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ML-Leaks: Model and Data Independent Membership Inference Attacks and Defenses on Machine Learning Models
Machine learning (ML) has become a core component of many real-world applications and training data is a key factor that drives current progress. This huge success has led Internet companies to deploy machine learning as a service (MLaaS). Recently, the first membership inference attack has shown that extraction of information on the training set is possible in such MLaaS settings, which has severe security and privacy implications.
However, the early demonstrations of the feasibility of such attacks have many assumptions on the adversary, such as using multiple so-called shadow models, knowledge of the target model structure, and having a dataset from the same distribution as the target model's training data. We relax all these key assumptions, thereby showing that such attacks are very broadly applicable at low cost and thereby pose a more severe risk than previously thought. We present the most comprehensive study so far on this emerging and developing threat using eight diverse datasets which show the viability of the proposed attacks across domains.
In addition, we propose the first effective defense mechanisms against such broader class of membership inference attacks that maintain a high level of utility of the ML model
How to wrap it up - A formally verified proposal for the use of authenticated wrapping in PKCS#11
Being the most widely used and comprehensive standard for hardware security modules, cryptographic tokens and smart cards, PKCS#11 has been the subject of academic study for years. PKCS#11 provides a key store that is separate from the application, so that, ideally, an application never sees a key in the clear. Again and again, researchers have pointed out the need for an import/export mechanism that ensures the integrity of the permissions associated to a key. With version 2.40, for the first time, the standard included authenticated deterministic encryption schemes. The interface to this operation is insecure, however, so that an application can get the key in the clear, subverting the purpose of using a hardware security module. This work proposes a formal model for the secure use of authenticated deterministic encryption in PKCS#11, including concrete API changes to allow for secure policies to be implemented. Owing to the authenticated encryption mechanism, the policy we propose provides more functionality than any policy proposed so far and can be implemented without access to a random number generator. Our results cover modes of operation that rely on unique initialisation vectors (IVs), like GCM or CCM, but also modes that generate synthetic IVs. We furthermore provide a proof for the deduction soundness of our modelling of deterministic encryption in Böhl et.al.'s composable deduction soundness framework
MALPITY: Automatic Identification and Exploitation of Tarpit Vulnerabilities in Malware
Law enforcement agencies regularly take down botnets as the ultimate defense against global malware operations. By arresting malware authors, and simultaneously infiltrating or shutting down a botnet’s network infrastructures (such as C2 servers), defenders stop global threats and mitigate pending infections. In this paper, we propose malware tarpits, an orthogonal defense that does not require seizing botnet infrastructures, and at the same time can also be used to slow down malware spreading and infiltrate its monetization techniques. A tarpit is a network service that causes a client to stay busy with a network operation. Our work aims to automatically identify network operations used by malware that will block the malware either forever or for a significant amount of time. We describe how to non-intrusively exploit such tarpit vulnerabilities in malware to slow down or, ideally, even stop malware.
Using dynamic malware analysis, we monitor how malware interacts with the POSIX and Winsock socket APIs. From this, we infer network operations that would have blocked when provided certain network inputs. We augment this vulnerability search with an automated generation of tarpits that exploit the identified vulnerabilities. We apply our prototype MALPITY on six popular malware families and discover 12 previously-unknown tarpit vulnerabilities, revealing that all families are susceptible to our defense. We demonstrate how to, e.g., halt Pushdo’s DGA-based C2 communication, hinder SalityP2P peers from receiving commands or updates, and stop Bashlite’s spreading engine
Program Repair for Hyperproperties
We study the repair problem for hyperproperties specified in the temporal logic HyperLTL. Hyperproperties are system properties that relate multiple computation traces. This class of properties includes information flow policies like noninterference and observational determinism. The repair problem is to find, for a given Kripke structure, a substructure that satisfies a given specification. We show that the repair problem is decidable for HyperLTL specifications and finite-state Kripke structures. We provide a detailed complexity analysis for different fragments of HyperLTL and different system types: tree-shaped, acyclic, and general Kripke structures
Journey Beyond Full Abstraction: Exploring Robust Property Preservation for Secure Compilation
—Good programming languages provide helpful abstractions for writing secure code, but the security properties of
the source language are generally not preserved when compiling a
program and linking it with adversarial code in a low-level target
language (e.g., a library or a legacy application). Linked target
code that is compromised or malicious may, for instance, read and
write the compiled program’s data and code, jump to arbitrary
memory locations, or smash the stack, blatantly violating any
source-level abstraction. By contrast, a fully abstract compilation
chain protects source-level abstractions all the way down, ensuring that linked adversarial target code cannot observe more about
the compiled program than what some linked source code could
about the source program. However, while research in this area
has so far focused on preserving observational equivalence, as
needed for achieving full abstraction, there is a much larger space
of security properties one can choose to preserve against linked
adversarial code. And the precise class of security properties one
chooses crucially impacts not only the supported security goals
and the strength of the attacker model, but also the kind of
protections a secure compilation chain has to introduce.
We are the first to thoroughly explore a large space of formal
secure compilation criteria based on robust property preservation, i.e., the preservation of properties satisfied against arbitrary
adversarial contexts. We study robustly preserving various classes
of trace properties such as safety, of hyperproperties such as
noninterference, and of relational hyperproperties such as trace
equivalence. This leads to many new secure compilation criteria,
some of which are easier to practically achieve and prove than
full abstraction, and some of which provide strictly stronger
security guarantees. For each of the studied criteria we propose an equivalent “property-free” characterization that clarifies
which proof techniques apply. For relational properties and
hyperproperties, which relate the behaviors of multiple programs,
our formal definitions of the property classes themselves are
novel. We order our criteria by their relative strength and show
several collapses and separation results. Finally, we adapt existing
proof techniques to show that even the strongest of our secure
compilation criteria, the robust preservation of all relational
hyperproperties, is achievable for a simple translation from a
statically typed to a dynamically typed language
Fidelius: Protecting User Secrets from Compromised Browsers
Users regularly enter sensitive data, such as passwords, credit card numbers, or tax information, into the browser window. While modern browsers provide powerful client-side privacy measures to protect this data, none of these defenses prevent a browser compromised by malware from stealing it. In this work, we present Fidelius, a new architecture that uses trusted hardware enclaves integrated into the browser to enable protection of user secrets during web browsing sessions, even if the entire underlying browser and OS are fully controlled by a malicious attacker.
Fidelius solves many challenges involved in providing protection for browsers in a fully malicious environment, offering support for integrity and privacy for form data, JavaScript execution, XMLHttpRequests, and protected web storage, while minimizing the TCB. Moreover, interactions between the enclave and the browser, the keyboard, and the display all require new protocols, each with their own security considerations. Finally, Fidelius takes into account UI considerations to ensure a consistent and simple interface for both developers and users. As part of this project, we develop the first open source system that provides a trusted path from input and output peripherals to a hardware enclave with no reliance on additional hypervisor security assumptions. These components may be of independent
interest and useful to future projects. We implement and evaluate Fidelius to measure its performance overhead, finding that Fidelius imposes acceptable overhead on page load and user interaction for secured pages and has no impact on pages and page components that do not use its enhanced security features
Bayesian Prediction of Future Street Scenes using Synthetic Likelihoods
For autonomous agents to successfully operate in the real world, the ability to anticipate future scene states is a key competence. In real-world scenarios, future states become increasingly uncertain and multi-modal, particularly on long time horizons. Dropout based Bayesian inference provides a computationally tractable, theoretically well grounded approach to learn likely hypotheses/models to deal with uncertain futures and make predictions that correspond well to observations -- are well calibrated. However, it turns out that such approaches fall short to capture complex real-world scenes, even falling behind in accuracy when compared to the plain deterministic approaches. This is because the used log-likelihood estimate discourages diversity. In this work, we propose a novel Bayesian formulation for anticipating future scene states which leverages synthetic likelihoods that encourage the learning of diverse models to accurately capture the multi-modal nature of future scene states. We show that our approach achieves accurate state-of-the-art predictions and calibrated probabilities through extensive experiments for scene anticipation on Cityscapes dataset. Moreover, we show that our approach generalizes across diverse tasks such as digit generation and precipitation forecasting
Knockoff Nets: Stealing Functionality of Black-Box Models
Machine Learning (ML) models are increasingly deployed in the wild to perform a wide range of tasks. In this work, we ask to what extent can an adversary steal functionality of such "victim" models based solely on blackbox interactions: image in, predictions out. In contrast to prior work, we present an adversary lacking knowledge of train/test data used by the model, its internals, and semantics over model outputs. We formulate model functionality stealing as a two-step approach: (i) querying a set of input images to the blackbox model to obtain predictions; and (ii) training a "knockoff" with queried image-prediction pairs. We make multiple remarkable observations: (a) querying random images from a different distribution than that of the blackbox training data results in a well-performing knockoff; (b) this is possible even when the knockoff is represented using a different architecture; and (c) our reinforcement learning approach additionally improves query sample efficiency in certain settings and provides performance gains. We validate model functionality stealing on a range of datasets and tasks, as well as on a popular image analysis API where we create a reasonable knockoff for as little as $30
Testing Conditional Independence on Discrete Data using Stochastic Complexity
Testing for conditional independence is a core aspect of constraint-based causal discovery. Although commonly used tests are perfect in theory, they often fail to reject independence in practice, especially when conditioning on multiple variables.
We focus on discrete data and propose a new test based on the notion of algorithmic independence that we instantiate using stochastic complexity. Amongst others, we show that our proposed test, SCI, is an asymptotically unbiased as well as L2 consistent estimator for conditional mutual information (CMI). Further, we show that SCI can be reformulated to find a sensible threshold for CMI that works well on limited samples. Empirical evaluation shows that SCI has a lower type II error than commonly used tests. As a result, we obtain a higher recall when we use SCI in causal discovery algorithms, without compromising the precision
Telling Cause from Effect by Local and Global Regression
We consider the problem of inferring the causal direction between two univariate numeric random variables X and Y from observational data. This case is especially challenging as the graph X causes Y is Markov equivalent to the graph Y causes X, and hence it is impossible to determine the correct direction using conditional independence tests. To tackle this problem, we follow an information theoretic approach based on the algorithmic Markov condition. This postulate states that in terms of Kolmogorov complexity the factorization given by the true causal model is the most succinct description of the joint distribution. This means that we can infer that X is a likely cause of Y when we need fewer bits to first transmit the data over X, and then the data of Y as a function of X, than for the inverse direction. That is, in this paper we perform causal inference by compression. To put this notion to practice, we employ the Minimum Description Length principle, and propose a score to determine how many bits we need to transmit the data using a class of regression functions that can model both local and global functional relations. To determine whether an inference, i.e. the difference in compressed sizes, is significant, we propose two analytical significance tests based on the no-hypercompression inequality. Last, but not least, we introduce the linear-time SLOPE and SLOPER algorithms that through thorough empirical evaluation we show outperform the state of the art by a wide margin