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Book Review: Blood and Ruins: The Last Imperial War, 1931–1945
Author: Richard Overy
Reviewed by Jonathan Klug, colonel, US Army, and assistant professor, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College
Many track the start of World War II to Poland in 1939.In Blood and Ruins, Richard Overy contends the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria was the start of an Asian war that later merged into the 1939 war in Europe when Japan attacked America. The book addresses policy and strategy as well as operational, technical, and tactical issues.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1032/thumbnail.jp
Book Review: Cyber Intelligence: Actors, Policies, and Practices
Author: Constance S. Uthoff
Reviewed by Dr. Robert J. Bunker, director of research and analysis, managing partner, C/O Futures LLC
From intelligence cycles and processes to intelligence agencies, security challenges, and more, Cyber Intelligence: Actors, Policies, and Practices is a solid work that “covers a lot of ground at a reasonable price.” The reviewer sees it as “a practical tool in our understanding of the cyber intelligence and conflict discipline.”https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1023/thumbnail.jp
SRAD Director\u27s Corner: US Army War College Russia-Ukraine War Study Project
The Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College is analyzing the operational events and activities of the Russia-Ukraine War to understand the war’s strategic implications for the US Army and its role within the NATO Alliance. Analysis will further inform theater and national US strategy and may benefit Army doctrine and concepts vis-à-vis the Russian threat. It will also examine how US and allied defense policies should adjust to the current character of war. Lessons learned from Ukraine are relevant to the evolving challenge in the Pacific in the near term and are opportunities for the United States to progress in terms of integrated deterrence and the provision of assistance with and through partners
Was the Russian Invasion of Ukraine a Failure of Western Deterrence?
In February 2022, many observers initially evaluated the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a failure of Western deterrence. That assessment was and is flawed inasmuch as the West never articulated a clear strategy to deter such an invasion. Engaging with relevant conceptual debates about how deterrence works and relating this information to what the West did and did not do in the run-up to the invasion, this article shows that deterrence efforts were based on problematic assumptions about the Kremlin’s motivations. The study concludes with lessons for Western military and policy practitioners with the intention to enable better future thinking about how to deter Russia
Daoism and Design: Mapping the Conflict in Syria
In contemporary military operations, some problems are so complex they do not give way to linear solutions but require problem management instead. Combining the fundamentals of Dao De Jing philosophy with the US military design process offers a new perspective to analyze complex security problems, devise management strategies, and plan military operations. Applying this new approach to the complex security environment in Syria allows for a nonlinear mapping of long-term goals and a new perspective on relationships between key actors, environmental factors that restrict changes in the security environment, and where planners should focus their attention
Book Review: Determined to Persist: General Earle Wheeler, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military’s Foiled Pursuit of Victory in Vietnam
Author: Mark A. Viney
Reviewed by Dr. Gregory L. Cantwell, professor, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College
Published on April 20, 2023. How did the leadership dynamics of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the president, and others during the height of the Vietnam War play out? Determined to Persist analyzes General Earle G. Wheeler and others and offers what the reviewer calls a fresh perspective on the topic.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1005/thumbnail.jp
Americans and the Dragon: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting from the Boxer Uprising
©2023 Mitchell G. Klingenberg
Drawing from archival materials at the US Army Heritage and Education Center and the United States Military Academy at West Point, numerous published primary sources, and a range of secondary sources, this monograph offers an overview of the China Relief Expedition from June 1900 to the moment of liberation in August. Its considerations range from the geopolitical to the strategic and down to the tactical levels of war. US forces partnered alongside the combined naval and land forces of multiple nations, thus constituting the first contingency, expeditionary, and multinational coalition in American military history. In the face of numerous obstacles conditioned by enemy forces, the environment, and internal to the informal coalition itself, American forces succeeded in liberating their besieged legation. While the character of war has evolved since 1900, students of war should see through disparities that appear to separate the China Relief Expedition from the historical present.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1957/thumbnail.jp
From the Acting Editor in Chief
Welcome to the Autumn 2023 demi-issue of Parameters. Released approximately one month before the full issue of the journal, the demi-issue addresses unfolding current events and topics critical to our readership, previews upcoming content for the forthcoming full issue, and tackles the big questions being asked today in the fields of military strategy and defense policy. This demi-issue includes two In Focus special commentaries—one on the US Army’s historical recruiting challenges and one on the Russia-Ukraine War as today’s strategic inflection point for modernizing the US Army—and the SRAD Director’s Corner on the US Army War College Russia-Ukraine War Study Project
Book Review: Number One Realist: Bernard Fall and Vietnamese Revolutionary Warfare
Author: Nathaniel L. Moir
Reviewed by John A. Nagl, professor of warfighting studies, US Army War College
Counterinsurgency expert John A. Nagl reviews the “long-overdue” biography of the American political scientist Bernard Fall who, as Nagl writes, was “always a couple years ahead of informed US public opinion” about the Vietnam War. Author Nathaniel L. Moir’s experience as an Afghanistan War veteran informs this examination of one of the most “contentious” topics in American history, and the intersection here of Dr. Nagl’s, Moir’s, and Fall’s expertise provides powerful insights about the persistent question of how best to approach counterinsurgency.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1034/thumbnail.jp