McMaster University Library Press Open Journal Systems

Lucas, B. J.

Moore\u27s Influence on Russell

Newberry [Vellacott], Jo

The Russell Archives came to McMaster just when I was consider-
ing on what topic to write n"ly doctoral thesis in modern British history.
Since the story of pacifism, its theories and practices, is a major
interest of mine, I was delighted to explore the possibilities of basing a
thesis on some part of Bertrand Russell's activities, and finally settled
on the first world war period. The two organisations with which Russell
was closely connected during this time were the Union for DemocratIc
Control and the No-Conscription Fellowship, and I am dealing mainly
with the latter. Correspondence and memoranda in the Archives are
one of the several sources of which I have made use. What is emerging
is a study not only of Russell's activities, but also of the Fellowship as
a political pressure group.
The N.-C.F. was founded in 1914 (by Fenner Brockway, then editor
of the Labour Leader, now Lord Brockway), to bring together men who
would refuse to fight even if conscription were introduced. Russell
seell"lS to have admired the work of the group and long contemplated
offering his services, but he did not become active in it until conscrip-
tion was actually brought in, at the beginning of 1916. He then forll"led
part of a sll"lall Associates' Political Committee, with H. N. Brailsford,
J. S. Middleton and Catherine Marshall. The last-named had had exper-
ience with the constitutional wing of the wOll"len's suffrage movell"lent,
and within the space of a few weeks the Committee produced and put
into action a quite rell"larkably comprehensive schell"le for exerting poli-
tical pressure, making use of the Press, all shades of sylnpathisers,
deputations, Parliamentary spokesmen. (notably Philip Snowden),
ll"leetings, liaison with other orga·nisations, and all manner of local and
central agitation.
Russell'S connection with the U.D.C. had been lill"lited to little
ll"lore than was appropriate from a dissident university lecturer -
mainly SOll"le writing and the organisation of a Call"lbridge branch. Even
thi s had brought some obloquy, but more because of the ll"li sleading
Press campaign against the U. D. C. than because of anything subversive
that could justly be ascribed to it.. But, for the N. -C. F., Rus sell
really call"le down into the arena, working incessantly, doing whatever
seemed necessary - speaking, writing, answering letters, telephoning,
briefing M. P. s, organising and serving on deputations. The machinery
for political agitation readied by the Associates I Comll"littee, together
with a remarkable information service, for which Catherine Marshall
RUSSELL IN 1916
9
is again entitled to much of the credit; was constantly in use throughout
1916 to involve public opinion and to confront the Government on issues
such as the treatrnent of conscientious objectors by the Tribunals and
by the military, the shipping of some to France (where they might be
shot for persisting in their refusal to obey orders), the need for changes
in the Military Servic e Acts, and for new administrative regulations.
Meanwhile, nearly all the National Committee went to gaol for issuing
a leaflet calling for the repeal of the Military Service Act; and Russell,
for the authorship of another pamphlet, suffered prosecution, a fine,
refusal of a passport to take up a temporary lectureship at Harvard,
and dismissal from his lectureship at Trinity College·, Cambridge. A
speaking tour which he gave in South Wales led to a War Office order
restricting his movements in Britain, under a regulation clearly
designed to prevent spies from entering coastal areas.
As the original leaders disappeared, one by one, into prison, for
refusing to serve in the army, more and more of the burden fell on the
As sociates. In January 1917, Rus sell was elected Acting Chairman of
the N.-C.F., and he and Catherine Marshall, as Acting Honorary
Secretary, worked together very closely, if not always in perfect har-
mony, throughout 1917. Some of the exhilarations and di scouragements
of that year may be described in a later article.
Department of Hi story
McMaster Unive!'sity
Jo Newberry
10


English

Russell in 1916

Keen, C. N.

THE INTERACTION OF RUSSELL AND BRADLEY
During recent research into the controversy between Russell and
Bradley concerning the nature of relations, points carne to light which
may be of interest to readers of this journal. The main conclusions
concerning the controversy about relations cannot be given here, since
they would require more space than is available; I shall limit myself
to a consideration of the general historical question of the Russell-
Bradley interaction, particularly considering the degree to which Brad-
ley influenced Russell.
It seems to be thought today that Bradley had a rather humble
place in Russell's development: Russell, it is said, could only begin
his philosophical career in earnest when he had shaken off the stifling
Hegelianism of Bradley, this being refuted when a logical error con-
cerning the underlying theory of relations was displayed. Bradley's
significance to Russell, it appears to be thought, was limited solely to
giving Russell an exercise for his genius.
It is no surprise that contemporary philosophers should have this
impression: Russell is known to be very free in acknowledging intellec-
tual debts when they occur to him, and yet he almost never publicly
acknowledged any debts to Bradley.l He also gives the impression that
he thought very little of Bradley's system since his general histories
of philosophy mention it very little. Though Wisdom of the West and An
Outline of Philosophy make a few (highly critical) references to Bradley,
the better known, and supposedly more comprehensive History of West-
ern Philosophy does not expound hi'S system at all, but only refers to it
a few times in passing.
That Russell should not have thought it worth while acknowledging
any significant intellectual debt to Bradley may corne as a surprise to
readers of their extensive correspondence, found in the Russell Ar-
chives. 2 Throughout their correspondence we find many cases of
mutual praise; Mr. J. Pitt in Russell 2, p.4, gives one example of
Russell's praise for Bradley, quoting from a passage in which Russell
claims to have learnt more from Bradley than from anybody else. We
may try to argue that Russell was only being polite, and simply return-
ing the compliments which Bradley had showered on him; the following,
however, should show that Russell ought to have been entirely serious.
A. Positive influences. Before Bradley's time, empiricists did
not carefully distinguish philosophy and psychology, as modern students
of philosophy are urged to do. The basic tenet of empiricism was that,
as a matter of contingent fact, all the ideas which a man can have are
derived, ultimately, from his experience. Now this led them to consi-
der the core of philosophy to be a descriptive science: the study of the
contents of the mind. Bradley did not like this at all; he produced a
bitter renunciation of "psychologism", a rejection which has had a pro-
found and lasting effect on philosophy in general. It is Russell, more-
over, perhaps more than any other philo sopher, who has reaped the
benefits of the attack on traditional empiricism.
Bradley argues, extremely successfully, that philosophy is not
concerned with ideas~ psychological entities, but only with ideas
inasmuch as they have "signification", or meaning. But meaning, he
argues, is not to be equated with the actual contents of the mind. This,
it may be noticed, has led to the fixation of contemporary philosophers
with meanings; it was Bradley who fir st drew the attention of contem-
porary philosophers to the importance of meaning, 3 and he deserves
much credit for the fact. But the influence of this upon Russell was
profound. His work centred around meanings; logical atomism was the
working-out of a particular theory of meaning, and the theory of des -
7
criptions was concerned with meanings. And Russell also benefited from
Bradley's teachings on this point by using the positive aspects of his
work concerning meanings to rebuild the tarnished empiricism. D. F.
Pears, in his Bertrand Russe~heBritish Tradition in Philosophy,
has argued that Russell's greatest achievement was the reconstruction
of empiricism within a logical, not a psychological, framework. In so
doing, he was heavily dependent upon Bradley. First, he had to absorb
Bradley's complaints concerning the psychological approach, these
complaints being founded on its lack of interest in meanings, and then
he made use of this new involvement with meaning to reconstruct empir-
icism. This was achieved simply by arguing that, regardless of what
the contents of the mind as a matter of fact may be, meaning can only be
attached to them by reference to that with which we can be acquainted.
Meaning is only attached by reference to the world; a person can only
understand the meaning of a word via this reference. This produced an
empiricism which has been highly fecund, and is also more defensible
than its psychological predecessor. Whereas the latter was based
merely on an alleged contingent fact, which though probably true, is not
at all easy to substantiate, the former was based solely on meanings of
terms, and thus on a logical basis.
Bradley was also influential in the field of logic. He showed him-
self, in his Principles of Logic, to be a great opponent of traditional
logic. He was certainly not prepared to admit that the logic of his day
was a finished science, and he expressed his views on the subject very
strongly indeed. His consideration of the view that all deductive infer-
ence is of the syllogistic form is full of the bitterest scorn, and we find
him arguing successfully that it could cover only a few types of inference,
and certainly does not cover relational inferences. This is certainly of
historical interest in the development of Russell's views. We know
that Russell did read the Logic with great care, since extensive notes
on it are to be found in the Archives. The coruscating attack on tradi-
tional logic could not have failed to have had an effect on him. But we
know also that Russell played a vital part in the reconstruction of logic.
Bradley does not deserve to be overlooked in this.
One aspect of the invective against traditional logic was Bradley's
rejection of the assumption that all propositions are of the subject··
predicate form. What, he asks us, can this analysis Inake of such pro···
positions as "A and B are equal" or "there is a sea,· serpent"? Now
Russell made a great deal of this point. He not only based a very fruit-
ful logic of relations on it, but al.so grounded a rejection of the bulk of
preceding metaphysical systems on it, including, ironi.cally, Bradley's
own system. It m.ay well be that Bradley reintroduced the assumption
that all propositions are of the subject··predicate form into his system
in a new form, but the significant reasons for the rejection of it in its
standard form, the form which really concerned Russell, can virtually
all be found in Bradley's work.
Another important doctrine of the .~!-~~:lE.~.~.. <.?i..Log~ was that the
best way of analysi.ng universal statements, i. e. statements such as
"all men are mortal ", is in terms of a hypothetical. Now Russell tells
us in My Philosophical Development. (~~!?.:) that he only made pro-
gress in logic when he realized that stateluents such as "Socrates is
mortal" are very different from statements such as "all men are mor-
tal ", and that the latter is really a disguised hypothetical: this becomes
fundamental in Russell's new logic. In M. P. D. , however, he claims
that his source of this was the Italian s~hool ;£ mathernatics, in spite
of the fact that it had been clearly stated in Bradley's ~ogic. Notes on
it had been made by Russell in 1893 or so, long before he had COlue
across the Italian school.
8
Allied to this is the point that Russell made a great deal of the
fact that the logical form of a statement may be very different from its
grammatical form, and may be disguised by it. It is this realization
which is essential to the theory of descriptions, and which set the tone
of analysis for Russell and his successors. But this very important
point can be found clearly in Bradley's Logic. In the first chapter, he
clearly differentiates the two, saying:
By the subject I mean here not the ultimate subject, to which the
whole ideal content is referred, but the subject which lies within
that content, in other words, the ,grammatical subject.
(2nd ed., p. 22)
The above-rnentionecl point, that all statements are "really" dis-
guised hypotheticals, is a demonstration of the fact that Bradley differ··
entiated between the logical and gralumatical form of propositions, and
so is the point that all propositions are elliptical, that "grass is green"
is really a proposition of the form "the world is such that grass is
green". It is finally emphasized, most clearly, in his discussion of the
negative judgement. Having argued that all judgements are of the world
as a whole, that all attribute something to the world as a whole, Bradley
had some problems concerning negative judgements, because they do
not seem to fit his analysis at all. Now in dealing with this, Bradley
simply states that we are misled by the grammatical form of the propo'"
sition. The logical form, he tells us, is: "the world is such that it ex..
cludes the possibility of roundness and squareness being conjoined ".
Now again, we may say that Rus sell derived thi s point from hi s
reading of Frege, but it can once more be pointed out that Russell read,
and seems to have understood, Bradley's point on it long before he read
Frege. The fact that he absorbed the point is shown luminously by his
notes on the Logic.
B. Th~_~ativeinfl~~p...£..~ Not only is Bradley of importance to
Russell in providing him with philosophical tools, and in positively in··
fluencing his philosophy, but he is also of importance inasmuch as it
was the rebellion against Bradley which gave direction to Russell's
work. Professor PaSSlllore has argued in a recent paper 4 that Logical
Atomislu is almost a direct product of Russell's reactions to Bradley.
Now we know, from. Russell's autobiographical works, that he detested
monism; that he felt it to be intellectually suffocating. His eal'1y work
has been presented, by Russell himself, as set up in conscious opposi-
tion to lllonism. PaSSluore explores the relations between the two phi·.
losophers briefly, and comes to the conclusion that "Logical Atomislll
ends up by being a kind of diffracted image of TIradley". He tells us
that though Russell may have adopted a view which is prima facie at
tb.e opposite extrelue to Bradley's monism, he nevertheless remained,
in some respects, very close to Bradley. Passmore supports the view
that Russell and Bradley are really closely allied, partly by mentioning
a few of the shared logical insights discussed in the previous section.
But his point is made more strongly when, in showing that Russell's
viewpoint was ostensibly the polar opposite to that of Bradley, he shows
that they have similar problems. That the positions were polar oppo··
sites is well supported in Passillore's paper. For instance, in Bradley's
systelu, we find that the most general of judgements are the most satis-
factory, since they are more comprehensive, are less of "abstractions"
than more particular judgeluents. Russell provides the complete anti ..
thesis of this view. For him, an atOluic judgement, such as "this is
red" is the most satisfactory; the rllore general the judgeluent, the less
satisfactory it is considered. An allied contrast between their views is
that for Bradley, a judgement is most true when it points towards the
whole cohering systelll into which it enters, when it is presented as
closely knit with the whole. For Russell, on the other hand, the I1.'lore
any case it is only a small matter of history which is of no con-
sequence. (27 September 1914)
lA very rare exception is to be found in "Logical Atomism" (Logic
and Knowledge, p. 324): "At Cambridge I read ... Mr. Bradley's Logic,
which influenced me profoundly. "
2The correspondence consists of 23 letters from Bradley, during
1901-1914, and 11 from Russell, during 1900-1922. We can also learn
from the Archives when Russell first read Bradley's works. In Sept.
1893 he read the Logic; in May 1894, Ethical Studies; and in August 1894,
Appearance and RealiJ:y.
3Note that f'rege shared Bradley's honour of originally emphasizing
meaning; but Frege was not read until the direction of philosophy had
already been changed, whereas Bradley was read widely.
4"Russell and Bradley" in Robert Brown and C. D. Rollins, eds.,
Contemporary Philos~1ry: in Australia (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969).
C. N. KeenDeparhnent of Philosophy
McMaster University
atomic the judgement, the more isolated the state of affairs to which it
points, the better.
Now Bradley soon reached the conclusion that no judgements are
ever quite general enough to adequately represent the Absolute. All
judgements, he believed, must be guilty of abstraction, since even the
most general of judgements must attribute a predicate to the Absolute,
and yet in so doin,g, they cannot fail to mutilate the unity of the whole,
since they differentiate the predicate from the subject. On the other
hand, Russell had the problem that no judgements ever seemed to be
quite atomic enough, since they always seemed to imply other proposi-
tions. For example, rejection of an apparently entirely atomic propo-
sition, such as "this is red ", will involve the rejection of other propo-
sitions, such as "this is the same colour as that object", which shows
that it is really not so independent as was thought. Their views being
extremes on this question, both met with the problems of extremity.
Passmore includes in his paper an attempt to understand~
Russell should have required such a strange position as that of Logical
Atomism. His conclusion is that Russell was so much in fear of mon-
ism that he only felt safe from it when he could point to absolutely. inde-
pendent particulars. If he could do this, then the world cannot be the
type of unity which monism demands. Now if Passmore is right, then
Bradley's system must have had a very strong influence on Russell in-
deed, inspiring as it did such a decisive reaction. Passmore's thesis
would have been made a good deal stronger, also, had he provided
Russell's motive for this reaction. The motive is not hard to find.
Russell spent his life in the search for certainty; he seemed to want cer-
tainty above all else. His love of mathematics was one product of this
desire. But monism denies this quest. To completely understand any
elen1ent of the world, we must completely understand the whole world,
and our failure to achieve this means that we fail to achieve any complete
truths. Again, it has already been shown that for Bradley, even the
most true of judgements is still not finally true, since it involves the
abstraction of the predicate from the subject. It is no wonder that
monism was poison to Russell!
Now Bradley and Russell were usually on very amiable terlns.
When Russell first met Bradley, in December 1902, he noted in his di-
ary: "I loved the man warmly". Their correspondence is full of mutu-
al esteem. But the r.elationship seemed to become somewhat strained
in later years, and it seems that Russell's failure to make public any
debts to Bradley may have been part of the cause. Bradley's last letter
to Russell, written at a time when his reputation had been tarnished by
Russell and Moore, is a very sad one for modern readers. Their long
correspondence ends on a note of considerable pathos, with Bradley
saying:
. . . I always have believed that in 1883 in the Logic I pointed out
a number of inferences which fell outside the category of subject
and attribute and pointed out again that there was nevertheless a
form in every possible inference. I don't claim originality ever
for anything because I have read various writers of various
schools and my memory is so bad that I may recall something
without remembering its source or that it had a source. Still I
believe that these points are unquestionably in my book of 1883.
You on the other hand appear to state that they came into the
world through Peano and Frege - of cour se with very much more.
Now even if this had happened in 1883 - I can't conceive how I
could have been aware of it directly or indirectly - and surely
no one could be more non-mathematical than myself. So why
should I have no credit at all even if Peano and Frege~ be-
fore me? However I probably have lnlsunder stood you and in
10 11


The Interaction of Russell and Bradley

[Trinity College, Cambridge Memorial Inscription]

Booth, Darlene

RECENT ACQUISITIONS
This list continues that in Russell 3, page 12. "Ps." m.eans
photocopies and ·"Ls." m.eans letters. _. D. B.
HARRISON, Jane E. L. to BR, [1902J. P., courtesy of Bodleian
Library, Oxford.
HENKIN, Leon. 2 Ls. to BR, 1963. L. from. BR, 1963. Ps., courtesy
of Professor Henkin. BR asks Henkin about the im.pact of GCide1 on
Principia Mathem.atica.
HEPBURN & ROSS, LTD. 4 Ls. from. BR, 1960-4. Courtesy of Messrs.
Hepburn & Ross, suppliers of Red Hackle, Russell's favourite
whiskey.
HILBERT, David. L. from. BR, 1919; L. from. Dora Russell, n. d. Ps.,
courtesy of Universitatsbibliotek, Gottingen.
HILLQUIT, Morris. L. from. Crystal Eastm.an enclosing a program.m.e
which N. Angell, R. MacDonald and BR put up to the English Work-
m.en's Council, 1917. Ps., courtesy of State Historical Society of
Wisconsin (Hillquit papers).
HOBHOUSE, L. T. L. from. BR, 1904. Microfilm., courtesy of Institut
Mittag-Leffler and Dr. 1. Grattan-Guinness.
HOCKING, William. Ernest. 12 Ls. and 3 te1egram.s from BR to Hocking
and secretary, 1939-4L Ps., courtesy of University Archives, Harvard.
HOERNLE, R.F.A. 2 Ls. and 1 telegram. from. BR, 1919. Es., cour-
tesy of University Archives, Harvard.
HOLT, Olivia. L. from. BR, 1939. P., courtesy of Freda Utley.
HUEBSCH, B.W. 3 Ls. from. BR, 1923-41. L. to BR,[l923). Ps.,
courtesy of Library of Congress.
JAGER, Ronald. 2 Ls. from. BR, 1960-66. Ps., courtesy of Prof.
Jager. One letter concerns a re-reading of "On Denoting".
JAMESON, Storm.. L. from. BR, 1928. P., courtesy of E. Dyson.
JOURDAIN, P.E. B.56 Ls.,and som.e notes, from. BR, 1902-11. Also,
drafts of Jourdain's letters to RusselL Microfilm., courtesy of In-
stitut Mittag-Leffler and Dr. 1. Grattan-Guinnes~. An invaluable
insight into the writing of Principia and other works of the period.
JUSTEMA, William.. L. from. BR, 193L P., courtesy of Bancroft Li-
brary, University of California, Berkeley.
KEMPE, A.B. 2 Ls. from BR, 1904; 3 Ls. from. H.H. Turner, 1904;
L. to A.E.H. Love, 1906; L. from. A.E.H. Love, 1906. Ps., cour-
tesy of Professor Kuklick and Rev. A.H. M. Kem.pe.
KEYNES, J.M. L. from. BR, 1921; L. from. A1ys Russell, 1905; 6 Ls.
m.ostly from. National Council for Civil Liberties, 1916. Ps., cour-
te sy of King I s College, Cam.bridge.
KIMBALL, ---. L. from. BR, 1944, on his intended work on induction.
P.urchase.
KOHLBERG, Alfred. L. from. BR, 1958. P., courtesy of Corliss
Lam.ont.
KOMISAR, Lucille. L. from. BR, 1961. P., courtesy of Tam.im.ent
Library, New York University.
KUKLICK, Bruce. 2 Ls. from. BR and a cancelled cheque endorsed by
BR, 1963. Ps., courtesy of Professor Kuklick.
LAMONT, Corliss. 46 Ls. and 4 te1egram.s from. BR; 11 Ls. and 1
telegram. to BR, 1955-69. 1 L. and 1 telegram. to Lady Russell; 1 L.
from. Lady Russell, 1970. Ps., courtesy of Dr. Lam.ont.
LARSON, Cedric A. 2 Ls. from. BR, 1963-4. Ps., courtesy of Pro-
fessor Larson.
LASKI, Harold J. 2 Ls. from. BR, 1919-23. Ps., courtesy of Univer-'
sity Archives, Harvard, and Syracuse University.
8


Recent Acquisitions

Ready, Liam

PHOTOCOPIES FOR RESEARCH
The Bertrand Russell Archives have on file ;ilmost all the
articles written by Lord Russell and rrlOst of the reprints of these
articles, whether in periodicals, books, or pamphlets. We are
trying now to obtain all books and articles about Russell. The
Archives also contain a large nUInuer uf unpublished writings by
Russell which are of considerable importance, as well as private
correspondence with friends, relatives, and important people in
many fields of human endeavour. This very good and substantial
collection of writings by and about Russell may be used by anyone
interested in studying Russell's life and thought.
PhotocopieE may in princ.iple h" han of th,,~e pllhl i "hen "nd
unpublished vvritings, although the copyright laws im.pose certain
re strictions and McMaster's contract with Rus sell's estate certain
other s. Clearan:::e may be obtained by writing to the Archivi st who
will supply the nece~sary information. The charge for photocopies
is $.10 each plus pustage. All copying will be done on Xerox machines
except for print-cmts from rnicrofihn. Exchange" lnay be arranged
of mutually important m.aterial. - L.H..
5


Photocopies for Research

Front Cover and Table of Contents [print edition]

Blackwell, Kenneth

Soon after Russell agreed to write anonYlnously for the Press, a
letter under the head of "Pra.ctical War Econolny" and over the signa-
ture of "F. R. S. " appeared in the Labour Leader (13 06J: 20 April 1916,
6). "F.R.S." could mean Fellow of the Royal Society, and the tone of
the letter is one of mordant irony, characteri.stic of Russell. I would
like to have readers 1 opinions as to the internal evidence for Russell's
UNSIGNED RUSSELL MATERIAL
With reference to the final paragraph of John Slater's article in
Russell 1, although I cannot offer proof of Russell's authorship of any
unsigned material publis.hed in the Tribunal or elsewhere, there is
evidence to support Wood's suggestion that Rus sell wrote material for
the N.-C.F. other than that known to us. There are several references
in the Minutes of the Political Comlnittee during the first half of 1916
to Russell's willingness to write what was needed, and especially to
write letters. On 4 April 1916 it was noted that "Mr. Cannan is com-
piling list of prolninent people willing to write or sign letters and list
of London and provincial papers willing to publish such letters. Mr.
Bertrand Russell is writing a series of letters to be used in this way,
designed to meet every sort and kind of misunderstanding." SOlne of
these, it was stated, were to be in answer to "important people who
need persuading or convincing", and of these, two have survived,
drafted in Russell's handwriting, with an additional sentence, added in
Catherine Marshall's hand, which indicates that they were to go out
over her signature; they were to friends of her father who had declined
to sign a memorial to the Prime Minister protesting the actions of the
Tribunals. And on 20 April, she writes to Gilbert Cannan to ask if he
is prepared "to write, in rotation with Mr. Bertrand Russell and Mr.
Brailsford, the weekly page which the Labour Leader has asked us to
supply theln with every Monday." (A.ll the documents referred to here
are in the Catherine Marshall papers, CUlnberland Record Office.)
- Jo Newberry
author ship of the letter, which was first noticed among the relatively
few WWI clippings he kept and is as follows: - K. B.
Sir, --The Government having now decided to fall in with
the Continental practice of automatic Conscription for boys as
they reach the age of 18, a little clear thinking shows that it
has become possible to simplify enormously the means of
achieving all that is to be hoped for from Mr. Asquith's noble
pledge never to sheathe the sword until the military domination
of Prussia has been wholly and finally destroyed.
My plan, which all will agree to be enormously more
humane and economical than the present mode of conducting the
war, is this: Let all the Great Powers of Europe agree that boys,
when they reach the age of 18;- shall be divided by lot into three
classes, one containing the half of them, the other two each con-
taining a quarter. The class containing one half shall be pain-
lessly executed in a lethal chamber. Of the other two classes,
the members of the one shall be deprived of an arm,~-le-g, or
an eye at the discretion of the surgeon; the members of the
other shall be exposed day and night to deafening noises, until
they acquire some nervous affliction--madness, speechless-
ness, mental blindness, or deafness--after which they shall be
liberated to form the future manhood of the country.
Sir, in the name of science and economy, but still more
in the name of humanity, I call upon the Government to propose
these terms at once to all the belligerents, and thus avoid an
immense mass of preventible suffering caused by the lack of
science in our present methods of killing. --Yours, etc., F.R.S.
10 11


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