334 research outputs found
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Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with asymmetric sellers
No full textIn a multilateral bargaining problem with one buyer and two heterogeneous sellers owning perfectly complementary units, we find that there exists an equilibrium which leads to inefficient delays when the buyer negotiates with the higher-valuation seller first and where players are extremely impatient. We also find that the buyer prefers to negotiate with the lower-valuation seller first, except in an equilibrium where both the buyer and the lower-valuation seller choose to play strategies that lead negotiations between them to hold out
Managerial delegation under network effects
No full textThis paper shows that network effects do not have any implication to the nature of the equilibrium strategic managerial delegation under Cournot type quantity competition, unlike as in the case of Bertrand type price competition a la Hoernig (2012). It also shows that delegation of output/price decision to the manager is optimal for the owner even in the case of monopoly in the product market, due to the existence of network effects. The monopolist offers sales-oriented incentive scheme to her manager in equilibrium, if there is network effect
Quantification of yield gaps in different planting types of sugarcane in Maharashtra
No full textThis paper is an attempt to estimate the magnitudes of yield gaps, causative factors and constrains for attending greater farm potential in adsali, suru, preseasonal and ratoon sugarcane production in Maharashtra. Primary data were collected from 250 sugarcane cultivators using random sampling technique. Data collected during 2011-2012 were analyzed using the IRRI methodology on yield gaps, multiple linear regression and tabular analysis. Results reveal that the magnitude of yield gap-I was higher, which implies that, the technology developed at research station cannot be duplicated on
demonstration plots to exploit the full potential of sugarcane. This gap was attributable to
environmental differences and non transferable component of technology. The orthodox practices being followed on farmer’s field lead to yield gap-II .The farmers usually do not adopt a technology as a package but take up individual practices suitably trimmed to fit into their budget and skills (management and operational) which lead to the variation in the adoption of cultural practices and consequently to the yield gaps. The yield gaps cannot be completely eliminated, but can be minimized by efficient and effective resources management
Size-dependent labour regulations and threshold effects: The Case of contract-worker intensity in Indian manufacturing
No full textLabour regulations like employment protection legislation in India are size-dependent rules and therefore constitute a basis for threshold effects. Firms could use non-permanent workers to stay below the legal establishment size threshold of 100 workers. This strategy is expected to cause the ratio of non-permanent to total workers to peak at size close to the legal threshold size. The study is based on a large nationally representative unbalanced panel of manufacturing plants in the formal sector covering
25 states and 5 union territories of India spanning the period 1998-2008. The average contract-worker intensity of factories in size group 50-99 is found to be significantly higher in general and particularly in labour intensive industries located in states categorized as inflexible. Contrary to the job security enhancing intention of labour regulation the employment status of average workers in establishments close to or just above the threshold size appear to be more vulnerable
