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CMSI Translations #19: Lessons and Thoughts from the Struggle for Command of the Sea in the Red Sea
Full text linkSince mid-November 2023 to the present Houthi armed forces in Yemen have continued to hijack and attack vessels in the Red Sea that use Israeli ports or engage in trade with Israel to oppose Israel\u27s military operations in Gaza and disrupt military assistance to Israel from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries. As of April 1, 2024, over 86 vessels related to the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and other countries have been attacked. The Houthis continue to maintain control over the Red Sea, forcing vessels from these countries to risk damage and loss of life while navigating through the area. The crisis in the Red Sea is worsening.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-translations/1018/thumbnail.jp
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems in Warfighting at Sea
Full text linkMuch of the debate surrounding the military use of artificial intelligence (AI) tends to focus on lethal autonomous weapons systems. Those are systems that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further human intervention; sometimes pejoratively called “killer robots.” Moreover, debates often focus on their use and risks in land warfare. This land-warfare focus tends to invoke questions about the systems’ ability to distinguish between combatants and civilians on urban battlefields and the potential for mistakes. Legal debates about the lawfulness of AI and lethal autonomous weapons systems in warfare similarly tend to focus on land warfare and thus the law of armed conflict as it applies specifically to that setting.
Centering legal debates primarily on lethal autonomous weapons systems in land warfare, however, risks overlooking important nuances in naval warfare and its governing law, the law of naval warfare. Naval warfare and the law of naval warfare differ in substantial ways from their land analogs. These differences may make naval warfare and the law of naval warfare more accommodating of AI and autonomous systems and mitigate some of the risks and concerns arising in debates about their use in land warfare. This article explores some of those nuances and differences in the law of naval warfare and how they can be conducive to AI and autonomous systems
CMSI Translations #20: Spring Breeze Accompanies Us As We Strive Forward
Full text linkStories of a Northern Theater Command Navy coastal defense missile regiment doing a good job educating and managing new recruits in the spring enlistment period by closely aligning with human sentiment.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-translations/1019/thumbnail.jp
China Maritime Report #48: Great Inspectations: PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Operations in the Taiwan Strait
Full text linkMain Findings People’s Republic of China (PRC) law enforcement operations function as forms of cognitive and legal warfare. They represent a clear effort to undermine international maritime law as well as Taiwan’s sovereignty. The PRC asserts that the Taiwan Strait comprises multiple “zones,” to include “internal waters, territorial sea, [the] contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone.” While China does not explicitly claim that the waters of the Taiwan Strait wholly constitute PRC sovereign territory, it clearly implies that it has the self-defined right to exercise distinct forms of control over different zones of the Strait. While stressing that China “respects the lawful rights of other countries in relevant waters,” the PRC exploits the absence of the term “international waters” in UNCLOS to assert non-existent sovereignty rights over the Taiwan Strait. China is using its Maritime Traffic Safety Law and Coast Guard Law to illegally enforce expansive maritime jurisdictional claims in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and beyond. The overzealous execution of “law enforcement” operations in the waters surrounding Taiwan’s outlying islands represents an effort to signal that the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration is incapable of conducing effective patrols. It also reinforces the narrative that the PRC possesses legal jurisdiction over waters within the First Island Chain, thereby undermining the lawful rights of Taiwan and neighboring states. The PRC very likely believes that employing China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) assets to implement a sea-based quarantine would remain below the threshold of conflict, effectively mitigating the risk of escalation and preventing third-party intervention. As joint MSA and CCG operations grow in scope, scale, and complexity, China is gradually exercising the skills necessary to seize one of Taiwan’s outlying islands and potentially seek to force Taiwan leaders to the negotiating table. Under China’s revised maritime law enforcement legal framework, leaders in Beijing could authorize the establishment of exclusion zones to prevent foreign vessels from entering into and operating in PRC-claimed waters, as well as board and inspect ships within the exclusion zone. China could also potentially attempt to divert ships to regional PRC ports for customs inspection and clearance. Beijing furthermore could authorize the use of “all necessary means”—to include the use of force—to implement its quarantine and counter perceived threats to its national security and sovereignty. A PRC decision to implement a quarantine, rather than a full military blockade, would force the United States and its key allies and partners to decide how to react effectively while themselves also mitigating the risk of substantial military escalation. Response options could comprise targeted sanctions or military escorts for commercial vessels carrying critical supplies.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1048/thumbnail.jp
Episode 1: Friction and Flow – Comparing and Contrasting Clausewitz’ and Sun Tzu’s Theories of War
No full textGuests Vanya Bellinger and Andrew Dex Wilson join host Brendan Neagle to compare and contrast the foundational theorists of war: Clausewitz and Sun Tzu.
Guests:
Andrew R. Wilson is the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies. Professor Wilson has lectured at military colleges and civilian universities across the United States and around the world. The author of a number of books and articles on Chinese military history, Chinese sea power and Sun Tzu\u27s “The Art of War,” he is presently at work on “The Acme of Skill: Strategic Theory from Antiquity to the Information Age.” Professor Wilson is also featured on “The Great Courses,” with lecture series including “The Art of War”; “Masters of War: History’s Greatest Strategic Thinkers”; and “Understanding Imperial China: Dynasties, Life and Culture.”
Vanya Eftimova Bellinger earned a Ph.D. in history at King’s College, London. Bellinger is the author of Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman Behind the Making of On War (Oxford University Press USA, 2015). She is the winner of the 2016 Society for Military History Moncado Prize for her article, “The Other Clausewitz: Findings from the Newly Discovered Correspondence between Marie and Carl von Clausewitz.” Bellinger is the first scholar to work with the newly discovered correspondence between the Clausewitz couple. Before transitioning to academia, Bellinger worked as a journalist and international correspondent for various European outlets.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/strategy-matters/1000/thumbnail.jp
Episode 7: WWII in Europe: Between Political Visions and Operational Realities
No full textIn episode seven, Admiral (ret.) Lars Saunes and Dr. Michelle Paranzino discuss how the outcome of the Second World War shaped the politics and security in Europe. This episode complements the Second World War case study within the Strategy and War course. It also addresses one of the primary themes in the study of war: the strategic implications of military operations. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union fought as allies, but they also had different visions for the world after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Their leaders, the so-called ‘Big Three,’ Franklin D Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, also had to consider operational and logistical challenges when seeking to fulfill them. Admiral Saunes and Dr Paranzino consider alternative scenarios for military operations on the continent and why they were not taken. Finally, the guests highlight that although understanding the agreement the Allies achieved at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 can help us grasp Vladimir Putin’s logic, it is not a good guide for achieving peace in Ukraine or navigating current security challenges.
The opinions expressed on this podcast represent the views of the presenters and do not reflect the official position of the Department of Defense, The US Navy, or US Naval War College.
Guests:
Rear Admiral (ret.) Lars Saunes was born in Alesund, Norway. He retired from the Navy from the position as Chief of Royal Norwegian Navy August 2017 and is now CNO Distinguished international fellow at the USNWC. He is a Submariner by trade and has held different command position on Kobben and Ula class submarines. He has been the commander of the Norwegian task group, Chief Naval operations at joint HQ, Commander submarine operating authority, Commandant and commander of the Norwegian Coast guard as well as Chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy. He has served as the head naval section of the Norwegian defense high command/join and the Norwegian defense research Institute.
Michelle Paranzino, earned her Ph.D. at the University of Texas at Austin, where she studied U.S. foreign policy, Soviet history and Cold War Latin America. She has published numerous articles and book chapters and is the author of The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War: A Short History with Documents (Cambridge: Hackett, 2018). She grew up in Los Angeles, earning her B.A. in history at UC Santa Cruz and an M.A. in history at Cal State Northridge. She has held fellowships at the Kennan Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College and is currently working on a book about the war on drugs.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/strategy-matters/1006/thumbnail.jp
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Remarks at the 2025 Military Law and Operations Conference
Full text linkAdmiral Samuel J. Paparo, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Remarks at the Military Law and Operations Conference, September 8, 202
CMSI Translations #23: The Elusive Deep-Sea Beast : Analysis of the Performance of the Main Equipment of the U.S. Navy Virginia-Class Nuclear Attack Submarine
Full text linkIn the vast expanse of the blue ocean, the U.S. Navy\u27s Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine, with its exceptional performance and advanced technology, has become the backbone of the U.S. Navy\u27s undersea force in the 21st century. As one of America’s most modern nuclear attack submarines, the Virginia-class leads the global development of nuclear submarine technology with its multifunctional and multi-purpose design, exceptional stealth, and powerful combat capabilities.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-translations/1022/thumbnail.jp
Iran and Its Proxies: Attribution and State Responsibility
No full textIran has invested heavily in proxy militias since the regime\u27s founding in 1979. In the decades that followed, groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi\u27a militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen have projected Iran\u27s influence across the region. Today, Iran\u27s proxy network is considerably weakened due to Israel\u27s military actions following October 7, 2023, and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Yet the Houthis\u27 attacks on Israel and against Red Sea shipping demonstrate how Iran\u27s support to these groups continues to facilitate their conduct in violation of international law. This article examines Iran\u27s potential responsibility for acts on the part of its proxies that violate its international legal obligations. It assesses first the grounds on which the proxies\u27 acts could be attributable to Iran before addressing Iran\u27s potential responsibility for aiding and assisting its proxies\u27 harmful conduct. Finally, the article considers Iran\u27s potential breach of primary norms of international law, such as the prohibition on the use of force, through its support to the proxy groups. The analysis highlights the varied relationships between Iran and its proxies and the difficulties that arise when seeking to hold Iran to account. Many of the proxy groups act with a degree of independence that precludes the attribution of their conduct to Iran. Other States might therefore be better served by calling Tehran out for its violation of primary norms of international law, including Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions