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Book Review: Small Armies, Big Cities: Rethinking Urban Warfare
Author: Louise A. Tumchewics (editor)
Reviewed by Dr. John P. Sullivan, instructor, Safe Communities Institute, University of Southern California
Dr. John P. Sullivan gives an overview of Louise A. Tumchewics\u27s anthology on the persistent challenge of urban warfare and highlights the work\u27s strongest chapters and their value to commanders and planners of future urban operations. Sullivan mentions chapter author Patrick Finnegan\u27s discussion of liminality as particularly valuable and also calls John Spencer\u27s siege discussion one of the book\u27s core contributions.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1040/thumbnail.jp
The Art of Avoiding Strategic Miscalculation
This examination of British War Secretary George Cornewall Lewis and the gold standard memorandum he penned in 1862 (that proved instrumental in preventing British intervention in the American Civil War) offers insights for modern leaders on how to avoid institutional barriers to effective strategic thinking and political-strategic miscalculation through insightful analysis of potential liabilities and policy assumptions. It shows how outstanding strategic thinkers possess an informed and reflective filter to evaluate past, present, and anticipated events—developed through a good education, diverse practical experience, lifelong intellectual curiosity, empowerment, and access to senior leadership
Book Review: Resourcing the National Security Enterprise: Connecting the Ways and Means of US National Security
Edited by: Susan Bryant and Mark Troutman
Reviewed by Christopher Sandrolini, Foreign Service officer and professor, US Army War College
Foreign Service officer and US Army War College professor Christopher Sandrolini calls this anthology, which contextualizes the defense budget within federal spending, a “well-organized and lucid practical introduction to working within the confines of a bureaucracy.” He highlights and distills Bryant and Troutman’s main arguments, noting, “[m]astering these rules [of bureaucracy] is essential to turn strategies and policies into funded, viable programs.” He also discusses the book’s explanation of how the Department of Defense balances the “four pillars” framework (force structure, force posture, readiness, and modernization in developing strategy) and praises the book’s concluding recommendations, outlined in the review.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1044/thumbnail.jp
Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson Jr.: Central Pacific Theater Army Commander for Admiral Chester W. Nimitz 1943–45
This monograph analyzes Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson Jr.’s service as de facto theater Army commander to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz from August 1943 to June 1945. It focuses on the theater-strategic level when Richardson led US Army Forces in Central Pacific Area and US Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas. This study highlights the context of Richardson’s operating environment beginning with prewar plans, the realities of early wartime defeats, and the state of joint operating procedures. It assesses Richardson’s accomplishments in exercising Landpower in the Pacific, across the entire range of today’s Army war-fighting and Joint functions and discusses the implications of posturing for large-scale combat operations in competition, crisis, and conflict. These assessments are relevant to US Army Pacific today in its four current roles of Theater Joint Force Land Component Command, Combined Joint Task Force, Combined Joint Force Land Component Command, and Army Service Component Command.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1965/thumbnail.jp
Avoiding the Escalatory Trap: Managing Escalation during the Israel-Hamas War
Israel finds itself in a trap: escalate or maintain the status quo; absent a political solution, it must develop capable threats that deter future Hamas attacks and dissuade Hezbollah and Tehran from providing the support Hamas requires to carry them out. This special commentary executes an analysis of Israel’s precarious position and, in doing so, confronts the larger question of how to avoid escalation when engaging with violent extremist organizations with clear but unverifiable state support. The analysis provides a clear picture of the problem and offers tentative, evidence-based solutions for evading escalation or an untenable status quo
Operating Successfully within the Bureaucracy Domain of Warfare: Part One
Policymakers in the defense community should approach bureaucracy as a sixth domain of warfare because, in doing so, they can successfully handle its processes and procedures. Part one of this two-part article discusses the first three (of 10) fundamentals these professionals must develop to navigate the bureaucratic domain and address and balance the complexities of the policy-making process for the overall benefit of US national security
Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander: A Reappraisal
This article argues that the historical assessment of Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II lacks objectivity and balance. It identifies several strategic errors and missteps attributable to Eisenhower, which resulted in severe casualties and prolonged the war in Europe. The conclusions can help US military practitioners and policymakers assess the background and qualities required for successful theater command during wartime and senior commanders’ performances
Book Review: British Grand Strategy in the Age of American Hegemony
Author: William D. James
Reviewed by Dr. Frank L. Jones, distinguished fellow, US Army War College
Dr. Frank L. Jones, a distinguished fellow of the US Army War College, provides a useful and comprehensive review of author William D. James’s first book, “an excellent study for members of the defense community who want to understand British grand strategy historically or aspire to policy-making or strategy-making positions and need a sound introduction.” Jones outlines James’s main arguments and the value of the case studies presented, including the “East of Suez” case study, a “vivid example of strategic adjustment where timing, domestic politics, other foreign policy priorities, economic power, and the concerns of allies shape decision making.”https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1069/thumbnail.jp