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    24907 research outputs found

    Attacking at non-harmonic frequencies in screaming-channel attacks

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    Screaming-channel attacks enable Electromagnetic (EM) Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) at larger distances due to higher EM leakage energies than traditional SCAs, relaxing the requirement of close access to the victim. This attack can be mounted on devices integrating Radio Frequency (RF) modules on the same die as digital circuits, where the RF can unintentionally capture, modulate, amplify, and transmit the leakage along with legitimate signals. Leakage results from digital switching activity, so the hypothesis of previous works was that this leakage would appear at multiples of the digital clock frequency, i.e., harmonics. This work demonstrates that compromising signals appear not only at the harmonics and that leakage at non-harmonics can be exploited for successful attacks. Indeed, the transformations undergone by the leaked signal are complex due to propagation effects through the substrate and power and ground planes, so the leakage also appears at other frequencies. We first propose two methodologies to locate frequencies that contain leakage and demonstrate that it appears at non-harmonic frequencies. Then, our experimental results show that screaming-channel attacks at non-harmonic frequencies can be as successful as at harmonics when retrieving a 16-byte AES key. As the RF spectrum is polluted by interfering signals, we run experiments and show successful attacks in a more realistic, noisy environment where harmonic frequencies are contaminated by multi-path fading and interference. These attacks at non-harmonic frequencies increase the attack surface by providing attackers with an increased number of potential frequencies where attacks can succeed

    A Meta-Complexity Characterization of Quantum Cryptography

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    We prove the first meta-complexity characterization of a quantum cryptographic primitive. We show that one-way puzzles exist if and only if there is some quantum samplable distribution of binary strings over which it is hard to approximate Kolmogorov complexity. Therefore, we characterize one-way puzzles by the average-case hardness of a uncomputable problem. This brings to the quantum setting a recent line of work that characterizes classical cryptography with the average-case hardness of a meta-complexity problem, initiated by Liu and Pass. Moreover, since the average-case hardness of Kolmogorov complexity over classically polynomial-time samplable distributions characterizes one-way functions, this result poses one-way puzzles as a natural generalization of one-way functions to the quantum setting. Furthermore, our equivalence goes through probability estimation, giving us the additional equivalence that one-way puzzles exist if and only if there is a quantum samplable distribution over which probability estimation is hard. We also observe that the oracle worlds of defined by Kretschmer et. al. rule out any relativizing characterization of one-way puzzles by the hardness of a problem in NP\mathbf{NP} or QMA\mathbf{QMA}, which means that it may not be possible with current techniques to characterize one-way puzzles with another meta-complexity problem

    Multi-Party Private Set Operations from Predicative Zero-Sharing

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    Typical protocols in the multi-party private set operations (MPSO) setting enable m>2m > 2 parties to perform certain secure computation on the intersection or union of their private sets, realizing a very limited range of MPSO functionalities. Most works in this field focus on just one or two specific functionalities, resulting in a large variety of isolated schemes and a lack of a unified framework in MPSO research. In this work, we present an MPSO framework, which allows mm parties, each holding a set, to securely compute any set formulas (arbitrary compositions of a finite number of binary set operations, including intersection, union and difference) on their private sets. Our framework is highly versatile and can be instantiated to accommodate a broad spectrum of MPSO functionalities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first framework to achieve such a level of flexibility and generality in MPSO, without relying on generic secure multi-party computation (MPC) techniques. Our framework exhibits favorable theoretical and practical performance. With computation and communication complexity scaling linearly with the set size nn, it achieves optimal complexity that is on par with the naive solution for widely used functionalities, such as multi-party private set intersection (MPSI), MPSI with cardinality output (MPSI-card), and MPSI with cardinality and sum (MPSI-card-sum), for the first time in the standard semi-honest model. Furthermore, the instantiations of our framework, which primarily rely on symmetric-key techniques, provide efficient protocols for MPSI, MPSI-card, MPSI-card-sum, and multi-party private set union (MPSU), with online performance that either surpasses or matches the state of the art in standard semi-honest model. At the technical core of our framework is a newly introduced primitive called predicative zero-sharing. This primitive captures the universality of a number of MPC protocols and is composable. We believe it may be of independent interest

    Towards Scalable YOSO MPC via Packed Secret-Sharing

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    The YOSO (You Only Speak Once) model, introduced by Gentry et al. (CRYPTO 2021), helps to achieve strong security guarantees in cryptographic protocols for distributed settings, like blockchains, with large number of parties. YOSO protocols typically employ smaller anonymous committees to execute individual rounds of the protocol instead of having all parties execute the entire protocol. After completing their tasks, parties encrypt protocol messages for the next anonymous committee and erase their internal state before publishing ciphertexts, thereby enhancing security in dynamically changing environments. In this work, we consider the problem of secure multi-party computation (MPC), a fundamental problem in cryptography and distributed computing. We assume honest majority among the committee members, and work in the online-offline, i.e., preprocessing, setting. In this context, we present the first YOSO MPC protocol where efficiency---measured as communication complexity---improves as the number of parties increases. Specifically, for 0<ϵ<1/20<\epsilon<1/2 and an adversary corrupting t<n(12ϵ)t<n(\frac{1}{2}-\epsilon) out of nn parties, our MPC protocol exhibits enhanced scalability as nn increases, where the online phase communication becomes independent of nn. Prior YOSO MPC protocols considered tt as large as (n1)/2(n-1)/2, but a significant hurdle persisted in obtaining YOSO MPC with communication that does not scale linearly with the number of committee members, a challenge that is exagerbated when the committee size was large per YOSO\u27s requirements. We show that, by considering a small ``gap\u27\u27 of ϵ>0\epsilon>0, the sizes of the committees are only marginally increased, while online communication is significantly reduced. Furthermore, we explicitly consider fail-stop adversaries, i.e., honest participants who may inadvertently fail due to reasons such as denial of service or software/hardware errors. In prior YOSO work, these adversaries were grouped with fully malicious parties. Adding explicit support for them allows us to achieve even better scalability

    Efficient Garbled Pseudorandom Functions and Lookup Tables from Minimal Assumption

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    Yao\u27s garbled circuits have received huge attention in both theory and practice. While garbled circuits can be constructed using minimal assumption (i.e., the existence of pseudorandom functions or one-way functions), the state-of-the-art constructions (e.g., Rosulek-Roy, Crypto 2021) are based on stronger assumptions. In particular, the ``Free-XOR\u27\u27 technique (Kolesnikov-Schneider, ICALP 2008) is essential in these state-of-the-art constructions, and their security can only be proven in the random oracle model, or rely on the ``circular-correlation robust hash\u27\u27 assumption. In this paper, we aim to develop new techniques to construct efficient garbling schemes using minimal assumptions. Instead of generically replacing the Free-XOR technique, we focus on garbling schemes for specific functionalities. We successfully eliminated the need for Free-XOR in several state-of-the-art schemes, including the one-hot garbling (Heath and Kolesnikov, CCS 2021) and the garbled pseudorandom functions, and the garbled lookup tables (Heath, Kolesnikov and Ng, Eurocrypt 2024). Our schemes are based on minimal assumptions, i.e., standard pseudorandom functions (PRFs)---we resolved the need for circular security. The performance of our scheme is almost as efficient as the best results except for a small constant factor. Namely, for any lookup table {0,1}n{0,1}m\{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^m, our scheme takes n+(5n+9)mλ+2nmn + (5n+9)m\lambda + 2^n \cdot m bits of communication, where λ\lambda is the security parameter of PRF

    Private SCT Auditing, Revisited

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    In order for a client to securely connect to a server on the web, the client must trust certificate authorities (CAs) only to issue certificates to the legitimate operator of the server. If a certificate is miss-issued, it is possible for an attacker to impersonate the server to the client. The goal of Certificate Transparency (CT) is to log every certificate issued in a manner that allows anyone to audit the logs for miss-issuance. A client can even audit a CT log itself, but this would leak sensitive browsing data to the log operator. As a result, client-side audits are rare in practice. In this work, we revisit private CT auditing from a real-world perspective. Our study is motivated by recent changes to the CT ecosystem and advancements in Private Information Retrieval (PIR). First, we find that checking for inclusion of Signed Certificate Timestamps (SCTs) in a log — the audit performed by clients — is now possible with PIR in under a second and under 100kb of communication with minor adjustments to the protocol that have been proposed previously. Our results also show how to scale audits by using existing batching techniques and the algebraic structure of the PIR protocols, in particular to obtain certificate hashes by included in the log. Since PIR protocols are more performant with smaller databases, we also suggest a number of strategies to lower the size of the SCT database for audits. Our key observation is that the web will likely transition to a new model for certificate issuance. While this transition is primarily motivated by the need to adapt the PKI to larger, post-quantum signature schemes, it also removes the need for SCT audits in most cases. We present the first estimates of how this transition may impact SCT auditing, based on data gathered from public CT logs. We find that large scale deployment of the new issuance model may reduce the number of SCT audits needed by a factor of 1,000, making PIR-based auditing practical to deploy

    Strong Federated Authentication With Password-based Credential Against Identity Server Corruption

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    We initiate the study of strong federated authentication with password-based credential against identity server corruption (SaPBC). We provide a refined formal security model, which captures all the necessary security properties in registration, authentication, and session key establishment between a user and an application server. The new model with fine-grained information leakage separates the leakage of password-related files and long-term secrets (including passwords and credentials). Moreover, we present two SaPBC protocols constructed from efficient cryptographic primitives for these corruption scenarios. In addition to rigorous security proofs, we also conduct comprehensive performance evaluation of the two protocols

    ANARKey: A New Approach to (Socially) Recover Keys

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    In a social key recovery scheme, users back up their secret keys (typically using Shamir\u27s secret sharing) with their social connections, known as a set of guardians. This places a heavy burden on the guardians, as they must manage their shares both securely and reliably. Finding and managing such a set of guardians may not be easy, especially when the consequences of losing a key are significant. We take an alternative approach of social recovery within a community, where each member already holds a secret key (with possibly an associated public key) and uses other community members as their guardians forming a mutual dependency among themselves. Potentially, each member acts as a guardian for upto (n1)(n-1) other community members. Therefore, in this setting, using standard Shamir\u27s sharing leads to a linear (O(n)O(n)) blow-up in the internal secret storage of the guardian for each key recovery. Our solution avoids this linear blowup in internal secret storage by relying on a novel secret-sharing scheme, leveraging the fact that each member already manages a secret key. In fact, our scheme does not require guardians to store anything beyond their own secret keys. We propose the first formal definition of a social key recovery scheme for general access structures in the community setting. We prove that our scheme is secure against any malicious and adaptive adversary that may corrupt up to tt parties. As a main technical tool, we use a new notion of secret sharing, that enables (t+1)(t+1) out of nn sharing of a secret even when the shares are generated independently -- we formalize this as bottom-up secret sharing (BUSS), which may be of independent interest. Finally, we provide an implementation benchmarking varying the number of guardians both in a regional, and geo-distributed setting. For instance, for 8 guardians, our backup protocol takes around 146-149 ms in a geo-distributed WAN setting, and 4.9-5.9 ms in the LAN setting; for recovery protocol, the timings are approximately the same for the WAN setting (as network latency dominates), and 1.2-1.4 ms for the LAN setting

    Improved Cryptanalysis of FEA-1 and FEA-2 using Square Attacks

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    This paper presents a security analysis of the South Korean Format-Preserving Encryption (FPE) standards FEA-1 and FEA-2. In 2023, Chauhan \textit{et al.} presented the first third-party analysis of FEA-1 and FEA-2 against the square attack. The authors proposed new distinguishing attacks covering up to three rounds of FEA-1 and five rounds of FEA-2, with a data complexity of 282^8 plaintexts. Additionally, using these distinguishers, they presented key recovery attacks for four rounds of FEA-1 and six rounds of FEA-2, for 192-bit and 256-bit key sizes. The complexities of both the four-round FEA-1 and six-round FEA-2 key recovery attacks are 2137.62^{137.6}. \\ In this work, we successfully extend the number of rounds attacked for both FEA-1 and FEA-2, using the square attack technique. Specifically, we present a four-round distinguishing attack against FEA-1 and six-round distinguishing attack against FEA-2. The data complexities of these distinguishers are 2642^{64} plaintexts. Furthermore, we apply these distinguishers to perform key recovery attacks on five rounds of FEA-1 and seven rounds of FEA-2, targeting the 256-bit key size. The time complexities of the presented key recovery attacks are 2193.62^{193.6}

    zkPyTorch: A Hierarchical Optimized Compiler for Zero-Knowledge Machine Learning

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    As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes increasingly embedded in high-stakes applications such as healthcare, finance, and autonomous systems, ensuring the verifiability of AI computations without compromising sensitive data or proprietary models is crucial. Zero-knowledge machine learning (ZKML) leverages zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) to enable the verification of AI model outputs while preserving confidentiality. However, existing ZKML approaches require specialized cryptographic expertise, making them inaccessible to traditional AI developers. In this paper, we introduce ZKPyTorch, a compiler that seamlessly integrates ML frameworks like PyTorch with ZKP engines like Expander, simplifying the development of ZKML. ZKPyTorch automates the translation of ML operations into optimized ZKP circuits through three key components. First, a ZKP preprocessor converts models into structured computational graphs and injects necessary auxiliary information to facilitate proof generation. Second, a ZKP-friendly quantization module introduces an optimized quantization strategy that reduces computation bit-widths, enabling efficient ZKP execution within smaller finite fields such as M61. Third, a hierarchical ZKP circuit optimizer employs a multi-level optimization framework at model, operation, and circuit levels to improve proof generation efficiency. We demonstrate ZKPyTorch effectiveness through end-to-end case studies, successfully converting VGG-16 and Llama-3 models from PyTorch, a leading ML framework, into ZKP-compatible circuits recognizable by Expander, a state-of-the-art ZKP engine. Using Expander, we generate zero-knowledge proofs for these models, achieving proof generation for the VGG-16 model in 2.2 seconds per CIFAR-10 image for VGG-16 and 150 seconds per token for Llama-3 inference, improving the practical adoption of ZKML

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