ETHICS IN PROGRESS
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Philosophy of the Deed. “Praxis” in Hegel and Posthegelian Discourses
Get PDFIn his Prolegomena to Historiosophy, published in 1838, August von Cieszkowski wrote that we are at the turning point in history, when facts turn into deeds. This raises the question of what is actually to be understood by the term “deed” [Tat] and why, the hour of the deed should have come precisely now. After focusing on Hegel’s concept of a history of freedom, I will present two models of understanding action and conclude by discussing their consequences. More specifically, I will undertake a search that will lead us – by way of a detour via Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit – to Fichte’s concept of the act of doing. That socio-political practice can be justified in this way, however, is denied by those who argue that society and politics in Hegel fall under the category of objective and not of absolute spirit. The alternative model of action that I will focus on, concerns action in relation to objects, or labour, a model that Hegel had already worked out in Jena, and that Marx will re-discover (rather than invent) and further develop
Self-determination and “the Right to Specificity”. Concerning Hegel’s Theory of Modern Freedom
Get PDFIn this paper, it will be shown that Hegel’s philosophical thematisation of subjective freedom has given a fundamental contribution to the historical innovation of modernity, which regards not only human rights, but also norms and values. Besides, it played an important role concerning the cultural transformation, i.e., the process of the realization of the historical innovation oriented towards the ideals of modern freedom. To show this, the author will focus on some passages from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right of 1820, in which Hegel regarded subjective freedom as universally-normative and, at the same time, as socially and historically contextualized (situated, respectively). Hegel, namely, explicates modern freedom in its ideality and moral normativity, addressing its realization in particular forms of life. Marriage, for instance, as it will be shown towards the end of this contribution, exemplified as the right to particularity, is the normative basis of modern subjective freedom. Tensions and collisions will permanently challenge this type of freedom and also require permanent (and self-defeating) efforts invested in striving for a (too contextualized and situated) „reconciliation“ (in Hegel´s terms Versöhnung)
Marx the Fichtean
Get PDFWe ignore the history of philosophy at our peril. Engels, who typically conflates Marx and Marxism, points to the relation of Marxism to the tradition while also denying it. In his little book on Feuerbach, Engels depicts Feuerbach as leading Marx away from Hegel, away from classical German philosophy, away from philosophy and towards materialism and science. This view suggests that Marx is at best negatively related to Classical German philosophy, including Hegel. Yet Engels elsewhere suggests that Marx belongs to the classical German philosophical tradition. In the preface to Socialism, Utopian and Scientific, Engels wrote: “We German socialists are proud that we trace our descent not only from Saint Simon, Fourier and Owen, but also from Kant, Fichte and Hegel” (Marx & Engels, Collected Works). In this paper I will focus on Marx’s relation to Fichte. This relation is rarely mentioned in the Marxist debate, but I will argue, it is crucial for the formulation of Marx’s position, and hence for assessing his contribution accurately. One of the results of this study will be to indicate that Marx, in reacting against Hegel, did not, as is often suggested, ‘leave’ philosophy, but in fact made a crucial philosophical contribution
Expectations towards the Morality of Robots: An Overview of Empirical Studies
Get PDFThe main objective of this paper is to discuss people’s expectations towards social robots’ moral attitudes. Conclusions are based on the results of three selected empirical studies which used stories of robots (and humans) acting in hypothetical scenarios to assess the moral acceptance of their attitudes. The analysis indicates both the differences and similarities in expectations towards the robot and human attitudes. Decisions to remove someone’s autonomy are less acceptable from robots than from humans. In certain circumstances, the protection of a human’s life is considered more morally right than the protection of the robot’s being. Robots are also more strongly expected to make utilitarian choices than human agents. However, there are situations in which people make consequentialist moral judgements when evaluating both the human and the robot decisions. Both robots and humans receive a similar overall amount of blame. Furthermore, it can be concluded that robots should protect their existence and obey people, but in some situations, they should be able to hurt a human being. Differences in results can be partially explained by the character of experimental tasks. The present findings might be of considerable use in implementing morality into robots and also in the legal evaluation of their behaviours and attitudes
Panic and the Lack of Moral Competence. How We Can Help to Prevent Panic Pandemics
Get PDFOften we have to decide on difficult problems and conflicts. For this, a certain level of moral competence is needed, in order to solve them as quickly and adequately as possible. Otherwise these problems and conflicts can overwhelm us, triggering a feeling of fear and panic, and making us react too slowly or inadequately, or both. Fear and panic can make us ignore problems and conflicts, attempt to “solve” them through brute force or deceit, or declare them to be beyond our responsibility and let an authority decide what to do. Often such makeshift solutions seem to work, but, more often, they have damaging effects. Therefore, society tries to curb criminal and anti-democratic activities through coercion, that is, through laws, law-enforcing institutions, and correction facilities – at high costs, and often with little efficacy. In this article I show that such coercion would not be needed if we gave all citizens an opportunity to develop their ability to solve conflicts and problems through thinking and discussion. Moral competence would immunize us against fear and panic, and thus also against immoral practices. Moral competence is not inborn in us, and it does not develop unless it is fostered through proper learning opportunities. Therefore, if we want to live together peacefully in a democratic society, we need to provide proper learning opportunities for everyone, not only of a few people. If the masses are infected by panic, a few rational people cannot stop this pandemic
What, If Anything, Most Memorable Personal Moral Dilemmas Can Tell Us About Women’s and Men’s Moral Competence?
Get PDFMost all popular moral reasoning or moral judgment tests are based on presenting subjects with two or more hypothetical moral dilemmas and asking them to make judgments on the moral quality of arguments supporting and questioning a protagonist’s decision (e.g., the Moral Competence Test by G. Lind). Although these tests have been insightful by tapping some aspect of individuals’ moral-cognitive schemas, moral maturity, or moral development, they also have limitations. Hypothetical moral dilemmas may be too abstract and impersonal, thus failing to create enough emotional salience. Learning more about real-life personally recalled moral dilemmas may reveal more about the individual’s moral mind and experiences. Objective. The current study was conducted to learn more about the personally experienced moral dilemmas, and how they relate to subjects’ level of moral competence and gender. Method. Subjects were asked to recall the most challenging personal moral dilemma; subjects completed the MCT test to measure moral competence. Results. Among some of the findings was that for both, men and women, higher moral competence scores were positively correlated with recalling personal moral dilemmas where the choice had to be made between some altruistic (care for others) and selfish actions. For men, it was the risk of compromising one’s status, whereas for women it was the risk of personal safety
Hegel and the Spiritual Evolution of Absolute Subject
Get PDFThe article interprets the methodological potential of Hegel’s speculative dialectics as a possible course of spiritual evolution of the Absolute subject. The intention is towards the method, first through the very construction of the “idea of freedom” from the point of view of Logic; second, through the constitutive function of freedom and the transition of the subjective spirit into the objective spirit; third, through the unfolding of mediation in the realms of the objective spirit. This essentially substantial methodologization dissolves the theoretical space of the idea of the mediating function of freedom as an ontological principle of ethical life. In line with the paradigm of such a course, the text considers a project of speculative ethics, a project within the framework of which the methodological and ontological sublation of spiritual evolution takes place
Making Human Traits Visible, Objectively and Validly, through Experimentally Designed Questionnaires
Get PDFResearchers who need valid and objective data for evaluating their theories or the efficacy of educational methods and programs have to choose between two equally undesirable alternatives: either they can use “objective” methods which have a questionable validity, or they can turn to “subjective” assessment methods with better validity. In other words, while subjective approaches to the study of human traits may be, or really are, valid, they lack objectivity, that is, they may be biased toward the researcher’s theory. On the other hand, objective approaches to the study of psychological traits often lack psychological underpinning but are solely designed to fit a certain statistical model. Thus, we cannot know what these instruments really measure. Here I present a new approach to the study of human traits, which claims to be objective as well as psychologically valid, namely the concept Experimental Questionnaire (EQ). An EQ lets us make traits visible without relying on dubious statistical assumptions. Thus, it makes it possible for the researcher to test the psychological theory underlying its designs. The EQ methodology is not only an idea, but it has been applied for constructing the Moral Competence Test (MCT) and for testing the assumptions about the nature of moral competence which were used to design it. So far, all the studies have clearly confirmed their validity. This makes the MCT suitable for testing hypotheses regarding the relevance and teachability of moral competence, and, therefore, also for evaluating the efficacy and efficiency of educational methods of fostering this competence. Experimentally designed questionnaires can also be used in other fields of educational and psychological research in which testable theories about the nature of its objects have been developed
The Humble Reason. On Education in Kant and Fichte
Get PDFIn this paper I will focus on education as the core function of reason in Kant and Fichte. The notion of reason carries an intrinsic tendency to universality, which is difficult to be reconciled with its local (cultural, historical, anthropological) background and actualisation. I believe that the stress on the importance of learning, which can be seen in the works of both Kant and Fichte, might provide useful clues to approaching the relation between universality and particularity. I will start by focusing on Kant’s narration on the genealogy of human reason in the Conjectural Beginning of Human History, and then move on to the critical writings and selected lectures in order to focus on the role of human dignity and ethical education for the moral appraisal and the practice of virtue. Later, I will consider Fichte’s lectures on the Vocation of the Scholar, the Vocation of Man and The Characteristics of the Present Age, which are crucial to understanding the social, ethical and political role of the scholar. For Fichte, education is the best instrument to eradicate selfishness, regarded as a historical phenomenon which can lead a nation to ruin. I will then provide some conclusions concerning the two accounts and their implications
Surrogates of Recognition. On the Reconstruction of a Possible Critical Hegelian Contribution to Current Discussions on “Identity”
Get PDFThe article discusses a central topic of contemporary understandings of society that seems to have no place in Hegel’s theory: the topic of “identity”, which seems to fall between the process of a “struggle for recognition” on the one hand, and, on the other, a consolidated recognition of subjects and their rights within the established social order. The article would like to propose a further reconstruction here. It discusses which considerations should be included so that the discourse on “identity” does not end in any substantialist or ethno-national, egocentric understandings, but, instead, could become possibly a part of Hegel’s theory. In today’s dynamics and unsettling changes, there are undeniable needs for “identity” (which are also easily addressed, even fuelled, by corresponding offers). These are, as one could learn from Hegel, surrogates of a still not or no longer successful sufficient recognition. In this, “identity” is to be understood as critical work on oneself as a product of becoming, on inheritances, achievements, challenges, divisions, discrepancies, guilt and failures