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MORE HUMAN THAN HUMAN: A Philosophical Exploration of Artificial Intelligence
Get PDFIn this essay, I explore the philosophical implications of Artificial Intelligence through an examination of Rene Descartes. Taking influence from Ridley Scott's classic science-fiction film Blade Runner, I ask if it is possible for a machine to become "more human than human". I provide an overview of Descarte's Axiom of Existence, mind-body dualism, functionalism, and mechanical philosophy as a basis for my argument regarding the potential 'person-hood' of androids. While Descartes himself argues against such a phenomenon, modern scientific advancements beg the following questions. What does it mean to possess the level of consciousness allowing one to be labelled as a ‘person’, and why do Artificially Intelligent androids fall short of this? Should "Rights for Robots" exist to protect androids from their human creators? Ultimately, the advancement of Artificial Intelligence forces us to question what it means to be human, and if it is possible to be "more human than human"?
 
MEMETIC INTENTION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENCY
Get PDFThe mind-body dilemma has historically been one of the more pernicious problems plaguing philosophers’ intent on solidifying the mind as a construct for empirical inquiry. Thomas Nagel so aptly stated, “Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable.”1 The areas of focus in mind research that deal with the essential foundations of consciousness, like our sense of agency, often find themselves mired in conceptual elements; they are unable to produce lasting, universal, operational definitions because the mind-body problem frames the issue as unwaveringly abstract from its inception. While certainly ambitious, my hope is that my endeavours here may be useful in framing a dialogue about elements of consciousness in a familiar, scientific framework that help to, at minimum, narrow the impact of the mind-body problem on the study of consciousness. In order to accomplish this, I will first attempt to tether pre-existing filaments to create a workable analogy between evolutionary biology and the study of the mind. With such a paradigm established, I will then elaborate on the idea of the meme as being analogous to the gene by introducing the concept of memetic alleles. I will then attempt to demonstrate how this type of bottom-up approach can be useful by demonstrating its applicability to the thorny philosophical realm of intention. Finally, I will attempt to show how this can formulate the necessary infrastructure to bring seemingly unfalsifiable arguments like the hard problem of consciousness within the realm of scientific exploration. This inquiry will by no means be exhaustive, but will act as an initial step in the direction of creating falsifiable parameters in areas previously thought to hold little room for systematization
Public Apologies: A Combined Perspective
Get PDFDiscourses on differing conceptions of justice frequently presuppose that retributive justice and restorative justice are mutually exclusive in their applicability. Given this divide, it is not surprising that there is considerable debate concerning the conception of justice that obtains in a successful public apology. This paper defends the position that, as it relates to a public apology, one specific understanding of restorative justice — namely, Elizabeth Kiss’s — and another specific understanding of retributive justice — namely, Jean Hampton’s — can actually obtain together in a single act. As a paradigm case for such an apology, this paper will consider Willy Brandt’s Kniefall
New Thoughts on Consciousness
Get PDFI will attempt to introduce some new ideas to the equation in the hopes of sparking new life and ideas in the debate. The views of Ned Block, from his paper Concepts of Consciousness, will be examined and taken as a rough example (given that it’s all I’m looking at) of current Philosophy of the Mind. It has the benefit of looking at consciousness in a variety of ways which will be analysed. Some phenomenological ideas from the late Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception will be used as a new approach to consciousness, particularly the notion of generality and his thoughts on sensations. I will also argue that Block’s view of consciousness assumes too much under that notion. We will begin with a treatment of his concepts of consciousness
