Helmholtz Center for Information Security
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ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium
ACM Computer Science in Cars Symposium, German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence, Kaiserslautern, Germany, October 8, 201
Pattern Recognition - 40th German Conference, GCPR 2018, Stuttgart, Germany, October 9-12, 2018, Proceedings
Pattern Recognition - 40th German Conference, GCPR 2018, Stuttgart, Germany, October 9-12, 2018, Proceeding
Robustly Safe Compilation
Secure compilers generate compiled code that withstands many target-level attacks such as alteration of control flow, data leaks or memory corruption. Many existing secure compilers are proven to be fully abstract, meaning that they reflect and preserve observational equivalence. Fully abstract compilation is strong and useful but, in certain cases, comes at the cost of requiring expensive runtime constructs in compiled code. These constructs may have no relevance for security, but are needed to accommodate differences between the source and target languages that fully abstract compilation necessarily needs
Poster: Let History not Repeat Itself (this Time) - Tackling WebAuthn Developer Issues Early On
The FIDO2 open authentication standard, developed jointly by the FIDO Alliance and the W3C, provides end-users with the means to use public-key cryptography in addition to or even instead of text-based passwords for authentication on the web. Its WebAuthn protocol has been adopted by all major browser vendors and recently also by major service providers (e.g., Google, GitHub, Dropbox, Microsoft, and others). Thus, FIDO2 is a very strong contender for finally tackling the problem of insecure user authentication on the web. However, there remain a number of open questions to be answered for FIDO2 to succeed as expected. In this poster, we focus specifically on the critical question of how well web-service developers can securely roll out WebAuthn in their own services and which issues have to be tackled to help developers in this task. The past has unfortunately shown that software developers struggle with correctly implementing or using security-critical APIs, such as TLS/SSL, password storage, or cryptographic APIs. We report here on ongoing work that investigates potential problem areas and concrete pitfalls for adopters of WebAuthn and tries to lay out a plan of how our community can help developers. We believe that raising awareness for foreseeable developer problems and calling for action to support developers early on is critical on the path for establishing FIDO2 as a de-facto authentication solution
Hide and Seek: An Architecture for Improving Attack-Visibility in Industrial Control Systems
In the past years we have seen an emerging field of research focusing on using the “physics” of a Cyber-Physical System to detect attacks. In its basic form, a security monitor is deployed somewhere in the industrial control network, observes a time-series of the operation of the system, and identifies anomalies in those measurements in order to detect potentially manipulated control commands or manipulated sensor readings. While there is a growing literature on detection mechanisms in that research direction, the problem of where to monitor the physical behavior of the system has received less attention.
In this paper, we analyze the problem of where should we monitor these systems, and what attacks can and cannot be detected depending on the location of this network monitor. The location of the monitor is particularly important, because an attacker can bypass attack-detection by lying in some network interfaces while reporting that everything is normal in the others. Our paper is the first detailed study of what can and cannot be detected based on the devices an attacker has compromised and where we monitor our network. We show that there are locations that maximize our visibility against such attacks. Based on our analysis, we design a low-level security monitor that is able to directly observe the field communication between sensors, actuators, and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). We implement that security monitor in a realistic testbed, and demonstrate that it can detect attacks that would otherwise be undetected at the supervisory network
Design and Realization of Testbeds for Security Research in the Industrial Internet of Things
Research on the (cyber) security of industrial control systems requires holistic understanding of practical systems in the field. In particular, important differences to IT security scenarios are related to industrial networking protocols and programming languages such as ladder logic. Arguably, access to realistic testbeds with physical process and related controls would enable researchers to understand the scenarios better, to develop attacks, and test countermeasures. While the implementation of such testbeds presents significant investments and efforts, the implementation process itself is often not discussed in literature. In this chapter, we discuss the design and realization of such industrial control system testbeds for security research. In particular, we discuss a process in which testbeds are designed by security researchers to resemble existing (and future) plants, and are then implemented by commercial system integrators using industry’s best practises. As use cases, we provide details on design decisions, cost, and outcomes for three testbeds established at the Singapore University of Technology and Design
Efficient Trace Encodings of Bounded Synthesis for Asynchronous Distributed Systems
The manual implementation of distributed systems is an error-prone task because of the asynchronous interplay of components and the environment. Bounded synthesis automatically generates an implementation for the specification of the distributed system if one exists. So far, bounded synthesis for distributed systems does not utilize their asynchronous nature. Instead, concurrent behavior of components is encoded by all interleavings and only then checked against the specification. We close this gap by identifying true concurrency in synthesis of asynchronous distributed systems represented as Petri games. This defines when several interleavings can be subsumed by one true concurrent trace. Thereby, fewer and shorter verification problems have to be solved in each iteration of the bounded synthesis algorithm. For Petri games, experimental results show that our implementation using true concurrency outperforms the implementation based on checking all interleavings
Secure Authentication in the Grid: A Formal Analysis of DNP3 SAv5
Most of the world's power grids are controlled remotely. Their control messages are sent over potentially insecure channels, driving the need for an authentication mechanism. The main communication mechanism for power grids and other utilities is defined by an IEEE
standard, referred to as DNP3; this includes the Secure Authentication v5 (SAv5) protocol, which aims to ensure that messages are authenticated.
We provide the first security analysis of the complete DNP3: SAv5 protocol. Previous work has considered the message-passing sub-protocol of SAv5 in isolation, and considered some aspects of the intended security properties. In contrast, we formally model and analyse the complex composition of the protocol's sub-protocols. In doing so, we consider the full state machine, the protocol's asymmetric mode, and the possibility of cross-protocol attacks. Furthermore, we model fine-grained security properties that closely match the standard's intended security properties. For our analysis, we leverage the Tamarin prover for the symbolic analysis of security protocols.
Our analysis shows that the core DNP3: SAv5 design meets its intended security properties. Notably, we show that a previously reported attack does not apply to the standard. However, our analysis also leads to several concrete recommendations for improving future versions of the standard
Nearby Threats: Reversing, Analyzing, and Attacking Google’s 'Nearby Connections' on Android
Google’s Nearby Connections API enables any An-droid (and Android Things) application to provide proximity-based services to its users, regardless of their network connectivity.The API uses Bluetooth BR/EDR, Bluetooth LE and Wi-Fi to let“nearby” clients (discoverers) and servers (advertisers) connectand exchange different types of payloads. The implementation ofthe API is proprietary, closed-source and obfuscated. The updatesof the API are automatically installed by Google across differentversions of Android, without user interaction. Little is knownpublicly about the security guarantees offered by the API, eventhough it presents a significant attack surface.In this work we present the first security analysis of theGoogle’s Nearby Connections API, based on reverse-engineeringof its Android implementation. We discover and implement sev-eral attacks grouped into two families: connection manipulation(CMA) and range extension attacks (REA). CMA-attacks allow anattacker to insert himself as a man-in-the-middle and manipulateconnections (even unrelated to nearby), and to tamper withthe victim’s interface and network configuration. REA-attacksallow an attacker to tunnel any nearby connection to remotelocations, even between two honest devices. Our attacks areenabled by REArby, a toolkit we developed while reversingthe API implementation. REArby includes a dynamic binaryinstrumenter, a packet dissector, and the implementations ofcustom Nearby Connections client and server. We plan to open-source REArby after a responsible disclosure period
Überwachung by Design
Das BVerfG erteilt datenschutzfreundlicher Technikgestaltung bei TK-Diensten eine Absage.
Im Dezember wies das Bundesverfassungsgericht eine Verfassungsbeschwerde eines E-Mail-Dienstanbieters zurück. Auch explizit datensparsame Telekommunikationsdienste müssen auf Anordnung umfangreiche Überwachungsmaßnahmen gegenüber einzelnen Nutzern technisch und organisatorisch ermöglichen