Pepperdine University

Pepperdine Digital Commons
Not a member yet
    11289 research outputs found

    Jealously Guarded: The Right to Trial by Jury in Federal Court Under California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act

    No full text
    Since California adopted heightened pleading standards for high-frequency litigants alleging violations of the Unruh Act in state court, federal district courts have seen a surge of ADA and Unruh Act claims filed together to secure subject matter jurisdiction. Most courts dismissed the Unruh claims under their discretionary authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, but they remained divided on whether plaintiffs in these cases have a right to jury trial—statutory or constitutional. In 2025, the Ninth Circuit resolved part of the split in In re Tsay, holding that the Unruh Act provides a constitutional right to a jury trial because it authorizes civil penalties, but not a statutory right, noting that the phrase “any amount that may be determined by a jury, or a court sitting without a jury” is too vague and insufficient to grant this right. On the constitutional issue, however, the court offered little guidance to district courts on whether those civil penalties become equitable when the Unruh claim is “intertwined with” or “incidental to” ADA injunctive relief—the very issue that divided the district courts. This Comment fills that gap and explains why intertwinement cannot defeat the availability of the right to jury trial. On the statutory issue, this Comment offers a route different from the one the Ninth Circuit took. Because the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to avoid constitutional questions when a reasonable statutory interpretation is available, the Ninth Circuit should first have considered whether it is “fairly possible” to read Unruh’s language to grant a jury trial. Although Erie generally requires deference to state-court interpretations, this Comment proposes an exception—rooted in Supreme Court precedent—recognizing that federal courts, guided by the Seventh Amendment’s unique protection of the jury right (which remains unincorporated), must apply federal interpretive tools to construe ambiguous state statutes like Unruh in favor of jury trial. This approach avoids the constitutional question, preserves the jury trial in federal court, and promotes federalism

    Standing in the Shadows: Member Anonymity in Associational Standing Cases

    No full text
    Associational standing serves several benefits for plaintiff members: associations often have expertise in a certain field that guides the representation of their members, they have greater resources that allow them to bring lawsuits in the first place, and they can serve as the public face of the lawsuit to shield the plaintiff member from serious retaliation that may result from bringing the claim. But due to some imprecise language in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Summers v. Earth Island Institute, circuit courts are divided over whether associational members can remain anonymous at all. Thus, individuals who have legitimate legal claims, lack the resources necessary to sue without the association, and are in danger of retaliation or even harm if they cannot sue anonymously may refrain from having their day in court if their jurisdiction imposes a naming requirement on associational plaintiffs. This Comment argues that the associational standing test should clarify that only an identification requirement is necessary, thereby closing the circuit split and offering vulnerable associational members the protection they need to confidently seek recompense in the courts. An analysis of Justice Scalia’s Summers majority under typical interpretive tools reveals that he likely did not mean distinct things by switching between the verbs “name” and “identify” because the facts before him did not require such a distinction. Courts should further disfavor the interpretation that Summers imposes a naming requirement because such a reading treats Justice Scalia’s majority as if it contains the same linguistic precision as statutes—an unrealistic and impermissible expectation for a judicial opinion. Finally, fact that the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment protects one’s right to keep one’s associations private undercuts the argument in favor of a naming requirement. This Comment’s proposed identification requirement will not leave defendants unprotected. The standard for an associational member to remain anonymous should echo the strict standards that lower courts have developed for allowing individual plaintiffs to sue anonymously. Accordingly, associational members will have to demonstrate the likelihood of some serious harm—beyond mere economic harm or embarrassment—that would result in the absence of anonymity. This requires sufficient facts to demonstrate that the anonymous member truly does exist and did suffer harm. At bottom, associations must provide everything except their members’ names and detailed identities. A multitude of public policy benefits flow from a clear identification requirement. Not only would it facilitate circuit-wide uniformity, but it would also incentivize vulnerable plaintiffs who need the protection of anonymity to bring their claims to court. This benefit is easily recognizable in cases involving victims of sexual violence, but courts should consider how it can similarly protect plaintiffs bringing First Amendment claims, given this nation’s history of permitting anonymous speech, the pervasiveness of online speech, and the rising political tensions in this country. Finally, setting forth a clear identification requirement will concretize an important rule in the body of standing doctrine, thereby reducing the danger that a judge may use indeterminate standing rules to keep disfavored plaintiffs out of the courtroom. Thus, the Constitution, Supreme Court precedent, and policy considerations all favor a clarification that associational standing requires only that associations identify the existence of their injured members

    Finding the Major Questions Doctrine

    No full text
    The major questions doctrine has been invoked primarily in the rulemaking context, where it requires agencies to identify particularly clear statutory authority before promulgating rules of “major” importance. Some scholars have suggested that the doctrine is a tool that should be limited to agency actions that are purportedly “legislative” in nature (e.g., rulemakings)—meaning the doctrine would not apply in other contexts, such as agency adjudications and enforce-ment actions that may not be similarly “legislative.” This Essay responds by arguing that the major questions doctrine is best understood as a limit on executive authority—meaning the doctrine could apply across a wider range of administrative actions that are formally exercises of executive power, regardless of whether the actions appear “legislative” in nature. That means that the doctrine could apply not just in the rulemaking context, but in the adjudication and enforcement action contexts as well. In advancing that argument, this Essay suggests that the major questions doctrine might be in the process of being “found” by judges. Thinking of the major questions doctrine as being found, rather than created, leaves room for the idea that only parts of the doctrine have been found to date. Thus, although the doctrine has been observed primarily in the rulemaking context so far, understanding the nature of the doctrine from first principles indicates that there are additional, yet-to-be observed aspects of the doctrine that apply in additional contexts. Recognizing the major questions doctrine as having been found would also make sense of how various jurists have discussed the doctrine to date. Justice Barrett, for example, has argued that the doctrine is a component of human language patterns—i.e., patterns that judges find and apply, rather than create from whole cloth. Similarly, in West Virginia v. EPA, the Court formally recognized the major questions doctrine by name in an opinion that discussed the doctrine as if it had long existed—with the concurring Justices stating more clearly that the doctrine was first observed by jurists reviewing actions taken by the first modern regulatory agency. As the modern administrative state continues to expand, revealing new aspects of itself, we might expect additional aspects of the major questions doctrine to be revealed as well. In short, thinking of the major questions doctrine as having been found is consistent with how the Supreme Court has discussed the doctrine to date, and might shed light on how the Court views the doctrine in the future

    The Power to Declare Peace

    No full text
    The Constitution gives Congress the power “to declare War.” The meaning of that grant of power is much debated, but its converse is much neglected: To whom does the Constitution assign the power to declare peace? This Article comprehensively examines the Constitution’s various assignments of the power(s) to make peace—constitutional powers to end, as a practical matter and as a binding legal matter, a prior legal condition of war. Both the President and Congress possess several such powers. The President has the power, with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, to make treaties, including peace treaties that legally supersede and extinguish a prior congressional declaration of war or its equivalent. The President also has the power to make unilateral “executive agreements” of peace with an enemy nation or power, pursuant to the general Article II executive power of the President over foreign affairs. Such sole-executive agreements, however, do not override or extinguish Congress’s declarations of war or authorizations of force and do not bind the actions of future Presidents. Finally, the President, as military Commander in Chief, possesses plenary power to end war as a practical matter simply by making the unilateral military decision to cease fighting (or, for that matter, not to fight an authorized war in the first place). The sum of these several powers yields in the President of the United States a near-plenary power to declare peace, at least as a functional matter, during that President’s time in office. Congress has a functional power to declare peace by not declaring war (or otherwise authorizing force) in the first place. Congress likewise has the power to declare peace by repealing or rescinding a prior authorization of war. (Both powers are of course subject to practical and political constraints.) In addition, Congress’s appropriations power is a formidable limitation on the war power. It affords Congress broad practical power to establish peace by refusing to provide appropriations for war or by conditioning such appropriations in a way that functionally ends a war. A funding limitation, however, does not (necessarily) repeal a prior war declaration: If Congress reopens the purse, the President can pick back up the sword. Consideration of the Constitution’s peace powers provides a useful, “backdoor” perspective on the Constitution’s allocation of war powers and helps buttress the proper conclusions as to the meaning and interaction of Congress’s power “to declare War” and the President’s power as “Commander in Chief” of the nation’s military

    Table of Contents & Masthead

    No full text

    Formulary Apportionment: A New Framework for Personal Income Taxation

    Get PDF
    Increased post-pandemic remote working arrangements and interstate migration have upended existing personal income taxation regimes. For decades, the current paradigm has proved to be an imperfect but workable means to determine which state has the prevailing claim to impose tax on a particular item of income. The individual’s state of residence has a residual claim to all the individual’s worldwide income but defers to the state in which the income is derived if such a state is determinable. To that end, the state of residence typically provides a credit for income taxes paid on a source basis to other states. Fundamentally, source trumps residence in the context of personal income taxation. The problem is that taxing jurisdictions can no longer readily determine the source of income or the individual’s state of residence within the existing legal constructs. Existing legal structures designed to tax employment income cannot cope with widespread remote working arrangements. The rise of the digital economy and independent contractor “gig work” allows individuals to shift the source of their income. At the same time, individuals are also shifting their state of residence from high-tax to low-tax states at historic rates. Increased interstate migration, particularly of high-net-worth individuals and profitable closely held businesses, has allowed income to migrate with individuals. The result is a genuine threat of multiple taxation for individuals and significant revenue losses for taxing jurisdictions. The stakes are enormous, as personal income tax regimes account for approximately one-quarter of all state and local tax revenues. A solution—formulary apportionment—is a concept with which states are very familiar. Although formulary apportionment has been the prevailing paradigm for multistate corporate income taxation for decades, state legislatures and the existing literature have largely and surprisingly failed to recognize its promise for multistate personal income taxation. This Article remedies that oversight

    Transactional and Autocratic Leadership in Practice: The Case of Trump’s Attempt to Redefine Birthright Citizenship

    Get PDF
    This case study investigates how President Donald Trump\u27s autocratic and transactional leadership style influenced the conception, implementation, and social impact of the 2025 executive order seeking to revoke birthright citizenship for children of undocumented immigrants. This study employs the case study approach and applies thematic analysis of public documents, legal texts, and media reports. The study identifies five major themes, including autocratic leadership and executive overreach, racialized policy implementation, media manipulation, legal resistance, and a broader crisis of democratic legitimacy. The findings suggest that while the executive order aims at framing a legal structure, it disproportionately affects marginalized immigrant communities, exacerbating systemic racial inequalities and undermining constitutional norms. The order triggered significant institutional and civil resistance, highlighting the importance of procedural fairness, racial equity, and democratic safeguards. The study concludes with policy recommendations for strengthening constitutional oversight, embedding racial equity assessments in immigration policymaking, and fostering democratic resilience in the face of authoritarian tendencies

    Leading Gen Z: The Connected Authentic Leadership Model

    Get PDF
    Generation Z is rapidly reshaping the global workforce, bringing with them new expectations for leadership grounded in authenticity, purpose, flexibility, technological fluency, and cultural intelligence. However, many traditional leadership models—such as transactional, servant, and even transformational leadership—only partially align with Generation Z’s needs. This study conducted a thematic analysis of 45 scholarly articles published between 2018 and 2024, identifying six leadership dimensions most valued by Generation Z: authentic transparency, servant-transformational focus, adaptive flexibility and inclusion, digital fluency, purpose-driven vision, and cultural intelligence. Based on these findings, the Connected Authentic Leadership Model (CALM) was developed to provide a holistic leadership framework suited to engaging and retaining Generation Z employees. CALM integrates these six dimensions, extending existing leadership theories by embedding digital competence, cross-cultural sensitivity, and social purpose as core leadership functions rather than peripheral concerns. Practical implications include the need for leadership development programs to prioritize authenticity, technological leadership skills, personalized motivation strategies, and mission-driven work cultures. Future research should empirically test the CALM model’s effectiveness across industries and global contexts. As organizations compete to attract the next generation of talent, leaders who embody the CALM principles will be best positioned to foster loyalty, innovation, and organizational success

    The CrossFit Affiliate Business Model: The Risks of the “Unknown and Unknowable”

    Get PDF
    In the wake of the tragic death of six-time Elite athlete Lazar Ðukič at the 2024 CrossFit Games, this study explores how CrossFit, LLC can enhance its public image and cultivate more substantial relationships with its affiliates and customer network. This purposeful case study examines the events surrounding Ðukič’s death in conjunction with founder Greg Glassman’s “Floyd-19” controversy, to posit that authenticity, transparency, and trust are three missing factors in the business model. With intentional and explicit collaboration with the Professional Fitness Athletes’ Association, this study argues that the organization’s Affiliate Business Model can be enhanced and affiliate and customer relationship management can be rectified, so long as authenticity, transparency, and trust are prioritized in the brand’s vision and value statement

    From intent to invent: an exploration of the entrepreneurial learning strategies of entrepreneurially-intentioned individuals when navigating social media as an informal learning environment

    Get PDF
    The journey from entrepreneurial intention to entrepreneurial invention involves various considerations for individuals with an intention to start a business in the next 3 years. While some individuals with entrepreneurial intentions pursue higher education prior to starting a business, some start businesses without graduating from a degree program—prompting an exploration of various entrepreneurial learning options. This study uncovered the learning strategies employed by individuals with entrepreneurial intentions when navigating informal learning environments, particularly social media, through a phenomenological qualitative approach. The study explored the phenomenon of entrepreneurial learning experiences through investigating the use of social media platforms as informal learning environments, the functional elements of social media platforms, and how these elements support the cultivation of personal learning environments. Data was collected from individuals, aged 25-34, with entrepreneurial intentions and individuals involved in early-stage entrepreneurial activity in the researcher’s personal and professional network, through homogenous purposive sampling. Thematic analysis yielded technological adaptability, intentionality and consciousness, and initiative as processes to describe the extent in which individuals navigate social media as informal learning environments. These findings contributed to the conclusion that individuals with entrepreneurial intentions personalize their entrepreneurial learning through intention, consciousness, and initiative while navigating multiple social media platforms as Entrepreneurial Personal Learning Environments (EPLE)

    8,006

    full texts

    11,289

    metadata records
    Updated in last 30 days.
    Pepperdine Digital Commons
    Access Repository Dashboard
    Do you manage Open Research Online? Become a CORE Member to access insider analytics, issue reports and manage access to outputs from your repository in the CORE Repository Dashboard! 👇