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Book Review: The Dark Path: The Structure of War and the Rise of the West
No full textAuthor: Williamson Murray
Reviewed by: Dr. John A. Nagl, General John J. Pershing Professor of Warfighting Studies, US Army War College
The Dark Path covers five decades of Western expansion as the author explores aspects of military organizations throughout history, focusing on the five Military-Social Revolutions. The reviewer believes this book “synthesizes [the author’s] career in an important and accessible package well worth the time for readers of this journal.”
©2025 John A. Naglhttps://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1113/thumbnail.jp
Book Review: The Clausewitz Myth: Or the Emperor’s New Clothes
No full textAuthor: Azar Gat
Reviewed by: Colonel Darren W. Buss, faculty instructor, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, US Army War College
Azar Gat, the author of The Clausewitz Myth, takes a closer look at Carl von Clausewitz’s On War and argues through looking at historical documents and unpublished versions of the text that there have been misinterpretations of his thoughts. The reviewer believes Gat’s assertions are not earth-shattering but still notes “engaging with [Clausewitz’s] thoughts through the lens of Gat is a valuable experience for readers.”https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1110/thumbnail.jp
Book Review: Arms Control at a Crossroads: Renewal or Demise?
No full textEditors: Jeffrey A. Larsen and Shane Smith
Reviewed by: Ronald J. Granieri
Arms Control at a Crossroads is a timely examination of arms control in a changing and complex strategic environment. The essays collected cover the broad context of arms control, specific examples of nuclear powers, and a review of arms control domains. The reviewer sees this book as “a useful addition to the library of any specialists in the field.”https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1106/thumbnail.jp
Book Review: Defining the Mission: The Development of US Strategic Military Intelligence up to the Cold War
No full textAuthor: Scott A. Moseman
Reviewed by: Dr. Thomas W. Spahr, Francis W. De Serio Chair of Strategic and Theater Intelligence, US Army War College
From a modest four-man office in 1882 to a sprawling intelligence network by the 1940s, Scott A. Moseman traces the evolution of US strategic military intelligence through war, politics, and institutional transformation. Focusing on the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division, he reveals how competing visions from military leaders, government officials, and the public shaped the mission and identity of American intelligence agencies. This richly detailed history uncovers the roots of modern intelligence and its deep entanglement with the rise of American power.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1116/thumbnail.jp
Book Review: Alliances & Armor: Communist Diplomacy and Armored Warfare During the War in Vietnam
No full textAuthor: Jim Pomeroy
Reviewed by: Dr. Gregory A. Daddis, Melbern G. Glasscock Endowed Chair in American History, Texas A&M University
In Alliances & Armor, Jim Pomeroy reveals how Cold War diplomacy shaped North Vietnam’s battlefield tactics, transforming guerrilla warfare into Soviet-style armored offensives. Drawing from multi-archival sources, the book traces Hanoi’s strategic pivot from China to the USSR amid shifting global alliances and escalating US involvement. With gripping detail, Pomeroy chronicles the rise of the People’s Army of Vietnam’s tank-led campaigns, culminating in the dramatic fall of Saigon.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1120/thumbnail.jp
A Long, Hard Year: Russia-Ukraine War Lessons Learned 2023
No full textFollowing the 2024 A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, which explored military lessons learned from the first year of the Russia-Ukraine War, this book examines the changing character of war as the second year of the war unfolded. This year’s authors explore the conflict from four different angles: information advantage (intelligence, information operations, and cyber); landpower operations (fires, maneuver, force protection, mission command, and mercenaries); multi-domain operations (air and maritime); and crosscutting themes (diplomacy, sustainment, and innovation and adaptation). The second year witnessed the innovative approaches to combat of the first year—drones, unmanned aerial systems, and electronic-warfare offensive and defensive capabilities—combined with entrenched warfare not seen at the current scale in Europe since World War I. The use of mercenary private military companies like the Wagner Group generated moments of high suspense (with a failed mutiny in July 2023) and led to changes in Russian force structure and tactics. Delays in continued allied support tested the resolve and operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which nevertheless kept up the fight and held Russia back. Through it all, the conflict offers a compelling picture of the war of the future, along with lessons for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command to prepare the Joint Force to meet the challenges of the large-scale combat operations of tomorrow.
©2026 John A. Nagl. All rights reserved.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/irps/1001/thumbnail.jp
A Human-Centric Framework: Employment Principles for Lethal Autonomous Weapons
No full textThis monograph challenges the Department of War to reframe the conversation about humans’ involvement in lethal autonomous weapons systems by codifying a human-centric framework built on the employment pillars of certification, authority, restriction, and accountability. Although an ample body of literature discusses lethal autonomous weapon systems, this monograph takes a novel approach by proposing a theoretical framework and applying it to historical and hypothetical practical scenarios involving weapons with autonomous characteristics. In terms of methodology, the monograph relies heavily on primary sources, including UN documents and Department of War publications, which are augmented by secondary sources from experts in the field and creative speculation about the characteristics of future warfare. The study’s conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners manage and integrate lethal autonomous weapon systems. This study is designed to spark a necessary and likely uncomfortable conversation about when relying on lethal machines is appropriate. The monograph provides tangible recommendations to help shape future policy decisions about developing and employing lethal autonomous weapon systems.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1980/thumbnail.jp
Book Review: World War II Battles Reconsidered: Game Theory and Decision Science Perspectives on Gazala, El Alamein, Falaise, and Arnhem
No full textAuthor: Mark Thompson
Reviewed by: Lieutenant Colonel Andy Nichols, US Army War College class of 2024
Former Harvard professor Mark Thompson applies cutting-edge decision science and game theory to four pivotal World War II battles, revealing how strategic missteps and psychological biases shaped their outcomes. From Gazala’s disastrous command decisions to Arnhem’s flawed reliance on surprise, each case is dissected with analytical precision and historical depth. This groundbreaking study challenges conventional military narratives and offers a fresh lens on leadership, risk, and battlefield logic.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1121/thumbnail.jp
Book Review: A Day in September: The Battle of Antietam and the World It Left Behind
No full textAuthor: Stephen Budiansky
Reviewed by: Dr. Wylie W. Johnson, US Army War College Class of 2010
A Day in September: The Battle of Antietam and the World It Left Behind analyzes the battle’s “Revolution in Military Affairs” and how it radically changed the United States and the world. It focuses on technologies, personalities, military doctrine, nongovernmental organizations, medical advances, international intrigue, and politics.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters_bookshelf/1118/thumbnail.jp
Weaponizing Risk: Recalibrating Western Deterrence
Full text linkThis monograph discusses how NATO might better leverage risk to strengthen the alliance’s extended deterrence. Such leverage would prove especially useful because Kyiv is unlikely to be permitted to join NATO and the United States may reduce its presence in Europe. Western analysts have not given Russian deterrence enough credit for the alliance’s deterrence failure on February 24, 2022. The alliance did not act fecklessly, nor did it self-deter. Rather, NATO’s deterrence measures were calibrated more for hybrid/gray-zone attacks of the sort it saw in 2014, not for the large-scale combat operations the alliance witnessed in 2022, which involved a nuclear-armed adversary with stronger interests in Ukraine than NATO had. To be sure, the alliance’s leaders acted responsibly in managing the risk of escalation. But in so doing, they also facilitated Russian deterrence efforts, which succeeded in keeping Washington and Brussels from intervening in the war. The alliance thus demonstrated its need for a strategy that would increase the risks and costs of war for Russia without unduly raising NATO’s. In short, the alliance needs a proxy strategy of “waging war without going to war,” whereby NATO can provide its full political, economic, and military support to Ukraine without running the risk of putting alliance troops in harm’s way.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1977/thumbnail.jp