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Reseña de¨ The Genesis of the Symbolic. On the Beginnings of Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophy of Culture¨ de Arno Schubbach
No full textDe la Paz Liberal a la Paz Militar: una nueva manera de hacer y (des)regular el uso de la fuerza
No full textThe international peacebuilding agenda is undergoing a series of transformations that have led the literature to question whether we are still within what has been called the Liberal Peace - a set of policies, understandings and approaches to conflict management whose main objective was to achieve peace through the reform of so-called conflict states, promoting liberal democracy, development and human rights. While this model has been in a state of flux and has had to adjust to each context, since around 2010 a loss of faith in the actual possibility of peace and political reform of states, and a tendency to seek military victories and to increase the provision of war resources to states in conflict, has taken hold. These two aspects have had other consequences, such as the loss of the multilateral context that had made Collective Security possible within the United Nations, a shift towards state protection and a condemnation of the civilian population, which is now seen as a threat.
The literature has provided three different readings to understand these changes. The first focuses on the objectives and normative foundations on which the Liberal Peace was based (Chandler, 2017; Bargués, 2020; Juncos, 2017; Moe, 2018). The second focuses on the actors who carry out peacebuilding (Krause, 2021; Xinyu, 2020). Along these lines, Lewis et al. (2018) argue that Liberal Peace is being replaced by Authoritarian Conflict Management, which, led by Russia and China, is characterised by a goal of controlling widespread violence rather than addressing the deep roots of conflict. And, third, it focuses on the means and operating principles of peacebuilding, including doctrinal shifts in peacekeeping, signalling an \u27aggressive\u27 and \u27militarising\u27 turn in the Liberal Peace (de Coning et al., 2017; Cunliffe, 2015, 2016; Karlsrud, 2017, 2019; Pugh, 2015; Tardy, 2011; Tull, 2018).
While this literature has been very sharp in identifying changes in peace interventions and conflict management, and the turn to the military, there has been no real analysis of the importance of changes in the organisation of war as a central element in the transformation of peacebuilding practices. Moreover, there has been a crossover literature where, despite the growing literature on global militarism, there has been insufficient analysis of how it affects the international peace agenda and, by default, the implications of these changes for global structures (Abrahamsen, 2018, 2019; Stavrianakis, 2018; Stavrianakis and Selby, 2013; Stavrianakis and Stern, 2018). As Stavrianakis and Selby (2013, p. 1) argue, the reasons why scholars dismiss militarism lie not in its lack of relevance, but in the tendency to focus on security as separate from questions of military organisation and war preparedness.
Therefore, whether the Liberal Peace model has come to an end, or whether it is possible to affirm, as Coleman and Williams (2021) do, that peace operations will continue, two correlated questions arise: To what extent do the objectives and practices that are characterising peace operations and conflict management differ from the so-called Liberal Peace in order to establish that this paradigm has ceased to exist? And what are the implications for the international peace agenda of the fact that military means and objectives seem to have taken precedence over political ones?
Based on the sociology of militarism, this article analyses the transformations of the Liberal Peace from the point of view of changes in the practices of legitimising and achieving war, arguing that we are moving from a paradigm of Liberal Peace to one of Military Peace. These two concepts attempt to capture the general characteristics of the cycles of the international peace agenda. This is done with three issues in mind. First, the Liberal Peace was itself already shaped by militarism. Second, the Liberal Peace already had at its core the objective of endowing the state with the preponderant role as the manager of political, social and economic order, under the control of the security forces. Third, there is no seamless and clean transition from one to the other, as, on the one hand, the liberalism of the Liberal Peace had already been questioned, and, on the other, a liberal ethos - or assistance on the basis of moral obligation - has permeated even the initiatives that have served to revise peacebuilding in order to address its challenges and pitfalls.
Military Peace is defined as a set of practices that are characterising the approach to conflict at the international level, including: a tendency to seek military victories and military preponderance of the state over the civilian population, with political reform objectives and the aspiration for peace taking second place; the search for alliances outside the traditional multilateral channels of the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), not reflecting an international agenda as such; and a perceived need for state protection from threats emanating from the population. This paradigm is no more or less militaristic than Liberal Peace. Militarism, as a discursive and material practice around the legitimisation, normalisation, organisation and exercise of military violence that influences both social relations and decision-making and serves as a source of power, has shaped the contemporary world order and blurred the line between peace and war (Manchanda and Rossdale, 2021; Mann, 1993; Shaw, 2013, para. 2; Stavrianakis and Selby, 2013). However, there is a greater trend towards a preponderance of weapons, military actors and the use of force as an instrument of hegemony and political power (Thee, 1984, p. 296). This trend has pushed the rhetoric of liberal state reform into the background, making war a de-monopolised and deregulated instrument, available and appropriate, outside the traditional monopoly of \u27legitimacy\u27 of the great powers in the UN Security Council, the EU and NATO.
The article offers a thematic analysis of the main documents on the UN peacebuilding agenda from 1992 to 2023 and includes some examples drawn from various observations and interviews with UN officials in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). The implications are not only how we should view the Liberal Peace going forward, but the fact that new trends are being established that further normalise warfare without the likelihood of improving the impact of these interventions. To do so, first, the context in which these transformations have taken place is analysed; second, the identifying elements of the Military Peace are examined. In conclusion, it highlights the consequences that these transformations are having, principally the continuation and expansion of conflicts, the growing role of armed actors in their management, and a reconfiguration of the international order.La agenda de construcción de paz internacional está experimentando una serie de transformaciones que han llevado a la literatura a cuestionarse si seguimos dentro de lo que se venía llamando Paz Liberal – un conjunto de políticas, formas de entender y abordar los conflictos cuyo mayor objetivo era la consecución de la paz mediante la reforma de los estados en conflicto, promoviendo la democracia liberal, el desarrollo y los derechos humanos. Si bien este modelo ha estado prácticamente siempre en transformación y se ha tenido que ajustar a cada contexto, desde aproximadamente 2010 se ha consolidado una pérdida de fe en la consecución de la paz y en la reforma política de los estados, y una tendencia a buscar victorias militares y a incrementar la dotación de recursos para la guerra a los Estados en conflicto. Estos dos aspectos llevan aparejados otras consecuencias como la pérdida del contexto multilateral que había hecho posible la seguridad colectiva en el seno de Naciones Unidas, un giro hacia la protección del Estado y una condena de la población civil, a la que ahora se ve como una amenaza. En base a la sociología del militarismo, este artículo analiza las transformaciones de la Paz Liberal desde el punto de vista de los cambios acaecidos en las prácticas de legitimación y consecución de la guerra, argumentando que estamos transitando de un paradigma de Paz Liberal a uno de Paz Militar. Esto no necesariamente implica que vivamos en un mundo más militarizado o menos pacífico, sino que en contra del objetivo de monopolizar y regular la guerra que se encontraba en el seno de la Paz Liberal, el uso de la fuerza se ha desmonopolizado, haciendo de la guerra, y no la promoción de la democracia o el control de la fuerza, el instrumento por defecto en la promoción del orden internacional. Metodológicamente, el artículo se basa en un análisis temático de los principales documentos sobre la agenda de construcción de paz de la ONU desde 1992 hasta 2023 e incluye algunos ejemplos sacados de varias observaciones y entrevistas realizadas con oficiales de la ONU en República Democrática del Congo (RDC) y la República Centroafricana (RCA)
La opinión pública internacional en el contexto de la geopolítica de la globalización desinformativa. Análisis desde la teoría de la complejidad y de la baja racionalidad
No full textTraditionally, international public opinion, since International Relations studies exist, has been studied regarding international security and conflicts and public diplomacy through a point of view essentially based in the study of the States’ foreign policy. Conceptually, from an estatocentric point of view, international public opinion was considered as a sum of individual public opinions, that will converge in a later stage, mostly influenced by the traditional mass media that act as mediators and globalizing agents.
After the arrival of digital globalization, public opinion has been analyzed through theories that focus on public diplomacy, highlighting the importance of listening and interacting with the foreign public to obtain information and take it into account in the decision making. In this sense, political communication theories classify organizational and political actors’ messages, media content and the effects of the political behavior, while other theories that emphasize social dimension and collective knowledge amplify the study about the use and integration of new technologies.
However, new analyses are required that will consider the new geopolitical context of globalization, characterized by two main elements. On the one hand, the power of manipulation and virilization of social networks and artificial intelligence through their capacity to influence the political public sphere (Habermas, 2022; Colomina, 2022). On the other hand, the composition of the new international digital publics considering variables such as disinterest, ignorance and misinformation (Valle-De Frutos, 2023; Stijn van Kessel et al. 2021) and also analyzing how divergent international public opinions are articulated, considered as an aggregate actor that derives in social movements.
With the intention of uncovering the potential contradictions implied in the hyperconnectivity generated by digital globalization, the study\u27s main purpose is to describe the characteristics of international digital public opinion, considered as an actor in the new virtual public sphere. For this, the paper takes its starting point in the theory of complexity of Rosenau (1978) and, notably, his concept of accidental aggregation of nature as a player as well as the rational theory of low information. This will allow us to understand the actual composition of the international digital public.
Concerning the methodology, descriptive, analytical, and comparative methods are employed. The first one, to describe the international public opinion supported by international audiences; the second, to analyze theories and their application to describe the composition of users; finally, the third, to compare indicators from international reports, which provide us with quantitative data on the order and control of information and digital misinformation in cyberspace. These are based on tools, strategies, and techniques for manipulating international information through social networks and the use of artificial intelligence, underpinned in a large sample of eighty-one countries.
The analysis is organized in three parts. Firstly, after analyzing the geopolitical misinformation from 2016 until 2023, it is concluded that the manipulation of the international public opinion through social media continues to be one of the biggest threats and a current trend of the democratic critic. The most used communication strategy consists of creating misinformation or manipulated media through fake news, memes, images or tampered videos, as well as other forms of misleading online content such as deepfake. Second, there is the use of trolling, doxing or online harassment to attack opponent politicians, activists or journalists in social media. Third, there is the strategy based on data to profile and address advertisements to specific segments of society political using ads that aim misinformation and false narratives. Finally, the least used strategy is based in the censure of speech and expression through a mass complaint of content and accounts. Additionally, conventional ways to control international information are used through four additional strategies: blocking sites and social media, connectivity restrictions, VPNs blocking, and forced content removal.
Moreover, the international public opinion can almost be seen as a true agent if we consider the influence that it can have in the digital geopolitical globalization. The cyberspace was considered, in the context of informative globalization, as a space of hyperconnectivity of the global society, with a potential access to information. This has had importance consequences which are, on the one hand, an excess of information or regular reports and, on the other hand, a bigger conscience about the international events, which doesn’t necessarily mean a greater knowledge thereof. However, this first contradiction about the potential effects of hyperconnectivity doesn\u27t automatically generate a common interest, knowledge or connection from the international public towards global challenges. In this regard, as the new media includes web 2.0, social media and logs are now characterized by their disconnection, their selflessness and the unknown.
Furthermore, contrary to traditional thesis about the international public being unstable and contracting in international or defense politics matters, other theories have claimed that the public can reach reasonable outcomes and have attitudes towards international relations, despite not having the complete information about global events. Since the release of theories like the rationality of low information, we can assume that the public can generate their own international images and arguments from various factors. Firstly, the structure of values and beliefs, which helps them to judge and guide their evaluations about international issues without any specific knowledge in one of the fundamental factors. In second place, the trust dimension, as a part of the structure of beliefs, is also a cultural factor that can determine the attitude and opinions towards international issues.
To conclude, it is set that international public opinion is a transcultural agent that transcends cultural borders, as if a natural agent of accidental aggregation, articulated and non-intentional, can become deliberate. This process can take place through a transformation of different phases. In the first phase, they spontaneously form groups of individuals with similar opinions about a specific matter coexisting in a determinate time. Meanwhile, this group formed by accidental aggregation can become, in a second phase, a deliberate aggregation when they believe that their opinions, shared with individuals from other countries, generate a conscience about a matter that can be made into a collective action. When this action achieves a continuity and a certain degree of structure and organization, it can assume the identity of a social movement, which usually has a leadership or a main voice. In this regard, the evolution or prediction of public behavior can be described through two transformations. The first one, related to cognitive character, in which the public acts following their idiosyncratic beliefs from the shared norms that could potentiate and produce a common cultural foundation. This determines and configures the transcultural international public opinion. Secondly, the relational character, which means that the international public or crowd is perceived as an expansion of the individual in a group identity, increasing the trust, respect, cooperation, and mutual help behavior, which would generate the creation of groups that could unleash collective actions and possible international movements.Tradicionalmente la opinión pública internacional ha sido estudiada, desde la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales, en relación con los asuntos de seguridad y conflictos internacionales y la diplomacia pública, con una óptica basada fundamentalmente en el estudio de la política exterior de los estados. Conceptualmente se entendía como la suma de las opiniones públicas, desde el paradigma internacional estatocéntrico, y posteriormente desde la convergencia de las opiniones de los públicos internacionales con la influencia de los medios de comunicación tradicionales como agentes globalizadores y mediadores en la formación de los públicos internacionales. Con la llegada de la globalización digital, la opinión pública internacional se ha analizado desde teorías que se centran en la diplomacia pública, en la comunicación política y en teorías que enfatizan la dimensión social y colectiva del conocimiento para dar mayor amplitud al estudio de la integración y uso de las nuevas tecnologías. Sin embargo, hacen falta nuevos análisis en los que se tenga en cuenta el contexto de la geopolítica de la globalización desinformativa y su repercusión en la composición de los nuevos públicos digitales internacionales y que analicen cómo se articulan las opiniones públicas internacionales divergentes, como actor agregado que deriva en movimientos sociales.
El estudio tiene como objetivo describir las características de la opinión pública internacional digital como nuevo actor en la esfera virtual, considerando las contradicciones que la geopolítica de la desinformación puede generar sobre los públicos internacionales. Para su reflexión se toma como punto de partida la teoría de la complejidad de Rosenau (1978) a partir del concepto de actor de naturaleza de agregación accidental no deliberada para la descripción de la opinión pública digital internacional, así como la teoría de la racionalidad de baja información para la comprensión de la composición actual de los públicos digitales internacionales con baja formación e información.
Metodológicamente, se emplean los métodos descriptivo, analítico y comparativo. El primero y segundo, para describir la opinión pública internacional sustentada por los públicos internacionales, y para las analizar las teorías y su aplicación sobre estos. El tercero, para comparar datos cuantitativos de informes internacionales sobre el orden y el control de la información y la desinformación digital en el ciberespacio, a través de las redes sociales y el uso de la inteligencia artificial en una muestra que abarca ochenta y un países.
La primera parte del trabajo aborda las perspectivas sobre las que se ha estudiado la opinión pública internacional desde el paradigma de las Relaciones Internacionales, teniendo en cuenta la dificultad de su medición y la dimensión digital como aspecto clave del desafío. En la segunda parte se estudia el contexto de la geopolítica de la globalización desinformativa, con las estrategias de manipulación de la opinión pública internacional. En la tercera parte se analiza la composición de los públicos internacionales. En cuarto lugar, se describe la opinión pública internacional como actor transcultural desde la teoría de la racionalidad de baja información. En último término se incluyen los resultados y conclusiones, subrayando la aportación teórica del estudio
El efecto Snowden en la región del Indo-Pacífico: las reacciones políticas y sociales frente a la vigilancia masiva
No full textIn 2013, Edward Snowden, a former US National Security Agency (NSA), reveals a list of documents about secret mass surveillance programs created by the White House and shared with the rest of the governments that belong to the Five Eyes Alliance (UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand), to virtually spy on populations, political leaders and corporations in the name of the global war on terror. This event revives the social and academic debate on the surveillance society of the XXI century, focused in finding the right balance between freedom and security. This article is inserted into the debate of critical studies on security and on the theories of surveillance, proposing the following research questions: what is the "Snowden effect" in the Indo-Pacific region? And what is the response of government and civil society to the discovery of surveillance by the Five Eyes Alliance countries? The analysis focuses on the reaction of thirteen governments and societies in the Indo-Pacific region to Snowden\u27s 2013 mass surveillance revelations. For the analysis, eleven countries included in a 2014 Pew Research Center survey on mass surveillance and espionage (India, Thailand, South Korea, Japan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Vietnam and China) are selected, followed by Australia and New Zealand as members of the Five Eyes. Data on the social reaction to the Snowden effect in these two countries are compiled from a survey conducted by Amnesty International in 2015. North Korea is not included in the analysis due to lack of available information.
The article adopts a qualitative methodology based on the collection of information available from primary and secondary open sources. The methodology used for the construction of the different indicators covers a wide variety of sources and resources, such as newspapers, videos, and other periodicals; monographs, demoscopic surveys, polls and annual reports; official press releases and government releases; national and international literature focused on critical security studies and, more specifically, on mass surveillance.The result of the combination of an analytical and a descriptive approach is a database on thirteen countries in the region, constructed from six indicators relating to the year 2013: the first is the color assigned to the country in the Heat Map generated by the tool used by the NSA, the Boundless Informant. The second indicator provides a dual classification of regime typology, based on reports prepared by The Economist Intelligence Unit and Freedom House. The next indicators describe the relationship between the countries of the region and the US (Indicator 3) and the relationship with the Five Eyes Alliance (4). The fifth indicator analyses the official response of governments, while the last one measures the social response in terms of protests and acceptance of surveillance in polls. The methodology employed includes a wide range of sources and resources, including newspapers, videos and other mass media; monographs, demographic surveys, and annual reports; official releases and government press releases; national and international literature focusing on critical security studies and, more particularly, on surveillance and mass espionage.
The results show that the Snowden effect in the Indo-Pacific region is limited because only five governments and five societies have a reaction. Regarding the limited government response, there is a clear regional dynamic to consider: countries that do not take an official stance have good relations with the US or the Five Eyes. The external factor is also essential to explain four of the five government responses: Australia and New Zealand justify their Alliance action; China openly criticizes the Five Eyes and the US, while Indonesia harshly criticizes Australia’s actions within a logic of competition for regional power. The only country in the region whose position is not explained by the external factor is India, which calls for accountability and responsibility from its Anglo-Saxon Partners. In terms of societal reaction, data on the protests show a limited Snowden effect in the Indo-Pacific, with small protests recorded in the capitals of Australia, India and the Philippines. The Hong Kong region is the scene of widespread protests, while the only country with nationwide protests is Indonesia. In line with the government\u27s response, Australia is the target of social protests in Jakarta, where protesters burn national flags and photos of Prime Minister Abbott in front of the Australian Consulate. On the other hand, eight societies do not react to the Snowden effect. There are three possible reasons that explain this fact: first, the normalization of surveillance by 21st century societies could be a common element in the countries of the region. Second, the hub-and-spokes network of alliances between the US and its allies seems to have majority social support among the Indo-Pacific countries. Third, absent or partial democratization helps to keep the level of protests low: in this sense, the internal factor (non-democratic state, little social interest in certain issues, little habit and social inclination to demonstrate in public spaces) could explain the lack of protests in two countries classified as hybrid and partially free (Pakistan and Bangladesh) and two others classified as authoritarian and unfree (Vietnam and mainland China). On the other hand, surveillance is accepted at regional level when it is justified in the name of the fight against terrorism and, to a lesser extent, when it concerns only US citizens. In conclusion, the Snowden effect in the Indo-Pacific is limited in terms of government response due to the network of alliances built by the US, following the hub-and-spokes model. This factor is important for also understanding the lack of large-scale social reactions in the region, except for Indonesia. The lack of social protests is also due to causes such as the low level of internal democratization in some regimes such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, and the normalization of surveillance in postmodern societies. The structure of the work is as follows. The first section provides the theoretical and conceptual framework on surveillance, presents the debate generated in critical security studies, and describes the methodology used. The second part explains the results in a database of the countries analyzed. Finally, the conclusions answer the research question, placing it in the current debates of critical security studies about mass surveillance.En 2013, el extrabajador de la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional estadounidense, Edward Snowden, revela la lista de programas de vigilancia masiva utilizados por la Alianza de los Cinco Ojos (Five Eyes) hacia terceros países, reavivando la atención sobre el equilibrio entre privacidad y seguridad en la sociedad internacional. En los debates críticos sobre seguridad de la posguerra fría, los estudios sobre la surveillance cobran especial importancia y resultan fundamentales para el propósito de esta investigación: analizar la reacción de trece gobiernos y sociedades del Indo-Pacífico al llamado efecto Snowden. La metodología cualitativa empleada se estructura alrededor del análisis, la categorización y la codificación de fuentes primarias, como las páginas oficiales gubernamentales, los sondeos demoscópicos sobre la surveillance y los medios de comunicación impresos y digitales, nacionales e internacionales, combinada con la consulta de la literatura nacional e internacional especializada en estudios críticos sobre seguridad y vigilancia masiva. El resultado obtenido es una base de datos con seis indicadores analíticos para los trece países estudiados, para contestar a la pregunta de investigación: ¿cuál es el efecto Snowden en la región del Indo-Pacífico? y ¿cuál es la respuesta gubernamental y la respuesta de la sociedad civil al descubrimiento de la vigilancia y el espionaje operados por los países de la Alianza de los Cinco Ojos? La estructura del artículo es la siguiente: la introducción contextualiza el debate teórico y social provocado por el efecto Snowden; el primer epígrafe explica las principales teorías y conceptos sobre la vigilancia utilizados para el análisis, además de la metodología empleada para construir los indicadores de la base de datos. El segundo apartado analiza la base de datos y los resultados obtenidos por cada indicador, mientras que las conclusiones recogen los resultados agregados, en una perspectiva comparada, para contestar a la pregunta de investigación, destacando si prevalecen las dinámicas y la lógica regional (nivel meso de análisis) frente al tradicional nivel estatal (nivel micro de análisis)
Cien años del Tratado de Lausana: la desprotección de las minorías en Grecia y Turquía
No full textThe 1923 Treaty of Lausanne is the only international convention still in force that stems from the minority protection system established after the First World War. The other conventions and unilateral declarations that made up that pioneering system lost their validity after the Second World War. In the Treaty of Lausanne, several guarantees and rights are recognised for non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and for Muslim minorities in Greece in order to ensure their non-discriminatory treatment and the maintenance of their distinct identity.
The objectives of this paper are, on the one hand, to analyze the degree of compliance with the Convention after one hundred years of being in force and, on the other hand, to identify its specificities both in its initial drafting and in its subsequent application. In order to fulfill the first objective, we will carry out a legal analysis of compliance with the minority rights provided for in the Treaty using concurrent normative, doctrinal and jurisprudential sources. In order to address the second objective, it will be necessary to analyze other previous legal documents, basic data and the most expert doctrine on the interpretation of the historical-political variables that have accompanied the treaty over the last 100 years. The work also has the subsidiary aim of extending the knowledge of this important document and its political context in the Spanish language.
The content and official interpretation of the Treaty, read from its historical and political context, show an important ideological legacy of the Ottoman Millet system. Its consequences are projected to the present day, particularly within minority communities where internal assimilation movements towards the group identified with the historical tradition can be observed. This is the case in Western Thrace of the Pomak and Roma communities with respect to the Turkish language and identity. In the Turkish Republic, this is the case for the Arab Orthodox Christian communities in the process of assimilation towards the Greek language and identity. Although the Treaty incorporates content similar to other international conventions of the time which included clauses for the protection of minorities, Lausanne establishes a significant difference in terms of the holders of the rights provided for; that is, by excluding racial and linguistic minorities and reducing the religious factor to minorities that do not share the majority creed. This fact shows a connection between the religious tradition and the national identity that the young states intended to promote. It also shows the link with the previous Millet tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire. This tradition, which exacerbates the religious factor in national identification, reaches its peak in the parallel agreement negotiated in Lausanne, whereby thousands of people were expelled from their places of residence without taking into consideration other elements of identity, such as language or their ethnic identity.
This historical tradition of the Millet system, which is deeply rooted in both Greek and Turkish policy, and an inadequate interpretation of reciprocity, have greatly conditioned the application of the protection regime provided for in the Treaty. This gives rise to numerous breaches and disputes that have prevented the protection envisaged from being effective. The current reality, as can be seen from basic demographic statistics, shows that the provisions on minorities in the Treaty of Lausanne have not fulfilled their original purpose and that they need to be reinterpreted in accordance with the more recent legal and political developments on the protection of persons belonging to minorities. The situation of all minorities that could in one way or another come under the protection of the Treaty today appears to be significantly worse than it was in 1923. The best current situation can be seen in the Turkish Muslim Minority in Western Thrace, although this may be due to the fact that it was initially the largest, to its settlement in rural and peripheral areas of Greece and to the phenomenon of gradual assimilation of the Pomak and Roma Muslim communities around it. In addition, the role of Turkey as a protective kin-state during these hundred years cannot be underestimated.
In any case, the mistrust of the two obligated countries regarding minorities on their territory is at the root of a deficient application of the protective norms of this convention. This mistrust is due to a construction of national identity based primarily on religion, and to the strong identification of the state with that national identity. Although this is not exclusive to Greece and Turkey, analyzing the origin and evolution of this treaty over the past 100 years allows us to understand the position of these states- vis-a-vis a large part of their internal diversity- and to raise the need to reinterpret the content of the treaty. This would include the protection of human rights, as well as denouncing the inappropriate use of the idea of reciprocity in an area of protection of individuals and groups.
Indeed, a characteristic element of the implementation of this treaty is the idea of reciprocity, which is rooted both in the states involved and in the protected minorities themselves. This idea of reciprocity was in fact desired from the outset by deliberately excluding the Muslim minority in Western Thrace from the forced population exchanges, to serve as a counterweight to the Greek minority in Istanbul. The resulting situation of mirror minorities, and the way in which both national identities have been constructed, have contributed to a flawed state interpretation that identifies internal minorities as external agents and not as genuine citizens of their own. This logic explains the attempts at assimilation on both sides of the border or, in other cases, segregation and separation from the majority community.
With the aim to carry out this analysis as clearly as possible, we will first present the historical context in which the Treaty is set. Subsequently, we will recall the two documents resulting from the Lausanne Conference of 1923, with attention to the rights recognised for minorities. In the central part of the article, we will systematize the main legal and practical controversies raised by the interpretation and application of the Treaty over the last 100 years. Finally, we will present the main conclusions of the analysis carried out in the light of the actual impact of the Treaty on protected minorities.
El Tratado de Lausana de 1923 es el único convenio internacional aún en vigor que procede del sistema de protección de minorías establecido tras la Primera Guerra Mundial. En el Tratado, varios derechos son reconocidos a las minorías musulmanas y no musulmanas de Grecia y Turquía respectivamente con el ánimo de garantizarles un trato no discriminatorio y el mantenimiento de su identidad diferenciada. Este trabajo pretende, por una parte, analizar el grado de cumplimiento del convenio después de cien años de vigencia y, por otra parte, identificar sus especificidades tanto en su redacción inicial como en su aplicación posterior. Para cumplir con el primer objetivo realizaremos un análisis jurídico del cumplimiento de los derechos sobre minorías previstos en el Tratado utilizando fuentes normativas, doctrinales y jurisprudenciales concurrentes. Para abordar el segundo objetivo es necesario analizar otros documentos jurídicos previos, datos básicos y la doctrina más experta en la interpretación de las variables histórico-políticas que han acompañado al Tratado en estos cien años. El trabajo también se propone, complementariamente, extender en lengua española el conocimiento sobre este importante documento y su contexto político. Para ello, en primer lugar, presentaremos el contexto histórico político en el que se inserta el Tratado. Posteriormente, recordaremos los dos documentos derivados de la Conferencia de Lausana de 1923, con atención a los derechos reconocidos a las minorías. En la parte central del artículo sistematizaremos las principales controversias jurídicas y prácticas que plantean la interpretación y aplicación del Tratado durante estos cien años. Finalmente, plantearemos las conclusiones principales del análisis realizado a la luz del impacto efectivo del Tratado sobre las minorías protegidas.
El contenido y la interpretación oficial del Tratado muestran una importante herencia ideológica del sistema otomano de los Millet, cuyas consecuencias se proyectan hasta la actualidad. Esta tradición y una inadecuada interpretación de la reciprocidad han condicionado extraordinariamente la aplicación del régimen de protección previsto en el Tratado, dando lugar a numerosos incumplimientos y controversias que han impedido que pudiera resultar eficaz. La realidad actual demuestra que las disposiciones sobre minorías del Tratado de Lausana no han cumplido su objetivo inicial y que es necesaria una reinterpretación de aquellas de acuerdo con los desarrollos jurídicos y políticos producidos sobre la protección de las personas pertenecientes a minorías. La desconfianza de los dos países obligados respecto a las minorías en su territorio está en la base de una aplicación deficiente de las normas protectoras de este convenio. Esta desconfianza responde a una construcción de la identidad nacional basada fundamentalmente en la religión y a la fuerte identificación del estado con dicha identidad nacional. Aunque ello no es exclusivo de Grecia y Turquía, analizar el origen y evolución de este Tratado en estos cien años permite entender el posicionamiento de estos estados frente a su diversidad interna y plantear la necesidad de una reinterpretación del contenido del Tratado a la luz de la protección de los derechos humanos
La disputa de la soberanía en el Indo-Pacífico: el impacto de las relaciones conflictuales entre Estados Unidos y China en el statu quo de Taiwán
No full textHistorically, the Indo-Pacific area has been a region where conflicts and clashes between regional actors, besides being conditioned by the interests of these same actors, have been influenced by the surrounding countries and by the interests of the great powers. Among the diversity of confrontation scenarios occurring in the area and, more specifically, in the Asia-Pacific region, we find the dispute over the sovereignty of Taiwan as one of the main sources of conflict in the region. The different dimensions of Taiwan\u27s dispute, and mainly its constitution as an internationally recognized sovereign state, are affected by the foreign policies of the main actors in the area. In the first place, the sovereignty and development of the activities of the government of Taipei are limited by the annexation attempts of the island by the People\u27s Republic of China. These aspirations result in permanent military tension in the Taiwan Strait and third parties not officially recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state for fear of worsening diplomatic and trade relations with Beijing. Along with Chinese demands on Taiwan, the recognition of this territory as a sovereign state is conditioned by the foreign and security policy of the United States in the area. This policy assumes Taiwan\u27s territorial defense in the frame of possible Chinese military aggression, while maintaining an ambivalent position on the international recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state. Although the United States maintains sovereign state relations with the government of Taipei, since 1979 it has not officially recognized Taiwan because of the implications that recognition of the territory would have on its relations with Beijing. The purpose of this article is to analyze and understand how disputes between the United States and China determine the various dimensions of sovereignty and to measure the impact that these disputes currently have on the normalized development of Taiwan\u27s sovereignty. Through the study of Taiwan, we will analyze the impact that clashes of interests between great powers have on the normalized development of state sovereignty in Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific countries. The article will start with a complex analysis of the concept of sovereignty linked to states and territory. Secondly, we will analyze the evolution of the different dimensions of Taiwan\u27s sovereignty from the constitution of its government in 1949 to the present day. We will also measure the influence that the disputes between the United States and China have had on these dimensions. Finally, by way of a conclusion, we will study the elements that determine and condition the development of Taiwan\u27s sovereignty today. This analysis is aimed at understanding how disputes between great powers impact the normalized development of sovereignty in Indo-Pacific countries. The article will start with a complex analysis of the concept of sovereignty linked to states and territory. In this section, we will address the basis of the sovereign conception of states, focusing our approach mainly on the international dimension of sovereignty. Following this perspective, we will detail the conditions that a state must have in order to be considered a sovereign subject from the perspective of International Relations and International Law. These elements will be analyzed mainly through the requirements established in the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States signed by the Organization of American States (OAS), which provides a basic legal framework to understand the characteristics that states have as sovereign subjects. Second, we will analyze the evolution of the different dimensions of Taiwan\u27s sovereignty from the establishment of its government in 1949 to the present. We will start by analyzing Taiwan\u27s evolution as an administrative territory and the transformation that its political-administrative claims have undergone since the establishment of the Taipei government as the international political context has evolved. We will unravel its struggle with the People\u27s Republic of China to be recognized as the legitimate government that emerged from the Xinhai Revolution during the Cold War period. In this section we will focus our approach on the evolution experienced by Taiwan\u27s political-administrative claims during this period and how, after the China-US rapprochement, the international recognition of the Taipei government is decreasing and generating a territorial and sovereign status quo that conditions Taiwan\u27s development as a normalized sovereign entity. We will analyze the adaptation of its strategy, mainly after the democratization process, where Taiwan, aware of its lack of international recognition, claims itself as a separate subject from the People\u27s Republic of China. After observing the evolution of the strategy of successive governments in Taipei, we will analyze how the major powers with a presence in the Indo-Pacific condition the normalized development of Taiwanese sovereignty. In this section, we will measure the conditioning that Chinese and U.S. foreign policy have on the development of the dimensions of Taiwan\u27s sovereignty and the influence that U.S.-China disputes have had on these dimensions. We will address the claims and the position of successive governments in Beijing vis-à-vis the Taiwanese dispute. For this task, we will synthesize China\u27s claims over Taiwan and analyze official documents detailing the Beijing government\u27s current strategy for dealing with this dispute, which is based on the historical claim of reunification of Taiwan and mainland China. After analyzing the limitations that the People\u27s Republic of China\u27s policy places on the development of Taiwan\u27s sovereignty, we will observe how U.S. foreign policy and its projection of power in the Indo-Pacific region has conditioned Taiwan\u27s sovereignty over the years. To measure the impact of U.S. foreign policy, we will begin with an analysis of U.S. military involvement in the First and Second Cross-Strait Crises (1954 and 1958, respectively), continue with the China-U.S. rapprochement between 1971 and 1979, and then move on to the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances established by the Reagan administration. To conclude, we will unpack the Pivot to Asia strategy initiated by the Obama administration, along with the National Security and Indo-Pacific strategies that detail the U.S. position on the Taiwan dispute. After integrating the strategies and visions of the three actors that determine the development of Taiwan\u27s sovereignty today, we will detail the conclusions of our work. Finally, we will conclude with the elements that determine and condition the development of Taiwan\u27s sovereignty today. This analysis is aimed not only at understanding how disputes between great powers condition the normalized development of sovereignty in Indo-Pacific countries.Históricamente, la zona del Indo-Pacífico ha sido una región donde los conflictos y choques entre actores regionales, además de estar condicionados por los intereses de estos mismos actores, han estado influenciados por los países del entorno y por los intereses de las grandes potencias. Entre la diversidad de escenarios de confrontación que se desarrollan en la zona y más concretamente en la región de Asia-Pacífico, podemos encontrar uno de los principales focos de conflicto en el entorno, el contencioso que envuelve a la soberanía de Taiwán. Las diferentes dimensiones que envuelven el contencioso de Taiwán y principalmente su constitución como estado soberano reconocido internacionalmente, están atravesadas por las políticas exteriores de los principales actores en la zona. En primer lugar, la soberanía y el desarrollo de las actividades del gobierno de Taipéi están limitadas por los intentos de anexión de la isla por parte de la República Popular de China. Estas aspiraciones dan como resultado un tensionamiento militar permanente en el estrecho de Taiwán y que terceros no reconozcan oficialmente a Taiwán como estado soberano por miedo al empeoramiento de relaciones diplomáticas y comerciales con Beijing. Junto a las demandas chinas sobre Taiwán, el reconocimiento de este territorio como estado soberano está condicionado por la política exterior y de seguridad de Estados Unidos en la zona. Esta política está basada en la asunción de la defensa territorial de Taiwán ante una posible agresión militar china, pero manteniendo una postura ambivalente en el reconocimiento internacional de Taiwán como estado soberano. Si bien Estados Unidos mantiene relaciones propias de los estados soberanos con el gobierno de Taipéi, desde 1979 no reconoce oficialmente a Taiwán debido a las implicaciones que un reconocimiento del territorio tendría en sus relaciones con Beijing. El objetivo de este artículo es analizar y comprender cómo las disputas entre Estados Unidos y China condicionan las distintas dimensiones de la soberanía y medir el impacto que estas disputas tienen en la actualidad en el desarrollo normalizado de la soberanía de Taiwán. A través del estudio de Taiwán analizaremos el impacto que los choques de intereses entre grandes potencias tienen en el desarrollo normalizado de la soberanía estatal de Taiwán y los países del Indo-Pacífico. El artículo partirá de un análisis complejo del concepto de soberanía ligada a los estados y al territorio. En segundo lugar, analizaremos la evolución de las distintas dimensiones de la soberanía de Taiwán desde la constitución de su gobierno en 1949 hasta la actualidad. En este apartado mediremos también la influencia que las disputas entre Estados Unidos y China han tenido en estas dimensiones. Por último, a modo de conclusión, estudiaremos los elementos que determinan y condicionan el desarrollo de la soberanía de Taiwán en la actualidad. Este análisis busca entender cómo las disputas entre grandes poderes condicionan el desarrollo normalizado de la soberanía de los países del Indo-Pacífico
Discapacidad física y mental en Roma y su solución jurídica: la cura furiosi
No full textDisability has been a challenge for every society, including the Romans. Even though it’s true that it took a long time to advance socially, a legal solution was found very early: the cura furiosi. This legal instrument was a huge advance, and it had a very interesting development.La discapacidad ha sido un reto para todas las sociedades, incluida la romana. Aunque es cierto que en el aspecto social se tardó mucho en avanzar, en el ámbito jurídico se alcanzó una solución en una época muy temprana: la cura furiosi. Este instrumento legal supuso un importante avance y tuvo una interesante evolución
Reseña de: San Martín, Francisco Javier (ed.): La fotografía en el arte del siglo XX, Diputación Floral de Álava, 2000, 175 pp.
No full textReseña de: San Martín, Francisco Javier (ed.): La fotografía en el arte del siglo XX, Diputación Floral de Álava, 2000, 175 pp
El sillar con volutas del Museo Íbero de Jaén: propuesta de reconstrucción de un nuevo monumento de Giribaile (Vilches, Jaén)
No full textIn this paper, the study of a corner ashlar decorated with volutes is presented. The piece is currently part of the collection of the Museo Íbero of Jaén. This architectural element, found out of context on the eastern face of the oppidum of Giribaile (Vilches, Jaén) was published in a succinct form in 1998. Now, thanks to the 3D scanning and digitalisation, a more complete study is presented. This includes a trial restitution of the piece, its archaeological analysis and a proposed dating. This date coincides with the last phase of the archaeological site.El trabajo presenta el estudio de un sillar de esquina decorado con volutas que forma parte de la actual colección del Museo Íbero de Jaén. La pieza, hallada fuera de contexto en la ladera oriental del oppidum de Giribaile (Vilches, Jaén) fue publicada de forma preliminar en 1998. Ahora, gracias a su escaneo en 3D y digitalización, se presenta un estudio más completo que incluye un ensayo de restitución de la pieza, su análisis arqueológico y una propuesta de datación coincidente con la última fase de vida del yacimiento