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Wooden Collision Head 1905 Jan 7 (3 of 3)
No full textReport from Albert Gleaves, Inspector of Ordnance at NTS, regarding an experiment of A wooden collision head. The torpedo with the wooden collision head is shown on the pier at the Torpedo Station.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/torpedo/1038/thumbnail.jp
Bliss-Leavitt torpedoes, 1905 Apr 7 (6 of 6)
No full textReport and photographs of the Bliss-Leavitt torpedoes at the Station, with descriptions of testing done. The photos show the damage of test fires.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/torpedo/1052/thumbnail.jp
Inspection Stamp, 1907 Jan 30 (1 of 2)
No full textMemo from the Inspector of Ordnance at E.W. Bliss Co. In Brooklyn to the Bureau of Ordnance regarding stamps in use for the Bliss-Leavitt 21-inch torpedoes.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/torpedo/1065/thumbnail.jp
Letter from Port Moresby
Get PDFAs the world shifts away from the global war on terrorism toward renewed great-power rivalry, areas previously considered strategically peripheral offer the United States and its allies both opportunity and challenge. Papua New Guinea (PNG), with its strategic location in the southwest Pacific, is poised to play a role in this new “Great Game.
Review Essay—Adaptation and the School of War: Mars Adapting: Military Change during War
Get PDFRetired Marine officer and National Defense University research fellow Frank Hoffman’s Mars Adapting is, first and foremost, a work of military theory. Hoffman initially achieved notoriety for his work and briefs about something he characterized as hybrid or compound warfare, since popularized alongside the rise in interest in gray-zone conflict. This book’s major contribution is similarly theoretical, but in the area of institutional learning, not modalities of war. Hoffman argues “for greater consideration of Organizational Learning Theory [OLT] to establish an analytical framework.
The Legal Requirement for Command and the Future of Autonomous Military Platforms
Get PDFTechnologically advanced armed forces extensively use platforms that can be controlled remotely and do not require an on-board crew. Increasingly, these systems have the capacity to function with some degree of autonomy. The use of autonomous functionality is not specifically prohibited or regulated by the law of armed conflict but the use of autonomous functions in military systems remains governed by the general principles and rules of international law.
One existing international law concept may constrain the use of autonomous capabilities in military vessels and aircraft. This is the notion that military units must be “under the command” of an appropriate person. In this article, we set out to investigate whether the command requirement places limitations on autonomous devices. We use the methodology on treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Our analysis shows that the ordinary meaning of the expression in question has been understood by militaries in a variety of ways and that the context in which the expression originally appears, and the object and purpose of the relevant instruments, do not provide conclusive answers. Accordingly, we also turn to the drafting history of the relevant provisions and examine subsequent State practice. This investigation supports the view that the command requirement does not necessitate direct oversight by a commander for every decision made, but rather requires asking whether the system is fulfilling the intent of the commander
How the Weak Can Beat the Strong in War at Sea
Get PDFModern asymmetric naval technologies have not erased the effects of geography. As fortress fleets evolved from dominating harbors to dominating near-sea expanses, weaker naval powers continued to blend the land with the sea to overcome their relative weakness. In response, the stronger naval power must stand ready to win command of the sea through an equally blended strategy
Mission Command in the Age of Sail
Get PDFThis article develops an analytical framework for mission command; proposes the full age of sail as an area for current military officers to mine for relevant lessons; and examines, through the mission-command lens, a case study from that era, involving a dispute between the British naval and land-force commanders in the Caribbean during the Hundred Days of Napoléon Bonaparte
