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Consent in Marriage: A Radical Feminist Analysis of Pakistani Law
In Abdul Kadir v. Salima, Mahmood J summarised the nature of a Pakistani wife’s duties under Islamic Law. The nikkah contract “imposes submission on the wife when summoned to the couch and confers on him the power of correction when she is disobedient or rebellious.” Earlier, a similar pronouncement was made across the ocean in the United Kingdom by Sir Matthew Hale that through the marriage contract the “wife hath given herself to the husband, consent of which she cannot retract.” Marital rape was later recognised as an offence in the UK by the House of Lords in R v. R. In Pakistan, however, the jurisprudence behind the decision in Abdul Kadir continues to prevail. This Essay will assess the offence of rape in Pakistan and analyse the difficulty in prosecuting marital rape cases. The discussion will also focus on the underlying source of this difficulty, being the corresponding rights of spouses under Islamic law, particularly the husband’s right to obedience and sexual access to the wife. A critique of these spousal rights will then be presented using radical feminist jurisprudence, particularly the works of Catherine MacKinnon, Robin West, and Andrea Dworkin. The subject of inquiry is the nature of a Pakistani wife’s ‘consent’ in light of social, economic and sexual inequalities prevalent in an Islamic marriage and whether exploitation of the same renders a consent-based definition of rape redundant
Dissent, Disagreement and Doctrinal Disarray: Free Expression and the Roberts Court in 2020
Using the United States Supreme Court’s 2019 rulings in Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, Nieves v. Bartlett, and Iancu v. Brunetti as analytical springboards, this Article explores multiple fractures among the Justices affecting the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. All three cases involved dissents, with two cases each spawning five opinions. The clefts compound problems witnessed in 2018 with a pair of five-to-four decisions in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra and Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees. Partisan divides, the Article argues, are only one problem with First Amendment jurisprudence as the Court enters the third decade of the twenty-first century. Other troubles range from vehement disagreement in Nieves about crafting a federal rule impacting both speech and press rights to a split in Brunetti over when and how the Court should save a statute via a narrowing construction. Furthermore, perceived political partisanship separates the Justices today not only on the standard of scrutiny that applies in a case—Becerra and Janus rendered this vivid—but also on a case’s framing and the concomitant selection of precedent to steer the inquiry, as occurred in Halleck. Ultimately, the Article concludes that the rifts render free-expression jurisprudence even more muddled today than in the past. The Justices simply are not operating from the same First Amendment playbook. Worse yet, they function at times—particularly in cases such as Halleck—in a manner that strips away the increasingly thin veneer that personal ideologies are set aside when deciding cases
Contractual Tax Reform
One-size-fits-all taxation fails to accommodate diverse taxpayer circumstances. This Article proposes allowing taxpayers to contract into alternative tax regimes administered by private intermediaries. Participating taxpayers would make payments to the intermediaries pursuant to contract, and the intermediaries would be required to pay to the government at least as much as these taxpayers would have paid the government otherwise. That amount is determined based on the actual tax receipts of a control group, taxpayers who wish to contract with an intermediary but instead are chosen at random to continue under the status quo. These alternative tax regimes might better accommodate taxpayers’ preferences, leaving the taxpayers with greater utility without reducing government revenue. An intermediary could offer different substantive law, different procedural rules, or both. Taxpayers, for example, might receive lower tax rates in exchange for forgoing deductions that cause the taxpayer to engage in socially wasteful behavior. Advances in artificial intelligence make contractual tax reform feasible
Case Preview: When Is a Fleeing Suspect “Seized”?
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable “searches” and “seizures.” On Wednesday, the Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in Torres v. Madrid, a case that will provide important guidance on what constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. Here’s a rundown of the case starting with the relevant facts and procedural history, followed by a discussion of the legal issues and finally a couple of things to watch for at the argument
Hosting Online Moot Court Competitions
Due to the worldwide pandemic, most moot court and other advocacy competitions unfortunately had to be canceled this spring. A few competitions moved forward in an online format, however, and many more are likely to do so this coming academic year. The practice of law has necessarily become-and will continue to be increasingly virtual, and law schools, professors, and coaches need to prepare students to practice in a virtual environment. This session will identify lessons learned from our experiences hosting first-year oral argument and moot court competitions on line this spring, provide suggestions for organizing and hosting virtual moot court competitions, and discuss the future of moot court and other advocacy competitions
Artificial Stupidity
Artificial intelligence is everywhere. And yet, the experts tell us, it is not yet actually anywhere. This is because we are yet to achieve artificial general intelligence, or artificially intelligent systems that are capable of thinking for themselves and adapting to their circumstances. Instead, all the AI hype—and it is constant—concerns narrower, weaker forms of artificial intelligence, which are confined to performing specific, narrow tasks. The promise of true artificial general intelligence thus remains elusive. Artificial stupidity reigns supreme.
What is the best set of policies to achieve more general, stronger forms of artificial intelligence? Surprisingly, scholars have paid little attention to this question. Scholars have spent considerable time assessing a number of important legal questions relating to artificial intelligence, including privacy, bias, tort, and intellectual property issues. But little effort has been devoted to exploring what set of policies is best suited to helping artificial intelligence developers achieve greater levels of innovation. And examining such issues is not some niche exercise, because artificial intelligence has already or soon will affect every sector of society. Hence, the question goes to the heart of future technological innovation policy more broadly.
This Article examines this question by exploring how well intellectual property rights promote innovation in artificial intelligence. I focus on intellectual property rights because they are often viewed as the most important piece of United States innovation policy. Overall, I argue that intellectual property rights, particularly patents, are ill-suited to promote more radical forms of artificial intelligence innovation. And even the intellectual property types that are a better fit for artificial intelligence innovators, such as trade secrecy, come with problems of their own. In fact, the poor fit of patents in particular may contribute to heavy industry consolidation in the AI field, and heavy consolidation in an industry is typically associated with lower than ideal levels of innovation.
I conclude by arguing, however, that neither strengthening AI patent rights nor looking to other forms of law, such as antitrust, holds much promise in achieving more general forms of artificial intelligence. Instead, as with many earlier radical innovations, significant government backing, coupled with an engaged entrepreneurial sector, is at least one key to avoiding enduring artificial stupidity
Mod Money, Mod Problems: A Critique of Copyright Restrictions on Video Game Modifications and an Evaluation of Associated Monetization Regimes
Video game modifications (mods) have had a tremendously positive impact on the game industry, both in terms of commercial success and evolution of the medium. But the present court doctrine, enabled by Micro Star v. Formgen and abetted by restrictive End User License Agreements, greatly underserves the mod community and undermines the principal tenet of copyright law: the fundamental right to reap the benefits of what one has created. This Note examines and critiques the current doctrine and its ethical pitfalls. It also explores the pros and cons of current methods of mod monetization, including remakes, developer partnerships, and donation systems. Finally, it advocates for a more equitable and ethically sound paradigm of mod rights through a proposed open licensing standard modeled after the tabletop gaming industry
Solving the First Mile/ Last Mile Problem: Electric Scooter and Dockless Bicycles are Positioned to Provide Relief to Commuters Struggling with a Daily Commute
Commuters in cities across the United States struggle to find ease in their daily commute. Public transportation no longer provides residents with an adequate and reliable source of transportation.1 For many commuters, getting to and from nodes of public transportation is difficult and a deterrent from using public or shared transportation instead of driving.2 This, therefore, increases vehicle congestion and car emissions in cities. While multiple new technologies and innovations have emerged to attempt to help commuters with the trip to and from public transportation, most have fallen short.3 But two new innovations that have gained major popularity among consumers, electric scooters and dockless bike share programs, have stepped up to provide much-needed relief to consumers. 4 Electric scooters and dockless bike shares give commuters the freedom they need to easily get to and from nodes of public transportation because they are not limited to certain locations in a city.5 However, many city governments have reacted adversely to electric scooters and dockless bikes, which has and will continue to harm commuters.6 Some cities have issued all out bans of the electric scooters, while others have filed lawsuits against e-scooter manufacturers and even threatened to sue commuters using the e-scooters.7 Further, other cities have over-regulated dockless bicycles to force them to leave the city.8 These measures will not only make life more difficult for commuters now, it could have a chilling effect causing new innovators to be hesitant to bring in a new transportation technology into cities in the future. This Note will argue that instead of banning the e-scooter and bicycle companies or regulating them out of existence, city government should be expending some of the resources spent on attempting to improve public transportation on helping the cities adapt to the new electric scooters and dockless bicycles. Spending some resources in this way would do more to help commuters make daily travel easier and quicker than using all resources to improve public transportation.
In this Note, I will describe the first mile/last mile problem and explain how it plagues commuters across the Untied States everyday. I will also illustrate how current transportation technologies available to commuters, such as ride sharing services and docking bicycle share programs, are lacking in their ability to solve the first mile/last mile problem effectively.
I will then explain that new transportation technologies have the ability to provide much needed relief to commuters struggling with the first mile/last mile problem. I will describe both e-scooter and dockless bike sharing programs and first explain how each technology works. Second I will discuss why they are able to effectively solve the first mile/last mile problem for city commuters. Next, this Note will explain how city officials reacted adversely to the sudden influx of dockless bicycles and e-scooters, such as filing lawsuits against the manufacturing companies or overregulating the companies. I will argue that the way that city officials have reacted to these new technologies is harmful to commuters because it does not allow for the efficient use of the technology and thus does not allow for the technology to help solve the first mile/last mile problem.
Finally, this Note will discuss how city and government officials should react to these incoming technologies to promote the safest and most efficient use by commuters. I will argue that because both e-scooters and dockless bicycles are essentially the same as regular bicycles that commuters own, e-scooters and dockless bicycles should be regulated in a way either the same as or similar to how cities regulate traditional bicycles. Next, I will argue that cities should expend resources on creating infrastructure, such as more bike lanes and bike racks, to allow commuters to take full advantage of e-scooters and dockless bicycles in a safe and efficient way to quell concerns of fellow residents. Lastly, I will look at a new ordinance passed by the Atlanta City Council and explain how it is a great illustration of a way cities can regulate e-scooters and dockless bicycles to ensure safety and overcome concerns voiced by city residents, while still creating enough flexibility for these technologies to grow and properly serve commuters in solving the first mile/last mile problem