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Jealously Guarded: The Right to Trial by Jury in Federal Court Under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act
No full textSince California adopted heightened pleading standards for high-frequency litigants alleging violations of the Unruh Act in state court, federal district courts have seen a surge of ADA and Unruh Act claims filed together to secure subject matter jurisdiction. Most courts dismissed the Unruh claims under their discretionary authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, but they remained divided on whether plaintiffs in these cases have a right to jury trial—statutory or constitutional. In 2025, the Ninth Circuit resolved part of the split in In re Tsay, holding that the Unruh Act provides a constitutional right to a jury trial because it authorizes civil penalties, but not a statutory right, noting that the phrase “any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury” is too vague and insufficient to grant this right. On the constitutional issue, however, the court offered little guidance to district courts on whether those civil penalties become equitable when the Unruh claim is “intertwined with” or “incidental to” ADA injunctive relief—the very issue that divided the district courts. This Comment fills that gap and explains why intertwinement cannot defeat the availability of the right to jury trial. On the statutory issue, this Comment offers a route different from the one the Ninth Circuit took. Because the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to avoid constitutional questions when a reasonable statutory interpretation is available, the Ninth Circuit should first have considered whether it is “fairly possible” to read Unruh’s language to grant a jury trial. Although Erie generally requires deference to state-court interpretations, this Comment proposes an exception—rooted in Supreme Court precedent—recognizing that federal courts, guided by the Seventh Amendment’s unique protection of the jury right (which remains unincorporated), must apply federal interpretive tools to construe ambiguous state statutes like Unruh in favor of jury trial. This approach avoids the constitutional question, preserves the jury trial in federal court, and promotes federalism
Standing in the Shadows: Member Anonymity in Associational Standing Cases
No full textAssociational standing serves several benefits for plaintiff members: associations often have expertise in a certain field that guides the representation of their members, they have greater resources that allow them to bring lawsuits in the first place, and they can serve as the public face of the lawsuit to shield the plaintiff member from serious retaliation that may result from bringing the claim. But due to some imprecise language in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, circuit courts are divided over whether associational members can remain anonymous at all. Thus, individuals who have legitimate legal claims, lack the resources necessary to sue without the association, and are in danger of retaliation or even harm if they cannot sue anonymously may refrain from having their day in court if their jurisdiction imposes a naming requirement on associational plaintiffs. This Comment argues that the associational standing test should clarify that only an identification requirement is necessary, thereby closing the circuit split and offering vulnerable associational members the protection they need to confidently seek recompense in the courts. An analysis of Justice Scalia’s Summers majority under typical interpretive tools reveals that he likely did not mean distinct things by switching between the verbs “name” and “identify” because the facts before him did not require such a distinction. Courts should further disfavor the interpretation that Summers imposes a naming requirement because such a reading treats Justice Scalia’s majority as if it contains the same linguistic precision as statutes—an unrealistic and impermissible expectation for a judicial opinion. Finally, fact that the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects one’s right to keep one’s associations private undercuts the argument in favor of a naming requirement. This Comment’s proposed identification requirement will not leave defendants unprotected. The standard for an associational member to remain anonymous should echo the strict standards that lower courts have developed for allowing individual plaintiffs to sue anonymously. Accordingly, associational members will have to demonstrate the likelihood of some serious harm—beyond mere economic harm or embarrassment—that would result in the absence of anonymity. This requires sufficient facts to demonstrate that the anonymous member truly does exist and did suffer harm. At bottom, associations must provide everything except their members’ names and detailed identities. A multitude of public policy benefits flow from a clear identification requirement. Not only would it facilitate circuit-wide uniformity, but it would also incentivize vulnerable plaintiffs who need the protection of anonymity to bring their claims to court. This benefit is easily recognizable in cases involving victims of sexual violence, but courts should consider how it can similarly protect plaintiffs bringing First Amendment claims, given this nation’s history of permitting anonymous speech, the pervasiveness of online speech, and the rising political tensions in this country. Finally, setting forth a clear identification requirement will concretize an important rule in the body of standing doctrine, thereby reducing the danger that a judge may use indeterminate standing rules to keep disfavored plaintiffs out of the courtroom. Thus, the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and policy considerations all favor a clarification that associational standing requires only that associations identify the existence of their injured members
Finding the Major Questions Doctrine
No full textThe major questions doctrine has been invoked primarily in the rulemaking context, where it requires agencies to identify particularly clear statutory authority before promulgating rules of “major” importance. Some scholars have suggested that the doctrine is a tool that should be limited to agency actions that are purportedly “legislative” in nature (e.g., rulemakings)—meaning the doctrine would not apply in other contexts, such as agency adjudications and enforce-ment actions that may not be similarly “legislative.” This Essay responds by arguing that the major questions doctrine is best understood as a limit on executive authority—meaning the doctrine could apply across a wider range of administrative actions that are formally exercises of executive power, regardless of whether the actions appear “legislative” in nature. That means that the doctrine could apply not just in the rulemaking context, but in the adjudication and enforcement action contexts as well. In advancing that argument, this Essay suggests that the major questions doctrine might be in the process of being “found” by judges. Thinking of the major questions doctrine as being found, rather than created, leaves room for the idea that only parts of the doctrine have been found to date. Thus, although the doctrine has been observed primarily in the rulemaking context so far, understanding the nature of the doctrine from first principles indicates that there are additional, yet-to-be observed aspects of the doctrine that apply in additional contexts. Recognizing the major questions doctrine as having been found would also make sense of how various jurists have discussed the doctrine to date. Justice Barrett, for example, has argued that the doctrine is a component of human language patterns—i.e., patterns that judges find and apply, rather than create from whole cloth. Similarly, in West Virginia v. EPA, the Court formally recognized the major questions doctrine by name in an opinion that discussed the doctrine as if it had long existed—with the concurring Justices stating more clearly that the doctrine was first observed by jurists reviewing actions taken by the first modern regulatory agency. As the modern administrative state continues to expand, revealing new aspects of itself, we might expect additional aspects of the major questions doctrine to be revealed as well. In short, thinking of the major questions doctrine as having been found is consistent with how the Supreme Court has discussed the doctrine to date, and might shed light on how the Court views the doctrine in the future
The Power to Declare Peace
No full textThe Constitution gives Congress the power “to declare War.” The meaning of that grant of power is much debated, but its converse is much neglected: To whom does the Constitution assign the power to declare peace? This Article comprehensively examines the Constitution’s various assignments of the power(s) to make peace—constitutional powers to end, as a practical matter and as a binding legal matter, a prior legal condition of war. Both the President and Congress possess several such powers. The President has the power, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, to make treaties, including peace treaties that legally supersede and extinguish a prior congressional declaration of war or its equivalent. The President also has the power to make unilateral “executive agreements” of peace with an enemy nation or power, pursuant to the general Article II executive power of the President over foreign affairs. Such sole-executive agreements, however, do not override or extinguish Congress’s declarations of war or authorizations of force and do not bind the actions of future Presidents. Finally, the President, as military Commander in Chief, possesses plenary power to end war as a practical matter simply by making the unilateral military decision to cease fighting (or, for that matter, not to fight an authorized war in the first place). The sum of these several powers yields in the President of the United States a near-plenary power to declare peace, at least as a functional matter, during that President’s time in office. Congress has a functional power to declare peace by not declaring war (or otherwise authorizing force) in the first place. Congress likewise has the power to declare peace by repealing or rescinding a prior authorization of war. (Both powers are of course subject to practical and political constraints.) In addition, Congress’s appropriations power is a formidable limitation on the war power. It affords Congress broad practical power to establish peace by refusing to provide appropriations for war or by conditioning such appropriations in a way that functionally ends a war. A funding limitation, however, does not (necessarily) repeal a prior war declaration: If Congress reopens the purse, the President can pick back up the sword. Consideration of the Constitution’s peace powers provides a useful, “backdoor” perspective on the Constitution’s allocation of war powers and helps buttress the proper conclusions as to the meaning and interaction of Congress’s power “to declare War” and the President’s power as “Commander in Chief” of the nation’s military
Formulary Apportionment: A New Framework for Personal Income Taxation
Full text linkIncreased post-pandemic remote working arrangements and interstate migration have upended existing personal income taxation regimes. For decades, the current paradigm has proved to be an imperfect but workable means to determine which state has the prevailing claim to impose tax on a particular item of income. The individual’s state of residence has a residual claim to all the individual’s worldwide income but defers to the state in which the income is derived if such a state is determinable. To that end, the state of residence typically provides a credit for income taxes paid on a source basis to other states. Fundamentally, source trumps residence in the context of personal income taxation. The problem is that taxing jurisdictions can no longer readily determine the source of income or the individual’s state of residence within the existing legal constructs. Existing legal structures designed to tax employment income cannot cope with widespread remote working arrangements. The rise of the digital economy and independent contractor “gig work” allows individuals to shift the source of their income. At the same time, individuals are also shifting their state of residence from high-tax to low-tax states at historic rates. Increased interstate migration, particularly of high-net-worth individuals and profitable closely held businesses, has allowed income to migrate with individuals. The result is a genuine threat of multiple taxation for individuals and significant revenue losses for taxing jurisdictions. The stakes are enormous, as personal income tax regimes account for approximately one-quarter of all state and local tax revenues. A solution—formulary apportionment—is a concept with which states are very familiar. Although formulary apportionment has been the prevailing paradigm for multistate corporate income taxation for decades, state legislatures and the existing literature have largely and surprisingly failed to recognize its promise for multistate personal income taxation. This Article remedies that oversight
5 Totally Ineffective Strategies for Teaching and Presenting (and How to Avoid Them): Using Evidenced-Based Learning Principles
No full textWhile educators are often fascinated with principles from learning science, Agarwal and Bain (2019) note that many ideas get filed away and are rarely implemented in the classroom. In addition, conference presentations often rely on traditional didactic methods rather than using sound principles from learning science (Corwin et al., 2019). This session explores the implications of learning science for our approach to “presentations” at educational conferences as well as in the classroom (by instructors and students
Determination of inorganic anions by ion-exchange chromatography utilizing inverse-UV detection coupled with solid-phase extraction applied to ground and seawater and natural juices
No full textAs this work is not yet published, the authors have requested the removal of the abstract
Effects of Acute and Multi-Day Beetroot Juice Supplementation on Power and Velocity During Resistance Exercise in NCAA Division I Baseball Position Players
No full textDietary nitrate supplementation can enhance muscle contractility in type II fibers; however, the efficacy of nitrate in exercises and populations that predominantly rely on type II fibers, such as resistance exercise in power-based athletes, remains unexplored. The purpose of this project was to determine whether acute and multi-day nitrate ingestion via concentrated nitrate-rich beetroot juice (BR) improves resistance exercise performance in NCAA Division I baseball athletes. Eighteen male collegiate baseball athletes were assigned in a randomized, double-blind, crossover design to consume: 1) nitrate-depleted beetroot juice placebo (PL) or 2) BR (~6 mmol of nitrate) for 8 consecutive days. On days 1 and 8, subjects consumed supplements 2.5 hours prior to performing back squat and bench press performed at 55%, 60%, and 65% of their one-repetition maximum. A linear transducer was used to measure peak and mean power and velocity. A two-way repeated measures analysis of variance will be used to analyze for differences in performance across condition and time. A subset of data (n=9) for peak and mean power and velocity for back squat and bench press is presented. These data will contribute to informing nitrate supplementation guidelines for enhancing resistance exercise, and for the first time, will provide insight on the efficacy of dietary nitrate as an ergogenic aid for resistance exercise in a sport-specific population
Performing Arts Session
No full textThe music department is proud to present the research of its students through performance. These students spend considerable time developing their technique and mastering the art of expression, and each performance is informed by significant research on the composer and the composition.
These performances will feature the following instruments and genres: arias, art songs, musical theater, instrumental solo pieces, and instrumental chamber music. The performances will appear in no particular order. Please stop by and enjoy this offering of music at the Weisman Museum.
Jess Chen, violin
Rachel Harrington, viola
Josh Kim, cello
Jason Press, double bass
Dr. Tan (professor), piano
Alima Ovali, violin
Abigail Grant, flute
Ceci McCormick, piano
Amanda Tatum, soprano
Noah Doss, tenor
Jace Vendelin, baritone-tenor
Claire Atchison, soprano
Cokie Daniel, soprano
Hannah Root, soprano
Miara Williams, soprano
Nicholas Gerding, bass
John Silva, tenor
Gannon Hays, baritone
Claire Jansen, soprano
Payton Ballinger, soprano
Emma Hirte, mezzo-soprano
Isaac Hui, clarinet, bass clarinet
Johnathan Hodges, keyboard
Ginny Stenstrom, piano/keyboard
Zachary Gamble, guitar
Jonah Chang, oboe
Bridget Ayers, violin
Brett Cochran, EWI
Tory Wile, viola
Abby Tsao, percussi