Hauptman-Woodward Medical Research Institute
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The Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program: The Need for Better Employment Eligibility Regulations
Get PDFA few people have now applied for and obtained tax-exempt debt forgiveness of their federal student Direct Loans under the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program after satisfying the requirements of 10 years of post-October 1, 2007 employment in a “public service job.” While only a relatively small number of people have received debt forgiveness to date, I estimate that as the number of persons eligible ramps up sharply in 2018 and thereafter eventually 200,000 people a year or more will obtain debt forgiveness under the PSLF program, at a total cost to the Treasury of $12 billion per year or more. Estimates are that up to one-quarter of all employment qualifies as a public service job that will allow the employee to obtain debt forgiveness for these loans.
For such a large and costly program, the precise eligibility criteria are crucial. The statutory definition of a “public service job” is very broad and specifically lists numerous categories of public service, and is in some ways ambiguous. The Department of Education (DOE) in 2008 issued regulations regarding PSLF program employment eligibility, but those regulations have serious deficiencies. First, the regulations improperly define a public service job in a manner that is inconsistent with the statute by imposing a “public service organization” employer requirement that is not in the statute. This requirement works to disqualify some statutorily-listed forms of public service employment from debt forgiveness eligibility, in particular public services employment provided on behalf of for-profit businesses or certain non-profit employers, and also improperly allows eligibility for debt forgiveness for some employees of private non-profit employers who are not employed to provide a qualifying public service. Second, the regulations fail to clarify vague statutory language regarding what constitutes “public” service, most importantly regarding the scope of “public interest law services.”
The DOE has also recently rescinded several previously granted certifications of employment as qualifying on the basis of a newly imposed restrictive “primary purpose of the employer” requirement that is not in the governing statute nor in the DOE regulations, actions that have been challenged in court by the American Bar Association. Even if this restriction is upheld, which appears unlikely, there is a strong argument that the DOE should be estopped from rescinding prior certifications.
In order to avoid unnecessary litigation once the expected large number of applications for debt forgiveness begin to be filed in 2018 and afterwards, I recommend that the DOE first seek Congressional action to clarify the contours of the PSLF program’s employment eligibility statute. Further, while awaiting such action, the DOE should rescind its public service organization eligibility requirement which is inconsistent with the statute, clarify that there is no primary purpose of the employer requirement, and provide much more detailed guidance regarding the contours of the various statutorily-specified forms of qualifying public service, especially public interest law service. If PSLF program employment eligibility is to be either narrowed or expanded, this should be done through appropriate legislation, and not through unauthorized and covert DOE actions
Doctors on the Take: Aligning Tort Law to Address Drug Company Payments to Prescribers
Get PDFThe pharmaceutical and medical device industries aggressively market their wares to health care professionals, and the giving of gifts has become a central feature of this process. Most observers regard financial incentives tied to the use of specific therapeutic products as ethically impermissible, and various institutions have tried combating inappropriate gifts and payments to physicians: medical and industry groups adopted voluntary codes, federal agencies published advisory guidelines, and, most recently, state and federal legislatures enacted reporting laws. Self-regulation, threats of prosecution, and transparency initiatives have tempered the practice, but manufacturers continue to find clever ways of purchasing the loyalty of prescribers. Fairly minor modifications in tort doctrine might help to discourage such payments. Courts could include potential conflicts of interest as material information that health care professionals must reveal when securing consent from their patients, but expanding the duties of drug and device manufacturers to convey warnings directly to patients offers a more promising way to curb gift giving. The prospect of having to communicate complex risk information to laypersons might make companies think twice before lavishing gifts and payments on physicians, which in turn would help to ensure that those “learned intermediaries” continue to serve the best interests of their patients
Wilfrid J. Waluchow: el positivismo incluyente y el constitucionalismo del “árbol vivo” [Wilfrid J. Waluchow: Inclusive Legal Positivism and the Understanding of Constitutionalism in \u3cem\u3eThe Living Three\u3c/em\u3e]
Get PDFEste artículo presenta los dos temas centrales de la filosofía del derecho de Wilfrid J. Waluchow –el positivismo incluyente y el constitucionalismo del “árbol vivo”– con una exposición crítica de sus principales tesis, los contextos en los que surgen y las principales objeciones y desaf íos a los que aún deben responder.
[This paper addresses the two main Wilfred J. Waluchow’s research interests on philosophy of law, namely Inclusive Legal Positivism and the Constitutionalism presented in The Living Tree. The author provides us with a critical exposition of Waluchow’s main theses and a proper background where Waluchow’s philosophy is set, as well the main objections and challenges that his philosophy has to be responsive for.
Failed Charity: Taking State Tax Benefits into Account for Purposes of the Charitable Deduction
Get PDFThe Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) substantially limited the ability of individuals to deduct state and local taxes (SALT) on their federal income tax returns. Some states are advancing schemes to allow taxpayers a state tax credit for contributions to a charity controlled by the state. The issue is whether state tax benefits are deductible as a charitable contribution for purposes of the federal income tax. Under a general rule of prior law—the full deduction rule—state tax benefits were ignored for purposes of the charitable deduction. If the full deduction rule is applied to the state workaround schemes, then the SALT limitation can successfully be avoided. This Article explains that after the TCJA, the legal basis for the full deduction rule is undermined. The IRS articulated the full deduction rule given the longstanding baseline of deductible state tax payments. Thus, to allow a charitable deduction for state tax benefits under prior law was simply to allow a deduction for an otherwise deductible expense. After the TCJA, this symmetry with the SALT deduction is gone and the full deduction rule is of questionable applicability. A charitable deduction for state tax benefits would allow taxpayers to deduct amounts not spent and even to profit from charitable transfers. The charitable deduction is intended to encourage giving, not tax avoidance. Thus, the Treasury Department and the courts should apply a longstanding principle of charitable contribution law that measures a contribution by the amount of taxpayer sacrifice. After the TCJA, a contribution should be reduced by the value of state tax benefits, whether the benefits take the form of a credit or a deduction. The reasoning applies both to state workaround credits (and deductions) and to existing state tax benefits that previously have been deducted as charitable. Further, denying a charitable deduction for previously deductible expenses is in fact consistent with the status quo prior to the TCJA, in that, given the loss of a SALT deduction, the charitable deduction was an offset that did not provide a meaningful benefit to taxpayers
