The Oracle (E-Journal)
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103 research outputs found
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Physicalism and Experience: Edited by Abraham Tenang
In "Facing Up to The Problem of Consciousness" (1995), David Chalmers argues that the existence of consciousness, by which he means experience (the term I will use hereafter), makes physicalism impossible and forces us to conclude that experience is a fundamental property of the world and some form of dualism is true. In his view, there is an explanatory gap between the physical and the experiential, and experience must be fundamental. He begins his argument by distinguishing the easy problem(s) of consciousness and the hard problem of consciousness. The easy problems consist of scientific problems, i.e., those that scientific methods can solve. This category includes questions such as what differentiates being awake from being asleep, our ability to access and report on our internal states, etc. These problems deal fundamentally with how we behave externally. Therefore, we can answer these questions by observing behaviour, developing predictive, testable theories which explain the observed behaviour and conducting experiments which test the predictions made by the available theories
Deprivation of Possibility: Implications for Socioeconomic Inequality: Edited by Abbey Hurri
Policies proposed to narrow North America’s growing economic class divide are often accused of violating rights to personal autonomy. Redistributive practices are thought to use innocent individuals as a means to benefit others. This serves as an easy argument against socioeconomic equality policies. To avoid this personal autonomy counterargument, I suggest that society has a moral requirement to increase socioeconomic equality consistent with the belief that it is harmful to be deprived of possibilities for one’s life. By deriving three core principles from Nagel’s views on death and possibilities, and applying those principles to the discussion of socioeconomic inequality, I demonstrate that our society is failing to uphold its moral obligation to those it disadvantages
Is Human Love Essentially Transactional? An Examination of Unconditional Love and Reciprocity: Edited by Amy Guillen-Lanza
This paper examines whether human love inherently follows transactional logic—requiring reciprocity and mutual benefit—or if it can exist authentically as unconditional love, independent of reciprocal conditions. Through everyday analogies and philosophical exploration, the essay argues that genuine love, particularly unconditional love, does not necessitate reciprocity. Instead, its authenticity lies in the intrinsic value of love and its associated emotions. To contextualize unconditional love, the essay first contrasts it with transactional relationships, exemplified by capitalist exchanges like selling handmade items. These economic interactions clearly illustrate the human tendency toward reciprocity and mutual benefit. However, not all attachments or affections strictly follow transactional logic. Examples such as the human fascination with indifferent creatures like cats, nurturing a flowerless plant, or a swimming coach experiencing genuine happiness through students' successes illustrate love or care that persists without explicit reciprocity. These examples set the stage for deeper philosophical analysis. The paper then explores Greek Philosopher Aristotle’s three categories of friendship—utility, pleasure, and goodness—to distinguish conditional relationships that inherently require mutuality. Subsequently, it examines German Philosopher Immanuel Kant’s ethical framework, emphasizing good will and moral actions undertaken purely for intrinsic value rather than external rewards, which aligns closely with the concept of unconditional love. Finally, Persian Poet Rumi’s perspective underscores love as fundamentally unconditional, selfless, and free from transactional expectations, reinforcing the authenticity of unconditional love. Addressing potential objections, the essay clarifies that unconditional love does not imply tolerance of harmful or emotionally draining situations but coexists with self-respect and healthy boundaries. Ultimately, unconditional love is presented as an authentic, meaningful, and practically relevant aspect of human experience—real, sincere, and fundamentally independent of reciprocity or conditions
Is Arithmetic Synthetic? A Defense of Kant Against Frege’s Logicistic Definition of Numbers: Edited by Nick Cicchini
Here I will assess Kant and Frege’s views on whether arithmetic is analytic or synthetic. I begin by presenting Kant’s definitions of syntheticity and how it applies to arithmetic in the Critique of Pure Reason, and then proceed with Frege’s framework of logicism in the Foundations of Arithmetic and his definitions of numbers through sets and equal numerosity. In the third section, I argue that Frege’s definition of numbers using set theory is insufficient to prove arithmetic as analytic, for the concepts and sets under the logicistically defined subject and predicate do not fulfill the two necessary containment relations that are conditions to analyticity in reciprocity. Furthermore, I argue that Frege presupposed Kantian epistemology by invoking intuition. Overall, my essay presents a defense of Kant’s assessment of arithmetic as synthetic a priori against the attack from Frege’s logicism that holds arithmetic to be analytic
Sexual Liberalism as Wantonism: A Frankfurtian Defense of Srinivasan: Edited by Micheal Habib
In "The Right to Sex: Feminism in the Twenty-First Century", Amia Srinivasan offers a new view of sexual desire situated between sexual conservatism and liberalism. She argues that sexual desire should be within the purview of feminist critique given that conventional desires often reflect systems of domination, and that the critique of desire is a way to emancipate ourselves from such systems. However, critics worry that any kind of critique of desire runs the risk of returning to sexual conservatism. To help motivate Srinivasan’s theory, I introduce Harry Frankfurt’s “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” to draw upon the concept of a “wanton” to first help critique the liberal view of desire, and to offer a way of critiquing our own desire without running into the problems of sexual conservatism
The Maternal Body Bears Violence: A Feminist Contractarian Reply to Giubilini and Minerva: Edited by Adam Bruni
The Giubilini and Minerva article “After-birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?” invites a feminist contractarian ethical position to defend their premises. Factoring in sociopolitical conditions that impact reproductive health, “After-birth Abortion” morally reflects on the lived experiences of women. Infanticide is then proposed as a response to structural inequalities that disproportionately burden childbearing individuals and the greater family unit. Objections outside of the feminist ethical lens attempt to disband these premises through reductio ad absurdum. Yet the maternal body absorbs absurd violence, therefore, absurd violent solutions must be considered when renegotiating the social contract for those harmed by reproductive inequality