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G. E. Hughes y M. J. Cresswell, A New Introduction to Modal Logic, Londres y Nueva York, Routledge, 1996, x + 421 pp.
A propósito de la crítica de Feyerabend al racionalismo crítico
The critical rationalism keeps apart the notions ofrational behavior and certainty, and explicitly admits our fallibility. This position seeks to avoid the risk of relativism assuming that there is an objective truth and that we can recognize and correct our mistakes. So it vindicates its right to evaluate the merits of rival theories and the need to eliminate those that were falsified. There are in the critical rationalism two different attitudes that will be called here "evaluative" and "prescriptive". In this work I wish to defend the following thesis:1) The criticism that Feyerabend makes against the critical rationalism is based on certain aspects of the evidence which affects not only to its prescriptive aim, but also to the evaluative task of methodology.2) It is possible to find an argument against prescriptivism that is independent of any consideration about evidence, avoiding in this way the undesirable consequences about evaluation.3) The notions of certainty and elimination are connected in a way that poses serious problems for the critical rationalism.Resumen en inglés
¿Es el "trilema de Fishkin" un verdadeo trilema?
Fishkin claims that the three liberals principles concerning assignment of social positions (family autonomy, merit and equal life chances) constitute a "trilemma": the realization of any two of these principies precludes the realization of the third. In this paper, I try to prove that this is the case, only if these principies are interpreted in an extreme way. Liberalism, however, has strong reasons to reject such interpretation of each of these principies. Moreover, these reasons are independent from the question of whether their conjunction may be conflictive or not. If we assume moderate versions of the principies (as I claim liberalism would), the trilemma disappears or, at least, becomes much weaker.Resumen en inglé
Richard L. Kirkham, Theories of Truth. A Critical Introduction, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1992, xi + 401 pp.
Manuel Comesaña, Razón, verdad y experiencia. Un análisis de sus vínculos en la epistemología contemporánea, con especial referencia a Popper, Mar del Plata, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, 1996, 172 pp.
S. Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1993, 181 pp.
Ensayo y error restringido y orientado: Esquema de una lógica del descubrimiento científico
This paper outlines a logic of scientific discovery. First, it argues that discovery rules must be general and able to guide the search for novel hypotheses. Then, it criticizes Zahars' deductivist logic of discovery, but accepts his idea of general heuristics principles. It shows that these principies are compatible with a complex version of retroduction. An historical case -the discovery of neutrino- is examined applying this approach. Finally, it concludes that this logic of discovery culminates in a restricted and directed method of trial and error