St. Mary's University, Texas
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Defining Violence on the Blackboard: An Overview of the Texas Education Code's Approach to Teen Dating Violence (Comment)
No full textTexas has taken a pioneering step by creating § 37.0831 of the Texas Education Code (the Teen Dating Violence statute) requiring Texas school districts to implement a dating violence policy in their schools. However, as this Comment will show, the current language of the Texas statute is unassertive and fails to provide school districts with sufficient direction for constructing and implementing an effective dating violence policy. Part II of this Comment outlines the various legal remedies teens in Texas have to protect themselves from dating violence, explains why these legal remedies are insufficient, and argues why the Texas Education Code has the potential to be a more adequate remedy. Part III explores the requirements set forth in the Teen Dating Violence statute, explains the importance of school districts satisfying each requirement, and recommends specific statutory revisions to provide school districts with more direction in satisfying the requirement. I conclude by providing a suggested amended version of the Teen Dating Violence statute designed to guide the Texas legislature and other State governments in creating a statute that is more explanatory and, thus, a more effective weapon against teen dating violence
The Anticipation Misconception
No full textThis article examines both the work product doctrine’s historical and philosophical roots to determine whether the “anticipation of litigation” requirement should be a bar to protection of “core” work product from discovery. Part II examines the current state of the work product doctrine through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and case law and compares the doctrine with the attorney-client privilege. Part II concludes by demonstrating how “core” work product can be discovered despite the protection of these two doctrines. Part III examines the Hickman v. Taylor case within its historical context, starting with the enactment of the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and concluding with an analysis of the Court’s decision itself. Part IV discusses the subsequent interpretations of Hickman v. Taylor, and how the “anticipation of litigation” requirement, or anticipation misconception, got its start through, of all things, a student note in the Harvard Law Review. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of Rule 26(b) as it currently exists. Finally, Part V examines the “anticipation of litigation” requirement in light of this historical development and proposes that the requirement is unjustified historically, philosophically and as a matter of policy. Part V, therefore, proposes that, with regard to core work product, a new exception be established, or rather recognition that an old exception continues to exist
