBJ’s global programming efforts against cruel and unusual punishment and in support of fair trial rights in developing and post-conflict countries
United States Institute of Peace in Washington, D.C.
Natalie Kruczkowski [1L] will serve on a team working to prevent atrocities in the context of conflict and supporting accountability for war crimes. As a federal institution, USIP assists governments and civil society organizations operating in conflict zones by contributing policy recommendations, educational resources and training programs
National Center for State Courts, International Programs Division in Arlington, Virginia
Sarah Conley [2L] will contribute to NCSC’s global programs, which partner with governments, donors and non-governmental organizations around the world to strengthen the Rule of Law and democratic institutions in post-conflict societies and developing democracies
Legal Resources Centre in Cape Town, South Africa
Venus Amadi [1L] will contribute to LRC’s mission of providing free legal assistance to South Africans dealing with the after-effects of apartheid. The Centre focuses on eliminating persistent inequalities that underlie structural and intergenerational economic and social discrimination. It was founded on the idea that lawyers have a particular responsibility in the face of gross injustices
We Are All Cafeteria Originalists Now (And We Always Have Been)
In Memory and Authority, I argue that Americans, both in politics and in constitutional culture, are ‘cafeteria originalists.’ They pick and choose when to follow the views of the founders, framers, or adopters (as they understand them) and often artfully recharacterize these principles to support contemporary political and legal arguments.” Like customers in a cafeteria who take the chocolate cake and leave the boiled kale, Americans pick the features of the framers they like to support their arguments, and leave other, less savory, features behind.
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My central claim is that cafeteria originalism is not a pathology or a falling away from a pure or correct version of constitutional interpretation. Quite the contrary, the persistence of cafeteria originalism in American constitutional culture reveals the deep rhetorical structure of American constitutional law. That is why non-originalists make originalist arguments all the time without thereby being converted to the originalist creed. Conversely, that is why conservative originalists who argue that originalism is the only legitimate approach have always had to leaven their theories with qualifications, exceptions, and epicycles, and why originalist judges routinely ignore originalist arguments in many cases. It is also why conservative originalists appointed to the Supreme Court will inevitably disappoint their fellow originalists in the academy who insist on theoretical purity and logical consistency. The disappointment, however, stems from an unrealistic vision of what originalist argument really is and how it works in American legal culture.
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Whether our constitutional interpretations are right or wrong in any particular case, we are all cafeteria originalists, and we always have been. The most plausible versions of interpretive theory—including, as I shall explain, the most plausible versions of originalism—make their peace with cafeteria originalism; indeed, they enjoy the smorgasbord.
This abstract has been taken from the author\u27s introduction
Shared Memories and Constitutional Foundations
It is significant that the first word in the title of Jack Balkin’s new book [Memory and Authority] is “memory.” A repeated theme of the book is that what binds a nation—or a constitutional order—together is shared memories around which diverse individuals can gather together and therefore establish themselves as a community. Balkin refers to an impressive array of sources with regard to the topic of “public memory,” but I want to concentrate on one of them, which is cited but not extensively discussed. That is Ernest Renan’s famous speech, delivered at the Sorbonne in Paris on March 11, 1882, under the title, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? (“What Is a Nation?”).
This abstract taken from the author\u27s opening paragraph
Personhood, Politics, Assisted Reproduction, and the Law Post-\u3cem\u3eDobbs\u3c/em\u3e
With the end of the federal constitutional right to abortion, state legislatures and state courts have become far more important in the sphere of reproductive rights. Before Dobbs, anti-abortion advocates had significant (albeit increasingly porous) ceilings on what they could prohibit in relation to reproductive health care. A significant check on those actions is now gone.
In the wake of Dobbs, societal debates about personhood have increased and expanded in terms of their practical implications. Before Dobbs, anti-abortion advocates admitted that Roe and subsequent cases limited the scope of their arguments, especially in relation to the legality of in vitro fertilization. That limit is gone. In the aftermath, many supporters of the right to an abortion saw the need to affirmatively express their support of the right to an abortion, leading to a sharp increase in participation in state and local elections.
As indicated by the bipartisan reactions to the Alabama Supreme Court decision in LePage v. Center for Reproductive Medicine P.C., post-Dobbs, assisted reproduction is in danger of illegalization as efforts to move personhood closer to conception, in the targeting of abortion, now impact assisted reproduction, especially in vitro fertilization. As a result, legislators of both parties should continue to enact legislation that protects assisted reproduction in the United States and eventually subsidize access to it