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Slaget vid 73 Easting: Numerärt underlägsen, Taktiskt överlägsen? En teorikonsumerade fallstudie av slaget vid 73 Easting med Modern Systems Theory
No full textThe purpose of this study is to better understand the cause of the United States major tactical victory over the Iraqi Republican Guard at the battle of 73rd Easting. The reason for conducting this study is to better understand how two American armored companies managed to strike a decisive blow against a republican guard’s tank brigade. On paper there are no indications that two companies should achieve victory while on the offensive against a defending brigade. This is the overarching research problem that this study aims to explain. The study aims to accomplish this by analyzing the battle from a purely tactical perspective, with the support from Stephen Biddle’s Modern Systems Theory. This was achieved by formulating several operationalized questions based on the offensive and defensive tactical principles of Biddle’s modern system. The analysis of the United States attack on the Iraqi defensive position highlighted that the two US armored companies fail to utilize all offensive tactical principles that the modern system advocates to achieve success on the modern battlefield. The result of the study is thus that the United States tactical superiority was not the deciding factor that defeated the Iraqi numerical superiority, yet they still achieved overwhelming victory. This points the study to discuss the alternative factors that might have affected the outcome, which are technological and psychological. While not decisively being able to better understand the case, the study highlights the weaknesses of the modern systems theory and points to alternative ways of understanding the battle.
Exploratory Wargaming with a “Superhuman” Tactician in the Team : A Controlled Experiment
No full textThe paper introduces a prototype decision support system for rapid exploratory wargaming of ground combat together with a conceptual framework for human-machine teaming. An AlphaZero agent provides continuous, GPS-device-like advice on how blue/red should proceed from the current situation to meet/prevent the long-term mission objective for blue. A controlled experiment with 100+ senior officers provides concrete evidence that the utility of wargaming in a digital environment improves with an AlphaZero agent in the team of players
Understanding an Australian sphere of influence beyond national identity
No full textThis article investigates Australia’s relationship with the ‘Territory Papua New Guinea’ (TPNG) (today’s Papua New Guinea, PNG) to, in turn, shed light on why non-great powers seek to establish or maintain spheres of influence. Constellations where strong states wield exclusive control, or ‘predominant influence’, over external geographical space or smaller states, are frequently referred to as ‘spheres of influence’ (Bull 2002, 314; Kaufman 1976, 11; Keal 1983, 15; Resnick 2022, 566), which, despite its wide use in political discourse is an under-researched and ‘essentially contested concept’ in International Relations (IR) literature (Costa Buranelli 2018, 380). The phenomenon has competing conceptualisations, but this article defines spheres of influence as ‘hierarchical constellations characterised by practices of exclusion and control’ (Jackson 2020, 257). Despite suffering from under-theorisation (Etzioni 2015, 118; Hast 2014, 1; Jackson 2020, 255), it is quite well-established in the IR literature that great powers engage in sphere-of-influence practices and policies. Different traditions emphasise different things. In the constructivist tradition, for instance, ‘spheres of influence’ are considered a part of ‘great power identity’ (Murray 2019, 63–64; Recchia 2020, 515; Zala 2020). But upon closer scrutiny, this picture is somewhat incomplete. There are other states, not belonging to the category of ‘(self-identified) great powers’ which also articulate a desire to have some degree of exclusive control over adjacent external geographical space and pursue such policies. Although there are disagreements regarding what type of country Australia is (Fern 2020), it has been identified as a ‘middle power’ by both scholars (Beeson 2011; Harijanto 2024; Widmaier 2019) and its own leaders (see Albanese 2024). Concomitantly, some of its leaders have also expressed views of its neighbouring region as Australia’s ‘patch’ (John Howard, quoted in McDougall 2019); an Australian sphere of influence (White 2019). There are two tensions one must keep in mind concerning Australia and spheres of influence. First, there is the one between the identification as a ‘middle power’ and the notion of spheres of influence. Second, there is the tension between Australia’s self-professed liberal principles and the notion of spheres of influence. These tensions have implications for two major IR schools of thought: constructivism and liberalism. Australia is a vocal advocate of the liberal (US-led) international order. Canberra frequently takes a stand in favour of a rules-based system and the self-determination of small states. However, as will be illustrated in a subsequent section, there is a parallel tendency in Australian foreign policy, as it simultaneously asserts that it has a special role in the region, the South Pacific, when it comes to maintaining order and its national interests. Based on these insights, this article problematises the notion that a ‘sphere of influence’ primarily is an attribute for (self-identified) ‘great powers’. In problematising this ‘conventional wisdom’, the article sets out to address the following research problem: why do states which do not identify as great powers pursue spheres of influence in their geographical vicinity? To address this research problem the article investigates the case of Australia, seeking to answer the question: what explains Australian policy towards TPNG in the 1960s? By utilising digitalised archival material from Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (henceforth ‘DFAT’), this article explores Australia’s view on TPNG/PNG which gained its recognition as independent and de facto self-determination from Australia in 1975 (Denoon 2012, 4–5). The period covered is from 1966 to 1969, and I use thematic analysis to establish prevailing perceptions. The large schools of thought in IR simplify spheres of influence to the extent that they risk giving inadequate accounts of the phenomenon. Instead, I argue that an ‘actor-centric foreign policy’ approach is a more beneficial way of analysing spheres of influence and states’ motivations for establishing them. Importantly, however, the article does not analyse foreign policy outcomes per se. Instead, it focuses on what Gideon Rose calls the ‘intervening variables’; a state government’s perception of its surroundings and the origin of these (1998, 157–161), which in turn inform the government’s foreign policy. The article’s study unearths that several actors within the Australian government perceived the maintenance of Australian exclusiveness over PNG as central to the national defence. These findings lead the article to suggest that Australia’s experiences from the world wars contributed to specific perceptions of PNG that subsequently were applied to the context of the Cold War. However, the article also shows that within the same foreign policy establishment, there was a wide range of perceptions of the strategic environment, informing different policy preferences. From this, a wider theoretical suggestion is derived: states, regardless of their (self-perceived) ‘identity’, pursue spheres of influence depending on the prevailing perceptions of and meaning ascribed to their strategic environment as shaped by previous experiences. The main contribution, outside the purely empirical, is that the article problematises the utility of the structural IR schools of thought in understanding why and how states seek to establish spheres of influence. Instead, it suggests an actor-centric to understand and explain this phenomenon of states seeking to establish and/or maintain exclusivity over geographical space external to their territory
Hybrid Threats, Cognitive Warfare, and Psychological Defence : A practitioners’ toolbox for intelligence analysis and resilience-building
No full textThis toolbox consolidates key practitioner takeaways from five publications authored by members of the Hybrid Threats Research Group into a single practitioner’s toolbox for countering hybrid threats and cognitive warfare and for strengthening psychological defence and resilience. The toolbox brings together models developed and published by the group. It links short-term threat–response cycles to long-term resilience and psychological defence, and operationalises national-level psychological defence in a convenient, ready-to-use format. First, the hybridity blizzard model depicts how the aggressor’s targeting of vulnerabilities interacts with the defender’s responses over time, situating intelligence at the interface of detection and countermeasures with resilience-building. The model also outlines responses to challenges in the contemporary operational environment, highlighting key focus areas for intelligence community actors across analysis, communication, and capability development. Second, the intelligence analysis interaction (hourglass) model captures three coupled processes – analysis, aggregated, tailored communication, and reception/absorption among societal actors. This model highlights bottlenecks and the need for feedback-rich, whole-of-society practice. Third, an analytical framework for building resilience and psychological defence countering hybrid threats and foreign influence and interference is outlined. This assess–address–evaluate framework provides a six-dimensional structure, including 1) threat assessment, 2) vulnerability assessments, 2) defence mechanisms, 3) coordination and cooperation, 4) legal/policy framework, and 5) impact and effectiveness. It guides analysis, action, and learning for psychological defence and resilience. Together, these elements provide practitioners with a practical toolbox to diagnose hybrid activity, design intelligence interactions that resonate well with the recipient (consumers), and strengthen resilience and psychological defence through a coordinated whole-of-society approach
NATO-narrativen : En kvalitativ komparativ analys av regeringarnas inramning av Nato-processens inledande fas
No full textThis thesis analyses the political framing employed by the two governments during the initial phase of Sweden’s NATO-accession process, focusing on security-policy narratives and legitimacy. It includes a comparative aspect that addresses specific time periods within the tenure of two prime ministers: Magdalena Andersson (S) and Ulf Kristersson (M), by examining the governments official statements and speeches regarding Sweden´s foreign policy. The analysis implements framing theory by Arjen Boin and Yihong Liu. Both governments started from the same premise: Russia’s actions created a significantly less secure reality for Sweden and undermined Europe’s security order. The Nato application is viewed as a response to this, aimed at securing security guarantees for Sweden. However, how the two governments framed the application afterwards differs and the analysis identifies a key transition in the framing of the Nato-membership. Andersson’s government relied on a strongly emotional framing shaped to evoke emotions of solidarity, shared values with the West, moral duty, identity and fear. Their rhetoric was most striking when emphasizing severity, highlighting democratic values, belonging with likeminded Nato-allies. Using vivid language about war crimes in Ukraine and humanitarian consequences. Emphasizing Swedish gains of a membership and abandonment of the policy of non-alignment, primarily addressing the Swedish public as audience. While still recognizing the importance of shared values Kristersson’s government, by contrast, employed a more two-dimensional framing. One of which also emotionally driven but rather intended to invoke emotions which emphasized duty, willingness/readiness to defend, individual responsibility and sacrifice. Primarily addressing the Swedish public as audience. The second more pragmatic and technocratic dimension stresses Sweden’s strengths, capabilities and compatibility as a future Nato-member. While still aiming to strengthen Sweden's defence capacity this practical framing underscores Sweden’s potential contributions to the alliance such as military, industrial, technological advantages and strategic among others. This government not only argued for the potential benefits Sweden would gain from a membership but also emphasized, more than the previous government, what the alliance itself would gain from Sweden joining. This dimension was primarily directed towards Nato-states and other external actors. Among other aspects, the findings highlight how Swedish security discourse evolved and underscore that defence and security policy is not only a matter of military strategy but also one of narrative control and political legitimacy
Hur kan Sveriges strategi för cybersäkerhet och cyberförsvar förklaras utifrån teorin om cybertotalförsvar? En studie av cybersäkerhet och cyberförsvar i Sverige.
No full textThis study examines whether the theory of cyber total defense can provide a deeper understanding of Swedish cybersecurity and cyber defense. The study is based on a qualitative text analysis of policy documents at the political-strategic and military-strategic levels. The theory of cyber total defense present three different modes: Reactive, Heuristic and Proactive. These three modes are all needed to provide an effective and efficient cyberdefense. The Swedish cyberdefense is well represented in all three modes. The findings indicate that the theory of cyber total defense is highly applicable for enhancing the understanding of Sweden’s cybersecurity. The theory could also be used to further improve the effectiveness of the Swedish cyberdefense for the future
Amfibisk krigföring och Försvarsmaktens framtida roll som allierad i Nato : Ett teoriprövande arbete som jämför resultatet mellan två slag för att uppnå amfibisk framgång
No full textThis study contributes to a debate how Försvarsmakten can develop the practice within amphibious warfare in the context of waging war as an allied party of Nato. This study examines a well-known theory, which is tested with two cases. The study is centralized trough the perspective of amphibious operations. The understandings allow extended possibilities about how Försvarsmakten could adapt for future challenges. The main purpose is to analyze the outcomes from both battles and compare the results for upcoming adaptions. The aim is to explain how to achieve success with future adjustments for military forces when performing amphibious warfare. Altered prerequisites admits continuous developments. The results indicate that only two of five criteria would be essential to adapt for future amphibious warfare. One of the criteria is not needed over time which implies that amphibious warfare still can be performed due to other factors. The last two principles are only partially achieved which vary due to the actual battle itself. The outcome of the thesis gives potential explanatory basis. Amphibious combat forces are declared to be needed in marine warfare which admits freedom of action. Amphibious battles must consist of rapid continuously movements that could result in surprising effects. Beneficial outcomes are shown when using high-technological systems. Meanwhile the forces should not depend upon modern systems to be successful, the amphibious power should be skillful and use main resources by combining different capabilities within and together with other combat forces.
Communicators’ Strategic Influence in the Public Sector : How Everyday Conditions Shape the Requirements for Crisis Communication
No full textDenna uppsats undersöker vad som möjliggör eller begränsar kommunikatörers strategiska inflytande i offentlig sektor, med fokus på hur deras roll formas av organisatoriska strukturer och maktförhållanden. Syftet är att förstå vilka villkor som påverkar kommunikatörers möjligheter att bidra på strategisk nivå, och hur dessa villkor får betydelse, inte minst i kris. Empirin bygger på åtta semistrukturerade intervjuer med seniora kommunikatörer i olika offentliga organisationer. Materialet har analyserats tematiskt utifrån en abduktiv ansats. Det teoretiska ramverket kombinerar ett strukturperspektiv med Steven Lukes tredimensionella maktbegrepp, vilket möjliggör en analys av både formella och informella aspekter av strategiskt inflytande. Tre centrala teman identifierades: strukturella förutsättningar, maktförhållanden samt sambandet mellan vardag och kris. Resultaten visar att kommunikatörers inflytande formas både av strukturella förutsättningar, såsom representation i ledningsgrupper och tillgång till centrala beslutsforum, och av mer informella faktorer som maktförhållanden och hur deras kompetens uppfattas inom organisationen. Det görs också tydligt att vardagliga strukturer spelar en avgörande roll för hur kommunikationen fungerar i kris, när kommunikativa perspektiv har låg status i det löpande arbetet tenderar även den strategiska kommunikationen i krislägen att försvagas. Slutsatsen är att kommunikatörers strategiska bidrag förutsätter mer än formell representation, det kräver ett organisatoriskt erkännande av kommunikation som en integrerad del av beslutsfattande. Det är just genom denna tidiga förankring som kommunikationen kan bidra med samordning, legitimitet och strategisk handlingskraft när krisen väl inträffar.
Belgium's defence spending pivot : A multiple streams framework approach to understanding Belgium’s defence spending policy trend reversal
No full textDefence spending has become a topic of interest for many countries since the Russian commitment to its attritional land war in Ukraine. This trend is not just limited to Europe; global military expenditure reached an all-time high in 2023. Belgium is no different in this, but it has a lot of catching up to do, seeing as it was the second-lowest defence spender among NATO members with 1,21 % of GDP. The promise of reaching 2 % by 2030 is therefore ambitious, considering Belgium’s historic trend of cutting its defence spending. If Belgium succeeds in upping its spending to the promised targets, there will be enormous opportunities for the defence sector and the military, however, the question is how the policy has changed, and if these increases address the problems at hand. The Multiple Streams Framework developed by John W. Kingdon provides a model to better understand how Belgian’s defence spending policy has changed by dividing policy-making processes into three streams; the problem stream where problem formulations compete for attention, the policy stream where policy proposals get formulated, and the politics stream where policy decisions are made. According the to MSF there exists a policy window when the problem, policy and politics stream converge. The intention of this research is to uncover the themes and people populating these streams to better understand how Belgium defence spending policy now projects a decade-long trend reversal. Findings from this study suggest that the multiple streams framework is applicable on the case of Belgium’s defence spending pivot, in part due to the change of government and change in public opinion that set up the conditions for the policy window to open, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine likely to be the focusing event that allowed the political entrepreneur, Minister of Defence Ludivine Dedonder, to push through this ambitious increase in defence spending
"Trapped between borders" : The human cost of the EU’s externalized migration governance in Libya and Tunisia
No full textThe EU has externalized its migration governance towards third countries to stem the flows of migration. The efforts include the establishment of an Emergency Trust Fund for Africa alongside cooperation with Libya and Tunisia, where migrants are subjected to abuse, exploitation, and racism. This thesis explores the relation between the EU’s externalized migration governance and the human rights conditions African migrants face in Libya and Tunisia. Existing research has examined the EU’s externalization, however, there has been limited focus on human rights outcomes in comparable contexts. This thesis addresses this gap by employing most similar system design and utilizing process tracing to analyze how the policies impact human rights in Libya and Tunisia since 2015, focusing on African migrants. The findings highlight how the EU’s initiatives contribute to human rights violations in both cases. In Libya, it contributes to a cycle of abuse as it enables militia groups to detain migrants through abusive methods. In Tunisia, racial discrimination towards black African migrants is institutionalized by the government whilst the EU has intensified its migration partnership. In sum, the EU effectively incentivizes actors in Libya and Tunisia who violate human rights.