10170 research outputs found
Sort by
Earth’s First Line of Defense: Establishing Celestial Body-Based Planetary Defense Systems
Get PDFThis article discusses legal issues related to the establishment and use of celestial body-based planetary defense systems (CBPDS). It first finds that the application of current international space law to analyze the lawfulness of CBPDS can lead to many ambiguities. Accordingly, this article proposes a new construction of Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty to balance the need to develop celestial body-based planetary defense capacities and the risk of militarization of outer space. According to this article’s approach, neither the “exclusively for peaceful purposes” clause nor the clause prohibiting “military bases, installations and fortifications” on the moon and other celestial bodies prohibit the establishment of CBPDS per se, provided that a State does not employ its armed forces to manage and operate its CBPDS and does not intend to use them for any aggressive purposes. However, a State can only use its CBPDS to test slow push/pull planetary defense techniques and cannot test impulsive techniques through CBPDS. Moreover, a State cannot rely on the peaceful exploration exemption in the last sentence of Article IV of the OST to bypass any of these restrictions
China Maritime Report No. 25: More Chinese Ferry Tales: China\u27s Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021-2022
Get PDFThis report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities from October 2021 through September 2022. As of 2022, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are still probably unable to provide significant amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, large volume lift exercises conducted in 2022 suggest that the PLA has made significant progress in the use of civilian vessels for the large-scale lift of PLA troops and equipment into undefended ports, a capability that may be leveraged in a military assault on Taiwan. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities not previously observed, including the use of civilian vessels and infrastructure to conceal PLA troop movements, operations from austere ports, use of ocean-going vessels to transport PLA forces along inland waterways, and logistics support for China’s South China Sea outposts.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1024/thumbnail.jp
Malware, a Device Under the 1988 SUA Convention
Get PDFIn 1988 the International Maritime Organization modernized international law in response to a vexing problem of the time—maritime terrorism. Before then, not all violent crimes against vessels amounted to piracy and therefore many maritime criminals escaped justice. To close this gap and facilitate the prosecution of those who endanger navigation, IMO member States enacted the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. More than three decades later, the 1988 SUA Convention may be useful to address a more modern problem—cyberattacks against commercial vessels. The 1988 treaty prohibits various acts against shipping, including the placement of a device on a ship when likely to cause damage that could endanger the ship’s navigation. This article explores whether this specific prohibition extends into the digital domain. It looks at the existing international regulatory framework meant to mitigate cyber threats and examines whether State parties of SUA may prosecute maritime malware cases that happen to breach the international regulatory framework. The article concludes that malware qualifies as a device under the treaty and advocates for the 166 State parties to incorporate SUA prosecutions into their maritime cyberattack response plans
Building Capacity in the Law of the Sea: The IMO International Maritime Law Institute’s Experience
Get PDFAlthough the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not make any express reference to capacity-building, scientific and technological development is a centerpiece of the Convention. In 1982, UNCLOS established a comprehensive legal framework for ocean-related activities with a latent and inexorable link to capacity-building through the transfer of technology, scientific and technical assistance, knowledge sharing, and cooperation and collaboration. Building capacity in the law of the sea enables States to benefit from the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans and seas and their resources. In the absence of expertise to incorporate and effectively implement international obligations under the Convention into domestic legislation, the International Maritime Organization\u27s (IMO) International Maritime Law Institute (IMLI) was established in 1988 under an agreement concluded between the IMO and the Government of Malta. This international training institution has been assisting governments, particularly those of developing countries, in building up both their human and institutional capacities for the uniform and effective implementation of international maritime law and the general law of the sea for the last three decades
Episode 27: Insurgent Groups of South Asia
No full textIn this episode Jon O\u27Gorman interviews Dr. Kolby Hanson about his field work interviewing insurgents in South Asia such as the Tamil tigers of Sri Lanka and Nagaland in India. We discuss the concept of the Maoist insurgent playbook and if these groups follow a Maoist model. Additionally, we talk about how governments in the region managed dealing with these groups and why there has been such different methods by different governments depending on the groups\u27 ethno-religious leanings. We then move into talking about how many of the governments have approached war termination or offering a cease-fire with these groups and what happens to the insurgency afterward. We end with Kolby\u27s general observations about the people who join the groups and his time at USNWC.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/profiles-in-strategy/1026/thumbnail.jp
Bringing Women to the Helm of Strategic Plans and Operations in the U.S. Navy
Get PDFUnderstanding the application of strategic planning, adapting problem-solving skills to get at the operational challenges of America’s navy, bridging the civil-military divide, and enhancing international security cooperation is a gender-ignorant process. Leadership in these essential missions, leadership at the helm of the U.S. Navy, belongs to the self-assured, the professional, the impassioned. To be successful in this as a woman - as in most career fields - takes stamina. The headwinds can, at times, be overpowering. But the sworn duty of the nearly 150,000 women in navy service today is to support and defend the constitution of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic – and headwinds and unfavorable tides will be a part of a daily effort to fulfill that oath. To surmount those challenges, women must be confident in their knowledge of the subject matter, their ability to strengthen navy operations, and their unique problem-solving and communications skills. Accomplishment comes from putting one’s life’s energy into a chosen path. In the U.S. Navy, that means being consistent and being determined and taking the helm.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/wps/1016/thumbnail.jp
Smart Balancers Kill Many Birds with Few Stones—Sino-Russian Security Cooperation in the Maritime Domain
Get PDFMinimizing the costs and risks of balancing is crucial for a coalition facing stronger opponents—such as China and Russia facing the United States and its partners. The motives of Sino-Russian security cooperation should be understood within the context of a full spectrum of balancing strategies in international relations and the relatively lower risk of escalation in the maritime domain