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A Vision for Future Mobility: Hyperloop One and the Submerged Floating Tunnel from Estonia and Finland
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the three types of forms available for the construction of underwater sea tunnel in Estonia and Finland in detail and explains that Hyperloop One is seeking to utilize the submerged floating tunnel form. Part II explores the existing international conventions, treaties, and regulations related with the Sea that are both compatible and incompatible with Hyperloop One Technology. Part III then argues that the construction of submerged floating tunnel as is, without engineering solutions, is not permitted as it potentially violates existing international legislation and that because of the violation, the interpretation of the existing law should be expanded to include the submerged floating tunnel
Event Program
Seventeenth Annual Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal Symposium
February 20, 2020Tull AuditoriumEmory University School of LawAtlanta, G
Piercing the Healthcare Veil: An Argument for Healthcare Pricing Transparency
This Comment analyzes the current problem of opaqueness regarding patient access to pricing of shoppable services within the healthcare industry, the trend of increasing out-of-pocket costs paid by patients for shoppable services, and how consolidation among health care providers contributes to increased costs to patients. Analysis of the price transparency in the cosmetic procedure industry and successful state healthcare price transparency initiatives is conducted to demonstrate that transparency in pricing can contribute to increased competition, consumer knowledge and lower costs of shoppable services. The Paper concludes with suggestions for both federal and state-level policymakers on the proper course of action for putting patients’ interests first by putting insurance companies and healthcare conglomerates second
Against the Safety Net
Then-Representative Jack Kemp and President Ronald Reagan originated the “safety net” conception of U.S. health and welfare laws in the late 1970s and early 1980s, defending proposed cuts to New Deal and Great Society programs by asserting that such cuts would not take away the “social safety net of programs” for those with “true need.” Legal scholars have adopted their metaphor widely and uncritically. This Article deconstructs the safety net metaphor and counsels against its use in understanding health and welfare laws. The metaphor is descriptively confusing because it means different things to different audiences. Some understand the safety net as comprising morality-tested subsistence programs (as did Representative Kemp and President Reagan), but others understand it as comprising all subsistence programs (whether reserved for those with “true need” or not); or both subsistence programs and poverty-prevention programs; or even the full panoply of laws that affect in any way the human ecosystem in which people live, die, sometimes get sick, and sometimes get help. Moreover, the vision that the metaphor conjures of laws springing into action to rescue an independent individual should she “fall” contradicts feminist and communitarian conceptions of the subject of regulation. Relatedly, this vision of law as a net reifies laws involved in rescue but not those involved in preventing harm, building resilience, or promoting equality, thereby hiding social and structural determinants of health and inequality and taking sides on difficult prioritization questions raised by acknowledging such determinants. In light of these arguments against the safety net, this Article endorses the “ecosystem” and other alternative terms that highlight rather than elide unresolved questions about the means and ends of health and welfare laws
Partisan Voting on the California Supreme Court
When did ideology become the major fault line of the California Supreme Court? To answer this question, we use a two-parameter item response theory (IRT) model to identify voting patterns in non-unanimous decisions by California Supreme Court justices from 1910 to 2011. The model shows that voting on the court became polarized on recognizably partisan lines beginning in the mid-1900s. Justices usually did not vote in a pattern that matched their political reputations and party affiliation during the first half of the century. This began to change in the 1950s. After 1959 the dominant voting pattern is partisan and closely aligns with each justice’s political reputation. Our findings after 1959 largely confirm the conventional wisdom that voting on the modern court is on political lines. But our findings call into question the usual characterization of the Lucas court (1987–1996) as a moderately conservative court. Our model shows that the conservatives dominated the Lucas court to the same degree the liberals dominated the Traynor court (1964–1970).
More broadly, this Article confirms that an important development occurred in American law at the turn of the half-century. A previous study used the same model to identify voting patterns on the New York Court of Appeals from 1900 to 1941 and to investigate whether those voting patterns were best explained by the justices’ political reputations. That study found consistently patterned voting for most of the 40 years. But the dominant dimension of disagreement on the court for much of the period was not political in the usual sense of that term. Our finding that the dominant voting pattern on the California Supreme Court was non-political in the first half of the 1900s parallels the New York study’s findings for the period before 1941. Carrying the voting pattern analysis forward in time, this Article finds that in the mid-1900s the dominant voting pattern became aligned with the justices’ political reputations due to a change in the voting pattern in criminal law and tort cases that dominated the court’s docket. Together, these two studies provide empirical evidence that judicial decision-making changed in the United States in the mid-1900s as judges divided into ideological camps on a broad swath of issues
Changing the Subject of \u3cem\u3eSati\u3c/em\u3e
Charan Shah\u27s 1999 death was widely considered to be the first sati, or widow immolation, to have occurred in India in over twenty years. Media coverage of the event focused on procedural minutiae-her sari, her demeanor-and ultimately, several progressive commentators came to the counterintuitive conclusion that the ritually anomalous nature of Charan\u27s death confirmed its voluntary, secular, and noncriminal nature. This article argues that the unlabeling of Charan\u27s death, like those of other women between 1999 and 2006, reflects a tension between the nonindividuated, impervious model of personhood exemplified by sati and the particularized citizen-subject of liberal-democratic politics in India
Comparative Law and International Dispute Resolution Processes: Looking Forward, Looking Back
The last few years have been momentous ones in the area of cross–border dispute resolution. Numerous countries have sought to bring the innovations of international commercial arbitration into their national legal systems by creating international business courts operating in English and/or with foreign judges sitting alongside national judges, while other jurisdictions have signed onto new international instruments facilitating the resolution of cross–border legal disputes. One of these agreements—the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Singapore Convention on Mediation)—came to fruition in record time (a mere five years from start to finish) and with record adherence (an unheard–of forty–six state signatories on the opening day), while another—the Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Judgments Convention)—has been more than twenty–five years in the making, proving that patience is a virtue in treaty deliberations.
While these initiatives were doubtless influenced by a variety of factors and can be analyzed from a variety of perspectives, one approach that is often overlooked involves the role that comparative law plays in the process, both with respect to decisions involving which projects to pursue and decisions relating to the ultimate shape of the instruments and mechanisms themselves. Comparative law also plays a vital role in the evaluation of the actual or prospective success of new proposals
Domestic Military Operations and the Coronavirus Pandemic
In response to the novel coronavirus crisis, we are witnessing one of the largest domestic military operations in American history. This article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers the emergency authorities invoked to address the coronavirus, including the Public Health Service Act (PHSA), National Emergencies Act (NEA), and Stafford Act. Part II deals with the laws, regulations, and policies governing the military’s role as a law enforcer— including restrictions on the military’s role to quell civilian disturbances. I also briefly discuss martial law, a rarely invoked but powerful authority held at the federal, state, and local levels. Part III deals with the scope of the military as emergency aid and relief provider. Unlike the military’s role in quelling domestic disturbances, there are far fewer restrictions when it provides relief following a natural disaster or health crisis
Reflections on the Effects of Federalism on Opioid Policy
One thing we have seen today that we talk about in health law all the time is how the policy, the laws and institutions up at the 10,000 foot level, can so dramatically influence the personal, people’s lived experiences. Our speakers today have done a really great job of drawing out abstract institutional questions and also showing us how those questions have influenced the lives of real people in often tragic ways. Another thing we have seen that we talk about in administrative law all the time is the importance of expertise, especially given how hard it is to trace the impact of laws and institutions on real life. Thank you to our amazing experts who have come a long way to share with us great insights about the really important issue of substance use disorder, and showing us that there really are good answers and bad answers, and maybe even right answers and wrong answers. We have heard important insights about causes, effects, and real solutions that they and other researchers have produced by studying incredibly complicated problems in depth. These problems are nuanced and they are complicated and that is part of what makes expertise so valuable.
Before we walk away, I would like to take a moment to dwell on a third theme, which is that knowing the right answer or having the expertise is not necessarily enough to get that answer executed in policy and then to have it impact people on a personal level. Experts certainly can and should try to persuade—and we have talked a bit about how best to do so—to figure out the answers and just go tell the people the answers and get them to vote, or tell policymakers the best way to handle the problem they face. But we have seen throughout the day that persuasion is often not enough, in part because of structural barriers that inhibit the ability of those with power or authority to be persuaded, or otherwise constrain or impede their choices even when they are persuaded
An Era of Foreign Political Interference: Impulsive, Overcompensation of Australia, and a Comparison of Legislative Schemes with the United States
In an increasingly globalized world, foreign political interference is a growing threat to democratic systems of government. Following events like Russia’s successful attack on the United States 2016 presidential election and growing threats of interference from China to Australia’s democratic process, Australia became the first country to completely overhaul its national security and foreign political interference laws through broad, sweeping reform. While its new legislation aims to provide greater transparency between the Australian government and the public, the impulsive and hastily drafted laws have given rise to the potential for many unwanted consequences. This Comment brings to light some of the most significant changes to Australia’s national security and foreign political interference laws and contemplates the potential repercussions. Further, this Comment compares the United States’ legislative framework for protections against foreign political interference to Australia’s new laws and proposes a solution to correct Australia’s failed reformations