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HyperLoop: Rationally secure efficient cross-chain bridge
Get PDFCross-chain bridges, realizing the transfer of information and assets between blockchains, form the core of blockchain interoperability solutions. Most existing bridge networks are modeled in an honest-malicious setting, where the bridge nodes are either honest or malicious. Rationality allows the nodes to deviate from the protocol arbitrarily for an economic incentive. In this work, we present HyperLoop, an efficient cross-chain multi-signature bridge and prove that it is safe and live game-theoretically, under the more realistic rational-malicious model.
As rational bridge nodes are allowed to deviate from the protocol and even collude, a monitor mechanism is necessitated, which we realize by introducing whistle-blower nodes. These whistle-blowers constantly check the operations of the bridge and raise complaints to a complaint resolution network in case of discrepancies. To enforce punishments, it is necessary for the nodes to stake an amount before participating as bridge nodes. Consequently, a cap on the volume of funds transferred over the bridge is established. We describe a sliding window mechanism and establish a relation between the stake and the sliding window limit necessary for the safety of the bridge.
Our design yields an economic, computation, and communication-efficient bridge. We realize and deploy our bridge prototype bridging Ethereum and Polygon chains over testnets. For a 19-node bridge network, each bridge node takes an average of only 3 msec to detect and sign a source chain request, showing the highly efficiency and low-latency of the bridge
A Critical Analysis of Deployed Use Cases for Quantum Key Distribution and Comparison with Post-Quantum Cryptography
Get PDFQuantum Key Distribution (QKD) is currently being discussed as a technology to safeguard communication in a future where quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive security evaluation of QKD-based solutions, focusing on real-world use cases sourced from academic literature and industry reports. We analyze these use cases, assess their security and identify the possible advantages of deploying QKD-based solutions. We further compare QKD-based solutions with Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), the alternative approach to achieving security when quantum computers compromise traditional public-key cryptosystems, evaluating their respective suitability for each scenario. Based on this comparative analysis, we critically discuss and comment on which use cases QKD is suited for, considering factors such as implementation complexity, scalability, and long-term security. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the role QKD could play in future cryptographic infrastructures and offer guidance to decision-makers considering the deployment of QKD
S5: Combining white-box countermeasures to resist state-of-the-art attacks
Get PDFIn white-box cryptography, early encoding-based countermeasures have been broken by the DCA attack, leading to the utilization of masking schemes against a surge of automated attacks. The recent filtering attack from CHES 2024 broke the last viable masking scheme from CHES 2021 resisting both computational and algebraic attacks, raising the need for new countermeasures.
In this work, we perform the first formal study of the combinations of existing countermeasures and demonstrate that applying Dummy Shuffling (EUROCRYPT 2021) then ISW masking (CRYPTO 2003) to a circuit carries algebraic, correlation, and filtering security - necessary conditions to withstand state-of-the-art automated attacks. We also show that applying these two countermeasures in the opposite order leads to a Higher-Order Filtering attack, highlighting the importance of the order of application of the combined countermeasures.
We also propose a new masking scheme called S5, standing for the Semi-Shuffled Secret Sharing Scheme, a scheme merging Dummy Shuffling and ISW in a single countermeasure more efficiently than a direct composition
SLIDE: Shuffle Shamir Secret Shares Uniformly with Linear Online Communication and Guaranteed Output Delivery
Get PDFWe revisit shuffle protocols for Shamir secret sharing. Existing constructions either produce a non-uniform shuffle or incur high communication and round complexity, in some cases exponential in the number of parties. We propose two new shuffle protocols that achieve uniform shuffle with communication complexity for shuffling rows of an matrix shared among parties, where is a tunable parameter that balances communication and computation. The first protocol is concretely more efficient, while the second achieves the best-known online communication and rounds. Both constructions enjoy an ideal property of guaranteed output delivery (GOD). In terms of both overall and online communication, our protocols improve upon the state of the art for shuffle protocols based on Shamir secret sharing.
Our key technical ingredient is a novel permutation sharing technique that represents a permutation by smaller permutation matrices. Once permutations are shared, applying them becomes significantly cheaper, enabling a highly efficient online phase. The first protocol applies independent secret permutations from all parties in sequence, while the second protocol builds on the shuffle correlation technique of Gao et al., achieving online complexity. We further extend shuffle correlation to support GOD with linear online communication, an extension has not been previously explored, As a result, we obtain SLIDE, the first shuffle protocol achieving both online communication and guaranteed output delivery.
Our constructions rely only on the most basic primitives of Shamir secret sharing over any field with . Since shuffle is a fundamental building block for higher-level MPC primitives such as sorting and oblivious data structures, our results are broadly applicable and can accelerate many real-world applications of secure multiparty computation
ABEL: Perfect Asynchronous Byzantine Extension from List-Decoding
Get PDFAsynchronous byzantine agreement extension studies the message complexity of -bit multivalued asynchronous byzantine agreement given access to a binary asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol.
We prove that asynchronous byzantine agreement extension can be solved with perfect security and optimal resilience in total communication (in bits) in addition to a single call to a binary asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol. For , this gives an asymptotically optimal protocol, resolving a question that remained open for nearly two decades.
List decoding is a fundamental concept in theoretical computer science and cryptography, enabling error correction beyond the unique decoding radius and playing a critical role in constructing robust codes, hardness amplification, and secure cryptographic protocols. A key novelty of our perfectly secure and optimally resilient asynchronous byzantine agreement extension protocol is that it uses list decoding - making a striking new connection between list decoding and asynchronous Byzantine agreement
Dimension-Reducing Algorithms for Quaternion Ideal-SVP
Get PDFWe study the approximate Hermite Shortest Vector Problem (HSVP) in ideal lattices in orders of quaternion algebras. For one- and two-sided ideals respectively, we show that for almost all ideals we may solve HSVP in a sublattice of dimension at most one half (respectively, one quarter) of the original lattice dimension, with only small losses in the approximation factor. For two-sided ideals in a cryptographically-relevant family of maximal orders, we obtain approximation factors independent of the algebraic norm of the ideal. For one-sided ideals, we obtain a similar result for a large and natural family of ideal lattices. Finally, we turn our mathematical results into algorithms, and give an unconditional quantum polynomial time algorithm to solve HSVP in ideals of maximal orders of quaternion algebras, given an oracle for HSVP in ideals of maximal orders of number fields, in lower dimension
TLShare: Private Authenticated MPC and FHE Inputs Over TLS
Get PDFTransport Layer Security (TLS) is the backbone of the web, allowing clients to establish secure and private channels with servers. DECO (CCS\u2720) and follow-up works proposed protocols that enable proving the provenance of a TLS response, i.e., that a payload came from a particular server, without needing server-side modifications. Unfortunately, these works are limited to proving Boolean statements over the payload (e.g., age 18) and cannot combine payloads from multiple clients.
We introduce TLShare, a framework that extracts authenticated data from a TLS connection and imports it into secure multiparty computation (MPC) or fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), without requiring server-side changes or exposing client credentials. Unlike prior work, TLShare allows the payload itself, not just a predicate about it, to serve as private input to secure downstream computation. TLShare supports combining verifiable inputs across multiple clients and servers, enabling new applications such as privacy-preserving financial risk assessment and collaborative analytics. We design three protocols for TLShare: one for MPC using verifiable secret sharing, and two for FHE using interactive and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, each ensuring input authenticity, integrity, and end-to-end privacy. We evaluate all three protocols of TLShare over both LAN and WAN settings, comparing their trade-offs and demonstrating their practicality
A Fully-Adaptive Threshold Partially-Oblivious PRF
Get PDFOblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRFs) are fundamental cryptographic primitives essential for privacy-enhancing technologies such as private set intersection, oblivious keyword search, and password-based authentication protocols. We present the first fully adaptive, partially oblivious threshold pseudorandom function that supports proactive key refresh and provides composable security under the One-More Gap Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
Our construction is secure with respect to a new ideal functionality for OPRFs that addresses three critical shortcomings of previous models–specifically, key refresh and non-verifiability issues that rendered them unrealizable. In addition, we identify a gap in a prior work\u27s proof of partial obliviousness and develop a novel proof technique to salvage their scheme
Binding Security of Combined KEMs: An Analysis of Real-World KEM Combiners
Get PDFIn this work we analyze the various binding properties of combiners for KEMs. We show that several binding properties follow easily for the most general combiner—assuming a collision-resistant hash function—while more performance-oriented combiners require the respective property from one or both of the underlying KEMs. Other binding properties are not obtained as directly and require either more properties of one underlying KEM or the respective property from both KEMs. Additionally, we provide an overview of the binding properties for several combinations of real-world KEMs
Automated Tool for Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks with Very Low Data and Memory Complexity (Full Version)
Get PDFIn this paper, we present a simple meet-in-the-middle attack that requires low data and memory resources. To evaluate the complexity of the attack, we also propose an automated tool that calculates the time, data, and memory complexities based on the suggested matching points. Our method operates at the bit level and employs a known-plaintext attack, with no constraints on the attacker\u27s choice of data. We apply our tool on various lightweight block ciphers, including CRAFT, Midori, WARP, PRESENT, and ARADI. For CRAFT, our tool successfully identified an attack targeting 15 rounds using 3 known plaintexts. In the case of Midori64 and Midori128, the tool proposed attacks on 5 rounds with 16 known plaintexts and 7 rounds with 3 known plaintexts, respectively. For WARP, the tool discovered an attack on 18 rounds utilizing 7 known plaintexts. Additionally, for PRESENT80, the tool identified an attack on 6 rounds with 18 known plaintexts, and for ARADI, an attack on 5 rounds with 28 known plaintexts was determined