bepress Legal Repository
Not a member yet
    645042 research outputs found

    Restoring Sovereignty: Advancing Tribal Jurisdiction Through Extradition Treaties

    No full text

    Fintech and Techno-Solutionism

    No full text
    Silicon Valley-style technological innovation is ill-suited to addressing complex problems like financial inclusion, concentrated market power, and privacy harms, yet promises abound that “fintech” can fix them. This oversimplified reduction of complex structural problems into technological puzzles is known as “techno-solutionism,” and it poses real dangers for public policy. When we start with the tech industry’s favored tools and then ask how to solve complex problems using those tools – rather than starting by defining the problem to be solved – it can distract policymakers from supporting real, structural solutions. Techno-solutionism can also deter policymakers from interrogating the limitations, and regulating the harms, of the proffered technological solutions.This Article argues that not only are many fintech products themselves extremely techno-solutionist, techno-solutionism is also impeding financial regulation’s ability to protect the public from fintech’s harms. It makes three major contributions. First, this Article offers a theory of how the law can perpetuate, and then be stymied by, techno-solutionism. Second, it comprehensively calls out the techno-solutionism inherent in many fintech offerings (particularly crypto), laying bare their harms and demonstrating where they are unable to solve the problems they claim to address. Such harmful non-solutions do not warrant accommodative regulatory treatment – and yet, some policymakers have sought to give fintech products just that. This Article’s third contribution is a detailed exploration of techno-solutionism’s impact on US financial regulatory policy as it pertains to fintech. This Article also uses this lens to consider how techno-solutionism might impact the regulation of AI in financial services

    Shifting Sands for the Stateless Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

    No full text
    The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) grants foreign sovereigns immunity from suit in U.S. courts, but also sets forth some exceptions. One exception to a foreign sovereign’s immunity occurs if its expropriation of property violates international law. Where the sovereign has expropriated property from its own nationals, however, the sovereign still remains immune from suit. This “domestic takings” rule is consistent with general principles of international law, although international law increasingly has been challenging a State’s right to mistreat its own nationals. In 2023, in Simon v. Republic of Hungary, the D.C. Circuit considered the issue of stateless plaintiffs, and held that they have no standing to sue foreign sovereigns under the FSIA. The court relied heavily on the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations in its reasoning. The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, but only agreed to review other issues in this case, thus leaving the D.C. appellate court’s decision in place with respect to stateless individuals. Simon was decided after it arose on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision two years earlier (2021), heard in conjunction with Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, and remanded per curiam to be consistent with the Philipp opinion. The Supreme Court had directed the lower courts to consider plaintiffs’ nationality at the time of the alleged property expropriations for purposes of determining FSIA jurisdiction. In Philipp, the context was Nazi German expropriation of Jewish-owned property, and in Simon, Hungary’s expropriation of Jewish-owned property under antisemitic laws. This article considers the 2023 D.C. circuit court’s holding in Simon in light of indications and implications concerning the standing of stateless FSIA plaintiffs to be garnered from the Supreme Court’s Philipp decision; the evolution of FSIA case law on the issue of standing; the U.S. Restatements of Foreign Relations; and international law. It concludes that a better interpretation of the FSIA does allow standing for stateless individuals

    Free Exercise Challenges to Entheogen Prohibitions: Precedents, Principles, and Issues

    No full text

    The “Ownership” of Real Property: The Consequences of Kelo v. City of New London

    No full text

    NCAA Videogames: How the Litigation That Cancelled NCAA Football Has Led to Its Comeback

    No full text

    But for Borders: The Protection Gap for Internally Displaced Persons

    No full text
    Internal displacement, encapsulating the phenomenon of people who are dislocated from their homes but remain within the border of their countries of origin, was once a forced migratory occurrence interchangeable with cross-border migration. This changed after the Second World War with the promulgation of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which was premised on an insistence of making a legal line in the sand based on which side of a border displacement ultimately transpires. Internally displaced persons (IDPs)—in recent history, presently, and in the projected future—far outpace the number of people displaced outside the border of their home countries. Both rhetorical maneuverings and traditional international legal theories have prevented a robust exploration of normative frameworks that would ensure enhanced protections for the causes and experiences of internal displacement.This Article places the experiences of IDPs within the context of the politically charged project of labeling migration to inform the international governance of migration insofar as determining which populations forcibly on the move are deserving of international protection. It provides a comprehensive account of existing international, regional, and domestic displacement instruments, and highlights how international climate change and other general migration agreements fall significantly short of adequately addressing the phenomenon of ongoing and growing incidents of internal displacement. This Article offers a vision of forced movement that treats human mobility as incidents that are not static, but instead as often occurring on a continuum traversing physical nation-state borders. In doing so, it offers a re-framing of people on the move so that international legal mechanisms are germane to the critical project of extending protection to vulnerable communities regardless of which side of a border they face displacement

    Information for Submitting Articles to Law Reviews & Journals

    No full text
    This document contains information about submitting articles to law reviews and journals, including the methods for submitting an article, any special formatting requirements, how to request an expedited review, and to withdraw an article from consideration. This article covers 195 law reviews and includes information about rankings of the journals and law schools associated with them

    A Lesson to Learn: Transgender Students Face Discriminatory School Policies in Texas

    No full text

    2,066

    full texts

    645,042

    metadata records
    Updated in last 30 days.
    bepress Legal Repository
    Access Repository Dashboard
    Do you manage Open Research Online? Become a CORE Member to access insider analytics, issue reports and manage access to outputs from your repository in the CORE Repository Dashboard! 👇