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    Un naturalismo minimalista

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    In this article, I propose a minimalist characterization of naturalism as the thesis that: 1) we must have a minimal, but not total, commitment to the ontology of our sciences, and 2) we must have a meta-methodological commitment to the use of methods that allow for justifications and claims that can be intersubjectively evaluated, such as formal and informal arguments, or the use of the methods of science themselves. In this way, I will first critique the classical definitions of naturalism understood as a form of physicalism and as a restriction on the postulation of supernatural entities and explanations in science. Then I will defend the priority of this meta-methodology not only in science and philosophy, but in all intellectual endeavors of research. I conclude that if philosophy intends to be an intellectual enterprise of research, then it must be oriented according to this meta-methodology; that is, it must be naturalistic

    Una apología de los conflictos entre metafísica y ciencia en la metafísica naturalizada

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    De acuerdo con la metafísica naturalizada, la metafísica debe ser informada por nuestra mejor ciencia disponible y no apoyarse en el razonamiento a priori. En consecuencia, la metafísica naturalizada tiende a descartar los intentos de los metafísicos por disputar con la ciencia. Este artículo sostiene que, en cambio, la metafísica naturalizada debería acoger tales conflictos entre metafísica y ciencia. La metafísica naturalizada no es (y no debería ser) eliminativa respecto de la metafísica. Por lo tanto, si tales conflictos se originan en la ausencia inmediata, dentro de la ciencia, de una respuesta a una cuestión metafísica, entonces el conflicto no debe ser descartado, sino recibido como una ocasión para hacer (más) metafísica naturalizada. Que los conflictos entre metafísica y ciencia pueden ser beneficiosos para la metafísica naturalizada se ejemplifica mediante el caso de las teorías no espaciales de la gravedad cuántica. Estas teorías son criticadas por metafísicos que, a menudo siguiendo a David Lewis, argumentan que la distancia espacial es un elemento fundamental indispensable en cualquier metafísica coherente debido a su rol como la relación constructora del mundo (world-making relation). Sin embargo, se reconoce que el conflicto resultante está bien fundado, puesto que las teorías no espaciales de la gravedad cuántica no ofrecen ninguna relación constructora del mundo alternativa a la distancia espacial. En lugar de descartar este conflicto, la metafísica naturalizada debería, por lo tanto, recibir la resistencia lewisiana como un llamado a buscar una. Cómo se desarrolla esto al modo de una negociación entre la teoría científica y la cuestión metafísica se ejemplifica en la última parte del artículo, donde se propone el entrelazamiento (entanglement) como una relación constructora del mundo alternativa dentro de la gravedad cuántica de lazos (loop quantum gravity)

    Sal-Meter: Canonical Definition and Non-Derogable Standard for Consciousness Measurement

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    This document establishes the canonical definition of the Sal-Meter as a consciousness-measurement system and fixes the non-derogable boundaries governing its legitimate use, interpretation, and implementation. Rather than proposing a theory of consciousness or an experimental protocol, it functions as a normative and philosophical standard that defines what a Sal-Meter is—and is not—across scientific, ethical, and institutional contexts. The definition is designed to prevent conceptual dilution, monopolization, and institutional capture by anchoring Sal-Meter legitimacy exclusively to DOI-registered canonical records and explicit compliance criteria. It delineates mandatory structural requirements, governance constraints, and exclusion conditions, thereby separating valid consciousness-measurement systems from adjacent technologies such as biometric trackers, EEG-only devices, or proprietary scoring frameworks. Positioned at the intersection of applied ethics, philosophy of science, and technology ethics, this document serves as a civilizational-level reference standard for open, multi-team development of consciousness-measurement infrastructure. Its role is foundational rather than empirical: to stabilize terminology, preserve interpretive integrity, and enable future scientific and technological work to proceed within a transparent and non-exclusive framework

    Should New Regulations be Imposed on Academic Publishing?

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    This article argues, using a case study on Elsevier’s business, that despite its many merits, the Open Science Movement has not succeeded in lowering the margins of for-profit academic publishing. Accordingly, regulations other than the ones suggested by the movement should be introduced to regulate this business. In conclusion, some reasons in favour of one proposal are briefly reviewed

    Is Stalnaker's Semantics Complete?

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    It is shown that one common formulation of Stalnaker's semantics for conditionals is incomplete: it has no sound and (strongly) complete proof system. At first, this seems to conflict with well-known completeness results for this semantics (e.g., Stalnaker and Thomason 1967; Stalnaker 1970 and Lewis 1973, ch. 6). As it turns out, it does not: these completeness results rely on another closely-related formulation of the semantics that is provably complete. Specifically, the difference comes down to how the Limit Assumption is stated. I close with some remarks about what this means for the logic of conditionals

    Can we “see” value? Spatiotopic “visual” adaptation to an imperceptible dimension

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    In much recent philosophy of mind and cognitive science, repulsive adaptation effects are considered a litmus test — a crucial marker, that distinguishes what is perceived from what is judged at the level of post-perceptual thought or cognition. Here, we provide evidence for a form of adaptation that challenges this contention. Across four experiments, we found consistent evidence of adaptation to a seemingly imperceptible dimension: arbitrarily assigned value. We show that this adaptation occurs across stimulus formats, is spatially indexed (i.e., spatiotopic) and otherwise analogous to putative cases of high-level visual adaptation in relevant respects. Combined, we suggest that our results force one of two conclusions: Either repulsive perceptual adaptation can be obtained for seemingly imperceptible dimensions, or — as we proceed to argue — adaptation fails to reliably demarcate perceptual content

    Théorie de l’Appartenance Universelle (LAU)

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    Cet article introduit la Théorie de la Loi de l’Appartenance Universelle (LAU), fondée par Gnouma Jérôme Kadouno, qui propose une refondation métaphysique du concept d’être à partir de l’arithmétique des nombres premiers. La LAU définit l’appartenance d’un être à un univers stable non comme une inclusion passive, mais comme une relation d’irréductibilité réciproque : un élément n’appartient à un univers que s’il ne peut en détruire aucun autre et s’il ne peut être détruit par aucun d’eux. Ce principe, inspiré du modèle de coprimalité arithmétique (pgcd (n;k#)= 1), se veut être le fondement d’une ontologie de la stabilité, où l’existence est conçue comme équilibre dynamique entre autonomie et coexistence. En reliant la logique, la métaphysique et les structures arithmétiques, la LAU ouvre un nouveau champ de recherche interdisciplinaire : « une philosophie mathématique de la résistance harmonique et de la cohérence universelle »

    Identifying Epistemic Injustices to Inform Epistemic Transformative Justice

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    In this chapter, we identify four specific subtypes of epistemic injustice that target Indigenous knowledge systems, practices, products, and methods of transmission. These four subtypes of epistemic injustice are: cultural-methodological epistemic injustice, epistemic diminishment, epistemic cultural disruption, and epistemic biophysical disruption. These subtypes identify avenues for the framework of transformative justice targeting these epistemic injustices and their harms. We provide three case studies from the Salish Sea, in British Columbia, Canada, of epistemic transformative justice, described as responses to these subtypes of epistemic injustice. The first involves Indigenous archaeological work on marine resource use over long spans of history. The second involves a Squamish First Nation-led collaborative herring monitoring initiative. The third is about work on revitalizing Straits Salish reef net fishing technology

    Why Devotion Mandates Self-Transcendence: Against Ostriching and Sandboxing

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    This essay considers how best to understand the relation between sacred values and rational reflection in a life of devotion. It focuses on a disagreement between Lisa Tessman (2014) and Paul Katsafanas (2022) concerning whether devotion requires refraining from justificatory reasoning about one’s commitment to a sacred value. After objecting to their accounts, it provides an alternative on which the devoted agent responds to sacred values with a sense of awe, recognizing a depth beyond their current reckoning. Devotion is a form of evaluation and commitment that constitutively involves epistemic humility that renders one’s commitment invulnerable to revision

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