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End Of Mission Statement Of The Special Rapporteur On The Negative Impact Of Unilateral Coercive Measures On The Enjoyment Of Human Rights To The Syrian Arab Republic
No full textEnd Of Mission Statement Of The Special Rapporteur On The Negative Impact Of Unilateral Coercive Measures On The Enjoyment Of Human Rights To The Syrian Arab Republic6/3/2018 OHCHR | End of mission statement of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights t…
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End of mission statement of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact
of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights to the
Syrian Arab Republic, 13 to 17 May 2018
Arabic
End of mission statement
17 May 2018
Preliminary observations and recommendations
I would like to begin this briefing by expressing my gratitude to the Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic for the invitation to visit the country and for the openness and readiness with which it
facilitated the meetings for my mission. I would also like to thank the office of the Resident
Coordinator, the members of the UN country team and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights for their invaluable support.
I have been entrusted by the Human Rights Council with the task of monitoring, reporting and
advising on the negative impact on the enjoyment of human rights of unilateral coercive measures.
The United Nations has repeatedly expressed concern that the use of such measures may be contrary
to international law, international humanitarian law, the UN Charter and the norms and principles
governing peaceful relations among States .
During my visit, I had the honour of being received by Ministers, Deputy Ministers and senior officials
of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Economy and Foreign Trade, Local Administration
and Environment, Social Affairs and Labour, Transport, Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, Electricity
and Health. I also met with the leadership pf the Planning and International Cooperation Commission,
the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Chamber of Commerce, and with the Governor of the Central
Bank.
I was b riefed by staff from civil society, humanitarian organizations and by independent experts. Last
but not least, I am also grateful to the numerous diplomatic missions that shared their views with me
during my visit. I very much appreciate the briefings I received from the United Nations Economic and
Social Commission for Western Asia in Beirut prior to my visit.
The purpose of this mission was to examine to what extent unilateral coercive measures targeting the
Syrian Arab Republic impair the full realization of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. I will present my full report to the
Human Rights Council in September 2018. My present statement contains my preliminary
observations on the outcome of my visit.
I have examined the situation of the Syrian Arab Republic as a target of unilateral coercive measures
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I have examined the situation of the Syrian Arab Republic as a target of unilateral coercive measures
by a number of source States. I have examined relevant evidence and endeavoured to assess the
actual impact of such measures on the Syrian people. One source country has applied unilateral
coercive measures since 1979, and they were strengthened in subsequent years. A larger group of
States began applying similar measures in 2011.
The collective measures call for a trade ban on the import and export of multiple goods and services.
It also includes international financial transfers. The superimposition of different packages of
collective sectoral measures, together with the acrosstheboard
implementation of financial
restrictions, are tantamount in their global impact to the imposition of comprehensive restrictions on
Syria. Additional measures targeting individuals by virtue of their alleged relationship with the
government have also been applied.
Because of their comprehensive nature, these measures have had a devastating impact on the entire
economy and the daily lives of ordinary people. This impact has compounded their suffering resulting
from the devastating crisis that has unfolded since 2011. Singling out the impact of the unilateral
coercive measures from that of the crisis is fraught with difficulty, but this does in no way diminish the
necessity to take measures to restore their basic human rights as a whole.
It is clear that the sufferings imposed by the unilateral coercive measures have reinforced those that
were caused by the conflict. Indeed, it seems ironic that these measures applied by source States out
of a concern for human rights are actually contributing to the worsening of the humanitarian crisis as
an unintended consequence.
The dramatic increase in the suffering of the Syrian people
The Syrian economy continues to decline at an alarming rate. Since the application of coercive
measures in 2011, and the beginning of the current crisis, the total annual GDP of Syria has fallen by
two thirds. Foreign currency reserves have been depleted, and international financial and other assets
remain frozen. In 2010, 45 Syrian Liras were exchanged for one dollar; by 2017 the rate fell to fell to
510 liras per dollar. Inflation has dramatically increased since 2010, reaching a peak of 82.4% in
2013; the cost of food items rose eightfold
during this time. This combination of factors visited
further devastation on the living conditions of the population that were already degraded by the
conflict. This has hit the half of working Syrians living on fixed salaries particularly hard.
The unintended consequences of unilateral coercive measures
This damage to the economy has had predictable effects on the ability of Syrians to realize their
economic, social and cultural rights. Syria’s human development indicators have all tumbled. There
has been a staggering increase in the rate of poverty among ordinary Syrians. While there was no
food insecurity prior to the outbreak of violence, by 2015 32% of Syrians were affected. At the same
time unemployment rose went from 8.5% in 2010 to over 48% in 2015.
Banking restrictions
The most pervasive concerns I have heard during my mission relate to the negative effect that
comprehensive financial restrictions have had on all aspects of Syrian life. Restrictions on the Central
bank, stateowned
and even private banks, and transactions in the main international currencies have
comprehensively damaged the ability of anyone seeking to operate internationally.
Despite nominally including “humanitarian exemptions” they have proven to be costly, or extremely
slow, to access in practice.
The uncertainty around what transactions do, or do not violate the unilateral coercive measures, have
created a “chilling effect” on international banks and companies, which as a result are unwilling or
unable to do business with Syria. This has prevented Syrian and international companies, nongovernmental
actors (including those operating in purely humanitarian fields), and Syrian citizens from
engaging in international financial transactions (including for goods which are legal to import),
obtaining credit, or for international actors to pay salaries or contractors in Syria.
This has forced Syrians to find alternatives, such as hawala, which result in millions of dollars flowing
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y , , g
through high cost financial intermediaries, who are alleged at times to be owned by terrorist
organizations. These channels which are not transparent, cannot be audited, and increase transaction
costs remain the only avenue for smaller companies and Syrian civil society actors to operate
internationally.
Medical care
Syria practices universal, free health care for all its citizens. Prior to the current crisis, Syria enjoyed
some of the highest levels of care in the region. The demands created by the crisis have overwhelmed
the system, and created extraordinarily high levels of need. Despite this, restrictive measures,
particularly those related to the banking system, have harmed the ability of Syria to purchase and pay
for medicines, equipment, spare parts and software. While theoretical exemptions exist, in practice
international private companies are unwilling to jump the hurdles necessary to ensure they can
transact with Syria without being accused of inadvertently violating the restrictive measures.
Migration and ‘brain drain’
While the security situation was a central factor which led to migration flows from Syria, it should be
emphasized that the dramatic increase in unemployment, the lack of job opportunities, the closure of
factories unable to obtain raw materials or machinery or to export their goods have all contributed to
increasing the emigration of Syrians. Some receiving States have selected skilled migrants, while
pressuring the less fortunate to return to Syria. This “brain drain” has harmed the medical and
pharmaceutical industries in particular, at the worst possible time for Syria.
The anticipated end of the current conflict will not put an end to the flows of migrants, especially to
Europe, in view of the saturation of neighbouring countries. These flows are likely to continue so long
as the Syrian authorities are prevented by unilateral coercive measures from addressing the pressing
problems related to their social and economic infrastructure, in particular the restoration of energy and
water supplies.
Ban on equipment and spare parts
The ban on the trade in equipment, machinery and spare parts has devastated Syrian industry.
Vehicles, including ambulances and fire trucks, as well as agricultural machinery suffer from a lack of
spare parts. Failing water pumps gravely affect the water supply and reduce agricultural production.
Power generation plants are failing, and new plants cannot be purchased or maintained, leading to
power outages. Complex machinery requiring international technicians for maintenance are failing,
damaging medical devices and factory machinery. Civilian aircraft are no longer able to fly safely, and
public transit buses are in woeful condition. Whatever rationale source countries may have for
restricting socalled
dual use goods, greater effort is needed to ensure that goods that are clearly
intended for civilian use are permitted, and that they can be paid for.
Ban on technology
As a result of unilateral coercive measures, Syrians are unable to purchase many technologies,
including mobile phones and computers. The global dominance of American software companies,
technology companies, and banking and financial software, all of which are banned, has made it
difficult to find alternatives. This has paralyzed or disrupted large parts of Syrian institutions.
Education
Shortages of inputs, energy and water supply as well as of teaching material causing delays in the
rebuilding of schools have kept 1.8 million children without access to their classrooms.
The ability of Syrians to participate in the international community has been sharply affected. Syrians
have been excluded from international educational exchange programs, and the tremendous
difficulties involved in obtaining a visa have prevented many from studying or travelling abroad,
upgrading their training and skills, or participating in international conferences. By removing consular
services from Syria, countries have forced people including the poorest, to travel to neighbouring
countries for such applications, which are also placing onerous restrictions on entry for Syrians.
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Conclusion
I am profoundly concerned that unilateral coercive measures are contributing to the ongoing suffering
of the Syrian people. Claims that they exist to protect the Syrian population, or to promote a
democratic transition, are hard to reconcile with the economic and humanitarian sufferings being
caused. The time has come to ask whether these unintended consequences are now more severe than
can be reasonably accepted by democratic States. Whatever their political objectives, there must be
more humane means by which these can be achieved in full compliance with international law.
In view of the complexity of the system of unilateral coercive measures in place, there needs to be a
multistage
approach to addressing the dire human rights situation prevailing in Syria. This would
imply a sequenced approach involving addressing the crucial humanitarian needs of the population
throughout the whole of Syria, without preconditions, when these touch on issues of life and death. A
first stage could include addressing the urgent needs of the food insecure, which represent nearly one
third of the population. The second stage is to translate at the ground level effective measures to fulfil
the commitment of source States to meet their obligation to allow humanitarian exemptions,
particularly for financial transactions. Finally, there must be a serious dialogue on reducing unilateral
coercive measures, starting with those that have the most egregious effect on the population, along
with those that will promote confidence building between the parties, with the ultimate aim of lifting
the unilateral coercive measures. I hope that my report and my future work can contribute in this
end.
Thank you.
Note:
1. More information on this prohibition can be found in the reports and resolutions on the website of
the Special Rapporteur.
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Security Council, 73rd Year: 8201st Meeting, Monday, 12 March 2018, New York
No full textThe Situation In The Middle East Report Of The Secretary-General On The Implementation Of Security Council Resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) And 2393 (2017)United Nations S/PV.8201
Security Council
Seventy-third year
8201st meeting
Monday, 12 March 2018, 11 a.m.
New York
Provisional
President: Mr. Van Oosterom. . (Netherlands)
Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz
China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu
Côte d’Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue
Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba
Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu
France. . Mr. Delattre
Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov
Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi
Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra
Poland. . Ms. Wronecka
Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia
Sweden . Mr. Skoog
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen
United States of America. . Mrs. Haley
Agenda
The situation in the Middle East
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of
speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official
Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).
18-06756 (E)
*1806756*
S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018
2/23 18-06756
The meeting was called to order at 11.15 a.m.
Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
The situation in the Middle East
The President: In accordance with rule 37 of
the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite
the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to
participate in this meeting.
The Security Council will now begin its consideration
of the item on its agenda.
I would like to warmly welcome the Secretary-
General, His Excellency Mr. António Guterres, and to
give him the floor.
The Secretary-General: I am here to report on the
implementation of resolution 2401 (2018), which the
Council adopted unanimously on 24 February. But I am
keenly aware that I am doing so just as the bloodletting
in Syria enters its eighth year. I would like to highlight
just one stark fact on this grimmest of anniversaries,
which is that in 2017, more children were killed in Syria
than in any other year since the war began. I am deeply
saddened by the immense loss and cascading suffering
of the Syrian people. And I am deeply disappointed by
all those who, year after year, by action or inaction,
design or indifference, have allowed this to happen.
My grief and frustration are compounded by all that
I know of the people of Syria. As United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees in the aftermath of the
Iraq war, I saw the remarkable hospitality of the Syrian
people in hosting 1.5 million Iraqi refugees — not in
camps, but in their communities across the country.
Syria was a place where refugees could live in security
as they tried to rebuild their lives and raise their
families. Today, so many of those generous Syrians
who shared so much have themselves been forced
from their homes, becoming refugees or internally
displaced. In neighbouring countries — whose
enormous hospitality I have also witnessed, but who are
burdened by overwhelming needs — the vast majority
of Syrian refugees live below the poverty line. Many
of the Syrians who journeyed even farther from home
in search of safety have found the doors that they once
opened to others in need shut in their faces. A country
known for its ancient civilization and a people known
for their rich diversity have been betrayed, and Syria
is bleeding inside and out. There should be one agenda
only for all of us — ending the suffering of the Syrian
people and finding a political solution to the conflict.
And the Council has a particular responsibility in
that regard.
Let me now turn to the implementation of resolution
2401 (2018) and the issue of the compliance of all the
relevant parties in Syria. I do so with a caveat. The
United Nations is following developments closely, but
we do not have the full picture, owing to our limited
presence and restricted access on the ground. Resolution
2401 (2018) demands that all parties “cease hostilities
without delay, and engage immediately to ensure full
and comprehensive implementation ... for a durable
humanitarian pause for at least 30 consecutive days
throughout Syria”, while still countering Da’esh and
other groups designated as terrorists by the Council.
It is true that in some areas, such as Deir ez-Zor and
Douma, where there has been a recent ceasefire that
I will address later, the conflict is diminishing in
intensity. Yet there has been no cessation of hostilities.
Violence continues in eastern Ghouta and beyond,
including in Afrin, parts of Idlib and into Damascus
and its suburbs. In eastern Ghouta in particular, the air
strikes, shelling and ground offensives have intensified
since the resolution’s adoption and have claimed
hundreds of civilian lives. Some reports even put the
toll at more than 1,000.
The resolution further demands the enabling
of “the safe, unimpeded and sustained delivery of
humanitarian aid and services”. Despite some limited
convoy deliveries, the provision of humanitarian aid and
services has been neither safe, unimpeded or sustained.
The resolution calls on “all parties to immediately
lift the sieges of populated areas, including in eastern
Ghouta, Yarmouk, Fo’ah and Kafraya”. No sieges
have been lifted. The resolution demands medical
evacuations of the critically sick and wounded. To our
knowledge, not one critically sick or wounded person
has so far been evacuated. But I will come back to
that later in relation to a recent announcement. The
resolution reiterates its demand “reminding in particular
the Syrian authorities, that all parties immediately
comply with their obligations under international law,
including international human rights law, as applicable,
and international humanitarian law, including the
protection of civilians”. And I remind all involved that
even efforts to combat groups identified as terrorists by
the Council do not supersede those obligations. Yet we
12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201
18-06756 3/23
see egregious violations, indiscriminate attacks and a
failure to protect civilians and civilian infrastructure.
Since the adoption of resolution 2401 (2018), my
Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura and I have been
focused on helping to create the conditions for a
cessation of hostilities in eastern Ghouta, where, as I
said to the Council two weeks ago, people have been
living in a hell on Earth (see S/PV.8185). As the Special
Envoy told the Council a few days ago, eastern Ghouta
is the most urgent situation, because it is where we have
the clearest potential to try to support the de-escalation
in concrete ways, and because we have been concretely
approached. On 26 February, the Russian Federation
announced a five-hour daily humanitarian pause in
eastern Ghouta. I will speak to that later in my remarks.
On 27 February, the President of the Security
Council and I received a letter from the Syrian National
Committee conveying another letter from the three
armed opposition groups in eastern Ghouta — Jaysh
Al-Islam, Faylaq Al-Rahman and Ahrar Al-Sham. They
expressed their commitment “to the full implementation
of the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially
resolution 2401 (2018)”, and to expelling from eastern
Ghouta “the armed groups of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham,
the Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaida and all of those
belonging to them”. They also promised to ensure
humanitarian access and the facilitation of the work
of United Nations agencies. On receiving the letter,
the Office of the Special Envoy opened channels
with all three groups, inside and outside the enclave.
The respective commanders issued further letters,
expressing the groups’ readiness to negotiate with the
Russian Federation in Geneva.
In parallel, both I and my Special Envoy engaged
with the relevant authorities of the Russian Federation.
My team on the ground did likewise, and also engaged
with the Government of Syria. We offered the good
offices of the United Nations to facilitate and observe
any meeting between the representatives of the armed
opposition groups, the Syrian Government and the
Russian Federation. Despite our best efforts over the
course of a few days, it was not possible to schedule
any meeting.
Meanwhile, on 6 March, the Syrian Government
addressed a letter to me and to the President of the
Security Council. That letter stated that Syria positively
welcomed resolution 2401 (2018), as it
“stresses firm commitment to the Syrian State’s
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity
in accordance with the provisions of the United
Nations Charter and calls for implementing
a humanitarian truce across Syria to ensure
a safe, sustainable and unhindered access of
humanitarian aid.”
That same day, my Special Envoy informed the
Russian Federation of his intention to invite the three
armed opposition groups to a meeting with the Russian
Federation in Geneva three days later. On 7 March, his
interlocutors replied that they did not think a meeting
in Geneva was the best option and were pursuing
contacts on the ground with the relevant armed
opposition groups.
As those diplomatic efforts were taking place,
fighting went on. The Syrian Government and its allies
intensified air strikes and launched a ground offensive,
progressively gaining control of parts of eastern Ghouta
from about 10 per cent of the enclave on 3 March to
more than 60 per cent today. The offensive initially
took place in less populated areas, steadily moving to
urban centres and forcing large-scale displacement.
In the follow up to the efforts I have described,
it was possible on 8 and 10 March to convene two
meetings between Russian officials and Jaysh Al-Islam
in the outskirts of eastern Ghouta, with the United
Nations as an observer. In those meetings, progress
was made in relation to the removal of a number of
members of the Al-Nusra Front, as well as other aspects,
including the potential for a ceasefire and improved
humanitarian access. The first group of Al-Nusra Front
fighters and their families were since evacuated from
eastern Ghouta.
Nevertheless, it has not been possible to facilitate
contact between the Russian authorities and Faylak
Al-Rahman. The group insisted that the meeting take
place in Geneva. The Russian Federation insisted that
the meeting take place on the ground. On 10 March,
Government forces intensified their offensive, capturing
the city of Misraba in a movement aiming at dividing
the enclave into three separate areas. On the evening
of that same day, the Russian Federation informed the
United Nations that a unilateral ceasefire would take
place at midnight, in relation to Jaysh Al-Islam in
Douma. It was agreed that a meeting would be held on
11 March with the facilitation of the United Nations. On
that day, with the ceasefire between the Government
S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018
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and Jaysh Al-Islam forces largely holding in Douma,
the meeting took place, followed by a meeting today.
As I speak to the Council now, I have not yet
received a full report on the results of today’s meeting.
But I was informed by our people in Damascus as I was
entering the Chamber that there has been progress with
regard to civilian evacuations and humanitarian aid.
Furthermore, I take note of a statement issued today by
Jaysh Al-Islam:
“[i] n the context of Security Council resolutions
2254 (2015) and 2401 (2018), an agreement was
reached with the Russian side through the United
Nations for a humanitarian medical evacuation of the
wounded for treatment outside of eastern Ghouta.”
We are also hearing reports of tentative initiatives,
both by tribal leaders and the Russian Federation, for
contact with other groups on the ground. I wish to
underscore the urgency of seeing medical evacuations,
civilian protection and full, sustained and unimpeded
humanitarian access as soon as possible.
Meanwhile, attacks on other parts of eastern
Ghouta continue, with the enclave now split into three
separate pockets. During this whole period, the shelling
from eastern Ghouta to Damascus was also ongoing,
causing dozens of civilian deaths and injuries, with
some reports putting the number close to 100.
My Special Envoy and I have remained apprised
at each step of the diplomatic engagement, offering
support and guidance to ensure the implementation in
letter and spirit of the resolution. In short, as my Special
Envoy has said to the Council, we are leaving no stone
unturned in trying to bring all major stakeholders
to the table and contribute in a concrete fashion to
find a sustainable solution for the implementation of
resolution 2401 (2018).
As the situation continues to unfold, the Turkish
offensive in Afrin — pursued with armed opposition
group allies — intensified with air strikes and ground
advances against Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat/People’s
Protection Units fighters, reinforced, in turn, by
elements coming from eastern Syria, where they were
combating Da’esh. Pro-Syrian Government forces have
also deployed inside of Afrin. The fighting resulted
in significant civilian displacement, with reports of
numerous casualties and damage to infrastructure.
With the cooperation of Syrian armed opposition
groups, Turkish forces established a so-called buffer
zone inside Syrian territory, linking northern rural
Aleppo and Idlib, and surrounding Afrin from three
sides. The offensive is now pushing ever closer towards
the city, with its large civilian population.
Allow me to now turn to our efforts to address
the humanitarian crisis. When resolution 2401 (2018)
was adopted, the United Nations and its humanitarian
partners stood ready to deliver. Plans were in place
for multiple convoys each week to agreed-upon
locations, in response to independently assessed needs.
Unfortunately, the actual delivery did not match our
plan. Let me describe what it was possible to do in the
past two weeks.
On 1 March, humanitarian organizations delivered
assistance to some 50,000 people in the hard-to-reach
areas of Afrin and Tell Rifaat, north of Aleppo. On
4 March, a convoy of 19 trucks organized by the United
Nations, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and partners
reached Dar Kabira, in northern Homs. It provided
assistance to 33,500 people of the requested 40,250.
However, the Government of Syria did not allow the
delivery of life-saving medicines, such as insulin,
nor key items, including solar lamps, syringes and
paediatric scales.
As I mentioned earlier, in eastern Ghouta, the
Russian Federation unilaterally announced a daily
five-hour humanitarian pause in the fighting, starting
from 27 February, to prevent civilian victims and to
enable civilians to leave the enclave. In reality, few
civilians left. On the one hand, sufficient protection
standards were not in place for voluntary movement.
Moreover, armed groups prevented others from leaving.
In that context, even though the five-hour window
was insufficient to enable the safe, unimpeded and
sustained delivery of humanitarian aid and services,
as demanded in the resolution, on 5 March the United
Nations sent an inter-agency convoy of 46 trucks
to Douma, in eastern Ghouta, with food for 27,500
people, along with health and nutrition supplies. Yet
those 27,500 represented only a third of the requested
beneficiaries, all in desperate need. And most of the
health supplies were removed by the Syrian authorities,
including basic medicines, dialysis treatments and
trauma and surgical materials, such as burn dressings
and adrenaline, despite the provisions of paragraph 8 of
resolution 2401 (2018).
According to the World Health Organization, only
about 30 per cent of medical supplies in the convoy
12/03/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8201
18-06756 5/23
were allowed in. United Nations personnel from the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
accompanying the convoy were also denied access
to eastern Ghouta. Violence rendered the operation
extremely perilous, despite prior assurances from the
parties to the conflict. The insecurity forced the team
to reluctantly halt unloading and to return to Damascus
with a large share of the food aid still on the trucks.
On 9 March, a convoy of 13 trucks reached Douma,
delivering the remaining food assistance that could not
be offloaded four days earlier. Once again, shelling
occurred nearby, despite assurances having been
provided by all parties. In those difficult circumstances,
I commend the valiant humanitarian workers risking
their lives to provide assistance and protection to
people in need.
But we are obviously far from safe, unimpeded and
sustained delivery of humanitarian aid, as demanded
in resolution 2401 (2018), as well as other relevant
Security Council resolutions. And so the humanitarian
and human rights situation is becoming more desperate
by the day. In Douma, relief workers who reached the
city last week described conditions as shocking and
overwhelming. People are sheltering in overcrowded
basements. Access to food, water and sanitation is
limited. In relation to Douma, we have a convoy ready
that I hope will be allowed to proceed in the coming
days, especially after the results of today’s meeting.
As in all conflict settings, the specific needs of
women are not receiving sufficient attention, including
access to safe spaces, critical health services, medicine
and baby formula for their children. In eastern Ghouta,
health partners on the ground advise that more than
1,000 people are in urgent need of medical evacuation.
The United Nations is ready to support these medical
evacuations, in cooperation with the Syrian Arab Red
Crescent and other partners. A prioritized list of those
in greatest need, mostly children, has been shared
with the Syrian authorities. I urge a positive response,
hoping that today’s meeting will allow these actions to
take place in the immediate future.
The Syrian Arab Red Crescent has announced
its intention to send a relief convoy to Afrin as soon
as security conditions allows. A United Nations
humanitarian mission is awaiting Government
authorization to immediately deploy to Raqqa for
assessments of security and needs. There are also new
disturbing allegations of the use of chlorine gas. Even
if we cannot verify them, we cannot ignore them. I
continue to urge the Council to find unity on this issue.
Having said what I said, I believe that despite all
the difficulties, lack of trust, mutual suspicions and
cold calculations, it should be possible to implement
resolution 2401 (2018). It should be possible to have
a cessation of hostilities. It should be possible to
deliver aid. It should be possible to evacuate the sick
and wounded. It should be possible to lift the sieges.
It should be possible to accelerate humanitarian mine
action throughout Syria. It should also be possible to
remove Security Council-listed terrorist fighters from
conflict zones without massive and indiscriminate
attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure.
We cannot give up, for the sake of the Syrian people.
I appeal to all parties to ensure the full implementation
of resolution 2401 (2018) throughout the whole of
Syrian territory. The United Nations is ready to assist in
any effort to make that happen. I call on all States with
influence to exercise it in support of the efforts of the
United Nations and the implementation of the resolution.
I hope that this week’s Astana ministerial meeting,
which will gather the guarantors of de-escalation, will
concretely restore de-escalation arrangements, and take
real steps on detainees, abductees and missing persons.
The dramatic situation I have described — the calamity
across the country, the rivalries, the cynicism, the
cruelty — highlight the need for a political solution.
My Special Envoy continues to work towards the full
implementation of resolution 2254 (2015).
On Thursday, the conflict will enter its eighth year.
I refuse to lose my hope to see Syria rising from the
ashes. To see a united, democratic Syria able to avoid
fragmentation and sectarianism and with its sovereignty
and territorial integrity respected, and to see a Syrian
people able to freely decide their future and choose
their political leadership.
The President: I thank the Secretary-General for
his briefing.
I now give the floor to those Council members who
wish to make statements.
Recalling the Security Council’s latest note 507 on
its working methods (S/2017/507), I wish to encourage
all participants, both members and non-members of
the Council, to deliver their statements in five minutes
or less.
S/PV.8201 The situation in the Middle East 12/03/2018
6/23 18-06756
Mr. Alotaibi (Kuwait) (spoke in Arabic): I deliver
this speech today on behalf of Kuwait and Sweden.
At the outset I would like to thank you,
Mr. President, for convening this meeting at the request
of the delegations of Kuwait and Sweden, pursuant to
resolution 2401 (2018). I also thank Secretary-General
António Guterres for his presence here today and for
his briefing about the implementation of this resolution.
Fifteen days have passed since the Security
Council’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2401
(2018), which demands that all parties implement a
30-day ceasefire throughout Syria without delay in
order to deliver humanitarian assistance to those in
need and to end the siege of residential areas. It is
with great regret that we continue to witness a clear
failure to implement the resolution’
Security Council, 73rd Year: 8174th Meeting, Monday, 5 February 2018, New York
No full textThe Situation In The Middle East Letter Dated 1 February 2018 From The Secretary-General Addressed To The President Of The Security Council (S/2018/84)United Nations S/PV.8174
Security Council
Seventy-third year
8174th meeting
Monday, 5 February 2018, 10 a.m.
New York
Provisional
President: Mr. Alotaibi. . (Kuwait)
Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz
China. . Mr. Wu Haitao
Côte d’Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue
Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba
Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu
France. . Mr. Delattre
Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov
Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom
Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra
Poland. . Ms. Wronecka
Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia
Sweden . Mr. Skoog
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Mr. Allen
United States of America. . Mrs. Haley
Agenda
The situation in the Middle East
Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the
President of the Security Council (S/2018/84)
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of
speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official
Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).
18-03099 (E)
*1803099*
S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018
2/17 18-03099
The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.
Expression of thanks to the outgoing President
The President (spoke in Arabic): As this is the first
public meeting of the Security Council for the month
of February, I should like to take this opportunity to
pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to His Excellency
Ambassador Kairat Umarov, Permanent Representative
of Kazakhstan, for his service as President of the
Council for the month of January. I am sure I speak
for all members of the Council in expressing deep
appreciation to Ambassador Umarov and his team for
the great diplomatic skill with which they conducted
the Council’s business last month.
Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
The situation in the Middle East
Letter dated 1 February 2018 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President
of the Security Council (S/2018/84)
The President (spoke in Arabic): In accordance
with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of
procedure, I invite the representative of the Syrian
Arab Republic to participate in this meeting.
In accordance with rule 39 of the Council’s
provisional rules of procedure, I invite Ms. Izumi
Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament
Affairs, to participate in this meeting.
The Security Council will now begin its
consideration of the item on its agenda.
I wish to draw the attention of Council members to
document S/2018/84, which contains the text of a letter
dated 1 February 2018 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council.
I now give the floor to Ms. Nakamitsu.
Ms. Nakamitsu: I would like to thank you,
Mr. President, for this opportunity to brief the Security
Council once again on the implementation of resolution
2118 (2013), on the elimination of the Syrian Arab
Republic’s chemical-weapons programme.
I remain in regular contact with the Director-
General of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to discuss matters related
to this issue; I spoke to him last week. In addition, I met
with the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of
the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations this
past Friday.
At the time of my previous briefing, planning
was under way with regard to the destruction of the
remaining two stationary above-ground facilities of
the 27 declared by the Syrian Arab Republic. I am
informed that the OPCW, working with the United
Nations Office for Project Services, is currently at the
stage of finalizing a contract with a private company to
carry out the destruction, which I understand could be
completed within two months.
There have been some developments on the
issues related to Syria’s initial declaration and
subsequent amendments. The translation and analysis
of documents that were provided to the OPCW by the
Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in November
have been completed. The OPCW has indicated that
this information provided clarifications on some
issues. However, the OPCW is continuing to follow
up with the Government of Syria on the remaining
gaps, inconsistencies and discrepancies. The Director-
General will submit a report in that regard to the next
session of the OPCW Executive Council, which will
take place in March.
Further to its routine inspections in Syria, samples
taken by the OPCW team during its second inspection
at the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Centre
are currently being analysed by two OPCW-designated
laboratories. The Executive Council will be informed
of the results of the inspection via a separate note
from the Director-General to the next session of the
Executive Council.
The OPCW Fact-finding Mission continues to look
into all allegations of the use of chemical weapons in
Syria, the majority of which involve the use of toxic
chemicals, such a chlorine, in areas not under the
control of the Government. The Fact-finding Mission
expects to submit a report on the allegations very soon.
In addition, another Fact-finding Mission team has
been looking into allegations of the use of chemical
weapons brought to the attention of the OPCW by
the Government of Syria. At the time of our previous
briefing, a Fact-finding Mission team was in Damascus,
at the invitation of the Government, to look into several
of those allegations. I am informed that a report in that
regard is also pending.
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18-03099 3/17
There is still work to do before resolution 2118 (2013)
can be considered to have been fully implemented,
and for the international community to have shared
confidence that the chemical-weapons programme of
the Syrian Arab Republic has been fully eliminated.
Moreover, allegations of the use of chemical weapons in
Syria have continued, including just this past weekend
in the town of Saraqeb. That makes abundantly clear
our continuing and collective responsibility to ensure
that those responsible are held to account.
New reports by the Fact-finding Mission are
pending. Should they conclude that there has been the
use, or likely use, of chemical weapons in any of those
alleged incidents, our obligation to enact a meaningful
response will be further intensified. It is my hope, and
the hope of the Secretary-General, that such a response
will favour unity, not impunity. As always, the Office
for Disarmament Affairs stands ready to provide
whatever support and assistance it can.
The President (spoke in Arabic): I thank
Ms. Nakamitsu for her briefing.
I shall now give the floor to those Council members
who wish to make statements.
Mrs. Haley (United States of America): The news
out of Syria this morning is following a troubling pattern.
There are reports of yet another chemical-weapon attack
on Sunday. Victims of what appears to be chlorine gas
are pouring into hospitals. Few things have horrified
my country and the world as much as the Al-Assad
regime’s use of chemical weapons against its people.
The Security Council has been outspoken on ending
Syria’s use of chemical weapons, and yet they continue.
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention and
resolution 2118 (2013), the Al-Assad regime’s obligations
are clear: it must immediately stop using all chemical
weapons. It must address the gaps and inconsistencies
in its Chemical Weapons Convention declaration. And
it must destroy all of its remaining chemical weapons
under the supervision of the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). These are
worthy goals. These are urgent goals. Yet we spent
much of last year in the Council watching one country
protect the Al-Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons
by refusing to hold them responsible.
What do the American people see? What do people
of all countries see? They see a Council that cannot
agree to take action, even after the OPCW-United
Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism, created by the
Council, found that the Al-Assad regime used chemical
weapons. Now we have reports that the Al-Assad
regime has used chlorine gas against its people multiple
times in recent weeks, including just yesterday. There is
obvious evidence from dozens of victims, and therefore
we proposed a draft press statement by the Security
Council condemning these attacks. So far, Russia has
delayed the adoption of the draft statement — a simple
condemnation of Syrian children being suffocated by
chlorine gas. I hope Russia takes the appropriate step
to adopt the draft text, thus showing that the Council is
unified in condemning chemical-weapon attacks.
Accountability is a fundamental principle, but it is
just the first step. Our goal must be to end the use of
these evil, unjustifiable weapons. When actions have
consequences — when perpetrators are identified and
punished — we come closer to reaching our goal. But
if we cannot even take the first step of establishing
accountability for the use of chemical weapons,
we have to seriously ask ourselves why we are here.
The requirements for establishing accountability for
the use of chemical weapons have not changed since
the Council voted unanimously to create the Joint
Investigative Mechanism, in 2015. They have not
changed since Russia acted alone to kill the Mechanism
last year. Such a mechanism must be independent
and impartial. It must be free of politics. It must be
controlled by experts, not politicians or diplomats. And
it must be definitive.
The latest Russian draft resolution does not
meet any of those criteria. Russia’s draft resolution
completely ignores the findings of the Joint Investigative
Mechanism, which was an investigation that Russia
supported until the investigators found the Al-Assad
regime to be responsible. That should already be enough
to make us sceptical. However, there are other deep
problems. For their new investigation, Russia wants to
be able to cherry-pick the investigators. It wants to insert
unnecessary and arbitrary investigative standards.
And it wants the Security Council to be able to review
all the findings of this investigation and decide what
makes it into the final report. That is not an impartial
mechanism; it is a way to whitewash the findings of the
last investigation that Russia desperately wants to bury.
No one should believe that the draft resolution is a good
basis for discussion, when it is designed to undermine
our core principles on chemical weapons. We cannot
S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018
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hope to end the use of chemical weapons if those who
use them escape the consequences of their actions.
Therefore, while we regret the need for its
creation, we applaud the efforts of France to launch
the International Partnership against Impunity for the
Use of Chemical Weapons. That is yet another way to
hold accountable the Al-Assad regime and any group
that uses chemical weapons. The United States has also
announced that we will contribute to the International,
Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for the Most Serious Crimes under International
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic since
March 2011. The United States strongly supports the
Mechanism as a valuable tool to hold the Al-Assad
regime accountable for its atrocities, including its
repeated and ongoing use of chemical weapons.
It is a true tragedy that Russia has sent us back
to square one in the effort to end the use of chemical
weapons in Syria. But we will not cease in our efforts
to know the truth of the Al-Assad regime — and ensure
that the truth is known and acted on by the international
community. That is why we hosted all 15 members of
the Council at the United States Holocaust Museum last
week. The exhibit was called “Syria: Please Don’t Forget
Us”. All of us saw undeniable evidence of the Al-Assad
regime’s atrocities and human rights violations. We
cannot, and should not, forget the Syrian people. The
United States will not forget them. While the Council
has not yet been able to act to provide real accountability
for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, the United
States will not give up on the responsibility to do so.
That is the sincere wish of the American people, and
I know that it is shared by many on the Council. We
are not motivated by score-settling, payback or power
politics. We are motivated by the urgent need to end the
unique and horrible suffering that chemical weapons
have inflicted on innocent men, women and children in
Syria. The Syrian people are counting on us.
Mr. Allen (United Kingdom): I would like to thank
High Representative Nakamitsu for her briefing.
We are holding this meeting in the open Chamber
today after reports of a series of chemical attacks in
eastern Ghouta within the past month, as the Al-Assad
regime continues its merciless bombing and killing
of civilians. Over the weekend, there were further
allegations of the use of chemical weapons in Idlib, as
well as air strikes by pro-regime forces that reportedly
hit three hospitals, leaving doctors scrambling to
remove premature babies from their incubators in order
to move them. I cannot say that they were moving them
to safety, because the reality is that for the citizens of
Idlib and eastern Ghouta, nowhere is safe.
We are appalled by this violence and the reports
of deliberate targeting of civilians and civilian
infrastructure, and we call on all parties to the conflict
to uphold international humanitarian law and protect
civilians. The Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is already investigating
reports of the use of chemical weapons in recent weeks,
but establishing who is responsible for that use will
be much more difficult, because Russia has vetoed
the continuation of the independent, expert OPCW-United
Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM)
three times, in order to protect the Al-Assad regime.
We would welcome any serious attempt to re-establish
a properly independent investigative and attribution
mechanism for continuing the JIM’s meticulous work.
Sadly, we do not yet see that in the Russian proposal.
Any successor investigation must be empowered to
investigate all use of chemical weapons, whoever the
perpetrator may be. Yet the Russian proposal focuses
only on non-State actors. We have repeatedly condemned
Da’esh for its use of chemical weapons, which the JIM
clearly reported. But given Al-Assad’s track record of
chemical-weapon use and its failure to comply with
the Chemical Weapons Convention, it is imperative to
ensure that any new mechanism also investigates the
use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime.
A second objection is the proposal that experts
would merely gather evidence, leaving the Council to
decide what it meant. No other United Nations expert
panel that I know of is specifically prohibited from
reaching conclusions and reporting to the Council on its
findings on what has happened. We are not specialists
on chemical weapons around this table. We rely on
independent, United Nations-selected expert panels.
The entire purpose of the JIM was that an independent
panel would reach conclusions on the basis of the
evidence, taking the issue out of the hands of us, the
Member States and Council members, because we have
been unable to agree. Russia’s proposal looks as if it is
designed to avoid the political embarrassment of having
to use its veto power to defend the indefensible when
independent bodies report on what has truly happened.
The underlying intent seems to be to ensure that there
are no clear conclusions in future reports.
05/02/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8174
18-03099 5/17
Thirdly, we object to the proposal’s demands that the
standard of proof should be beyond reasonable doubt.
That standard has not been used in any other comparable
past or current United Nations investigation. It is used
in relation to criminal prosecutions in courts of law,
which have significantly greater investigative powers
and independence than those envisaged in Russia’s text.
Finally, the proposal insists on site visits, despite the
explicit provision in the Chemical Weapons Convention
for other ways to gather relevant evidence, recognizing
the difficulty of safe and timely visits. There is no
scientific basis for this proposal. It is simply an attempt
to hamstring future investigations and discredit the JIM.
Of course, Russia made much of the lack of a site visit
to Khan Shaykhun, despite the fact that the Al-Assad
regime handed over to the United Nations samples from
the site that contained chemical signatures unique to
regime sarin, obviating the need for such a visit. It is for
those reasons that the current text is unacceptable. The
JIM set a high standard of impartiality and expertise.
We expect that standard from any future mechanism.
The Syrian regime, of course, claims not to have
used chemical weapons. Yet over the years two separate
reports from the JIM, under separate leadership panels,
drawing on a broad range of respected independent
international experts, concluded that the regime had
used chlorine at least three times — in Talmenes in April
2014 and in Sarmin and Qmenas in March 2015 — and
had used sarin to attack Khan Shaykhun in April 2017.
We should also remember the infamous attack in eastern
Ghouta in August 2013, when a separate United Nations
investigation found that sarin was used to kill hundreds
and injure thousands. That attack brought near-universal
international condemnation, and following
our concerted international pressure, Syria joined the
Chemical Weapons Convention. Syria promised, as it
was legally obliged to do, to destroy and abandon its
chemical-weapon programme. Yet it has been unable to
satisfy inspectors that it has done so. We have to ask
ourselves why that is. In 2013 Russia promised to act as
a guarantor for the Al-Assad regime’s compliance with
the Chemical Weapons Convention. Yet month after
month we all sit here and hear that Al-Assad has not
done so. Why does Russia not compel the Syrian regime
to comply with its obligations and make it impossible
for it to use chemical weapons?
Tragically, for the people of Syria, the regime
continues to use chemical weapons with impunity. If
it is confirmed that Al-Assad has again used chemical
weapons on his own people, it would not only be
another entry in the catalogue of his war crimes, it
would also be another attack on us all, Members of
the United Nations who have worked for decades — in
the words of the Chemical Weapons Convention, for
the sake of all mankind — to completely exclude the
possibility of the use of chemical weapons. Throughout
history, our peoples have said “never again” — among
others, starting with the First World War battlefields,
in Ethiopia, in Manchuria and in Saddam Hussein’s
attacks on Iran and on Iraqi Kurds. Let us, the members
of the Council, stand up for the peoples of the United
Nations, determined that such abhorrent chemical
weapons should never be used. Let us stand up for the
people of Syria and give them a real investigation into
those responsible for the use of chemical weapons — an
investigation that pursues justice for the horrific crimes
committed against them. Let us signal our determination
to pursue accountability by all means available, even
if one member of the Security Council is currently
preventing us from taking action here.
Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): I
would first like to congratulate Kuwait through you,
Mr. President, on the start of its presidency of the
Security Council. You can rely on France’s support in
the month to come. I would also like to thank Izumi
Nakamitsu for her usual very informative briefing.
This is the second time we have met in less than
two weeks after reports of four new cases of the use
of chlorine against Syria’s civilian population, some of
them in Idlib province, which is a de-escalation zone.
We are examining the information that is available
and waiting for the conclusions of the investigative
mechanism, but the reality is that resorting to toxic
substances as weapons has never ended in Syria. I
would like to remind the Council that the Syrian regime
has already been identified as the perpetrator in four
such cases, one of which involved the use of sarin, in
violation of international humanitarian law and the
obligations that Syria assumed when it acceded to the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
The challenges go beyond the Syrian issue. A
century after the end of the First World War, in which
mustard gas was used on a massive scale against
civilians, what we are seeing is shocking. These
weapons, which we had thought were a thing of the
past, are once again being used methodically and
systematically by the Syrian regime against its own
people. Furthermore, there is a real threat of such
S/PV.8174 The situation in the Middle East 05/02/2018
6/17 18-03099
weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. The threat
is all the greater given the fact that the dismantling
of the Syrian chemical-weapon programme remains
at a deadlock. The cooperation of the Syrian regime
with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) has for months taken place in a
piecemeal manner, and suspicions remain about the
status of Syrian stockpiles.
I would recall that OPCW expert teams
Security Council, 73rd Year: 8228th Meeting, Tuesday, 10 April 2018, New York
No full textThe Situation In The Middle EastUnited Nations S/PV.8228
Security Council
Seventy-third year
8228th meeting
Tuesday, 10 April 2018, 3 p.m.
New York
Provisional
President: Mr. Meza-Cuadra . (Peru)
Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Llorentty Solíz
China. . Mr. Wu Haitao
Côte d’Ivoire. . Mr. Tanoh-Boutchoue
Equatorial Guinea. . Mr. Ndong Mba
Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu
France. . Mr. Delattre
Kazakhstan. . Mr. Tumysh/Mr. Umarov
Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi
Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom
Poland. . Mr. Radomski
Russian Federation. . Mr. Nebenzia
Sweden . Mr. Skoog
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce
United States of America. . Mrs. Haley
Agenda
The situation in the Middle East
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of
speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official
Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).
18-10187 (E)
*1810187*
S/PV.8228 The situation in the Middle East 10/04/2018
2/21 18-10187
The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.
Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
The situation in the Middle East
The President (spoke in Spanish): In accordance
with rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of
procedure, I invite the representatives of Canada, the
Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey to participate in
this meeting.
The Security Council will now begin its consideration
of the item on its agenda.
Members of the Council have before them document
S/2018/175, S/2018/321 and S/2018/322, which contain
the texts of three draft resolutions, respectively.
The Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the
draft resolution contained in document S/2018/321,
submitted by Canada, France, the Netherlands, Peru,
Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States
of America.
I now give the floor to those members of the Council
who wish to make statements before the voting.
Mr. Delattre (France) (spoke in French): For
years, as part of its responsibilities for maintaining
international peace and security, the Security Council
has been mobilized on the issue of chemical weapons.
After the chemical attacks in Ghouta in 2013, the
Security Council adopted resolution 2118 (2013), which
provided for the complete dismantling of the chemical
arsenal of the Syrian regime. Russia, as co-sponsor
of that resolution, had guaranteed its implementation.
Despite that guarantee, the Damascus regime has never
complied with its obligations under resolution 2118
(2013) and has never renounced — as we saw again
on 7 April — the use of chemical weapons against its
civilian population.
Five years after the Council’s adoption of resolution
2118 (2013), we note that the general subject of chemical
weapons remains tragically topical. The upcoming
voting marks our fourth meeting in less than a week on
this issue. Yesterday we met in an emergency meeting
(see S/PV.8225) following a new chemical-weapons
massacre in Douma, Syria, whose appalling images
left us shocked. Last month we met to discuss the
unacceptable attack in Salisbury (see S/PV.8203). Last
year we met day after day after the terrible attack of
Khan Shaykhun. That shows the deterioration of the
situation and how serious the stakes are today for
our security.
The use of chemical weapons is so abominable
that it has been banned for almost 100 years, and the
international community began years ago to eliminate
them. As such, the chemical non-proliferation regime,
which we have patiently developed and strengthened, is
one of the pillars of our collective security architecture,
at the heart of our security system. Yet today it is under
serious threat. We face the cynical, barbaric and all-out
use of chemical weapons against civilian populations.
The Douma attacks once again illustrated the
abject brutality of the Syrian regime’s resolute military
strategy. Such acts constitute war crimes or even
crimes against humanity. They increase the risk of
dangerous normalization — tolerating the return of
these agents of fear and death is nothing more than a
blank cheque to all those who would like to use them.
To allow the normalization of the use of chemical
weapons without responding is to let the genie of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — which
pose an existential threat to us all — out of the bottle. It
would mark a serious and reprehensible setback to the
international order that we have all patiently helped to
develop. The consequences would be terrible, and we
would all pay the price.
That is why we cannot accept it. France will do
all it can to prevent impunity for the use of chemical
weapons. It is in that spirit that we launched an
international partnership last January. The demise
of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW)-United Nations Joint Investigative
Mechanism in November, due to the Russian veto to
protect Al-Assad’s regime, sent a dangerous signal of
impunity. It deprived us of an essential deterrent tool.
It left a vacuum that the Syrian regime has rushed to
exploit, and which yesterday’s atrocities have tragically
reminded us of.
The American initiative to re-establish an
independent mechanism, based on a balanced approach
and taking into account the concerns expressed by every
member of the Council, enables us to fill that glaring
void. Such a mechanism would support the inquiry
that has already been launched by the OPCW. It would
also respect the essential criteria of independence,
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without any interference, and impartiality to which
each member of the Council has committed. Such
a mechanism would have a mandate to attribute
responsibility for the attacks. Only the combination of
those two criteria — independence and a mandate to
attribute responsibility — will make that mechanism
effective, and therefore dissuasive. Let me be clear: in
view of the gravity of the 7 April attack, France will
not accept any third-rate or sham mechanism whose
independence and impartiality would not be genuinely
ensured. That is what the Security Council owes today
to the Syrian victims of chemical attacks and to the
entire international community, whose security is
threatened by the chemicals in the hands of the regime
of Bashar Al-Assad.
Since the threat is of an existential nature for us
all, combating the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction must, more than ever, be among the top
priorities of the Security Council. If there is one
area in which the Council has a moral and political
responsibility to convene and act, it is this one. If there
is one domain for which the credibility of the Council
is at stake, where tactical games have no place, it is
this one.
This is one of those moments when we have no
choice but to act because what is at stake is essential.
We cannot allow the chemical non-proliferation regime,
and with it our entire security architecture — along
with the principles and values that underpin our
action — to crack and disintegrate before our very eyes.
Today’s vote is one of those key moments, one of those
moments of truth. On behalf of France, I therefore call
on each member of the Council to properly gauge and
assume its responsibilities now and to vote in favour of
the American draft resolution (S/2018/321).
Mrs. Haley (United States of America): We have
reached a decisive moment as the Security Council.
On Saturday the first haunting images appeared
from Douma, in Syria. We gathered around this table
yesterday (see S/PV.8225) to express our collective
outrage. We then collectively agreed that the Council
needed to take steps to determine exactly what happened
in Douma and to put an end to these barbaric attacks.
The United States has put forward a draft resolution
(S/2018/321) that accomplishes those shared goals.
For weeks we have been working with every single
delegation on the Council to develop a new attribution
mechanism for chemical-weapons attacks in Syria. We
held open and transparent negotiations so that every
delegation could provide its input. And we went the extra
mile for one Council member. We adopted paragraph
after paragraph of Russia’s proposed draft resolution
(S/2018/175). We tried to take every Russian proposal
that did not compromise the impartiality, independence
or professionalism of a new attribution mechanism.
After the Douma attack, we updated our draft
resolution with common sense changes. Our proposal
condemns the attack. It demands unhindered
humanitarian access for the people in Douma. It calls
on the parties to give maximum cooperation to the
investigation. And it creates the attribution mechanism
that we worked so hard with each member to develop.
The draft resolution is the bare minimum that the
Council can do to respond to the attack. The United
States did everything possible to work towards
Council unity on this text. Again, we accepted
every recommendation that did not compromise
the impartiality and independence of the proposed
attribution mechanism.
I want to say a brief word about Russia’s draft
resolution, which is also before us for a vote. Our
draft resolutions are similar, but there are important
differences. The key point is that our draft resolution
guarantees that any investigations will truly
be independent. Russia’s draft resolution gives Russia
itself the chance to choose the investigators and then
to assess the outcome. There is nothing independent
about that. The United States is not asking to choose
the investigators, and neither should Russia. The
United States is not asking to review the findings of any
investigation before they are final, and neither should
Russia. All of us say that we want an independent
investigation. Our draft resolution achieves that goal.
Russia’s does not. This is not an issue that more time
or more consultations could have resolved. At a certain
point, you are either for an independent and impartial
investigation or you are not. And now that the Douma
attack has happened, this is not a decision that we can
delay any longer.
The United States calls on all Security Council
members to vote in favour of our draft resolution and to
abstain or vote against the Russian draft resolution. The
Syrian people are counting on us.
Mr. Nebenzia (Russian Federation) (spoke in
Russian): Today the delegation of the United States
is once again trying to mislead the international
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community and is taking yet another step towards
confrontation by putting to a vote a draft resolution
(S/2018/321) that does not enjoy the unanimous support
of the members of the Security Council.
It is not true that it meets almost all our
requirements. The text is nothing more than an attempt
to resurrect, unchanged, the former Organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations
Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM), established to
investigate cases of the use of chemical weapons in
Syria. Russia has always emphasized that it will not
support that approach. The JIM became a puppet in the
hands of anti-Damascus forces, and it covered itself with
shame when it issued a guilty verdict for a sovereign
State without credible evidence. The American draft
resolution represents an identical reproduction of all of
the former Mechanism’s flawed working methods. The
new mechanism would conduct investigations as it sees
fit, with no reference to the standards of the Chemical
Weapons Convention. That has nothing to do with
independence, which the draft resolution’s sponsors
and its closest allies only pretend to care about. We
know the worth of such independence. It is true anarchy
and manipulation.
At every stage of our work on the American
initiative we have insisted that the Secretary-General
should select the staff for the investigative mechanism
on the basis of the broadest possible geographic
representation, with subsequent approval by the
Security Council. Visits to the sites of the incidents
and strict adherence to the principle of sequential
actions while ensuring the preservation of the material
evidence should be not optional but mandatory working
principles. In a collective decision, the Security Council
would determine who was responsible in any given
case of the use of chemical weapons, based on reliable
evidence that would leave no room for doubt about the
correctness of the conclusions. There is nothing about
this in the American draft resolution. The authors know
that it goes against the Russian position and will not be
adopted. But they are obstinately sticking to their line.
It is clear that today’s provocative step has nothing
to do with a desire to investigate what happened in
Douma, Syria, on 7 April. An attributive mechanism
is not necessary in order to initially establish the facts.
Even if we could conceive of the improbable scenario
in which the draft resolution creating the mechanism
was adopted today, it would take several months to put
the mechanism together and fine-tune its operations.
Establishing who is to blame is the final link in a
very long chain of actions. Here, in front of everyone,
I would once again like to ask the sponsors why they
need the mechanism when they have already identified
the guilty parties before the investigation. They do not
need it. They do not want to hear anything. They do not
want to hear that no traces of a chemical attack were
found in Douma. They have simply been looking for
an excuse the whole time, and the provocateurs among
the White Helmets have very kindly provided it. This is
all reminiscent of a kind of spring fever. Exactly a year
ago, in April 2017, a similar scenario unrolled with the
chemical provocation in Khan Shaykhun, followed by a
missile strike.
The fact is that the authors of the draft resolution
are motivated by completely different priorities. They
have pinned their hopes on the assumption that the draft
resolution will not be adopted. That is what they want,
and it is something that they can bank along with the
rest of their reasons justifying the use of force against
Syria. For several days now, the Administration in
Washington, D.C., has been keeping the international
community in suspense while discussing the so-called
important decisions being prepared. Only yesterday we
heard how anxiously Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura
spoke about the current escalation extending beyond
Syria’s borders (see S/PV.8225), and we know that the
Secretary-General is also very concerned about that.
It is clear that Russia will once again be the target of
the propaganda cannons. My American colleague will
painstakingly enumerate the Russian vetoes on Syria.
It is not impossible that she has taken upon herself a
capitalist commitment to using the reckless policies
of the United States to achieve some sort of personal
record in that regard. We are using the veto to protect
international law, peace and security and to ensure that
the United States does not to drag the Security Council
into its misadventures. The United States representative
says that we are covering up for someone. Russia is in
Syria at the invitation of its lawful Government in order
to combat international terrorism, in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, while the United
States is covering up for militias and terrorists.
If the United States has decided to carry out an
illegal military venture — and we still hope that it will
think better of it — it must answer for that itself. It wants
to dump this draft resolution, which has been sitting on
the shelf for a long time, onto the Security Council in
order to find a pretext. The United States representative
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herself has said repeatedly that if the Council does not
make a decision, the United States will make a decision
on its own. Why is the suta purposely undermining
the Council’s authority by promoting a draft resolution
that we know will not go through? And a lot of people
said that yesterday during consultations. We urge the
Americans to give sober consideration to the potential
this presents for confrontation, to think better of it and
to withdraw its draft resolution from a vote. Russia
cannot support it.
The President (spoke in Spanish): I shall first put
to the vote the draft resolution contained in document
S/2018/321, submitted by Canada, France, the
Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
United States of America.
A vote was taken by show of hands.
In favour:
Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, France,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Peru, Poland,
Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and United States of America
Against:
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Russian Federation
Abstaining:
China
The President (spoke in Spanish): The draft
resolution received 12 votes in favour, 2 against and 1
abstention. The draft resolution has not been adopted,
owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of
the Council.
I shall now give the floor to those members of
the Council who wish to make statements following
the voting.
Ms. Pierce (United Kingdom): This is a sad day
for the Security Council; it is a sad day for the cause of
universal norms and standards; and it is a sad day for
the non-proliferation regime. But, above all, it is a very
sad day for the people of Douma, who now are without
the protection that the international system was set up
to provide for them.
This is the fourth time in six days that the Council
has discussed chemical weapons. Yesterday 14 members
of the Security Council called for an investigation.
Several members called on the permanent five (P-5)
to assume their responsibilities to uphold the universal
prohibition on weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom was ready to do
that and was joined by France and the United States.
Conversely, by vetoing, Russia has crossed a line in the
international order, and worse, if possible, history is
repeating itself one year on from Khan Shaykun.
Russia helped to create the original independent
investigation that attributed Khan Shaykun to the
Syrian regime and concluded that sarin, which can be
developed only by a State actor, had been used. But last
autumn, Russia vetoed renewal of that mechanism on
not one but three occasions. The reason is clear: it is
because Russia would rather cross the WMD line than
risk sanction of its ally Syria. Instead, we are asked
to believe that the Russian version of this latest attack
should be the one that the Security Council believes.
Russia is not authorized by the Security Council
to carry out an investigation in Syria. Russia says
that there were no traces of a chemical attack. No
traces were found by whom? I repeat: Russia is not
authorized to carry out an investigation on behalf
of the Security Council. We need an independent
investigative mechanism for that purpose, and only
that sort of mechanism can have the confidence of the
Security Council, the confidence of the membership
of the United Nations and the confidence of the people
of Syria.
Sadly, reports of chemical-weapon attacks in Syria
have continued since the original Russian veto, in
November. It has become very clear that Russia will do
what it takes to protect Syria, whatever the compelling
evidence of the crimes committed, and to shut down
further investigation and discussion of those crimes.
This has come at the cost of Russia’s own obligations
and credibility as a permanent member of the Council,
as a State party to the Chemical Weapons Convention
and as a declared and supposed supporter of peace
in Syria.
The Security Council has been unable to act solely
because Russia has abused the power of veto to protect
Syria from international scrutiny for the use of chemical
weapons against the Syrian people. Even today open-source
investigations have located a chlorine cylinder,
the same kind that the Joint Investigative Mechanism
has found that the Syrian regime used, atop a house
in Douma full of people who had clearly died from
respiratory problems.
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I frankly doubt that in 48 hours Russia has verified
all similar reports and can conclude that they are all
fake. They are not fake; they need to be looked at and
investigated by a proper independent mechanism such
as the Council was prepared today to pass.
Russia’s credibility as a member of the Council is
now in question. We will not stand idly by and watch
Russia continue to undermine the global norms that
have ensured the security of all of us, including Russia,
for decades. As a P-5 member, the United Kingdom
will stand up for international peace and security; it
is our moral duty. It is a matter of shame that Russia
has once again blocked a draft resolution. The Russian
Ambassador mentioned that it was not a question of
counting the number of Russian vetoes. I beg to differ.
To quote Lenin, quantity has a quality all of its own.
Russia’s actions today are a step against the rules and
authority of the Security Council and the wider United
Nations. They are a step against international peace
and security and non-proliferation, and they are a step
against humanity.
Mr. Wu Haitao (China) (spoke in Chinese): China
is deeply concerned at re
Security Council, 73rd Year : 8260th Meeting, Wednesday, 16 May 2018, New York
No full textThe Situation In The Middle EastUnited Nations S/PV.8260
Security Council
Seventy-third year
8260th meeting
Wednesday, 16 May 2018, 10 a.m.
New York
Provisional
President: Ms. Wronecka. . (Poland)
Members: Bolivia (Plurinational State of). . Mr. Inchauste Jordán
China. . Mr. Ma Zhaoxu
Côte d’Ivoire. . Mr. Djédjé
Equatorial Guinea. . M. Ndong Mba
Ethiopia. . Mr. Alemu
France. . Mr. Delattre
Kazakhstan. . Mr. Umarov
Kuwait. . Mr. Alotaibi
Netherlands. . Mr. Van Oosterom
Peru. . Mr. Meza-Cuadra
Russian Federation. . Mr. Polyanskiy
Sweden . Mr. Skoog
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . Ms. Pierce
United States of America. . Ms. Eckels-Currie
Agenda
The situation in the Middle East
This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the translation of
speeches delivered in other languages. The final text will be printed in the Official Records
of the Security Council. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They
should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member
of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room U-0506
([email protected]). Corrected records will be reissued electronically on the Official
Document System of the United Nations (http://documents.un.org).
18-14999 (E)
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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.
Adoption of the agenda
The agenda was adopted.
The situation in the Middle East
The President: In accordance with rule 39 of
the Council’s provisional rules of procedure, I invite
Mr. Staffan de Mistura, Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General for Syria, to participate in this meeting.
Mr. De Mistura is joining today’s meeting via
video-teleconference from Geneva.
The Security Council will now begin its
consideration of the item on its agenda.
I give the floor to Mr. De Mistura.
Mr. De Mistura: When I last briefed the Security
Council on 9 April, it was at an emergency meeting (see
S/PV.8225). On that occasion, I warned of the threats
to regional and international peace and security arising
from developments in or related to Syria. I know that
today it is not an emergency meeting. However, the
circumstances of an emergency very much remain. I
do not need to remind members that tensions are high
and regional and international confrontations have
occurred several times. Allow me to highlight some
recent events since 9 April.
On 13 April, the United States, France and the
United Kingdom conducted missile strikes in response
to the allegations of the use of chemical weapons in
eastern Ghouta. Those countries say that the strikes
targeted three research and production facilities near
Damascus and Homs.
On 29 April, strikes were reported on Syrian
Government military facilities in Hamah and Aleppo.
Some media outlets attributed those strikes to Israel,
alleging that those killed included Iranian personnel.
Neither Israel nor Iran responded to those claims.
On 8 May, strikes were reported just south of
Damascus. Syrian State media attributed those strikes
to Israel. Israel did not confirm that claim. Israel then
said that it had detected “irregular Iranian activity” in
the occupied Golan, which it put on high alert.
Between 9 and 10 May, Israel carried out dozens
of strikes against presumed Iranian and Syrian
Government military targets across southern Syria.
The Israeli authorities claim that they were responding
to Iranian forces firing rockets from Syrian territory
at Israeli military targets in the occupied Syrian
Golan. Iran condemned the Israeli strikes and denied
those claims.
We are not is a position to independently verify
every aspect of those incidents. However, even an
incomplete picture shows the troubling trajectory
of the increasingly frequent and ever more intense
international confrontations over Syria, unprecedented
since 1973.
As the Security Council knows, the Secretary-
General has followed those developments with great
concern and called for restraint by all parties in order
to avoid any acts that could escalate the situation
and worsen the suffering of the Syrian people. The
Secretary-General stressed that the United Nations
has a
“duty to remind Member States that there is
an obligation, particularly when dealing with
matters of peace and security, to act consistently
with the Charter of the United Nations, and with
international law in general.” (S/PV.8233, p. 2)
On the issue of chemical weapons, let me again echo
the Secretary-General’s call for the Security Council to
“agree on a dedicated mechanism for ensuring
effective accountability for the use of chemical
weapons in Syria” (ibid.).
As the Council well knows, as of now, we await the
results of the ongoing investigation by the Fact-finding
Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons following its visit to Douma, with
a report to be issued to States parties to the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
However, we have also seen worrying developments
elsewhere in Syria. Evacuations from eastern Ghouta
were similarly repeated in the eastern Qalamoun area,
southern Damascus and northern rural Homs.
First, on the military escalation, the pattern has
been one of incoming air strikes and artillery and
outgoing mortars and rockets towards Damascus. Then
there was a negotiation, followed by an agreement
for the evacuation of those civilians and fighters
unwilling to remain under Syrian Government
control or Russian Federation protection guarantees.
We have also seen similar evacuation agreements
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being discussed in Idlib province but in a completely different format — the reverse format. This time we are talking about civilians and fighters in Government-controlled areas, namely, Kafraya and Fo’ah, while considering evacuations — beginning with medical evacuations — following the three-year siege and intermittent attacks from armed groups surrounding that area.Let me share with the Council a recurrent concern that I know that all members have. If civilians and fighters are simply funnelled into northern Syria — mostly into Idlib — then that might only postpone another conflict affecting many additional people, which I will discuss later. Therefore, it is important to keep close watch on future developments in Idlib province. Meanwhile, civilians continue to pay a terrible price. To be precise, 110,000 people have been evacuated to north-western Syria and Operation Euphrates Shield areas in the past two months. Many of them are reportedly traumatized and in urgent need of assistance and protection. Humanitarian partners are overwhelmed and stretched quite thin by the scale of those evacuations, but continue to do their utmost to respond to the growing needs, with the Council’s assistance.Returning to the topic of Idlib, if a Ghouta scenario were to play out there, the situation could be six times worse, affecting 2.3 million people, half of whom are already internally displaced and would have nowhere else to go. But that is not purely a question of the Syrians’ suffering. We fear that any substantial escalation in Idlib, Dar’a or in the north-east might also result in risks not only to Syrian civilians, but also for international peace and security. As we know, many of those areas contain external and international forces. Conflict there might entail confrontations with those forces, thereby leading us down a slippery slope towards regional or potential international conflict. Therefore, discussions at the international level on how to prevent that and on de-escalation are needed, and, although they are taking place, they also need to be very intensive.I was therefore very encouraged to see concrete discussions on de-escalation when I attended the ninth high-level Astana meeting yesterday, which covered the issue of Idlib in particular, as the three guarantors have a say and the means to avoid it. That round of discussions in Astana saw constructive discussions on how that might be achieved. While fully stressing the need to respect Syria’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, we saw at first-hand the parties engage actively on how to avoid a worst-case scenario in Idlib. Moreover, the working group, of which the United Nations is a member and a proactive supporter — as hundreds of thousands of people in Syria expect of us — held its second meeting on the release of detainees, abductees and bodies, and on the identification of missing persons. The members of the working group held constructive discussions on practical and concrete steps to address that key humanitarian issue. The guarantors informed us that they have secured the parties’ support — which, if confirmed, is good news — for the activities taking place under the auspices of the working group, which is a positive development. As it is a matter of preliminary discussions, I hope that we will see progress with regard to that complex issue at the working group’s next meeting, which we understand will be held in Ankara.De-escalation is indispensable, as the Syrians themselves are telling us, but it is only one of the ingredients necessary to move forward the political process. We also need to overcome concrete challenges to meaningfully follow through with the Geneva process so as to implement resolution 2254 (2015). As instructed by the Secretary-General, I have consulted with a broad spectrum of relevant stakeholders and proactively identified options for a meaningful relaunch of the United Nations-facilitated Geneva process. Over a period of two weeks, I conducted an exhaustive tour of consultations with members of the League of Arab States; representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq; the European Union (EU) High Representative; representatives of several key European countries, Turkey, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran; and all members of the Council, during what I believe was a very productive and useful retreat in Sweden; United States authorities during my visit to meet with them in Washington, D.C., several days ago; and also the Syrian Government and the opposition, with whom I had constructive discussions on the sidelines of the Astana meeting over the past two days. My deputy, Mr. Ramzy, was also in the region this past weekend in continuous political contact with regional stakeholders, and my chief of political affairs, Mr. Robert Dann, is visting China as we speak to exchange views with officials of that important member of the Security Council.What did I learn from that long tour? Not surprisingly, I returned to Geneva with a mixed picture. S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018
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Clearly, significant differences remain, but there is also much common ground and interest on the need, first, to de-escalate, secondly, to form a constitutional committee under the auspices of the United Nations, thirdly, to facilitate the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment — leading to our shared goals in the political process — and, fourthly, to respect Syria’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. However, those commonalities risk getting glossed over, especially in the absence of serious international dialogue. I will say more on that later. During my tour, my message to all was the need — now more than ever — for robust, strong, proactive and urgent dialogue and consensus at the international level to create the minimum conditions necessary for a realistic and credible political process. As we know, much water has flowed under the bridge and much has happened since resolution 2254 (2015) was adopted. We are therefore becoming increasingly realistic and know that we need a credible political process that takes into account the current situation and does not forget resolution 2254 (2015).As the Secretariat, we are not sitting idle in that regard. We are assessing a number of creative options to update, revive and advance the Geneva-based political process. Let me state for the record that the United Nations remains ever-mobilized and -ready to work on the formation of a constitutional committee in accordance with the final statement of the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Sochi. I therefore welcome the intention of the Astana guarantors to actively and regularly engage with the United Nations in Geneva so as to see through a concrete follow-up to the statement since its adoption three and a half months ago.I was also pleased to see a significant number of Member States reaffirm the primacy of the United Nations-led Geneva process, in general, and the need for a constitutional committee working under United Nations auspices, when I was at the EU-United Nations Brussels conference from 24 to 25 April. Those at the conference nearly unanimously reiterated the message that the only solution to the crisis will be political and that only such a political solution will pave the way for reconstruction efforts. Also in Brussels, we saw the entire United Nations system highlight the increasing needs of millions of Syrians, including internally displaced persons (IDPs) and neighbouring countries hosting refugees.Let me also note the important contribution of Syrian civil society in Brussels, in particular during a side event organized by the EU and my own Office. Those present did not shy away from debating with one another constructively and intensively on complex issues, such as transitional justice and sanctions. They all demanded the release of all detainees, abductees and missing persons. They all affirmed that any political solution must protect the right of refugees and IDPs. Despite their differences, Syrians — Syrian civil society — displayed a genuine commitment to dialogue and a spirit of negotiation that I hope can be replicated in the formal negotiations.In Brussels I also met with a group of Syrian women activists who stressed that not enough has been done to secure the direct participation of Syrian women in the political process. I committed to translating our collective commitment to that inclusion into concrete measures, and I will count on the Council’s support to keep that promise. For instance, in future intra-Syrian talks, I will insist that the relevant number of seats be reserved exclusively for Syrian women. When I am criticized, I hope that the Council will support me. I know it will not be popular, but it needs to be done.Let me briefly touch on an issue that was raised by the civil society in Brussels and by many Syrians elsewhere who have been writing to us, that is, the possible implications of the newly adopted Law No. 10. We are quite aware of the concerns surrounding that law. We, as well as other United Nations partners, are seeking clarifications on the law’s goals and repercussions, especially for refugees and IDPs who do not have access to legal documentation.Let me conclude with two bottom lines.First, de-escalation is critical between the Syrian and international stakeholders, both regional and global. We hope that the relevant players can re-establish some overarching rules of the road in that regard. We stand ready to facilitate such a discussion, with focused support from the Council and key countries for the good offices of the Secretary-General and myself.Secondly, we must revive the political process in terms of the constitutional committee, as well as in terms of some initial steps towards the establishment of a safe, calm and neutral environment. We stand ready to facilitate discussions on both. Let me stress that a critical component of either aspect of the political process is active, continuous and positive United 16/05/2018 The situation in the Middle East S/PV.8260
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Nations engagement with the Syrian parties. I repeat once again that we stand ready, today as always, to engage with the Syrian Government in Damascus. We will also continue our contacts with the opposition and Syrian civil society.To unlock and lock those two aspects, careful diplomacy is required more than ever — careful, but proactive diplomacy, including at a high level. Hence, we look with interest to the forthcoming visits to Moscow and meetings of Chancellor Merkel and, later on, President Macron with President Putin, which undoubtedly will not avoid the issue of a political process in Syria. The United Nations believes that there is an urgent need for high-level diplomacy to support de-escalation, avoid any miscalculation and ensure a genuine communication system about a sustainable end to the conflict. With the support of the Secretary-General, we will increase our own efforts to contribute to that endeavour, including by offering further ideas and —if required, which we hope it will be — bridging proposals.The President: I thank Mr. De Mistura for his briefing.I shall now give the floor to the members of the Security Council who wish to make statements.Ms. Eckels-Currie (United States of America): Since this is my first opportunity to congratulate you upon assuming the presidency, Madam President, I would like to do so at this time. I also thank Staffan for his briefing.Last week the world witnessed a new and extremely dangerous escalation in Syria. It should not surprise anyone on the Security Council that Iran was responsible. Iranian forces operating from Syrian territory launched a rocket attack against Israeli citizens — citizens of a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. The United States strongly supports Israel’s right to act in self-defence. Iran’s reckless and provocative acts last week prove what we have been saying: wherever Iran shows up in the Middle East, chaos follows. Last week’s rocket attack against Israel is the latest in a pattern of destabilizing behaviour that is a dire threat to the region’s stability.Iran’s rocket attack against Israel shows something else too. It puts to bed any myths about why Iran is present in Syria, or what its true objectives might be. The fact is that Iran has installed offensive rocket and missile systems in Syria aimed at Israel. Iran has introduced those threats that were not present in Syria before the conflict; they are now. Iran, together with Hizbullah and other militias, is taking advantage of Syrian territory to establish bases and training camps. They are moving ever closer to Israel. The United States calls on Iran, Hizbullah and their other proxies to take no further provocative steps. If they do, Iran will bear full responsibility for its actions.It is also important to emphasize that Iran’s actions do not serve the interests of the Iranian or the Syrian people. The Syrian people get no say in whether Iran threatens war against Syria’s neighbours, but it is they who have to live with the consequences.All of us on the Security Council have an important choice to make: we can stay quiet and watch as Iran builds up the infrastructure to create another Hizbullah in Syria, or we can speak up and take steps to put real pressure on Iran to stop. For our part, the United States refuses to stay quiet. Russia in particular has a special responsibility here. Its troops are on the ground, sometimes alongside Iran’s. Russia must know that Iran’s provocative actions do nothing to help resolve the war in Syria. Russia must know that Iran’s actions do just the opposite. They only inflame, prolong and widen the conflict.We heard once again from Staffan today that there has been very little progress on the political track. There has been no progress at all in Geneva, or following Russia’s own conferences in Astana and Sochi. Since January, the United Nations was supposed assemble a new constitution drafting committee that would help kick off a new round of talks. The United Nations was supposed to have the ability to choose which people would serve on the committee, and the United Nations was supposed to be empowered to facilitate those talks. Instead, the Al-Assad regime has backtracked, stalled and then refused to cooperate.At the same time, the Syrian regime escalated its brutal military campaign. It seized eastern Ghouta, at the cost of thousands of lives and tens of thousands displaced. It used chemical weapons in Douma. Just yesterday, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Fact-finding Mission released a report determining that chlorine was used during attacks on 4 February in Saraqib.As reported by the Fact-finding Mission, the facts of that chemical-weapons attack bear the hallmarks S/PV.8260 The situation in the Middle East 16/05/2018
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of similar attacks conducted by the Al-Assad regime. As we have said before, the United States assesses that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons well over 50 times since the start of the civil war. The Al-Assad regime, with Iran’s and Russia’s full support, is choosing to pursue a military solution instead of a political solution, and that goes against everything we should stand for as the Security Council.In the aftermath of eastern Ghouta, the need for a real ceasefire could not be more obvious. Already, we see the Al-Assad regime launching new attacks in Idlib and the south-west. As Staffan noted, a Ghouta scenario in Idlib would be six times worse than the horror we saw in recent months in Ghouta. Air strikes in the south-west have tripled in the last month, even though that area is part of a de-escalation zone. Russia is supposed to be a sponsor of that zone. It must urgently meet its commitments to prevent the regime from carrying out attacks and stop Iranian militias from expanding their foothold in the south.Members of the Security Council — all of us — must push the political process forward. There is Council unity behind th
Secretary-General's Briefing To The Security Council On Syria
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Security Council, 73rd Year : 8195th Meeting, Wednesday, 28 February 2018, New York
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Statement By H.e. Ambassador Philippe Lalliot Permanent Representative Of France To The Opcw At The Eighty-seventh Session Of The Executive Council
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Andrew Main Oral History
No full textAndrew Main was a faculty member in Biology at the American University in Cairo from 1994 to 2005. He relates his professional background and how he came to work in Cairo at the U.S. Naval Medical Research Unit and then at AUC as the head of the Biology Unit of the Science Department. Main gives an account of the emergence and development of the biology program at AUC, including the establishment of a major and Biology as a department in 2000, for which he served as Chair. He recalls the faculty in the unit and then department, and the growth of its personnel. Developments in the biology curriculum and facilities are also covered, and he discusses the Scientific Thinking course that he taught. Main also gives a portrait of students in and graduated from the program, and describes the activities of the Biology Club. He gives his impressions of living in Cairo as well