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Consciousness Enframed: The Alētheia of Qualia
Get PDFThere is nothing that we could be more familiar with than our own consciousness. It seems to us that conscious experience consists of subjective qualia – the what-it-is-like to experience the redness of an apple, the taste of coffee, or any other sense datum. Explaining how these can come about from material causes is often referred to as the hard problem in consciousness. Daniel Dennett gives a materialistic explanation of consciousness by equating qualia to a magic trick; there are no qualia, there just seem to be. In this paper I will examine this explanation in light of Heidegger\u27s critique of technological thinking. Consciousness enframed in this way stands as a one-sided explanation that covers over more than it reveals. It is still useful, however, to see that it is the very building blocks of our conscious experience – our qualia – that we challenge forth to give us this one-sided view of experience. Dennett\u27s explanation of consciousness is correct, but it does not capture the truth of consciousness
The Inexplicable Neutral Entity: A Critique of Metaphysical Two Aspects Interpretations
Get PDFThe goal of this essay is to outline several objections to what are commonly called metaphysical two-aspect interpretations of Immanuel Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism. This essay will be divided into two sections. §1 will argue that any notion we might have of the ‘thing-in-itself’ is completely vacuous. §2 will outline three objections to metaphysical two-aspect interpretations. The interpretive objection is that there is little textual basis for the neutral entity presupposed by metaphysical two-aspect interpretations. The exclusionary properties objection argues that metaphysical two-aspect interpretations presuppose that the same thing has exclusionary properties. The identity objection argues that Kant does not allow for a sense of identity outside of appearances and thus one cannot identify appearances with things-in-themselves
On the Inevitable Internalization of the External in the Process of Metaphysical Enquiry
Get PDFIn this paper, I posit that our minds inevitably internalize the external in the process of metaphysical enquiry because they naturally rely on abstraction, categorization, simplification and association. I first focus on the idea of substratum by claiming that it cannot exist independently of our minds. Second, I opine that both primary and secondary qualities are significantly dependent on our minds. Last but not least, I extend the shadow of relativity over the notion of motion. Finally, I postulate that even though there is certain external reality upon which our enquiry can converge, the external world is neither perfectly nor particularly closely knowable
Redefining the Class of Qualitative States—A Reply to Shoemaker
Get PDFThe so-called qualia-type objections to functionalism seem to imply that some qualitative states are not functionally definable (or identical to some functional state type). In “Functionalism and Qualia,” Sydney Shoemaker concedes that functionalists can allow for some types of mental states to be functionally undefinable without committing themselves to a view that cannot account for the class qualitative states. If qualitative states are construed as a relation of qualitative similarity, Shoemaker argues that qualia are functionally definable, and thus do not pose a serious problem for functionalists. In this paper I argue that (i) Shoemaker’s argument against the possibility of absent qualia is untenable, (ii) if cases of absent-qualia are possible, then Shoemaker’s reconciliation fails, and (iii) even if his reconciliation succeeds in functionally defining the class of qualitative states, it still fails to account for qualitative states being capable of existing independently from functional characterization
Narrowing the Divide: Posthuman Autopoiesis and Social Propaganda
Get PDFThis paper examines the relationship between social propaganda as presented by Jacques Ellul in his book Propaganda: the Formation of Men’s Attitudes and the concept of autopoiesis (or self-generation) within posthuman ideology. These two concepts intersect in their connection of the individual to the masses. Both posthuman theory and Ellul’s concept of social interaction are based on the bridging of the ontological gap to overcome cognitive isolation, resulting in the engagement in a community outside of oneself. The stripping of individuality becomes necessary, as our self-contained autopoietic beings employ analogical inference in order to connect with the mass, and therefore be subject to the influences of propaganda
Saving the Substratum: Interpreting Kant’s First Analogy
Get PDFKant’s transcendental idealism requires that experience be both spatial and temporal. In the First Analogy of Experience, he argues that in order for experience in time to be possible, there must be something permanent in our experience. This something permanent is substance: a bearer of properties that persists and conserves its quantity throughout any empirical change. The trajectory of Kant’s argument in the First Analogy is not entirely clear and this has left room for multiple interpretations. In this paper, I introduce the First Analogy and three suggested interpretations of its argument. I defend the so-called substratum interpretation, associated with Henry Allison and Andrew Ward, from philosophical objections raised by Paul Guyer. In order to unify all of experience within a singular time-frame, we must presuppose a persistent substratum through which all experiences can be related to one another
Temperature Change in New England: 1895-2012
Get PDFOver the past century, the globe’s temperature has been increasing at a higher rate than in the past. Over the last century increasing temperature is due to higher levels of human-generated greenhouse gases. Global warming has a dominating effect and will cause changes in climates all over the world. Since 1895 air temperature data have been collected from stations across the United States and the data have been aggregated in the U.S. Historical Climatological Network (USHCN) data set with temperatures for the New England states. To determine if there has been a change in temperature in New England between the years 1895 until 2012, we calculated the USHCN data into annual, seasonal annual, decadal, and seasonal decadal anomalies for each state and New England as a whole. We then analyzed the anomalies using temperature change measurements. The decadal and annual temperature change values for each state were mapped so the data could be spatial analyzed. We also compare temperature change in New England to Global and Northern Hemisphere (44°N to 64°N) change. We did this by comparing the USHCN data to the Goddard Institute Space Studies (GISS) Surface Temperature Analysis (GISTEMP) data set.Faculty Sponsor: Stephen Youn
Our Shared Space and Threat Without Exit
Get PDFGlobalization is fraught with dangers due to institutional relationships that threaten humanity. These institutions, acting in unaware-concert, provide a looming danger for everyone in 21st century life. Humanity has created the threatening context; humanity bears the responsibility for its remedy. This is known as “world risk society” (Beck, 2009). The threat is all encompassing, grounded in material limits; no human is exempt from the danger. People can use these two features as fuel to politically engage and create meaningful change. It is this political context that requires generating everybody’s political will all the way from the heads of state to the average citizen.This fictitious slam poetry piece seeks to generate political will within the reader. The “Reflections from 2013” are meant to emphasize the role of “manufactured uncertainties” (2009)—the human-made risky elements of globalization-- which create a pressure within the reader as they travel from the present into the four possible futures. The order of the futures is intentionally designed to increasingly generate a sense of political will as the reader progresses from the most structurally unsustainable future (Future I) to the most sustainable future (Future IV). The movement of the piece is a transition from the possibility of destruction to the possibility of adapting to a life affirming way of organization in the end.Stories do not reveal how the future will go, only how it could go.Stories do not unpack ideas in linear form. Rather, they allow for the reader to encounter embodied ideas.Faculty Sponsor: Sherrie Steine
From Ancient Greece to Beloch\u27s Crease: The Delian Problem and Origami
Get PDFThe problem of how to double the volume of a cube, also known as the Delian problem, has intrigued mathematicians for millennia. The great variety of solutions discovered over the centuries have used diverse tools, mathematical and otherwise. Recently, in 1936, Margherita Piazollo Beloch discovered a simple and elegant solution to this question. It uses a single piece of paper and a handful of folds. The solution has renewed interest in geometrical constructability problems, in particular those that incorporate origami. And ultimately, it\u27s given rise to the field of origami mathematics.Faculty Sponsor: Shenglan Yua
On Aristotle’s Function Argument
Get PDFIn this paper, I will reflect upon Aristotle’s argument claiming that the function of a human being is to engage in activity of soul in accord with reason (AWR). I will explicate and further defend this argument, which is based on the fact that the function of X must characterize it as an X and set a standard for X’s impairment and excellence, and the only candidates for a human’s function are: to take in nutrients and grow, to perceive and move, and to engage in activities of soul in accord with reason. I will raise the objection that having a continuous sense of self (CSOS) in addition AWR is a relevant candidate for a human’s function that Aristotle did not consider. I will define CSOS as involving being aware of and being able to understand one’s own emotions, beliefs, identities, relationships, and experiences at a given time that are relevant to the answering of some question at hand. I will then show that by discounting CSOS as a candidate for characterizing a human being, past what is needed for AWR and considered as separate from AWR, we would be missing a crucial element of what defines a human