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The Waiting Is the Hardest Part: The Constitutionality of Firearm Waiting Periods
No full textThis Article examines the constitutionality of firearm waiting period laws through the lens of the Supreme Court’s evolving Second Amendment jurisprudence. Although such laws are frequently defended as prudent public safety measures, their validity turns not on legislative purpose but on constitutional principle, particularly as framed in District of Columbia v. Heller and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.
Under those decisions, the scope of the Second Amendment is determined not by judicial balancing of contemporary interests, but by reference to the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Article surveys that tradition and finds no meaningful analogue to modern waiting period laws in the Founding Era or during Reconstruction. Rather, the historical record reflects an understanding of the right to keep and bear arms as encompassing immediate and unencumbered possession by lawful citizens.
The Article addresses and ultimately rejects two primary categories of historical analogues offered in support of waiting periods: regulations involving temporary disarmament (such as those applied to intoxicated individuals), and early licensing or registration schemes. In both instances, the Article demonstrates that the analogies are either inapposite or rooted in practices that lack constitutional legitimacy.
It further contends that the Second Amendment necessarily protects the acquisition of firearms as a logical predicate to their possession. Drawing upon First Amendment doctrine, the Article analogizes to those cases recognizing the right to access books, newspapers, or information as essential to the exercise of free speech.
While public safety remains a legitimate and important governmental objective, constitutional rights do not yield to broad legislative generalizations or modern policy intuitions. Where the Constitution secures an individual right, and the government fails to demonstrate a consistent and representative historical tradition to justify its regulation, the right must prevail.
This Article concludes that mandatory waiting periods impose a categorical burden on the exercise of the Second Amendment without sufficient historical foundation, and are therefore constitutionally infirm under the standard articulated in Bruen
Internet Search Engines’ Privacy Violations and the Lack of Federal Regulation to Protect Consumers Rights
No full textThe United States’ current legal framework regarding internet search engines is disadvantageous to consumers. Federal privacy laws (although not encompassing search engines) grant businesses a strong legal basis in privacy claims and alibies for arbitrary behavior; these laws favor businesses over consumers. Moreover, state privacy laws empower nonspecific agencies to oversee privacy matters and enforce consumers’ rights. Thus, the U.S. privacy legal framework is in need of a new federal law that establishes consumers’ rights, as well as a federal agency dedicated solely to privacy matters. This Article proposes a federal law recommendation based on the standards of the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation. This Article advocates for a federal law to solve all the issues that exist in this field, such as the lack of federal regulation contemplating consumers’ privacy rights and establishing boundaries for businesses’ behavior towards consumers. It also argues that the possible limitations of this federal law—such as government surveillance or influence and First Amendment limitations—demonstrate the need for federal regulation
BIG WORDS, QUESTIONABLE LEGALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO RESTRICTING BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP
No full textThis article analyzes the nuances of Trump\u27s Day One executive order restricting the grant of birthright citizenship only to children whose parents possess either a green card or U.S. citizenship. The article discusses the constitutional impediments to this executive order, as well as prior caselaw and academic articles, positing that the executive order stands on rather shaky ground constitutionally
