St. Mary's University, Texas
St. Mary's University, San Antonio: St. Mary's Law Digital RepositoryNot a member yet
1503 research outputs found
Sort by
A Law and Economics Analysis of the Duty of Utmost Good Faith (Uberrimae Fidei) in Marine Insurance Law for Protection and Indemnity Clubs
No full textWhen Fantasy Becomes Reality: Attempts to Regulate the Highly Unregulated Daily Fantasy Sports Industry
No full text
Am I a “Licensed Liar”?: An Exploration into the Ethic of Honesty in Lawyering . . . and a Reply of “No!” to the Stranger in the La Fiesta Lounge
No full textAfter hearing for the first time the lawyer-disparaging phrase, “licensed liar,” the author investigated its significance. This article presents the question of those two words’ meaning and explains how the author reached the conclusion that, as applied to attorneys, the phrase is an unmerited epithet.
The phrase is known and utilized in nonlegal texts in fields such as fiction, poetry, literary criticism, and journalism, but the two words are absent from legal texts. The author’s discovery of the phrase in various criticisms of lawyers in other publications illuminates and confirms that the phrase constitutes the pejorative allegation that an attorney will engage in prevarication for clients in exchange for compensation.
In tracing the history of the question of lawyer honesty, this Article shows honesty to be a persistent ethical obligation. When the essence of the phrase, a supposed willingness to speak untruths with deceptive intent for a fee, is compared to not only the persistently stated ethic of honesty in the practice of law, but also the reality of professional discipline that can result from violations, the phrase is seen to be an unjustified epithet
A Constitutional Amendment Allowing Broader Campaign-Finance Reform Would Not Criminalize Political Satire
No full textAgreements to Alter the Limitation Period Imposed by U.C.C. Section 2-725: Some Overlooked Complications
No full textUniform Commercial Code Section 2-725 sets forth the Statute of Limitations that is applicable to U.C.C. Article 2 sale-of-goods transactions. There is a fairly extensive body of literature that analyzes the numerous problems and litigation that this poorly drafted provision has created. However, such commentary overlooks several ambiguities presented by Section 2-725(1) with regard to agreements to depart from the provision’s four-year limitation period default rule. This brief article will attempt to resolve these ambiguities.
Starting from the conventional premise that a statute’s ambiguities should be interpreted so as to maximize the contractual freedom of the parties that are subject to that statute, absent compelling reasons otherwise, Section 2-725(1) should be interpreted to give effect not only to those agreements that impose symmetrical limitation periods within the permitted statutory range, but also to asymmetric agreements that impose different limitation periods upon the various parties to a contract, so long as all of the limitation periods fall within the statutorily permitted one-year to four-year range. Second, symmetrical agreements that establish a limitation period that lies outside of this permitted statutory range, and asymmetric agreements that impose one or more limitation periods that lie outside of that range, while clearly unenforceable under Section 2-725(1), should nevertheless be regarded as providing clear evidence of the parties’ joint intent—and should therefore be given effect to the extent that the provision permits