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TimerShield: Protecting High-Priority Tasks from Low-Priority Timer Interference
No full textTimer interference arises when a high-priority realtime task is delayed by a timer interrupt that is intended for a lower-priority task. We demonstrate that high-resolution timers, as exposed for instance by Linux's hrtimer API, can cause substantial timer interference, which manifests as significantly increased response times and lowered throughput. To eliminate this source of unpredictability, we propose TimerShield, a priority-aware highresolution timer subsystem that selectively delays the servicing of lower-priority timer interrupts while a high-priority task is executing. We present the design and implementation of a fully functional TimerShield prototype in Linux PREEMPT RT and compare it against Linux's stock hrtimer subsystem on two different platforms (x86 and ARM). Our results show that TimerShield adds only little overhead, while completely eliminating the timing unpredictability and throughput degradation caused by unnecessary interrupts
ASICS: Authenticated Key Exchange Security Incorporating Certification Systems
Get PDFMost security models for authenticated key exchange (AKE) do not explicitly model the associated certification system, which includes the certification authority and its behaviour. However, there are several well-known and realistic attacks on AKE protocols which exploit various forms of malicious key registration and which therefore lie outside the scope of these models. We provide the first systematic analysis of AKE security incorporating certification systems. We define a family of security models that, in addition to allowing different sets of standard AKE adversary queries, also permit the adversary to register arbitrary bitstrings as keys. For this model family, we prove generic results that enable the design and verification of protocols that achieve security even if some keys have been produced maliciously. Our approach is applicable to a wide range of models and protocols; as a concrete illustration of its power, we apply it to the CMQV protocol in the natural strengthening of the eCK model to the ASICS setting
Symbolically Analyzing Security Protocols Using Tamarin
Get PDFDuring the last three decades, there has been considerable research devoted to the symbolic analysis of security protocols and existing tools have had considerable success both in detecting attacks on protocols and showing their absence. Nevertheless, there is still a large discrepancy between the symbolic models that one specifies on paper and the models that can be effectively analyzed by tools.
In this paper, we present the Tamarin prover for the symbolic analysis of security protocols. Tamarin takes as input a security protocol model, specifying the actions taken by the agents running the protocol in different roles (e.g., the protocol initiator, the responder, and the trusted key server), a specification of the adversary, and a specification of the protocol’s desired properties. Tamarin can then be used to automatically construct a proof that the protocol fulfills its specified properties, even when arbitrarily many instances of the protocol’s roles are interleaved in parallel, together with the actions of the adversary
