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Let the Buyer Beware: A Comparison of Flood-Related Real Estate Disclosure Laws of Virginia and Other States
Get PDFThis white paper examines the state of flood disclosure laws for residential real estate transactions in Virginia and compares them to those of other states that have much more rigorous disclosure laws. Part II explores the history behind Virginia’s current “buyer beware” laws and examines previous attempts at establishing stricter real estate disclosure laws surrounding “special flood hazard areas”. Part III surveys a number of disclosure laws from other states that have successfully required sellers to disclose the risk of flooding in some capacity, and examines the events or circumstances that led to the enactment of those laws. Finally, Part IV concludes with an examination of the policy implications of implementing more stringent disclosure requirements in the Commonwealth.
This abstract has been adapted from the author\u27s introduction
Digital Internment
Get PDFIn Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster, Eric L. Muller explores whether Korematsu v. United States is dead post-Trump v. Hawaii, and whether by failing to strike down Hirabayashi v. United States, the “mother” of Korematsu and a “second monster” lives on. This brief response Essay contends that answering these questions first demands grasping how Trump v. Hawaiifailed to fully address the program implemented by the Muslim Ban–Travel Ban: Extreme Vetting. Extreme Vetting can be characterized as a form of “digital internment” through a complex web of cybersurveillance, administrative-imposed restraints, and “identity-management” rationales that are referenced in the text of the Muslim Ban–Travel Ban Proclamation(s). This Essay concludes that coming to grips with whether Korematsu was resurrected by Trump v. Hawaii, and exactly how the reasoning of Hirabayashi remains a vibrant threat, depends upon confronting the full discriminatory impact of Extreme Vetting.
This abstract has been taken from the first paragraph of the author\u27s essay
Nick Armah J.D. \u2721 Looks Back at Fall 2020
No full textNicholas (“Nick”) Agyevi-Armah is a 3L at William & Mary Law, where she currently serves as President of the Student Bar Association, the law school’s student government. Nick recently shared her reflections on the law school experience during the Fall 2020 semester and the COVID-19 pandemic
When the Enemy Drew Our Attention : Reconsidering Prior Restraint in the Context of Dual Use Research of Concern
Get PDFThrough 2016 and 2017, a team led by Canadian virologist David Evans, and funded by an American pharmaceutical company, attempted to synthesize the previously extinct horsepox virus. After just six months and an expenditure of $100,000, the research team was able to successfully construct the virus “using only commercially available information, technology and tools.” In January of 2018, the team went on to publish their information in an American-based journal, PLOS ONE.
The publication was controversial because it included a potential “blueprint” for the synthesis of a genetic strand in the same viral family as the highly lethal, albeit eradicated, smallpox virus. Though horsepox does not itself cause infection in humans, some have argued that the findings presented in PLOS ONE are dangerous nonetheless because “[t]he publication of the horsepox synthesis process lowers technical hurdles for making smallpox de novo.” Evans himself recognized the prospective risks inherent in such works, noting that although he notified the proper regulatory authorities, they “may not have fully appreciated the significance of, or potential need for, regulation or approval of any steps or services involved in the . . . synthesi[s] and replicat[ion] [of] a virulent horse pathogen.”
Research such as Evans’s, which does not pose an immediate threat but could be detrimentally misapplied for a possible bioterrorist attack, is not itself unique. This type of research is categorized as dual use research of concern (DURC). The Office of Science and Technology Policy, which advises the executive branch on the effects of science and technology on domestic and international affairs defines DURC as: life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.
In the case of the horsepox virus, though the intent of the research—an attempt to craft a less toxic alternative to the smallpox vaccine—was inherently noble, its publication posed a potentially insidious threat to national security because of its ability to serve as a blueprint for the synthesis of smallpox. The commercial availability of the research team’s materials, the relatively modest sum that was needed, and the short amount of time in which the synthesis was concluded, all contribute to the conclusion that replication and ill-intended expansion may not be difficult tasks to achieve.
The publication of materials regarding DURC poses a difficult dilemma for research journals. The situation often forces publishers to choose between two, potentially antagonistic, options: help advance scientific progress through the proliferation of new information, or help ensure national security by limiting the chance of harmful information falling into the hands of nefarious actors. Transparency within the scientific community allows other researchers to build upon previous research rather than expending unnecessary resources in an attempt to reinvent the wheel. This is particularly useful in the quickly evolving field of genetic research. Contrarily, those whose arguments are more concerned with ensuring national security raise worries that the potential benefits do not outweigh the great risks within the current regulatory regime.
Weighing these conflicting arguments invokes several different considerations: bioethical, economic, and, most pertinent to this Note, constitutional. More specifically, the publishers must balance the compelling interest in ensuring national security with freedom of the press protections afforded by the First Amendment.
The research and publication regarding the horsepox virus exemplifies this DURC dilemma. Prior to getting published in PLOS, David Evans’s team was turned down by two other research journals who refused to publish its findings due to the potential complications arising from dual use research of concern. Furthermore, the subsequent calls for increased regulatory oversight and censorship over such research help frame the underlying concerns and establish the timely need for guidance in this area. This need for guidance is particularly acute regarding the constitutional concerns which necessarily follow all requests for prior restraint over the publication of any subject matter.
Although numerous political commentators, scientists, and bioethicists have commented on the issue of DURC and the oversight policies that are currently exercised over it, there has been a notable lack of discussion regarding the First Amendment rights of the researchers. To the extent that there has been such discussion, the constitutional arguments have largely been used as a shield against any call for restraint placed on the publications. To be certain, arguments for a regime in which the government is more inclined to censor a work, or disqualify it for publication altogether, are hampered by the fact that courts have been remarkably hesitant to permit prior restraint over publications in general. This idea is exemplified by the relatively high success rate of journalists in Supreme Court litigation involving press regulation.
This is not to suggest, however, that the government is never permitted to subject a publication to increased oversight or censorship. The Supreme Court has articulated an exception in instances where national security is at stake. In Near v. Minnesota, a seminal case in the jurisprudence of prior restraint, the Supreme Court articulated that curtailing the First Amendment may be warranted in instances where the nation is at war and thus subject to a unique threat of danger. The Court stated that “[n]o one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.” Since the Near decision came down in 1931, this exception has been interpreted incredibly narrowly.28 Due to the Court’s current hesitancy in accepting prior restraint, any calls for censorship over publications involving DURC would face an uphill battle in articulating a strong enough justification for the restraint in terms of national security interests.
The purpose of this Note is to suggest that the courts should reevaluate the high burden associated with the national security exception articulated in the Near decision. The Court’s reasoning in that case is nearly 100 years old. Threats to national security no longer come in the exclusive form of bullets and bombs. “In an age of terrorism, it is not just guns, explosives, and chemical or radiologic hazards that destabilize communities and countries; there is also the prospect of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens.”
As gene-editing technologies continue to evolve and become more readily available to actors who may have interests adverse to those of the State, the potential for biowarfare on a national scale increases significantly. In instances such as the recent horsepox debate, where the published materials decrease the burden of synthesizing a deadly virus and thus increase the potential for bioweaponization, courts should be less tentative in considering some form of prior restraint.
Part I of this Note will explore key cases involving the application of the prior restraint doctrine. It will particularly focus on cases involving restrictions placed against publications alleged to have threatened national security in some capacity. Part II will explore in more detail the dangers associated with the publication of dual use research of concern, whether those dangers be in the form of a bioterrorist application or accidental exposure by unregulated entities. Part II will also apply the courts’ reasoning discussed in Part I to an argument in favor of exploring the potential applicability of prior restraint in the context of dual use research of concern
University Inventions Reconsidered: Debunking the Myth of University Ownership
Get PDFMost universities today assert ownership rights over all patentable inventions (and many other types of intellectual property) created by members of the university community, including faculty, staff, students, visitors, and others. Universities then attempt to license that intellectual property (IP) to third parties, in order to generate revenue for the university and to give the public the benefit of innovations developed by the institution, often with the use of federal funds. This Article provides an evaluation of the technology transfer policies and practices of U.S. universities. Part I surveys the IP policies of a representative group of universities, showing that most universities claim outright ownership of the invention rights of most members of the university community, while a few require present or future assignment of such rights to the university. Part II reviews the history of IP ownership and demonstrates that claims to ownership of university inventions evolved slowly over the course of the last 100 years, beginning with inventor ownership as the accepted model and culminating in the passage of the Bayh- Dole Act in 1980 and subsequent case law. Parts III and IV provide two proposals for addressing problems in the current ownership and technology transfer model. One is a more “modest” proposal that could be implemented immediately by universities to bring their IP policies and agreements into line with relevant laws; the other is a long-term proposal for discussion and substantial change in which university inventors would have an option to retain ownership of their inventions, and universities could assume more natural and supportive roles as educators and facilitators
The Deficiencies of the European Union\u27s Regulatory System Governing the Classification of Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals
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The Epistemic Function of Fusing Equal Protection and Due Process
Get PDFThe fusion of equal protection and due process has attracted significant attention with scholars offering varied accounts of its purpose and function. Some see the combination as productive, creating a constitutional violation that neither clause would generate alone. Others see the combination as merely strategic, offered to make a claim acceptable at a particular historical moment but not genuinely necessary. This Article offers a third alternative. Judges have and should bring both equal protection and due process together to learn what each clause independently requires. On this Epistemic vision of constitutional fusion, a focus on equality helps judges learn what rights are truly fundamental, and a focus on who lacks fundamental liberties helps judges learn which groups need the special protection of heightened review under the Equal Protection Clause