8227 research outputs found
Sort by
MFW Framework Requires Majority-of-Minority Stockholder Approval Even When Controller Structures Transaction to Avoid Statutory Stockholder Vote
Get PDF
Chancery Court Considers Whether Either Party to Failed Multibillion Dollar Merger Was Entitled to Payment of a Fixed Termination Fee
Get PDF
Chancery Court Declined to Apply Blasius Compelling Justification Standard in Sustaining Board\u27s Rejection of Opposition Slate under Commonplace Advance Notice Bylaw
Get PDF
Rethinking Swing Voters
Get PDFIn recent decades, swing voters in courts and legislatures have made many of the United States’ most important decisions of law and policy. It would be easy to conclude from the recent history of the Supreme Court and Congress that democracy or majority rule inevitably entails placing many of a society’s most important decisions in the hands of swing voters. Far from being inevitable, however, swing voters result from a highly contingent set of circumstances, both ideological and institutional.
This Article probes these contingencies, describing and evaluating swing voters and the power they hold. It first explains the conditions under which swing voters will exist and wield power, including an account of why swing voters hold greater power than other pivotal voters. Understanding swing voters requires understanding institutional design and internal procedures: some arrangements increase swing voter prevalence and power, while others have the opposite effect. The ways in which rules construct swing voters give institutional designers and reformers ample tools at their disposal to increase or decrease the prevalence of swing voters and the extent of their power. But nearly any judgment about swing voters and the power they exercise necessarily rests on thorny empirical and normative issues—including the relative importance of moderation and stability in different institutions, the performance of swing voters as compared to other voters, and how swing voter power interacts with principles of majority rule. Swing voters are therefore best understood not as ends unto themselves, but as windows into broader issues in democratic theory and institutional design
Advisory Opinions and the Problem of Legal Authority
Get PDFThe prohibition against advisory opinions is fundamental to our understanding of federal judicial power, but we have misunderstood its origins. Discussions of the doctrine begin not with a constitutional text or even a court case, but a letter in which the Jay Court rejected President Washington’s request for legal advice. Courts and scholars have offered a variety of explanations for the Jay Court’s behavior. But they all depict the earliest Justices as responding to uniquely American concerns about advisory opinions.
This Article offers a different explanation. Drawing on previously untapped archival sources, it shows that judges throughout the anglophone world—not only in the United States but also in England and British India— became opposed to advisory opinions in the second half of the eighteenth century. The death of advisory opinions was a global phenomenon, rooted in a period of anxiety about common-law authority.
Early modern English judges had routinely advised the Crown. This advisory role was politically fraught but doctrinally unproblematic thanks to a jurisprudential orthodoxy that treated judges’ opinions as evidence of a preexisting common law. Although this declaratory theory survived into the nineteenth century (and beyond), it began to fragment after 1750, as lawyers began to disagree about the nature of precedent. Those disagreements generated new pressure to clarify the weight of different kinds of legal authority. Most lawyers intuited that advisory opinions were less authoritative than decisions arising from litigation. But because bench and bar lacked a common theory of legal authority, they were unable to articulate a shared understanding of what respect was due to judges’ extrajudicial pronouncements. As a result, advisory opinions became dangerous, because the judges who issued them could not control how future readers might treat them. In response, judges sought to limit their advisory activity—first in England, then in British-controlled Bengal, and finally in the United States, whose judges inherited Britain’s contested and dynamic understanding of the judicial role
Data Autonomy
Get PDFIn recent years, “data privacy” has vaulted to the forefront of public attention. Scholars, policymakers, and the media have, nearly in unison, decried the lack of data privacy in the modern world. In response, they have put forth various proposals to remedy the situation, from the imposition of fiduciary obligations on technology platforms to the creation of rights to be forgotten for individuals. All these proposals, however, share one essential assumption: we must raise greater protective barriers around data. As a scholar of corporate finance and a scholar of corporate law, respectively, we find this assumption problematic. Data, after all, is simply information, and information can be used for beneficial purposes as well as harmful ones. Just as it can be used to discriminate and to embarrass, information can be used to empower and to improve. And while data privacy is often pitched at ending unauthorized data sharing, it all too often leads simply to the end of data sharing, period. This comes at a cost. Data silos can inhibit consumer choice, protect the positions of powerful incumbents, and reduce the efficiency of markets. The best example of these costs comes from the financial industry. For more than a century, banks and other financial institutions have built their information technology systems to keep financial records as private and nonshareable as possible. While security concerns can be a primary reason for such closed systems, banks also understand that financial data is an advantage that can protect them from market entry and competition. Banks can hold up consumers with unfavorable rates and inferior products as a result, and a set of market failures make it difficult for consumers to opt out. First, information asymmetries between consumers and financial institutions are large and difficult to resolve. Second, search and switch costs—the difficulty of finding out more information about the risks and benefits of financial products and of switching to a better financial service—are high in the financial industry. Finally, individuals struggle to take advantage of even simple financial strategies to save, borrow, and invest. Data sharing can help resolve these problems. The emergence of a new regulatory and technological framework called “open banking” raises the possibility of consumers being able to task trusted intermediaries with automatically analyzing their financial data, nudging them to achieve their goals, and switching them to better products, all in order to reduce the substantial inefficiencies in their financial lives. There is one problem, however. A combination of market failure and regulatory ambiguity has led to a situation in which data is limited, siloed, and inaccessible, thereby preventing individuals from using their data in efficient ways. Ultimately, this Article contends, resolving these problems will require us to replace the clarion call of “data privacy” with a new, more comprehensive concept, that of “data autonomy”—the ability of individuals to have control over their data. Data autonomy balances the need for data to be protected and secure with the need for it to be accessible and shareable. In this Article, we lay out a set of key principles that grant individuals a legal right to data autonomy, including a right of ownership over data, as well as obligations on institutions to safely share standardized and interoperable data with third parties that consumers so choose. Perhaps counterintuitively, the only way of expanding consumer welfare and protection today is by breaking down the barriers of data privacy