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    24907 research outputs found

    Post-Quantum Stealth Address Protocols

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    The Stealth Address Protocol (SAP) allows users to receive assets through stealth addresses that are unlinkable to their stealth meta-addresses. The most widely used SAP, Dual-Key SAP (DKSAP), and the most performant SAP, Elliptic Curve Pairing Dual-Key SAP (ECPDKSAP), are based on elliptic curve cryptography, which is vulnerable to quantum attacks. These protocols depend on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem, which could be efficiently solved on a sufficiently powerful quantum computer using the Shor algorithm. In this paper three novel post-quantum SAPs based on lattice-based cryptography are presented: LWE SAP, Ring-LWE SAP and Module-LWE SAP. These protocols leverage Learning With Errors (LWE) problem to ensure quantum-resistant privacy. Among them, Module-LWE SAP, which is based on the Kyber key encapsulation mechanism, achieves the best performance and outperforms ECPDKSAP by approximately 66.8% in the scan time of the ephemeral public key registry

    On the structure of the Schur squares of Twisted Generalized Reed-Solomon codes and application to cryptanalysis

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    Twisted generalized Reed-Solomon (TGRS) codes constitute an interesting family of evaluation codes, containing a large class of maximum distance separable codes non-equivalent to generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) ones. Moreover, the Schur squares of TGRS codes may be much larger than those of GRS codes with same dimension. Exploiting these structural differences, in 2018, Beelen, Bossert, Puchinger and Rosenkilde proposed a subfamily of Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) Twisted Reed--Solomon (TRS) codes over Fq\mathbb{F}_q with \ell twists qn2q \approx n^{2^{\ell}} for McEliece encryption, claiming their resistance to both Sidelnikov Shestakov attack and Schur products--based attacks. In short, they claimed these codes to resist to classical key recovery attacks on McEliece encryption scheme instantiated with Reed-Solomon (RS) or GRS codes. In 2020, Lavauzelle and Renner presented an original attack on this system based on the computation of the subfield subcode of the public TRS code. In this paper, we show that the original claim on the resistance of TRS and TGRS codes to Schur products based--attacks is wrong. We identify a broad class of codes including TRS and TGRS ones that is distinguishable from random by computing the Schur square of some shortening of the code. Then, we focus on the case of single twist ({i.e.}, =1\ell = 1), which is the most efficient one in terms of decryption complexity, to derive an attack. The technique is similar to the distinguisher-based attacks of RS code-based systems given by Couvreur, Gaborit, Gauthier-Umaña, Otmani, Tillich in 2014

    Verification-efficient Homomorphic Signatures for Verifiable Computation over Data Streams

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    Homomorphic signatures for NP (HSNP) allow proving that a signed value is the result of a non-deterministic computation on signed inputs. At CCS\u2722, Fiore and Tucker introduced HSNP, showed how to use them for verifying arbitrary computations on data streams, and proposed a generic HSNP construction obtained by efficiently combining zkSNARKs with linearly homomorphic signatures (LHS), namely those supporting linear functions. Their proposed LHS however suffered from an high verification cost. In this work we propose an efficient LHS that significantly improves on previous work in terms of verification time. Using the modular approach of Fiore and Tucker, this yields a verifier-efficient HSNP. We show that the HSNP instantiated with our LHS is particularly suited to the case when the data is taken from consecutive samples, which captures important use cases including sliding window statistics such as variances, histograms and stock market predictions

    Simultaneous-Message and Succinct Secure Computation

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    We put forth and instantiate a new primitive we call simultaneous-message and succinct (SMS) secure computation. An SMS scheme enables a minimal communication pattern for secure computation in the following scenario: Alice has a large private input X, Bob has a small private input y, and Charlie wants to learn f(X,y)f(X, y) for some public function ff. Given a common reference string (CRS) setup phase, an SMS scheme for a function f is instantiated with two parties holding inputs XX and yy, and has the following structure: - The parties simultaneously exchange a single message. - Communication is succinct, scaling sublinearly in the size of XX and the output f(X,y)f(X, y). - Without further interaction, the parties can locally derive additive secret shares of f(X,y)f(X, y). Indeed, Alice and Bob simultaneously send each other a message using the CRS and their private inputs. Using the transcript and their private state, the parties locally derive additive secret shares of f(X,y)f(X, y), which they can send to Charlie. As such, an SMS scheme incurs a communication cost to Charlie that is only twice that of the function output length. Importantly, the size of Alice’s message does not grow with the size of her input XX, and both Alice’s and Bob’s first-round messages grow sublinearly in the size of the output. Additionally, Alice’s or Bob’s view provides no information about the other party’s input besides the output of f(X,y)f(X, y), even if colluding with Charlie. We obtain the following results: - Assuming Learning With Errors (LWE), we build an SMS scheme supporting evaluation of depth-dd circuits, where Alice\u27s message is of size f(X,y)(2/3)|f(X, y)|^{(2/3)}· poly(λ, d), Bob\u27s message is of size (y+f(X,y)(2/3))(|y| + |f(X, y)|^{(2/3)}) · poly(λ, d), and λ is the security parameter. We can further extend this to support all functions by assuming the circular security of LWE. - Assuming sub-exponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation, in conjunction with other standard assumptions, we build an SMS scheme supporting arbitrary polynomial-sized batch functions of the form (f(x1,y),...,f(xL,y))(f(x_1, y), ..., f(x_L, y)), for X=(x1,...,xL)X = (x_1, ..., x_L). The size of Alice\u27s and Bob\u27s messages in this construction is poly(λ) and poly(λ, |f|, log L), respectively. We show that SMS schemes have several immediate applications. An SMS scheme gives: - A direct construction of trapdoor hash functions (TDH) (Döttling et al., Crypto\u2719) for the same class of functions as the one supported by the SMS scheme. - A simple and generic compiler for obtaining compact, rate-1 fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) from any non-compact FHE scheme. - A simple and generic compiler for obtaining correlation-intractable (CI) hash functions that are secure against all efficiently-searchable relations. In turn, under the LWE assumption, we obtain the first construction of TDH for all functions and generic approaches for obtaining rate-1 FHE and CI hashing. We also show that our iO-based construction gives an alternative approach for two-round secure computation with communication succinctness in the output length (Hubáček and Wichs, ITCS\u2715)

    XBOOT: Free-XOR Gates for CKKS with Applications to Transciphering

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    The CKKS scheme is traditionally recognized for approximate homomorphic encryption of real numbers, but BLEACH (Drucker et al., JoC 2024) extends its capabilities to handle exact computations on binary or small integer numbers. Despite this advancement, BLEACH\u27s approach of simulating XOR gates via (ab)2(a-b)^2 incurs one multiplication per gate, which is computationally expensive in homomorphic encryption. To this end, we introduce XBOOT, a new framework built upon BLEACH\u27s blueprint but allows for almost free evaluation of XOR gates. The core concept of XBOOT involves lazy reduction, where XOR operations are simulated with the less costly addition operation, a+ba+b, leaving the management of potential overflows to later stages. We carefully handle the modulus chain and scale factors to ensure that the overflows would be conveniently rounded during the CKKS bootstrapping phase without extra cost. We use AES-CKKS transciphering as a benchmark to test the capability of XBOOT, and achieve a throughput exceeding one kilobyte per second, which represents a 2.5×2.5\times improvement over the state-of-the-art (Aharoni et al., HES 2023). Moreover, XBOOT enables the practical execution of tasks with extensive XOR operations that were previously challenging for CKKS. For example, we can do Rasta-CKKS transciphering at over two kilobytes per second, more than 10×10\times faster than the baseline without XBOOT

    On Composing Generic Voting Schemes for Improved Privacy

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    Hybrid encryption provides a way for schemes to distribute trust among many computational assumptions, for instance by composing existing schemes. This is increasingly relevant as quantum computing advances because it lets us get the best of both worlds from the privacy of the post quantum schemes and the more battle tested classical schemes. We show how to compose members of a very general class of voting schemes and prove that this preserves correctness and integrity and improves privacy compared to its constituent parts. We also show an example composition using a lattice based decryption mixnet where the improvement in privacy can indirectly lead to an improvement in integrity

    Trustless Bridges via Random Sampling Light Clients

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    The increasing number of blockchain projects introduced annually has led to a pressing need for secure and efficient interoperability solutions. Currently, the lack of such solutions forces end-users to rely on centralized intermediaries, contradicting the core principle of decentralization and trust minimization in blockchain technology. In this paper, we propose a decentralized and efficient interoperability solution (aka Bridge Protocol) that operates without additional trust assumptions, relying solely on the Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) of the two chains being connected. In particular, relayers (actors that exchange messages between networks) are permissionless and decentralized, hence eliminating any single point of failure. We introduce Random Sampling, a novel technique for on-chain light clients to efficiently follow the history of PoS blockchains by reducing the signature verifications required. Here, the randomness is drawn on-chain, for example, using Ethereum\u27s RANDAO. We analyze the security of the bridge from a crypto-economic perspective and provide a framework to derive the security parameters. This includes handling subtle concurrency issues and randomness bias in strawman designs. While the protocol is applicable to various PoS chains, we demonstrate its feasibility by instantiating a bridge between Polkadot and Ethereum (currently deployed), and discuss some practical security challenges. We also evaluate the efficiency (gas costs) of an on-chain light-client verifier implemented as a smart contract on ethereum against SNARK-based approaches. Even for large validator set sizes (up to 10610^6), the signature verification gas costs of our light-client verifier are a magnitude lower

    Time-Lock Puzzles from Lattices

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    Time-lock puzzles (TLP) are a cryptographic tool that allow one to encrypt a message into the future, for a predetermined amount of time TT. At present, we have only two constructions with provable security: One based on the repeated squaring assumption and the other based on obfuscation. Basing TLP on any other assumption is a long-standing question, further motivated by the fact that known constructions are broken by quantum algorithms. In this work, we propose a new approach to construct time-lock puzzles based on lattices, and therefore with plausible post-quantum security. We obtain the following main results: * In the preprocessing model, where a one-time public-coin preprocessing is allowed, we obtain a time-lock puzzle with encryption time log(T)\log(T). * In the plain model, where the encrypter does all the computation, we obtain a time-lock puzzle with encryption time T\sqrt{T}. Both constructions assume the existence of any sequential function ff, and the hardness of the circular small-secret learning with errors (LWE) problem. At the heart of our results is a new construction of succinct randomized encodings (SRE) for TT-folded repeated circuits, where the complexity of the encoding is T\sqrt{T}. This is the first construction of SRE where the overall complexity of the encoding algorithm is sublinear in the runtime TT, and which is not based on obfuscation. As a direct corollary, we obtain a non-interactive RAM delegation scheme with sublinear complexity (in the number of steps TT)

    Highly Efficient Server-Aided Multiparty Subfield VOLE Distribution Protocol

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    In recent development of secure multi-party computation (MPC), pseudorandom correlations of subfield vector oblivious linear evaluation (sVOLE) type become popular due to their amazing applicability in multi-dimensional MPC protocols such as privacy-preserving biometric identification and privacy-preserving machine learning protocols. In this paper, we introduce a novel way of VOLE distribution in three-party and four-party honest majority settings with the aid of a trusted server. This new method significantly decreases the communication cost and the memory storage of random sVOLE instances. On the other hand, it also enables a streamline distribution process that can generate a sVOLE instance of an arbitrary length, which results in 100 percent of utility rate of random sVOLE in multi-dimensional MPC protocols while preserving complete precomputability

    Cryptography is Rocket Science: Analysis of BPSec

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    Space networking has become an increasing area of development with the advent of commercial satellite networks such as those hosted by Starlink and Kuiper, and increased satellite and space presence by governments around the world. Yet, historically such network designs have not been made public, leading to limited formal cryptographic analysis of the security offered by them. One of the few public protocols used in space networking is the Bundle Protocol, which is secured by Bundle Protocol Security (BPSec), an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard. We undertake a first analysis of BPSec under its default security context, building a model of the secure channel security goals stated in the IETF standard, and note issues therein with message loss detection. We prove BPSec secure, and also provide a stronger construction, one that supports the Bundle Protocol\u27s functionality goals while also ensuring destination awareness of missing message components

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