LARC Cardoso Law (Yeshida Univ)
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The Challenge of Legal Citation Systems
Get PDFMastering legal citation means understanding multiple citation systems. In addition to the Bluebook, fifty states produce fifty sets of laws, and each state decides how it wants its own materials to be cited. For case law, the Bluebook advises authors to use the West Reporter citations if available, but to add public domain citations if a state uses them. However, a state’s internal rules may require citation to the official state reports. All this creates a maze of rules that practitioners need to follow. Legal citation presents difficulties for law students that law librarians and instructors need to appreciate, so they can find the best ways to address them
Panel III: The Future: Waves of Change and Areas of Promise: Technology and AI
No full textModerated by Robyn Weinstein, this panel brings together Giuseppe De Palo, Felix Steffek, Noam Ebner, and Colin Rule to explore the realities, expectations, and concerns surrounding the use of technology in Alternative Dispute Resolution. From efficiency gains to ethical dilemmas, the speakers will examine both the potential advantages and the challenges of continuing to integrate technology into conflict resolution processes
Consumer Litigant Finance and Legal Ethics: Empirical Observations From Texas
No full textA handful of states, including Texas, have Rules of Professional Responsibility which permit attorneys to provide cash advances to their own clients. In previous work, we suggested that if more states permitted law firms to offer this sort of funding to their clients it would increase competition within the consumer litigant funding market, to the benefit of consumers. We also hypothesized that relaxing these existing prohibitions would better enable tort claimants to decline low-ball settlement offers from defendants in one-off cases.
This Article offers some initial insights into these questions. It reports the findings of our modest empirical study involving semi-structured interviews with four established Texas plaintiffs’ firms, each of which represents a large number of mass-tort claimants as well as varying numbers of single-event claimants. We obtained confidential information on the circumstances, frequency, and financial terms under which these sophisticated and well capitalized firms provide cash advances to their clients. We also sought information on each firm’s views on third-party advances to their clients, including their willingness and ability to negotiate repayment haircuts with third-party funders on behalf of their clients.
We found great diversity among the four Texas firms in their approach to the opportunity provided by Texas Rule 1.08(d) to advance “reasonably necessary medical and living expenses” to their clients. Our findings suggest that clients are likely to benefit from – and are unlikely to be harmed by – a relaxation of the strict prohibition against attorney advances to their clients that exists in the vast majority of states and in ABA Model Rule 1.8(e)
A One-Egg Wonder: Working to Cure Judicial Gender Bias and Increase Access to Pre-Embryos for Infertile Parties
Get PDFThe first live birth of a child conceived from in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) happened in 1978. Today, over eight million children have been born through IVF procedures. The first dispute over the resulting pre-embryos was in 1990 when the Tennessee Supreme Court outlined a balancing approach with a presumption favoring non-use of the pre-embryos for courts to follow when resolving these matters. Numerous states have taken differing approaches—some have taken a contractual approach, others an approach requiring contemporaneous mutual consent before there can be a departure from the status quo, and very few state legislatures have directly addressed how to resolve disputes over pre-embryos. The balancing approach is the sole approach that addresses the issues of infertility among parties or when a party subsequently becomes infertile after creation of pre-embryos. However facially neutral the balancing approach may seem, there are inherent gender biases in its application. This Note advocates for ensuring that both parties are entitled to the same analytical starting point when the balancing approach is used in spite of a presumption for nonuse and for making the infertility exception into a working standard that courts would be more apt to apply by mitigating the damages suffered by the objecting party
A Distinct System for Presidential Succession on Inauguration Day: Getting the Most Out of Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment
Get PDFThe current presidential-succession statute uses the same line of succession for every conceivable situation. But there are many different types of potential succession scenarios. Succession need not—and should not—be governed by a one-size-fits-all approach.
Before the Twentieth Amendment was ratified in 1933, the Constitution authorized Congress to provide only for double vacancies during the term, when there already is a President and Vice President. Recognizing this gap, Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment empowered Congress to cover inauguration-day double vacancies: at the outset of a term, when nobody is available to become President or Vice President in the first place.
Significantly, Section 3 gives Congress much more flexibility for inauguration-day double vacancies than Article II allows for middle-of-the-term ones. But Congress has never fully embraced its Section 3 powers: When Congress wrote the current succession law in 1947, it chose a monolithic system that ignored the distinctive needs of inauguration-day succession and left Section 3’s flexibility unused. The time for Congress to make full use of its Section 3 powers is long overdue. Moreover, Section 3 has been largely neglected by scholars. The time for a full-length published treatment of Section 3 is overdue as well
\u3ci\u3eDobbs\u3c/i\u3e and Democracy
Get PDFIn Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Justice Alito justified the decision to overrule Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey with an appeal to democracy. He insisted that it was “time to heed the Constitution and return the issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives.” This invocation of democracy had undeniable rhetorical power: it allowed the Dobbs majority to lay waste to decades’ worth of precedent, while rebutting charges of judicial imperialism and purporting to restore the people’s voices. This Article interrogates Dobbs’s claim to vindicate principles of democracy, examining both the intellectual pedigree of this claim and its substantive vision of democracy.
In grounding its decision in democracy, the Dobbs majority relied on a well-worn but dubious narrative: that Roe, and later Casey, disrupted ongoing democratic deliberation on the abortion issue, wresting this contested question from the people and imposing the Court’s own will. The majority insisted that this critique had always attended Roe. However, in tracing the provenance of the democratic deliberation argument, this Article finds more complicated intellectual origins. In fact, the argument did not surface in Roe’s immediate aftermath, but rather emerged years later. And it did so not organically, but through a series of interconnected legal, movement, and political efforts designed to undermine and ultimately topple Roe and Casey. The product of these efforts, the Dobbs majority’s claim that democracy demanded overruling Roe and Casey, was deployed to overcome the force of stare decisis in Dobbs — and may ultimately reshape the scope and substance of the Court’s stare decisis analysis in future cases.
Having identified the intellectual origins of the democratic deliberation argument and its contemporary consequences, this Article examines the contours of the Dobbs majority’s vision of democratic deliberation. We show that although Dobbs trafficked in the rhetoric of democracy, its conception of democracy was both internally inconsistent and extraordinarily limited, even myopic. The opinion misapprehended the processes and institutions that are constitutive of democracy, focusing on state legislatures while overlooking a range of other federal, state, and local constitutional actors. As troublingly, it reflected a distorted understanding of political power and representation — one that makes political power reducible to voting, entirely overlooking metrics like representation in electoral office and in the ecosystem of campaign finance. The opinion was also willfully blind to the antidemocratic implications of its “history and tradition” interpretive method, which binds the recognition of constitutional rights to a past in which very few Americans were meaningful participants in the production of law and legal meaning. The deficits of the Dobbs majority’s conception of democracy appear even more pronounced when considered alongside the Court’s recent and active interventions to distort and disrupt the functioning of the electoral process. Indeed, Dobbs purported to “return” the abortion question to the people and to democratic deliberation at the precise moment when the Court’s own actions have ensured that the extant system is unlikely either to produce genuine deliberation or to yield widely desired outcomes.
Ultimately, a close examination of the Dobbs majority’s invocation of democracy suggests that the majority may have employed the values and vernacular of democracy as a means to a different end. As we explain, the majority’s embrace of democracy and democratic deliberation allowed it to shield its actions from claims of judicial activism and overreach. More profoundly, and perhaps paradoxically, the opinion may lay the groundwork for the eventual vindication and protection of particular minority interests — those of the fetus. With this in mind, the Dobbs majority’s settlement of the abortion question is unlikely to be a lasting one. Indeed, aspects of the opinion suggest that this settlement is merely a way station en route to a more permanent resolution — the recognition of fetal personhood and the total abolition of legal abortion in the United States
Real Estate Law Association Welcomes: Starr Associates
Get PDFhttps://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/flyers-2023-2024/1119/thumbnail.jp
Family Law Society Networking Night!
Get PDFhttps://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/flyers-2023-2024/1123/thumbnail.jp
