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“Unwilling or Unable”
Get PDFCritics of the unwilling or unable doctrine suggest that it could undermine the United Nations collective security system and argue that it requires an unacceptable ceding of a State’s territorial sovereignty. Increased reliance on the doctrine following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, particularly in relation to the use of force against ISIL in Syria since 2014, has caused the doctrine to face significant scrutiny. The purpose of this article is to ascertain whether the unwilling or unable doctrine has reached customary international law status. If found to be the case, the doctrine would confirm the right of States to act in self-defense when an extraterritorial armed attack cannot be attributed to a State, and where the territorial State is not willing or able to address the threat posed by the non-State actor. The article concludes that there is sufficient relevant State practice and opinio juris sive necessitates to conclude that the doctrine has reached customary international law status. It finds that while controversy regarding its application remains, the basic desire of States to protect themselves is such that continued reliance upon the doctrine is inevitable
Episode 5: Wagner - The Rise and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Group
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Guests Dr. Colin Clarke and Raphael Parens join host Col. Dave Brown and co-host Dr. Christopher Faulkner to discuss the Wagner Group’s rise and fall, as well as what’s happened to the group since the death of its leader in August 2023. Private military companies (PMCs) have been around for decades, but Russia’s use of these private military entities has become an increasingly prominent feature of its overall foreign policy, and the Kremlin has made extensive use of them across the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Ukraine. One of the most well-known of these PMCs in security circles is the infamous “Wagner Group,” which burst on the international scene in 2014, but became increasingly visible after Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
Articles: Wagner Group: Where Are They Now?, C. Clarke, C. Faulkner & R. Parens, FPRI, 29 Nov 23 Commentary: “Who Thinks Wins”: How Smarter U.S. Counterterrorism in the Sahel Can Pay Dividends for Great Power Competition, C. Faulkner, R. Parens & M. Plichta, CTC Sentinel, Apr 23 – Vol 16 – Issue 4 How Russia’s Wagner Group Is Fueling Terrorism in Africa, C. Clarke, Foreign Policy, Jan 25. After Prigozhin: The Future of the Wagner Model in Africa, C. Faulkner, R. Parens & M. Plichta, CTC Sentinel, Sept 23 – Vol 16 – Issue 9 Mercenary Shocks: What the War in Ukraine Will Eventually Mean for Africa., R. Parens, WOTR, 17 Feb 23 Niger’s Pivot to Moscow: What’s Next for US Engagement in Africa?, R. Parens, C. Faulkner & M. Plichta, FPRI, 5 Apr The West Needs to Prepare for the ‘Next Wagner’ in Africa, C. Faulkner, R. Parens & M. Plichta, WPR, 20 Jul 23
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Guests:
Colin P. Clarke, Ph.D., Director of Research and Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Group (TSG), an intelligence and security consulting firm based in New York City. He is also an Associate Fellow at the International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) - The Hague, and a non-resident Senior Fellow in the Program on National Security at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Prior to joining TSG, Clarke was a professor in the Institute for Politics and Strategy at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh, PA and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He appears in the media frequently to discuss global security, conflict, and terrorism, and is the author of several books, including After the Caliphate: The Islamic State and the Future Terrorist Diaspora.
Raphael Parens, Fellow in FPRI’s Eurasia Program and an international security researcher focused on Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. He specializes in African security, paramilitary groups, and Eurasian security. Raphael has been published in Foreign Affairs, West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel magazine, War on the Rocks, and FPRI. His work was recently published in a French-language anthology, Les défis sécuritaires en Afrique. He has been cited in the U.S. Congressional Testimony, and he has been interviewed for a variety of pieces on the Wagner Group.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/the-trident/1004/thumbnail.jp
China Maritime Report No. 39: A Hundred Men Wielding One Gun - Life, Duty, and Cultural Practices Aboard PLAN Submarines
Get PDFSubmarine performance is not just measured in technical terms, but also in how crews operate over time. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly deploys its submarine force beyond the near seas on long-distance combat readiness and training missions, studying the force’s human components benefits a broader understanding its overall effectiveness. This report explores work and living conditions, crew endurance, service culture, political requirements, and approaches to resolving human issues in the submarine force. An inherently dangerous and challenging profession, the submarine force has gradually developed numerous solutions to address various challenges to prevent non-combat attrition among crews. Life and duty in the “Dragon Palace,” both an internal joke and the overarching embodiment of PLAN submarine culture, reveals a professional community focused on secrecy, safety, and expertise that is working to enhance its human performance.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1039/thumbnail.jp
Analogous Response Redux: Vladimir Putin’s Aspirations for Altering the Maritime Balance
Get PDFAnalogous Response was a term of analytical shorthand that American strategists and intelligence analysts developed in late 1983 and early 1984. The term characterized in two words a Soviet maritime strategy of deploying off the U.S. coast submarines armed with nuclear SLCMs. By making that deployment, the Soviet leadership could establish an endo-atmospheric nuclear threat to the continental United States (CONUS) that Marshal Nikolay V. Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR, described as follows: “The Soviet systems to be deployed in the oceans and seas and relevant to the territory of the United States itself will be no less effective than American systems that are being deployed in Europe, in range, yield, accuracy, and, what is especially important, in time of flight to their targets.”https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1046/thumbnail.jp
Collective Attribution in Cyberspace: A Rebranded Version of Attribution Does Not Make It More Effective
Get PDFThe international community has been unsuccessful in establishing an effective legal framework for holding States accountable for cyber wrongdoing. Instead, official political attribution—collectively denouncing States for irresponsible conduct in cyberspace—has become a common substitute to encourage compliance with voluntary non-binding international norms. Since December 2017, the United States and United Kingdom, along with their closest allies, have embraced and implemented collective attributions and responses. They thereby seek to shape “rules of the road” for responsible State behavior in cyberspace and to enhance accountability and deterrence. However, these attributions rely primarily on the outcomes of American and British attribution processes that may not be perceived as sufficiently legitimate or credible. A review of the limited number of collective attributions announced as of January 1, 2024, barely reaching fourteen, suggests their effectiveness is limited. The analysis of these collective attributions raises critical issues and lessons, which the United States and the United Kingdom, as the driving force of this strategy, must consider, along with their partners in the “Five Eyes.” They should reevaluate their strategy and its effectiveness and conclude that a shift from official national attribution to collective multinational attribution would be more effective than a superficial change of brands
CMSI Note #7: PLA Navy Reserve: Out of the Shadows and into the Forefront?
Get PDFAs a part China’s goal to build a fully modernized military by 2035, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is improving its reserve forces through increased defense spending, critical policy changes, and organizational restructuring. Reserve forces (后备力量) encompass the PLA Reserve (预备役部队) and paramilitary forces, such as the militia, which fall under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and can be mobilized by the National Defense Mobilization Department to support combat. The many components that make up China’s fighting force such as active-duty PLA forces, China Coast Guard, and the militia have been studied in depth; however, the PLA Reserve remains an understudied and underreported topic. While the PLA Reserve represents a fraction of the force structure of their active-duty counterparts, recent changes in military reform specific to the PLA Reserve highlight the importance of this relatively small force and the evolving role reservists (预备役人员) may play within the PLA.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1006/thumbnail.jp
China Maritime Report No. 40: Onboard Political Control - The Ship Political Commissar in Chinese Merchant Shipping
Get PDFSince the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship political commissar system is currently undergoing a revitalization in staterun shipping companies. The position has supporting roles to play in carrying out national tasking such as evacuations of overseas Chinese citizens. Most ship political commissars are former PLA officers. Chinese roll-on/roll-off ferry operators constitute a special case where the ship political commissar may have greater authority in the ship hierarchy and potentially a role in supporting PLA use of those vessels. This report focuses on the ship political commissar system over the last 20 years, providing a needed update on this understudied topic in the English-language literature.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/1040/thumbnail.jp
CMSI Translations #5: Strengthen National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force Construction
Get PDFThe report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party proposed strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction. In the face of the Era\u27s requirements for strengthening the country and the military, the serious situation of national security, and the real existence of the risk of war, we must place the construction of national defense mobilization and reserve forces in a more important strategic position, and strive to promote the high-quality development of national defense mobilization and reserve force construction from a new starting point.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-translations/1004/thumbnail.jp
CMSI Note #9: On the PLAN\u27s Core Operational Capabilities
Get PDFKey Takeaways: The PLAN is prioritizing the development of what it calls “four core operational capabilities.” These capabilities include 1) integrated near seas operations, 2) far seas mobile operations, 3) strategic deterrence and counterstrike, and 4) amphibious warfare. Analysis of Chinese writings suggest the focus of these efforts is on prevailing in a high-end conflict involving the U.S. military. The PLAN seeks the ability to dominate the near seas, strike U.S. bases and sea lines of communication in waters east of the first island chain and in the Indian Ocean, achieve “reliable, credible, and effective” deterrence against the U.S. through SSBN patrols within and beyond the first island chain, and execute sophisticated multi-domain amphibious operations against U.S. allies and partners.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-notes/1008/thumbnail.jp