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Categorization through Sensory Codes
Get PDFThe central premise of concept empiricism is the denial of unique cognitive mental representations. The negative thesis applies as well to classic empiricists as it does to current ones. John Locke’s (1690) refusal to accept ‘abstract ideas’ is one way of denying unique and distinct cognitive representations. Jesse J. Prinz’s (2002) multi-modality hypothesis, according to which cognition functions on a multi-sensory code instead of a central ‘amodal’ one, is another. Both empiricist models have a common foil in a theory that posits one unique kind of ‘intellectualist’ mental representation to account for human cognitive achievements. For Locke, it was Descartes’ abstract mental medium for clear and distinct ideas and for Prinz it is Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought. In this paper, I explore the empiricists’ denial of unique cognitive representations and argue that both Locke’s and Prinz’s theories privilege a unique representational medium – a spatial ‘code.’ As such, this tacit assumption does not entail that cognition runs on a unique medium. It does not lead to a ‘common code rationalism,’ to use Prinz’s terms, or support computational theories of the mind that privilege innate linguistic structures over sensory ones. To incorporate the idea of a spatial code more smoothly within empiricist intellectual resources, I interpret it through Lakoff’s experientialist account of categorical cognition. Through Lakoff’s embodied experientialist account – embodied neo-empiricism – the spatiality of cognition becomes founded in a broader and more plausible sensory matrix. I further suggest that Lakoff’s ideas on and use of spatial codes can be given a largely externalist reading. Lakoff’s space is not a unique cognitive one. This way, current neo-empiricism can be saved from assuming any unique internal posits including a language of thought
Abductive Reasoning as an Aesthetic of Interpretation and a Logic of Creativity in Umberto Eco’s ‘The Name of the Rose’
Get PDFI begin my argument by questioning Peirce’s assumption that aesthetics exists only in the state of impulse and feeling (as opposed to method): if I can show how aesthetics necessitates reason, then abductive reasoning emerges as an aesthetic of creative logic useful for the interpretation of texts. Interpretation of the sign—Peirce defines the sign in terms of a triadic relation—to symbol (a word that stands for something that cannot be seen but is not meant to define or signify the object that it represents) evolution demands an aesthetic more than linguistic approach insofar as the symbol requires an interpretation that we attach randomly. I then draw on John Dewey who maintains that the highest transformative experience occurs at the non-cognitive level, and this experience gives way to the branching off of imagination, habit, and other ways to approach and create meaning. But where Peirce and Dewey dichotomize the cognitive and non-cognitive experience, I will show how the factual nature of an intellectual judgment does not preclude us from asserting an aesthetic judgment. The process of interpretation itself functions as a process of abducting (Peirce’s notion) between the observed fact and the law of nature in order to create a testable hypothesis—in this case, a meaning assigned to a sign. I will test this method of abduction by applying it to The Name of the Rose in two ways: I will use the symbol of the rose to test this interactionist theory of metaphor, and I will show how the labyrinth operates as a metaphor for the abductive model that informs my theory. If the abductive method works favorably in terms of drawing out an interpretable and useful aesthetic, then the abductive method ought to guide readers and writers in their literary aesthetic
Generalized Collatz Functions: Cycle Lengths and Statistics
Get PDFConsider the function T (n) defined on the positive integers as follows. If n is even, T (n) = n/2. If n is odd, T (n) = 3n + 1. The Collatz Conjecture states that for any integer n, the sequence n, T (n), T (T (n)), . . . will eventually reach 1. We consider several generalizations of this function, focusing on functions which replace 3n + 1 with 3n + b for odd b. We show that for all odd b \u3c 400, and all integers n ≤ 106, iterating this function always results in a finite cycle of values. Furthermore, we empirically observe several interesting patterns in the lengths of these cycles for several classes of values of b.Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Dominic Klyv
The Aestheticality of Allusiveness: Language, Meaning, and Indeterminacy
Get PDFThis paper will be investigating the largely unexamined questions that arise when the general question is asked: why do we allude instead of refer? I will be dealing with this matter as ultimately a question of aesthetics, but only insofar as common approaches to \u27aesthetic questions\u27 become inadequate. Accordingly, I will be employing my own methodology, shaped by the question of what I will call \u27aestheticality.\u27 With this special approach, I will attempt to uncover the conditions for the possibility that an allusion may be in such a way that it provokes aesthetic attention. Prior to this, I will carry out a short examination the most relevant study I\u27ve found towards my topic, W.T. Irwin\u27s The Aesthetics of Allusion , with the intention of contextualizing my own investigation within a more common approach to aesthetic questions, and particularly the aesthetic question of allusion. However, through my own investigation, I will attempt to substantiate Irwin\u27s descriptive claims about the \u27aesthetics\u27 of allusion, with my own theoretical claims about the conditions of its aestheticality, hoping to articulate a more philosophically significant conception of how allusiveness works within the dynamics of meaning and language
Meaning and (F)act: Ray Brassier’s Speculative Nihilism and its Implications for Dialectics
Get PDFThis paper seeks to frame the proper place for the empirical phenomenon of human meaning in the scientifically disenchanted world described by Ray Brassier. I embrace Brassier’s statement that “Nihilism is not an existential quandary but a speculative opportunity” but disagree with his injunction that human meaning is unimportant. Meaning should be an object of philosophy insofar as we are biologically bound to experiencing the world in a meaningful way. Brassier’s work is exciting for its application of rigorous analytic techniques to continental discourse, in a manner that makes contributions to both metaphysics and philosophy of science
Memory, the Self and Why We Are Conscious (Or alternatively: Why We Don’t Do Consciousness)
Get PDFThis paper aims at examining a new assessment of a foundational paradigm for conducting science within the fields of neurology and its corresponding philosophy of mind. The main view examined is that of Alva Noë, professor of philosophy at UC Berkeley, and the view he forwards in his book Out of Our Heads. His main thesis rests on a critique of current scientific methodology and the foundational paradigm of functionalism, which he counters with a view from a more radical examination of what consciousness is in terms of living beings in their environments and the processes that animate these living beings. The author of this paper takes some issue with this process ontology that Noë forwards and critiques it based on its own premises and what follows from it, while later contrasting it with a focus on personal memory as Henri Bergson had described them in developing his metaphysical system
Possible Parthood and Modal-Mereological Composition
Get PDFI argue that, if we take the world-time parallel seriously, then those who support Sider’s (2001) argument for unrestricted diachronic composition (UDC), establishing the existence of temporal parts, should also hold that its modal analogue, my argument for unrestricted modal composition (UMC), establishes the existence of modal parts. I formulate the latter argument and develop it by testing it against objections.Editor\u27s Note: Best Conference Paper, 17th Annual Pacific University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference (2013
The Immateriality of Consciousness and the Immanence of Thought: How Emergence Forces Us to Rethink Metaphysics
Get PDFThis paper wishes to follow the injunction given to us from Badiou that philosophy shouldn’t dictate the progress in various fields that it’s coupled with (science, politics, etc.), and that it should instead be receptive to the ‘Events’ in these fields. This paper wishes to take the field of science called ‘Complexity Science’, specifically the idea of ‘Emergentism’ in it, as an Event that philosophy should be receptive to. In exploring this relatively new field, this paper wishes to draw the properly radical metaphysical conclusions that crop up from such an investigation. Thus this paper’s goal is two-fold: it wishes to explore Emergentism as an important new topic for philosophy, and it wishes to explore the new avenues of thought that this science opens up
The Problem of the Criterion & Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology
Get PDFThe Problem of the Criterion arises from two plausible intuitions: first, belief sources (such as testimony and perception) should be reliable. Second, a person should be justified in believing that the source is reliable before it can produce justified beliefs. The problem is that these intuitions create a vicious circularity and lead to skepticism. The circularity arises from the priority relation between justified beliefs about a source and justified beliefs produced by a source. Oftentimes, the only way to have justified beliefs about the reliability of a source is to use that very source. For instance, the only way to acquire justified beliefs about the reliability of testimony may be to use other instances of testimony. But that is circular. In this paper, I apply The Problem of Criterion to testimony and argue that Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology offers a solution.Editor\u27s Note: Honorable Mention Paper, 17th Annual Pacific University Undergraduate Philosophy Conference (2013
Bayesian Techniques for Surface Fuel Loading Estimation
Get PDFIn previous work, researchers compared three sampling techniques for estimating the biomass of surface fine woody fuels by using them on known distributions. An important result was that precise estimates of fuel biomass required intensive sampling for both planar intercept and fixed-area methods. This study explores Bayesian statistical methods as a means to reduce the sampling effort needed to obtain a desired precision. We examined how initial estimates of the minimum and maximum fuel loading at a site could be used as prior information in a Bayesian framework. We found that, under certain scenarios, Bayesian techniques dramatically increased the precision of the estimator compared to using no prior information from the site.Faculty Sponsor: Kathy Gra